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Introduction 
Background to the research 
Research set-up 
Fieldwork: methodological approach, choices and constraints 
Outline of the book 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In times of conflict, rural livelihoods are affected in various ways: people lose access to their 
assets, options and networks. Aid agencies aim to assist conflict-affected people in re-
establishing themselves and their livelihoods during and after conflict ends. During 27 years 
of civil war (1975-2002), Angola was faced with grave humanitarian crises; massive 
displacement of its population, high levels of malnutrition and mortality, a collapse of social 
service delivery, high unemployment levels, and destruction of the country’s infrastructure. 
Humanitarian aid was made available to assist the crisis-affected population. The question is 
what role aid has really played in society, especially with reference to recovery of rural 
livelihoods?  
This thesis analyses how people’s livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid 
interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created for themselves in Huíla province, 
Angola. It is based on fieldwork in two municipalities in the province of Huíla into the 
livelihoods that emerged with or without the availability of different types of aid. The 
fieldwork in the villages enabled an understanding of the type of livelihoods that existed 
before, during and after conflict, and how people were able to adapt to changing and difficult 
circumstances. The role that aid played in the support or transformation of these livelihoods 
was investigated by following aid programs as well as analysing the discourses and practices 
of aid actors. 
This chapter discusses the background and rationales of the research, the research 
objectives and questions as well as an introduction to the theoretical pillars of this thesis. 
Also, the chapter presents the methods that I used for data collection, and gives an overview 
of the fieldwork period with a discussion of some of the difficulties encountered in the field.  
 
 
Background to the research 
 
Livelihoods are never static; they change over time by external influences and the choices 
that people make (Scoones 2009). Aid interventions that have the aim to assist livelihoods 
can sometimes have unexpected outcomes. The interface between these two dynamic systems 
can have such consequences that actually make it more difficult for people to secure the 
assets and activities that make up their livelihoods. During my fieldwork in the village of 
Nonguelengue I encountered such an example in which people’s livelihoods were negatively 
affected by external interventions. This small village lies in the southern municipality of 
Chibia, and consists of a group of 120 people of the Khoi-San ethnicity. The village only 
exists since May 2007 when the Ministry of Social Assistance and Re-integration (MINARS) 
took the group of 120 people from an area nearby and placed them in Nonguelengue. The 
population had until that time practiced small-scale agriculture, sometimes worked fields of 
neighbouring farmers, and mostly deployed hunting and gathering activities. The official 
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rationale of MINARS behind the relocation was to improve the families’ living standard, 
make aid delivery more effective, and ensure a livelihood of crop production that was 
deemed more sustainable than hunting and gathering.  Underneath these official claims, other 
hidden objectives seemed to have played a role. A MINARS official told me: 
I find that both the Khoi-San as well as the Nyanekas
1
 live very traditional lives. Such 
a traditional lifestyle is not sustainable or wanted in this time of globalization. This is 
why MINARS is trying to offer them alternative lifestyles. This often fails because of 
their unwillingness to change traditions. MINARS is mostly offering agriculturally-
based projects as alternatives to a hunter-gatherer lifestyle.  
 
The Government of Angola (GoA) forced these people to abandon their traditional lifestyle, 
under the pretext of offering them assistance towards an alternative and more sustainable way 
of life. 
Since the GoA’s relocation of this group of Khoi-San in 2007, the people in the 
village have become completely dependent on food aid. Seeds and tools were handed out 
soon after the relocation and building of the village had started, yet land hadn’t become 
legally available and/or prepared. Access to water was also problematic, only possible at a 
borehole of a neighbouring large landowner. Consequently, the seeds and tools that had been 
handed out in 2007 were already eaten or sold by the time of the fieldwork from May to 
August of 2008. Next to the food aid distributions that were becoming increasingly erratic, 
due to the inability of MINARS to ensure regular transport to Nonguelengue, people were 
seeking other strategies to secure food and cash. For example, most women in the village 
were weaving baskets and selling them to neighbouring villagers. Men still went hunting for 
some small wild animals in the area, as well as collecting honey. Both men and women 
worked on the field of their Nynaneka neighbours, for which they often received 
compensation in the form of maize or alcohol instead of cash. People continued pursuing the 
strategies that had enabled their survival before, but the conditions in their new environment 
were insufficient to rely on completely. The health situation in the village had deteriorated 
and a United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) nutrition assessment amongst the children 
of the village in August 2008 revealed malnutrition rates of 71%.  A newspaper article of 
September 2010 revealed that the government was still handing out food and clothes items to 
the Khoi-San population, and that the process to assist the Khoi-San towards a agro-
pastoralist lifestyle to replace hunting and gathering was moving very slowly due to people’s 
resistance to changing livelihood practices, despite handing out agricultural tools and inputs. 
2
 
 The experience in Nonguelengue follows the surprising move of the Angolan state to 
relocate a group of people in peacetime, and in doing so making them dependant on food aid. 
At the same time, it uncovers some of the core issues of this research. First of all, instead of 
supporting the populations existing livelihoods, they have actually disconnected them from 
their former livelihood options. It is important for livelihood interventions to build on 
existing practices in order for them to be relatively successful. In the case of Nonguelengue 
an ‘alien’ livelihood was promised but not delivered as the necessary conditions (water and 
land) were not in place. At the same time people’s traditional ways of life were obstructed. 
Also, no further follow up took place except for food aid distributions. Secondly, it showed 
the fragility of rural livelihoods six years after peace was signed, in contrast with Angola’s 
economy that is said to have recovered remarkably well, mostly due to the oil export 
revenues. As in most of the villages where the fieldwork took place, aid interventions 
                                                 
1
 Predominant ethnic group in the Chibia area that mainly practice pastoralism. 
2
 http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt_pt/noticias/sociedade/2010/8/37/Administracao-municipal-assegura-
apoio-comunidade-San-Chibia,9b23e766-caf8-499b-b3bd-d2c22d10c148.html 19-09-2010 
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focusing on rural livelihoods followed a uniform pattern of handing out seeds and tools, often 
without needs assessments, follow up, or understanding of the different livelihoods that 
people pursued. Aid interventions, however well intended, can have very unexpected and 
negative outcomes. As in the case of Nonguelengue the village was left with malnutrition 
levels reminiscent of wartime, even after relocation, food aid, and seeds and tools 
interventions. Hence, people in the village continued pursuing the livelihood strategies that 
had helped them survive the war in the first place. This thesis will show how people’s 
livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the conditions and 
strategies that people have created for themselves. 
 
 
Rationales and relevance of the research 
There are a number of reasons why this research is relevant. Humanitarian agencies have 
seen their area of work increasingly move from basic relief to more development oriented 
projects and programmes (Hilhorst 2007). And by incorporating this developmental 
orientation agencies have made interventions that impacted livelihoods significantly, 
although evaluation practices have not always been adapted accordingly. “Taken as a whole, 
the humanitarian system is poor at measuring or analysing impact, and the introduction of 
results-based management in headquarters has yet to feed through into improved analysis of 
impact in the field” (Hofman et al. 2004, 2). Academic analyses of especially the unintended 
consequences of humanitarian aid in relation to livelihoods first addressed the phenomenon 
that aid can contribute to and prolong war and conflict, increases migration to food aid 
centres and how food aid distributions leads to competition with local farmers resulting in 
low market prices (de Waal 1989, Hofman et al. 2004). Increasingly more comprehensive 
meta-evaluations and joint evaluations of the impact of humanitarian aid interventions on 
livelihoods and livelihood practices on a broader scale have been undertaken
3
 (Beck and 
Buchanan-Smith 2008). One example of such a comprehensive and joint evaluation of an 
unprecedented humanitarian response to disaster has been the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 
(TEC) evaluation report of 2006 after the 2004 Tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia.
4
 The TEC 
specifically targeted six different thematic areas for a cross cutting country and agency wide 
evaluation, one of which focused on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 
(LRRD) with reference to livelihood recovery as part of the humanitarian response. The 
research at the heart of this thesis distinguishes itself from these earlier research programmes 
and evaluations by the examination of the long history and range of different aid 
interventions, and its consequences, both intended and unintended, on livelihoods. The 
analysis starts from the life worlds and experiences of people and their own efforts to rebuild 
their livelihoods, to understand how aid supports those efforts.   
People living in prolonged crisis situations continue to find ways of making a living 
and sustaining themselves and their families. There is also normality in crisis: “Although 
economies may largely collapse during war, people hold on to normality as much as they can 
and continue planting their fields and trading their products” (Hilhorst 2007, 8). Although 
violence, chaos and displacement can affect their lives significantly, they also cope and adapt 
their livelihoods to new circumstances. In this thesis the concept of a livelihood is understood 
                                                 
3
 One of the most prominent research  institutions that carry out meta-evaluations, amongst others on 
humanitarian aid and livelihoods is the Feinstein International Center of Tufts University. 
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center 
4
 The TEC was hosted by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP), a forum for learning which was founded following a recommendation from one of the first 
humanitarian sector-wide evaluations after the 1994 Rwanda genocide. 
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as those assets, activities and access to these that determine a persons or households means of 
living (Ellis 2000a). In the process of securing and rebuilding livelihoods especially in a post-
conflict setting, aid actors implement interventions that can have long-lasting and sometimes 
unintended outcomes on people’s own efforts of restoring their livelihood activities. This 
research investigated the way conflict and aid have impacted on the assets and activities that 
comprise many rural livelihoods of people in Huíla province, Angola.  
Humanitarian agencies and development agencies increasingly encroach upon each 
other’s working terrains (Hilhorst 2007). The debates on Linking Relief Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD), have attempted to bridge humanitarian and development approaches, 
including livelihoods recovery, by creating space within relief programs to enter into 
rehabilitation and development activities (Christoplos 2006). Although the LRRD approaches 
have gained momentum among humanitarian agencies, experiences that were recorded from 
the relief effort after the Tsunami of 2004 in Asia on livelihood recovery programmes 
showed some fundamental differences and flaws in the way agencies deal with LRRD 
(Christoplos 2006). As the Tsunami relief effort had access to an unprecedented amount of  
funding for relief and recovery activities, available budget and finances weren’t major 
constraints to effective implementation of LRRD as many had argued was the case before 
(Christoplos 2006). The debates on LRRD also uncover some of the major differences in the 
way humanitarian and development organisations approach the issue of livelihood recovery. 
Christoplos stated that “humanitarian livelihoods programming is usually fundamentally 
different from the kinds of interventions that would be chosen in development efforts. This is 
a central issue in LRRD since developmental approaches could be expected to emanate from 
the livelihood strategies of the affected populations themselves, whereas humanitarian 
approaches tend to reflect what aid agencies think the target group should be doing” 
(Christoplos 2006, 29). This reflects a thought pattern in which it is considered that in 
emergencies there are little strategies to build on, and where interventions are not necessarily 
informed on existing needs. In practice this all too often means that the formulation and 
implementation of aid programmes is based more on what organizations can offer and 
manage. Ensuing interventions that follow this line of thinking can create unintended 
outcomes on livelihoods by its mismatch with practice.   
This PhD research is part of a larger research programme investigating the history, 
principles and practices of humanitarian aid in Angola. The idea for this programme was born 
from the realization that aid actors in the Angolan context have played significant roles in the 
ordering and reordering of Angolan society. The research programme studies the 
“humanitarian complex through studying the everyday practices of policy and decision 
making and by following programmes at the interfaces of intervention” (Hilhorst 2005, 1). 
The value of studying humanitarian aid through everyday practices and at the interface of 
intervention is that it allows for a more thorough understanding of how aid is actually shaped 
and gains meaning in local realities through everyday interaction of social actors (Hilhorst 
2007, 10). The research program which investigates local institutions, livelihoods and aid in 
conflict enables a comprehensive and extended case study of humanitarian aid in Angola and 
its consequences from a historical perspective. 
My interest in the influence of aid interventions on livelihoods, especially in war and 
post-conflict situations, was further triggered by a chapter by Utas (2005) in the book entitled 
“No Peace, No War” (Richards 2005) on skills training for young ex-combatants in rural 
Liberia by the Belgium Red Cross. He describes how these ex-combatants received training 
to become mechanics, and electricians when there were already some unemployed mechanics 
and no electricity system in the area. His research with these rural young men in Liberia 
uncovered the unexpected result of increased migration to urban areas after the skills training 
ended. The aim of the aid programme had however been exactly the opposite; to assist the 
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social reintegration process of these young men back in rural Liberian society. This example 
triggered my interest in how livelihood approaches are perceived and incorporated by 
organisations that are considered to be humanitarian, and therefore more equipped to 
providing aid that is life-saving. Livelihood approaches are considered as more long-term 
development interventions that are not so easily reconcilable with the more restricted or 
narrow mandates of humanitarian organisations, yet there is an increasing move towards 
integrating these approaches in the humanitarian sphere, especially under the LRRD 
discourse. 
The scientific relevance of the research lies in furthering the discussion on how people 
deal with crisis and what role aid plays in assisting their recovery processes. This research 
investigated how aid and livelihoods feed into each other over a longer period of time, 
especially in the particular political context of Angola. Furthermore the research also has 
policy relevance for organisations that engage in humanitarian as well as development issues 
as it shows the longer-term impact and consequences of their work in these contexts, and the 
challenges of applying LRRD in practice.  
 
 
Introducing the fieldwork area 
Angola has seen nearly 40 years of conflict, starting from a struggle for independence from 
Portugal, to a civil war between the government-led Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The 
Cold War significantly impacted the conflict through interference by the former Soviet 
Union, Cuba, USA and South Africa (Vines 2000). Peace accords were reached in 1991 and 
1994, but did not lead to sustainable peace. Rather, in the post-Cold War period one of the 
most violent and destructive stages of conflict in Angola commenced, which ended in 2002 
with the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Conflict in Angola has most often been 
portrayed as a struggle over control of Angola’s oil and diamond reserves exacerbated by a 
combination of factors such as ethnicity, the heritage left by colonialism, and the influence of 
external parties during the Cold War which shaped the different stages of conflict (Hodges 
2004). Revenues from oil and diamonds certainly contributed to the long duration of war in 
Angola, as both parties found means to finance their military operations, but they cannot in 
itself explain causes, courses and local complexities and experiences of war. The years of 
conflict were marked by ‘no peace, no war’ contexts, where peaceful periods were alternated 
by periods of active conflict, and this differed throughout the country. The war created 
massive population movement, where at some point an estimated 4 million people were 
displaced, much of the infrastructure was destroyed and service delivery from the state came 
to a near standstill (Sogge 2006, Birkeland 2002, Christoplos 1998). Warfare directly 
impacted people’s lives and livelihoods, as battles took place in both rural and urban areas. 
Markets collapsed, industries were abandoned or destroyed, and agricultural production 
became increasingly difficult as the result of violent attacks, the placing of mines, and 
constrained access to assets and important institutions. Peace was achieved in 2002 after the 
death of Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA. By that time the social, economic and institutional 
fabric of rural society was severely affected, parts of the country’s infrastructure had been 
destroyed, and economic inequality reached unprecedented levels. In 2001, 68% of Angola’s 
population lived below the official poverty line of $1.70 a day, whereas the richest 10% of 
the population received 42% of the national income in the same year (Sogge 2006). At the 
same time Angola’s formal economy grew rapidly since the end of the war, reaching a 9.7 % 
growth in the period 2002-2004 primarily due to its oil exports. Reconstruction programmes 
of the government since 2002 have focused mostly on urban areas and the rebuilding of 
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infrastructure. Provision of post-conflict reconstruction in the rural areas has often been left at 
the hands of aid organisations.  
The long awaited peace in 2002 created more space for (international) humanitarian 
agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to implement aid programmes aimed 
at the reconstruction of Angola. The international aid organisations that were in Angola 
during the conflict were divided across the country along warring party-lines, with UN 
agencies in MPLA territory and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in UNITA controlled areas (Richardson 2000). Most of 
these agencies started their work in Angola at the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s, 
and often stayed for prolonged periods of time. Humanitarian agencies continued their 
programmes after 2002, but changing their activities from basic relief to resettlement, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. This continued until 2007, when specifically Huíla province 
saw a massive exodus and closure of both national and international agencies, many of whom 
had been implementing aid programmes in Angola for many years. Their work has so far not 
been taken over by development agencies and the state, leaving a gap in the implementation 
of the idea of linking relief and rehabilitation to development.  
The reasons to situate this research in Angola were primarily because the country had 
seen 27 years of civil war which created a grave humanitarian situation. The conflict in 
Angola saw different phases with varying ideologies and intensities in violence, which also 
influenced the extent of the role that humanitarian agencies played in assisting the affected 
population, as well as the assumptions and conditions for aid. Assistance was given by 
different types of aid actors (humanitarian, development, national/international, church-
based, state, military, etc.) which made a variety of interventions where and when the 
political and security situation would allow. Also, due to the inaccessibility of the country 
during so many years of war, compounded by the difficulty of obtaining a visa to enter the 
country, let alone a research permit, the amount of academic research that has been done in 
Angola had been very limited. 
Zooming in on the different possible locations in Angola, the choice was made to 
implement this research in the province of Huíla, located in the south western part of the 
country. One important reason for choosing this location was the fact that the provincial 
capital, Lubango, had been a relatively safe and stable base for a high number of diverse aid 
agencies that had been operational in Angola. Lubango had served as an important location 
from where aid supplies arriving at the port of neighbouring province Namibe could more 
easily be distributed to the other southern provinces of Cuando Cubango, Cunene and 
Namibe.  These circumstances were conducive to choose Huíla province for a comparative 
analysis between the different NGOs present, their strategies and projects. This province also 
had the second largest group of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returned refugees, 
some areas had been severely affected by the conflict and it was battling with land issues and 
conflicts at the time of the fieldwork.  
 
 
Research set-up 
 
This section discusses the objectives and research questions that are at the core of this 
research. Also, I introduce the theoretical pillars underlying this thesis. 
 
 
Objectives and research questions 
The objective of this research is to analyse how people’s livelihoods are affected during 
crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created. Conflict and 
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natural disasters profoundly affect livelihoods in many ways, and force people to make far-
reaching decisions about the future of their livelihoods. Next to the direct effects of crisis and 
people’s decision-making processes to cope with these effects on their livelihoods, aid 
interventions are implemented that aim to further shape livelihood options. This research 
aimed to uncover which livelihood interventions humanitarian agencies have implemented in 
the past and continue to do in the post-war period, on what analyses and approaches these 
interventions are based, and to see how these approaches and other interventions are 
responded to by aid beneficiaries. The purpose of this analysis is to create a better 
understanding of the way in which people survive during crisis, which choices they have and 
make in terms of their livelihoods, and which intended and unintended outcomes aid 
interventions have on the livelihood options of people. This does not imply that the research 
consisted of an evaluation of the impact of organisations’ interventions but rather focused on 
defining factors that have influenced people’s livelihood strategies.  
In the absence of state and development institutions, humanitarian agencies become 
crucial agents for addressing issues of livelihoods in war-affected areas. By helping people to 
re-establish themselves, wittingly or unwittingly agencies have impact beyond their activities 
for the social ordering and reordering of society. In a post-conflict situation, aid agencies 
have to adapt to the changing circumstance and organizational space and reformulate their 
positions, programs and practices accordingly. Investigating the changing organizational 
space can be done by studying the agencies’ discourses on issues such as participation and 
partnerships. This research has analysed some of these changing organisational discourses 
and the manner in which they were translated into practice.  
Aid interventions are conceptualised as social interfaces, where the programmes with 
their mandates, objectives and styles of intervention encounter the life worlds of local people 
with their own differentiated situations and aspirations (Hilhorst 2005). One of the problems 
in situations of (post) conflict is that livelihood programmes implicitly aim to restore 
‘normal’ development. With conflict since 1961, the majority of Angolans has no experience 
with peace and there is thus no ‘normality’ to fall back on. This is especially relevant when 
related to LRRD debates in which the assumption is that livelihood programmes serve as a 
natural bridge from food aid and food security interventions to reaching sustainable 
development, or ‘normality’. 
The starting point of this thesis is that aid, no matter its intentions, always affects the 
livelihood conditions of local people. This resulted in the following central research question: 
 
How are people’s livelihoods affected in times of crisis, and how do aid interventions 
influence the livelihood options that people have in Huíla province, Angola?  
 
This main research question was divided into the following sub-questions: 
 What are people’s past and current livelihoods and how have they been affected and 
influenced by crisis? 
 How have different aid interventions influenced and transformed the livelihood 
options that people have nowadays? 
 How do agencies with different mandates analyse and organize their interventions and 
how does the livelihood approach fit into the everyday practice of humanitarian 
agencies? 
 What have been people’s responses to aid interventions? 
  
These questions are the result of adaptation during fieldwork of the initial questions raised in 
the research proposal. The adaptation was necessary to incorporate important and interesting 
issues arising in the fieldwork context. The major changes have been that the research 
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became less aid-centred and gained a stronger focus on reconstruction processes.  
A first focus on aid interventions changed to incorporate the ways in which people 
themselves re-establish their lives and livelihoods and if and how aid plays a role in the 
outcomes of these livelihoods. People re-established themselves already in various ways 
before the first aid agencies appear. Also, many people who had never received aid, 
continued their livelihood activities next to the people that had. It was precisely the way in 
which aid interventions interface with people’s livelihood strategies that became the focal 
point of this research.  
At the start of the research, a separate question on labelling was included, to 
understand how distinctions made between different client groups contributed towards 
perceptions of communities and identity, but also how the different aid organisations 
(humanitarian or developmental, local or international, principled or not) were perceived by 
the client groups. This last aspect of labelling however, was difficult to approach in fieldwork 
practice. People did not see a difference between development and humanitarian aid, also 
because in the Portuguese language, such distinction is used only amongst the relevant 
institutions, not something people use or distinguish on an everyday basis.  
An issue that became very important throughout the fieldwork was the notion of a 
society being in transition, which influenced the context, institutions and type of aid 
interventions that were developed after the war ended in 2002. Often, during interviews 
people were not able to say that the situation they found themselves in was that of an 
emergency, or rather a stable context, yet they kept on referring to Angolan society as being 
in transition, with an occasional step backwards or forwards. The idea of society being in 
transition, the aid and state agencies’ response to this connecting to debates on LRRD policy 
and practice, became an additional focal point in this research, in which much of the collected 
data has been framed. 
 
 
An introduction to the theoretical framework 
Here I want to introduce the main theoretical pillars of this research. The conceptual 
framework is elaborated in the next chapter. This research is grounded in the actor-oriented 
approach developed by Norman Long, in which issues of development are approached 
through the notion of agency that people and institutions have in acting and fostering change 
in their surroundings (Long 1989b, Hebinck et al. 2001). Actors and their agency are central 
in understanding how planned development and social change follows from negotiation 
between social actors rather than from external and linear models to development (Long 
1989b, Long 1992). Actors are not passive recipients of interventions, but active brokers in 
the development and change processes bringing their own knowledge, power and interests to 
the table (Long 1992).  Following from this actor orientation to development this research has 
included social interface analysis as a method to investigate aid interventions as processes of 
negotiation amongst a variety of actors, instead of an external event. The social interface was 
conceptualized as: “a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social 
systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon 
differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found” (Long 1989b, 
2). By viewing interventions as an interface where differences in power and knowledge are 
made visible, it serves to understand how outcomes of aid interventions are shaped in 
negotiation amongst the various actors (Long 2004).   
 In this thesis, humanitarian aid is considered as assistance which is given to alleviate 
human suffering, and is supposedly needs-based and void of any political motivation 
(Hilhorst 2007). In contrast, development aid focuses on long-term processes of achieving 
social equity and economic modernisation (Smillie 1998, Duffield 2000). In practice the two 
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approaches have increasingly become intertwined. A translation of an actor-oriented 
approach towards the humanitarian domain is made by applying the concept of the 
humanitarian arena (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). The concept of a humanitarian arena 
emphasizes the multitude of other actors (state, churches, the military and people themselves) 
beside humanitarian organisations alone that shape the outcomes of aid. Furthermore, it 
stresses the importance of an empirical approach to aid, incorporating the everyday realities 
and politics that tend to be neglected when using the normative framework of principled aid 
alone (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010).   
 In this thesis a livelihood is conceptualized, following the definition provided by Ellis 
(2000a, 10): A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social 
capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) 
that together determine the living gained by the individual or household”. Livelihoods change 
over time, influenced by different circumstances and choices. During a protracted crisis, as in 
the case of Angola’s civil war, the activities, the assets, and access are put under pressure to 
adapt, when institutions change or stop functioning all together, basic services are halted, and 
displacement occurs. On-farm and non-farm livelihood diversification offer rural people a 
way to divert livelihood risks brought about by conflicts and disaster, yet options for 
diversification are constrained in times of crisis. Assistance to livelihoods is one of the main 
pillars in LRRD policy and practice. Relief is supposed to provide ‘a springboard to 
recovery’, after which development aid can reduce people’s vulnerability to future shocks 
(Harmer and Macrae 2004). With LRRD, the relief mandates are stretched, which puts 
different demands on humanitarian organisations when it comes to organizational capacity 
and approaches. An approach towards recovery and development requires increased linkages 
with state institutions, a more holistic view on the present socio-economic conditions, and 
providing inputs and services from which people can draw to sustain their ways of making a 
living.  
 
 
Fieldwork: methodological approach, choices and constraints 
 
This section will start with an explanation of how the areas of fieldwork were selected. Then 
it will elaborate on how the two PhD projects in this research program on Angola were 
complementary to each other in theme and fieldwork. This is followed by an overview of the 
main research methodology, and a discussion of the different methods that were used in this 
research, complemented with some examples of how they were used in practice. 
Furthermore, a discussion is included of some of the difficulties encountered in the field 
which impacted the course of the fieldwork. 
 
 
Selecting the fieldwork areas  
I started my fieldwork in Lubango, the capital of Huíla province, to establish contacts and 
conduct interviews with various organisations. These included the national and international 
NGOs, the UN organisations, state institutions, church organisations, and the local university. 
During these first three months I interviewed 21 staff of organisations in Lubango, and 
presented my research at an Action Against Hunger (ACF) seminar. With one of the 
organisations I visited the municipality Cacula, where part of their food security program was 
being implemented. I stayed there for one week to get an idea of rural reality in Angola and 
conduct some preliminary interviews with people living in villages in the area. The 
municipalities were selected during the first phase of the fieldwork in Angola, on the basis of 
data from interviews, reports, and some initial field visits. Initially the intention had been to 
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select three municipalities for case study comparison on the basis of the following 
distinctions: 1) a municipality that had received extensive aid and interventions that had 
specifically targeted people’s livelihoods, 2) a municipality that had only received relief aid, 
and 3) a municipality that had received no aid. But logistical and ensuing planning problems 
made this selection unfeasible. Hence, I was unable to conduct further fieldwork in the 
municipality of Chicomba (category 2), and instead focused on two municipalities: 
Caluquembe (category 1), and Chibia (category 3),  
A Vulnerability Assessment report of the UN (2001) with regards to the humanitarian 
situation in Huíla made a distinction between three different regions in the province on the 
basis of vulnerability to food insecurity. The three regions were referred to as Livelihood 
System 1, 2 and 3. Livelihood system 1 was considered to be a mixed farming environment 
with a well-developed access to markets, where food deficits only occasionally occurred. 
Livelihood System 2 was characterized by large scale cattle production and moderate food 
insecurity. Livelihood System 3 used to revolve around maize and livestock production, but 
as most livestock disappeared during the war the asset base on which people relied in times of 
crisis was considered to have diminished considerably, leaving the population in these areas 
highly vulnerable to food insecurity (UN 2001, 3). Decisions of UN organisations about the 
amount of humanitarian interventions and food assistance were made on the basis of this type 
of information. Under this framework my fieldwork in Caluquembe (in the north of the 
province, much conflict, and much aid) would fall under Livelihood System 2. My second 
selected municipality of Chibia fell under Livelihood System 1 (in the south of the province, 
little conflict, little aid), and the third municipality of Chicomba would follow Livelihood 
System 3 (northeast of province, much conflict, limited aid due to accessibility). 
Fieldwork in both Chibia and Caluquembe took place for several months in total, 
giving sufficient time to make a comparison between the local livelihood practices, and to 
assess how issues such as conflict, displacement, reconstruction efforts, and aid interventions 
had shaped the livelihood practices in six villages. I made comparisons amongst villages 
within the two municipalities. In each municipality I selected three villages that had different 
histories in terms of displacement and aid encounters. In Chibia, I selected three villages of 
different ethnic backgrounds, due to displacement. The comparison between these six very 
different villages made the case studies richer and more varied, strengthening the finding that 
uniform livelihood approaches are not always appropriate when the differences between the 
inhabitants also mean differences in experiences, skills, needs and aspirations when it comes 
to livelihood strategies. The comparison between the different localities highlighted some 
local specificities that contributed to changes in livelihoods. Certainly, issues like conflict, 
displacement and aid altered the availability of and access to assets in all the villages to 
different degrees. Moreover, livelihoods remain inspired by personal preference, skills, and 
experiences. Yet, from the comparative research amongst the villages a clear picture emerged 
of how the availability and type of aid interventions shaped the livelihoods in villages 
thoroughly. This is done by the choices the aid agencies make not only by making an item 
available for one and not for the other, but also by supporting certain livelihood activities and 
not others for instance.  
 
 
Two PhD projects, one province  
Humanitarian aid influences livelihoods, whether it is through direct interventions, or 
unintentionally through other actions. At the same time, aid is often channelled through local 
institutions in order to reach the beneficiaries, or at some instances agencies even take over 
social service delivery when local institutions have become too weakened by conflict and 
state collapse (Christoplos 1998). These two important aspects in which humanitarian aid 
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takes on a considerate role in rural societies by its influence on both livelihoods and 
institutions, have been captured in the research program through two PhD researches. 
Livelihoods and institutions are not separated, they are interconnected and influence each 
other. Although local institutions are affected by conflict institutional arrangements and 
processes of ordering continue (Hilhorst 2005). Livelihoods are mediated through these local 
institutions that surround them. Institutions can support and/or constrain people’s livelihood 
activities as it is in institutions that issues of power and access are played out, which in turn 
define the extent to which people can pursue certain livelihood strategies (Ellis 2000b, 
Scoones 2009). For instance, lack of access to institutions such as markets, and social service 
providers hampers the economic and technical advances that people can make with respect to 
their livelihoods (Dorward et al. 2003). Addressing livelihoods and institutions in two  
separate PhD projects enabled the researchers to emphasize, analyse and address their 
specificities, especially in relation to the interaction of aid with these two themes. The 
combination of the two PhD projects allowed for a comparison amongst four very different 
municipalities on different terrains, enabling an extensive study on Huíla province, covering 
both fundamental themes as well as geographically wide data collection.   
 
 
Methodology 
 
Historical ethnography 
How people’s livelihoods were affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shaped the 
livelihoods that people have created for themselves were mainly investigated by ethnography: 
participant observation in villages of local farmers, IDPs and ex-combatants, complemented 
with observations of the implementation of NGO programmes in the field at the level of 
intervention. Conducting ethnographic research has long been considered as something “you 
just go and do”, requiring little preparation in terms of research design (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1983). However, when considering the fieldwork, there has to be a prior 
conceptualization of the theoretical interests, issues, places, types of organisations, and 
especially the particular items in social life that will be of most importance in the research. 
Therefore, I designed the fieldwork in such a way that it gave me sufficient research focus, 
yet allowed me enough flexibility to follow more interesting leads that would emerge from 
the interviews and information during the actual data collection. As Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1983) point out, narrowing down the research problem often starts by exploring the 
secondary data to better define exactly those themes, places and periods that will be most 
interesting for ethnographic investigation.  
This research took an historical ethnography approach to analyse how people’s 
livelihoods were affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shaped the livelihoods that 
people created for themselves. According to Silverman and Gulliver (1992, 16) “A historical 
ethnography provides a description and analysis of a past era of the people of some particular, 
identifiable locality, using archival sources and, if relevant, local oral history”. Historical 
ethnography as a separate approach from ethnography seems to be an overstatement in the 
sense that ethnography cannot do without a historical approach to understand current practice 
in societies (Radcliffe-Brown 1951, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Researching a society’s 
history is indeed an integral part of ethnography and understanding of current social 
phenomenon and realities. Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) argue that historical ethnography 
should pay attention to the context, power and meaning of the situation that is analysed. 
Without taking those aspects into account it will remain just people’s stories. Historical 
events are analysed in order to understand how certain outcomes are shaped. Outside 
interventions change socio-economic structures in villages and societies sometimes 
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unwittingly, in a way that they become an integral part of history. In Angola’s context it 
might be hard to distinguish certain historical changes as there are many factors that have 
contributed to a changing society or practice: colonialism, war, displacement, aid 
interventions, national reconstruction programs, etc. In this research changes that occurred in 
people’s livelihoods, and the factors that contributed to those changes, are central. By using 
archival sources in the provincial capital and municipal administrations, organisational and 
employers’ discourses and experiences, and experiences and life histories of local people, this 
study attempted to unfold the histories of the two municipalities and its current inhabitants. 
Also, the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino archive in Lisbon revealed interesting 
documentation on the colonial history of Angola, and Huíla province in particular. I used 
some of the information collected in that archive for chapter 4 on colonial policies as well as 
for the chapters on Chibia and Caluquembe.  
One feature of my interviews and surveys was to ask what people’s livelihoods looked 
like in 1975, 1990 and now, to understand how they evolved over time and compare them to 
the start of the war (1975) and in the middle of the conflict period (1990). I would, for 
instance, ask what income-generating activities people had at that time compared to now, the 
difference in amount of land they had access to, if they had remittances from family members 
that had migrated, what type of crops they produced in comparison to now, and then compare 
this to the type and amount of aid they had received throughout these years. 
Villages and organisations were the units of observation in this research, with 
interface analysis as a main method to identify the linkages, networks, and struggles that exist 
between the inhabitants of the villages and staff of the aid organisations (Long 2001). The 
interface that Long (1989b, 2001) refers to is the symbolic space where planned development 
and social change is negotiated amongst social actors that all bring in their own meaning, 
negotiations, desires and needs into the process. Interface analysis deepens the understanding 
of aid interventions as transformational processes amongst actors, shaped through interaction 
(Hebinck et al. 2001). In this research interface analysis was used to uncover these processes 
of transformation during and after aid interventions.  
 
 
Methods  
 
Participant observation 
Dewalt and Dewalt define participant observation as “a method in which an observer takes 
part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of the people being studied as one 
of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their culture” (DeWalt and DeWalt 
1999, 260). There are some misconceptions surrounding the term participant observation, 
with a specific emphasis on the word participant. DeWalt and Dewalt (1999) distinguish 
between four levels of participation. These are: Nonparticipation (for instance only by 
reading), Moderate Participation (compared to commuting to the community instead of 
staying there), Active Participation (ethnographer engages in everyday life of the 
community), and finally Complete Participation (the ethnographer becomes a full member of 
the community). My aim was to engage and interact with inhabitants within a village in order 
to get a fuller understanding of people’s everyday life, and at the same time ensure that the 
people I interviewed would no longer view me as a complete outsider, to create a level of 
trust. The same applied to my studies of the organizations. I would make regular visits and 
sometimes use their office space, participate in workshops and seminars, and accompany staff 
on field visits. This form of participation resembles that of Active Participation as explained 
above. The method can have valuable influences on the research itself, and may also create 
more acceptance for the presence of a researcher. It serves as both a data collection 
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instrument as well as a data analysis or interpretation tool (DeWalt and DeWalt 1999, Russell 
Bernard 2006). 
For this research the emphasis lied primarily on understanding people’s daily 
interactions with each other and with aid agencies as well as the way people went about 
safeguarding and sustaining their livelihoods on a daily basis. Observation uncovers the 
practices and village dynamics that cannot be captured by interviews alone, as it entails 
“experiencing the lives of the people you are studying as much as you can” (Russell Bernard 
2006, 344). It shows the context in which people live and the realities of everyday life in rural 
villages in Angola. Participant observation also revealed the personal dynamics and practices 
of aid, by studying the daily interactions of aid actors one can get a better grasp on how 
certain aid interventions get shaped in practice beyond the formal policy document 
formulations. Observation creates understanding of how aid is shaped in practice and as a 
result of negotiation between so called ‘aid providers’ and ‘aid beneficiaries’. 
 
Discourse analysis 
One of the ways in which it can be assessed how members of an organization give meaning 
to their activities and to their interactions with local people, is by using discourse centred 
approaches. “These approaches distinguish themselves by focusing on the dialogical 
processes through which persons, social institutions and cultural knowledge are socially 
constructed through spoken discourse and other signifying acts/forms of expressive 
performance” (Farnell and Graham 1998, 411). Discourse in language, documents and 
practices allowed for collecting in-depth knowledge on the way people in these organizations 
perceived not only their organizational mandate but also how they viewed their work and 
role. Hilhorst (2003) discusses the ‘duality of discourse’ in which multiple discourses co-
exist, and are negotiated amongst various actors but at the same time they can become so 
powerful and unchallenged that they become part of local reality. “The more dominant a 
discourse, the more it operates as a set of rules about what can and cannot be said and done, 
and about what. As a consequence, actors, through their discursive practice, may turn these 
discourses increasingly into reality” (Hilhorst 2003, 216).   
For this research, discourse analysis was valuable to understanding how the 
organizational discourses influenced the formulation and implementation of interventions by 
aid actors. Discourse analysis in this research was specifically relevant for analysing 
labelling, a practice which is discussed more in depth in chapter 2 of this thesis. Labelling 
people as being part of a group of “subsistence farmers”, “ex-combatants”, a “community”, 
“displaced”, or “most vulnerable” is an organizational practice that legitimizes the targeting 
of specific groups of people for aid interventions. Labelling practices brushes over social 
differentiation and informs the consequent interventions for very specific groups of people, or 
can lead to non-intervention. In this study organizational discourses were uncovered in which 
people were labelled as suffering from dependency syndrome, a term used to describe aid 
beneficiaries as having become passive and lacking initiative after long periods of 
humanitarian assistance (Harrell-Bond 1986). This label was used to explain the perceived 
lack of development in certain villages, and motivated decisions to not respond to stated 
needs of the population as this would increase people’s dependency on aid. This specific 
labelling discourse has vanished in policy language, but continues to appear in practice even 
used beside participation discourses. Discourses on dependency syndrome highlight a 
preoccupation with overreliance on relief, whereas people stating a certain need could be 
interpreted as participation in the development process instead. Analysis of these 
organizational discourses are presented in chapter 7 on the humanitarian arena.  
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Life histories 
Recording life histories is an instrument to analyse how people have perceived changes, 
events and developments in their lives and the way these have personally affected them and 
the further choices they made in their lives. In this research life histories were used to 
understand the way people encountered and perceived aid and conflict and how those factors 
affected the choices they made in relation to their livelihoods. Debates that surround the use 
of life histories in research include the issue of subjectivity, and lack of reliability and 
validity of the data that is gathered through recording these histories (Powles 2004, Brettel 
1998). Critics claim that life histories are very much individualistic and isolated accounts of 
persons, from which no further analysis can be derived. Also, they point at the role of the 
researcher at deriving further conclusions from the life histories and narratives. In this 
particular research, life histories did not stand alone to explain how people have coped with 
conflict, and how they make sense of interventions and livelihoods, however valid this may 
be in other studies. The aim of using life histories in this research is to understand, next to 
information gathered from archival sources, semi-structured interviews, surveys and 
interviews with organisations, how aid has impacted on the lives of people in the area of 
study. It is integral part of explaining the situation and people’s perceptions of their life 
course. Furthermore, life histories, especially when collected over a number of areas and 
cases, uncover some shared experiences of conflict and aid, as well as alternative ways of 
dealing with them.  
In total, 9 life histories were recorded from the various villages. They were personal 
stories of someone’s life course, related to the impact that important external events had on 
them. Also, people would indicate to me names of people that had much knowledge about the 
village’s history, sometimes dating back to colonial times. During interviews with NGOs I 
would sometimes receive information regarding local historians, or persons with very specific 
knowledge and experience on themes pertaining to local livelihoods or conflict experiences. I 
would follow up these suggestions and approach these people for a more extended interview 
in which the person’s history and experiences would be noted. Specifically I would ask 
questions about village life in the colonial period and during conflict, what changes occurred 
in people’s livelihoods over the years, what choices they made to deal with the effects of 
conflict, and what experiences people had with aid. Recording life histories in the villages 
during fieldwork revealed much more in-depth information about the personal encounters 
with conflict, livelihoods and aid.  
Although this might not have been implied by Powles (2004), Brettel (1998), and 
others in the term life histories, in this research the life history of a particular project or 
programme initiated by a humanitarian agency were also drawn up in much the same way. By 
speaking to the people that were involved through the most part of developing and 
implementing a programme in a locality as well as reading the different project documents, 
one can trace the initial idea and goal and eventual outcomes. The life histories of two Dutch 
NGOs that were operational in Huíla province were constructed, in order to compare their 
mandates, activities and exit strategies. This enabled understanding of how organizations 
view their own role and work in the context of LRRD, as well as the decision-making 
processes in defining their presence and strategies towards aid delivery in a country.  
 
Comparative analysis and case studies 
Ragin (1994) states that comparative research is especially well suited for research that tries 
to interpret historically significant phenomena across a number of comparable cases. In this 
research the six selected villages were the cases which were compared on the basis of 
historically significant phenomena such as the influence of colonialism, encounters with (and 
effects of ) conflict, the availability of aid and reconstruction programs, and (changes in) 
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livelihoods. The overall research program also takes a new approach to comparative research 
on aid by comparing different forms of aid in situations of conflict and post-conflict from a 
perspective of everyday practices, and is as such an extended case study of aid in Angola 
(Hilhorst 2005).  
  Ragin (1994) notes that although one case study can create in-depth knowledge on a 
specific situation, “Often, however, it is best achieved by studying several instances of the 
same thing because different aspects may be more visible in different cases” (Ragin 1994, 
86). The six villages in two municipalities in Huíla province were the case studies in this 
research. By observing the everyday practices of people in these villages, recording their 
stories, conducting surveys, and consulting written sources from the archives, municipal or 
NGO reports, a case emerges of social and historical dynamics in a village that co-shape the 
way its inhabitants cope during crises and make a living. They show how the (livelihood) 
dynamics of these villages have changed under the influence of conflict, displacement and 
return, and aid interventions and reveal the similarities and differences there were amongst 
people in the way they made a living and coped with important events. Also, specific events, 
projects or interventions are approached as a case study in itself in this thesis, as this allows 
analysing the variety of social, economic, institutional and political factors that determine 
intended and unintended outcomes of aid. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative analyses 
This research is qualitative in nature, as it relies on qualitative methods such as participant 
observation and open interviews to understand how people’s livelihoods are affected during 
crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created for 
themselves. I used open or semi-structured interviewing techniques to collect data on 
people’s livelihoods, the context and history. However, during my fieldwork I have used a 
quantitative survey method next to the mainly qualitative approaches and methods. There has 
been much debate and discussion on whether social scientists and anthropologists should 
venture into using more quantitative data, as if the use of these data would make the 
researcher any less of an anthropologist. As Hammersley (1992) points out well, the issue is 
all about precision and accuracy. The main criticism of quantitative researchers on 
ethnographic work is that this type of research lacks precision. According to Hammersly 
(1992, 160) these quantitative researchers are arguing that “ethnographers are insufficiently 
precise in their claims, and that the necessary precision requires quantification”. In my view 
this does not entail that ethnographical methods lack the ability to make valid claims, but 
rather that at times ethnographic work could benefit from using quantitative methods as well. 
In this research for instance, the quantitative information serves as background to the data 
that were gathered qualitatively in the field. The data from surveys act as quantitative 
information that helps to further understand some particular elements from the research 
localities which support the qualitative data and observations that form the backbone of the 
study.  
Quantitative methods focus on exploring patterns and relationships amongst variables 
(Ragin 1994). Quantitatively assessing changes in crop production over a period of time and 
relating these changes qualitatively to people’s practices, life histories and village dynamics, 
made it easier to explore the relationship and impact of humanitarian interventions on these 
changes. I conducted 58 surveys with the objective to assess the amount and types of 
livelihood activities that people practiced, and see how they have evolved over time. I would 
select people while walking through the villages, ensuring as much as possible an equal 
respondent representation in terms of gender, age, and power. For instance, although village 
chiefs many times tried to put forward their own selection, I would make clear this was left to 
me to ensure equal representation as much as possible. Questions on household composition, 
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remittances, linkages to community institutions and the amount and type of received aid were 
included. The surveys that I used during my fieldwork in the villages acted as a support tool 
to the qualitative methods. By starting a conversation with a survey, people felt comfortable 
as they often knew what to expect from experiences of other inhabitants in the village. Some 
questions in the surveys then paved the way to discuss in depth any particular or interesting 
issues that would appear in conversation. In this way the surveys served as good entry points 
to understanding many of the phenomena in the village and personal histories of its 
inhabitants, as well as giving some structure to both the interviewer and interviewees. The 
data obtained from the surveys are analysed and presented in chapters 5 and 6 on 
Caluquembe and Chibia. 
 
 
Fieldwork in a complex context 
Fieldwork in complex settings such as post-conflict countries can create special challenges, 
affecting the outcomes of research. The first challenge is related to the practical logistics and 
planning of the fieldwork, and the second recounts an experience with the brutal reality of 
rural poverty in Angola. These experiences have shaped my fieldwork and my perceptions of 
Angolan society.  
 
Visa as a constraining factor to the fieldwork 
In this section I highlight an issue that has had severe consequences for my fieldwork, in 
terms of time, planning, and even choice of municipalities. The problematic procedures for 
obtaining a visa in Angola, allowing the researcher to be in the country long enough to do 1.5 
years of fieldwork, has been a major constraining factor in the fieldwork period, and also 
explains some of the particular constraints of working in Angola, not just for researchers but 
also for most of the international aid workers. 
A request for a work visa was compiled and handed over at the Angolan  Consulate 
General in The Netherlands before leaving for Angola, so was a request for an ordinary visa 
for one month, that could be extended twice after which I should leave the country. The 
prospects of actually getting the work visa were unsure. The first three months of fieldwork 
were marked with many uncertainties surrounding the visa, and even its monthly extensions. 
Every month I was struggling to find an organisation willing to write a letter to show at the 
immigration office for another month extension. The unwillingness of organisations to do this 
was understandable due to the many problems that existed for expatriates and organisations 
to obtain a visa, and the ensuing visits that the immigration officers would make to verify the 
validity of the visa that had been issued with cooperation of organisations. At the end of the 
first three months I had to leave the country. After coming back with a new one month visa, 
the problems started all over again, until I came into contact with the Provincial Director of 
the Ministry of Social Assistance, who committed that the ministry would help with the 
application of the visa, as well as the work visa. After that, much time was spent on all 
subsequent bureaucratic procedures of getting the right documents, ranging from the 
Ministry, to the local immigration office, and the Angolan Consulate in The Netherlands. 
These procedures prevented me from staying in the remote villages for prolonged periods of 
time, but eventually had the result that I was able to enjoy the unexpected granting of a work 
visa during the last three months of my one and a half year fieldwork period. My visa 
experience was anything but exceptional in Angola. Throughout the fieldwork and interviews 
with all expatriate staff in Angola, the visa issue came up. It was the talk among expatriates: 
“Has your visa been issued already?”, “When do you have to leave the country to get an 
extension again?”, “How many years have you been waiting for the work visa to be issued?”, 
etc. During a Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organisations (FONGA) meeting held in 
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Luanda in 2007, the whole conference was dominated by the recounting of personal 
experiences by expatriates with their visa issues, and a person from the immigration 
department was invited to explain the official procedures and answer any personal questions. 
Overall, it seems to be a problem that affects all people coming to work in Angola, either 
through invitation by Angolan government institutions, international organisations, and 
commercial enterprises. Many international aid organization staff has seen their work being 
affected by having to leave the country for a visa extension without knowing if and when it 
would be possible to return, or having to work from home if the immigration officers would 
make regular visits to aid offices to check people’s work visas. 
The visa complications did have their effects on the planning and implementation of 
fieldwork in especially Caluquembe. To reach Caluquembe it took a 4-6 hour drive, 
depending on whether it was the rainy season or not. As the town was very isolated due to the 
bad state of the road, there was little traffic between Lubango and Caluquembe. For the visa 
renewal procedure I always needed at least a week to make sure all the bureaucratic 
procedures were in order, from visits to the ministry and provincial government to getting the 
letters ready, photocopies made, coloured photocopies made, back to the immigration office, 
etc. The problems surrounding the visa applications and procedures did affect my planning in 
such a way, that I was never able to stay in Angola for more than three months in a row. 
Also, during those three months much time was lost with the logistical and administrative 
procedures to obtain the visa or extension on time. Eventually this meant I had to abandon the 
initial idea to do a comparative research between three municipalities in the province, and 
instead focussed on two: Caluquembe and Chibia. In the beginning, I was able to visit the 
third municipality, Chicomba, for one week. Unfortunately soon after that introductory trip it 
became apparent that I would have to limit the fieldwork to only two municipalities. 
However, during this week in Chicomba, I did encounter a situation that made a severe 
impression on me and the rest of my fieldwork period as it brought together human suffering, 
the true extent of rural poverty, a tremendously weak health system and the way aid and 
assistance is given in these extreme situations.  
 
Rural poverty in Chicomba: realities of humanitarian aid 
In this final section I recount an experience during my fieldwork in Chicomba that influenced 
the manner in which I viewed the complex context that local people and humanitarians are 
faced with, giving a face to the people directly affected by conflict and extreme poverty, as 
well as the people that try to assist them in these circumstances. 
During a fieldwork visit of a week in Chicomba, a municipality in the centre of Huíla 
province, I stayed at the Catholic Mission. This Catholic Mission was located just outside of 
the municipal centre. The Catholic Mission of Chicomba consisted of various buildings, 
including a school which was bombed in 1993 but was still more or less functioning, and a 
health post. During my time there Sister Leonor, a Spanish lady of close to 80 years old who 
had been working and living in Huíla province for 27 years, guided me across the mission 
compound. As we were walking along the little health post we were asked to come in by one 
of the Sisters and have a look at a baby girl that had been brought in by her parents that 
morning. The baby had contracted malaria, which had been left untreated for too long 
resulting in her being severely anaemic. Sister Leonor told the parents to pack some stuff to 
take to the hospital of Chicomba. Arriving at the hospital the parents were told that the girl 
urgently needed a blood transfusion. The hospital of Chicomba does not have the facility to 
test blood on the presence of an HIV infection, therefore blood transfusions are not allowed at 
the hospital. The baby therefore needed to be urgently transported to the hospital in Matala (a 
1.5 hour drive) or Lubango (a 4-6 hour drive). The child and her mother were checked into 
the hospital, and were told that the only available ambulance at the hospital had broken down 
18 
 
some weeks ago, and there had been no possibilities to fix it. Sister Leonor then took the 
father to the local market, where they tried to locate a taxi, or any other form of available 
transport to Matala or Lubango. When the taxi arrived and I entered the hospital I found 
Sister Leonor and the mother in the hallway. Sister Leonor was pouring water over the baby’s 
head. The baby had stopped breathing and her eyes were half open. I went back to the car and 
Sister Leonor followed me a bit later and told me that the baby had just died. After we had 
returned to the mission Sister Leonor said that the child had been about 8 months old. The 
parents had not started medicines yet as they didn’t have the necessary cash. The mother had 
told Sister Leonor that they were still preparing the baptism for the child, but hadn’t 
succeeded yet in getting sufficient money for the ceremony and party. The mother had been 
very concerned about what was going to happen to the child if she died without having been 
baptized and therefore had asked Sister Leonor to perform a quick baptism in the hallway of 
the hospital. 
For me, this experience brought many dimensions of my research together. First of all, 
it served as a strong reminder of the extent of poverty in rural Angola. The family did not 
have sufficient money to obtain medicines for their baby, or organise a baptism which they 
deemed essential. They had neither (financial) means of transportation nor belongings they 
could take with them when planning to stay at a hospital in Lubango or Matala for an 
extended period of time. Furthermore, the state of health services in Angola was revealed 
through the non-functioning ambulance, the lack of neither HIV-testing nor blood transfusion 
facilities. It was a reminder of the extra-ordinary high level of child mortality (under the age 
of five) in the country, which in 2003 was estimated at 260 per 1000 live births (WHO 2005, 
182).  Although I had heard this mortality rate mentioned before in connection with Angola, 
what it signified in reality only became clear to me in Chicomba. For me, the reality behind 
the numerous NGO reports, policy documents and research papers about the humanitarian 
situation in Angola was given a face. Another dimension of this experience involved the 
extent to which people, like Sister Leonor, continue aiding people in the most difficult of 
circumstances without losing their commitment and humanity, even after witnessing the 
extreme poverty, misery and violence for decades. Some weeks after my visit to Chicomba 
this was accentuated when I heard that the Sisters at the Catholic Mission in Chicomba had 
been attacked and robbed by four armed men.  
The mission work that these women were so dedicated to, is in practice based on the 
similar objectives of humanitarian assistance. Observing their daily practices to enhance the 
quality of life of the people living around them for years on end, while being vulnerable to 
violence themselves, offers an understanding of what humanitarian aid is about. The 
principles of humanity, to relieve the suffering of people wherever they are found, are the 
principles that shaped the emergence of humanitarian aid, and are still found to be practiced 
by people, even if they themselves would not call it humanitarian aid per se (Hilhorst 2007). 
Humanitarians are vulnerable to attacks by belligerents, even though the humanitarian 
principles of neutrality and impartiality would entitle them to protection and security in these 
violent contexts. In recent years, the number of humanitarian staff encountering violence has 
increased significantly. A study by Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2009, 1) has shown 
that in the period 2006-2008 127 violent incidents occurred in which 95 aid workers were 
killed, with the 2008 fatality rate for international aid workers even exceeding that of UN 
peacekeeping forces.  
Debates on humanitarian aid often revolve around its effectiveness, policy 
instruments, humanitarian principles, and many other subjects that at times seem distant from 
the realities that organisations and their staff find themselves in on an everyday basis, and the 
way the affected people themselves perceive it and/or transform it to fit their own needs and 
aspirations. This reality of aid, its different dimensions, and the context and difficulties 
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people encounter were revealed to me during many stages of the fieldwork. The death of the 
baby girl in Chicomba, the poverty that surrounded it, the lack of functioning basic services, 
and the commitment of people working to uphold the basic principle of humanity, gave me a 
personal perspective on the reality I was faced with. It showed me the context in which 
people make choices regarding their livelihoods, as they are the result of many different 
processes, like availability of resources, perception of risks, need for monetary resources, 
availability of aid systems, strength of local institutions, health risks, access to education, 
availability of family or other network support, etc. Livelihood options and choices in the 
context of extreme rural poverty, conflict and displacement can literally become a matter of 
life or death.    
 
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the theory and debates underlying the concepts that are 
central to this research: livelihoods and humanitarian aid. The chapter will present how 
theoretical, policy and practice discourses on humanitarian aid have changed over time, 
slowly encompassing much more than just the life-saving activities it was first designed for. 
In this chapter I will argue for the importance of studying humanitarian aid as an arena which 
allows for a more empirically-based understanding of aid outcomes and the role of various 
actors in this process, rather than understanding humanitarian aid from the normative 
framework of principles. Improving people’s livelihoods is a popular but complex objective 
which has increasingly entered humanitarian aid’s policy and practice. Livelihood approaches 
that are adopted by aid organizations try to incorporate as much as possible of the different 
components that make up a livelihood, yet do not always take into account the changing and 
non-linear nature of livelihoods. This chapter will argue for a stronger focus on people’s own 
efforts to rebuild and secure their livelihoods during and after crisis, and seeks the various 
ways in which aid actors support or hinder these efforts.  
In chapter 3 the history and experiences of conflict in Angola are analysed. It starts 
with an historical overview of different stages of war in Angola, including the main actors, 
motivations and effects. The chapter then analyses Angola’s conflict through a political 
economy of war approach, by focusing on processes of distribution of power and wealth. 
Furthermore, the chapter argues for an increased understanding of local experiences and 
manifestations of war.  By introducing empirical data from fieldwork in the municipalities, a 
case is made for a socio-institutional approach to war, which focuses on the local level where 
conflict interacts with local norms and power relations. The chapter argues for a focus on the 
everyday realities of war to understand how conflict plays out locally.  
Chapter 4 introduces the colonial history and its impact on rural socio-economic life 
in Angola, and rural livelihoods in Huíla province specifically. It starts with a 
characterization of Portuguese colonialism, and the major economic developments and 
policies during the colonial rule in Angola. These colonial economic policies by the 
Portuguese in Angola are then translated to the regional application and effects on rural 
economies and societies. People’s experiences with the colonial institutions and policies in 
their villages are presented, to create understanding of how major colonial policies were 
actually experienced and influenced people’s everyday lives. In the last paragraph in this 
chapter, leaps in history are made around periods of colonialism, independence, and various 
stages during the civil war. Throughout this timeline information regarding changes in 
livelihoods and the rural society is presented. Specific attention is paid to rural institutions 
that play a role in the assistance of livelihoods, and how these have also changed over time 
and were affected by colonialism and conflict. The chapter is based on both a review of 
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(historical) literature, archive material as well as data from fieldwork in Lubango, 
Caluquembe and Chibia. The chapter argues that colonialism and conflict have severely 
affected the rural economy and institutions. The disappearance of the colonial trading system 
and economic institutions, even though highly exploitative in nature, has reduced the options 
for rural livelihoods significantly. Furthermore, colonial policies and post-independence rural 
policies are shown to have influences the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the Angolan 
state.  
Chapters 5 and 6 contain the empirical data from fieldwork in six villages in the two 
municipalities Caluquembe (chapter 5) and Chibia (chapter 6). The case studies consist of an 
analysis of past and current livelihood practices of village and inhabitants. The histories of 
each village are presented, highlighting social and economic changes and the effects of war. 
By looking at the different critical events in village and personal life, war, displacement, 
migration, and aid the changes in livelihoods are drawn. The chapters argue that 
rehabilitation of livelihoods in Caluquembe is an example of an externally driven type of 
recovery in the context of post-war Angola, whereas the history of inhabitants in Chibia 
offers insight into processes of self-recovery, as well as processes of state recovery. The two 
chapters bring the observation and analysis of the practices of humanitarian organisations and 
actual livelihood activities in the case study villages together, based on empirical material 
collected through open and semi-structured interviews and surveys with inhabitants of the six 
villages, as well as interviews with staff from organisations and other key actors in the areas.  
Chapter 7 analyses the humanitarian arena in Huíla province through past and current 
practices of various aid actors. The chapter starts with an historical overview of aid 
interventions in Angola. It then identifies the diversity of actors that were part of the 
humanitarian arena historically and currently operating in Lubango and Huíla province, to 
analyse their activities and approaches to relief, recovery and development. From analyses of 
interviews, observations in the field and offices and written information, a picture of the 
history of humanitarian aid in the province, its changing discourse, practice and policy over 
time emerged. In 2007 most of the national and international humanitarian organisations 
closed their offices in Lubango; this has not been followed by a surge of developmental 
organisations coming in. This chapter explores the various reasons for this phenomenon, how 
organisations and their staff struggled with the decision to stay or go, and what they have left 
behind institutionally and programmatically through their partnerships with local 
organisations. This is illustrated by a comparison between two Dutch organizations, one with 
a humanitarian and the other with a development mandate. The comparison shows that 
despite the different approaches used, not just programmatically but also in terms of 
partnerships, their organizational decision-making and exit strategies have not been informed 
by different mandates per sé.  
Chapter 8 discusses the challenges in post-war Angolan society as they were 
identified in 2002 and compares them to the rehabilitation and recovery efforts from the 
Angolan state, aid agencies and people themselves that ensued afterwards. The chapter 
focuses on the so-called transition period after the conflict ended in 2002, from the 
perspective of rebuilding rural livelihoods. This transition period is analysed by looking at 
people’s opportunities, constraints and efforts to rebuild their lives in rural settings as well all 
as the state agencies and NGO responses to these efforts. The chapter starts with an analysis 
of the goals that were set for rural rehabilitation and whether those goals have been achieved 
when zooming in on the current state of the recovery of rural livelihoods. From the interviews 
with state and aid agencies as well as beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of these 
reconstruction efforts in rural Huíla, a picture emerges of a quite uniform approach to 
rebuilding rural livelihoods. In this chapter I argue that although conflict and displacement 
have had significant effects on the livelihoods choices people make, state and aid agencies 
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sometimes unwittingly limit or redirect the livelihood options by choosing a uniform and 
simplified approach to rural livelihood recovery: seeds and tools programs. The chapter 
analyses the differences in livelihood options by conceptualizing livelihood recovery through 
three pillars: externally driven, state recovery and self recovery. 
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of the thesis, analysing the information from the 
previous chapters, and providing answers to the research questions put forward in chapter 1 
on the intended and unintended outcomes of humanitarian aid on rural livelihoods in Huíla 
province, Angola. The chapter underlines the importance of understanding how people 
survive during crisis, which livelihood strategies they deploy, and how both aid interventions 
and processes of state reconstruction actually support or hinder these efforts in practice. 
Specifically it argues that in the context of Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development 
(LRRD) processes, such a process in Angola has been left unfinished. By following this 
process and the outcomes on livelihoods when LRRD is stopped halfway and lacks follow 
up, this thesis questions the conditions under which livelihood recovery interventions should 
be started if long-term goals and objectives cannot be reached.  
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2. Conceptual framework  
  
Introduction 
Humanitarian aid  
Livelihoods 
 Conclusions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the theory and debates around the concepts that are central 
to this research. The chapter will present the way theories, policies and practice of 
humanitarian aid have changed over time, gradually encompassing more than the life-saving 
activities it had started out with. I will argue that although humanitarian and development aid 
in theory and policy terms are presented as being disconnected, the everyday organizational 
discourses and practices often do not follow this separation at all. In this chapter I will also 
argue for studying humanitarianism in line with what Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) have called 
the ‘humanitarian arena’, which is based more on an empirically-based understanding of the 
outcomes of humanitarian interventions through the interplay of various actors, rather than a 
normative framework of principled action.  
Improving people’s livelihoods is a popular but complex objective for many aid 
actors, especially those who try to apply linkages between relief, rehabilitation and 
development. A livelihood can be understood as the way an individual or household makes a 
living through the assets (material and immaterial), activities and access to these assets and 
activities (Ellis 2000a). In order to make interventions on livelihoods more manageable, 
livelihood approaches and tools have been developed which try to define assets in ‘capitals’ 
(such as social, human and natural capitals) that need to be addressed. These policy 
constructs do not always take into account the changing and non-linear nature of livelihoods, 
nor do they capture the complexity and diversity of ways in which people make a living in 
times of crises. People’s own capacities and initiatives in surviving crises are often deemed 
unsustainable when viewed from these pre-defined livelihood frameworks, and little attention 
is paid to the diversification strategies that people deploy. In this thesis, I argue for an 
improved understanding of people’s own efforts to rebuild livelihoods during and after crises, 
and the need for increased flexibility in responding and assisting these efforts. 
  
 
Humanitarian aid 
 
History and principles of humanitarian aid 
Humanitarianism or the ‘humanitarian impulse’ finds its roots in diverse political discourses, 
religion and philosophy dealing with notions of commiseration, human rights and solidarity 
(Weiss and Collins 2000). The notion of humanitarianism as we think of it today was first 
introduced by Henri Dunant in 1859, when he witnessed the battle of Solferino in Italy. He 
negotiated access and mobilised the local population to attend to and assist the wounded 
soldiers that were left behind on the battlefield. His experiences at Solferino and his belief in 
the need for a neutral aid organisation in war-time led to the founding of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1864, as well as the codification of humanitarian 
principles during the 1864 Geneva Convention (Weiss and Collins 2000). The fundamental 
idea of humanitarianism that was put forward at that time was that assistance should be given 
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to alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Therefore, it is supposed to be purely 
based on existing needs and lacking any politically motivation (Hilhorst 2007). 
The impulse or imperative to give assistance to people in need, was translated by the 
ICRC into the classic humanitarian principles underlying relief assistance: neutrality, 
humanity, and impartiality. The principle of humanity has been put forward by the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as “a desire to bring 
assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield....to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to 
ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, 
cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples” (IFRC 2001). Neutrality, one of the most 
debated and abandoned principles in the humanitarian field, was defined as “In order to 
continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or 
engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature”. And 
finally, the classic principle of impartiality dictates that an organisation “makes no 
discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It 
endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to 
give priority to the most urgent cases of distress”. Furthermore, the principle of independence 
states that the ICRC should maintain its autonomy in relation to its donors (Hilhorst and 
Jansen forthcoming). Humanitarian principles lean heavily on the idea of non-interference in 
war and politics, and especially neutrality and independence were seen as essential to give 
ICRC the protected status to work in situations of war as was agreed under International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Leader 2000, Hilhorst and Jansen forthcoming). IHL consists of 
the human rights law as stipulated in the Geneva and Hague conventions at the end of the 19
th
 
century and described the need for protecting civilians during armed conflict (Kleinfeld 
2007).  
Increasingly, humanitarianism and humanitarian principles have come under fire, 
especially regarding the underlying notions of non-interference and aid being apolitical. The 
applicability of principles has been questioned by the changing nature of contemporary 
conflicts, the contexts in which humanitarian agencies operate and the increasing number of 
agencies (Leader 2000). Humanitarian aid has become a tool for donors and the international 
community to reach certain political objectives, a process that started during the Cold War 
and gained prominence after the 9/11 attacks where aid was seen as a contribution to counter-
terrorism efforts (Harmer and Macrae 2004, 4). The principle of neutrality had slowly been 
abandoned by agencies, realizing that aid always gives advantage to either warring party 
during conflict, and giving agencies space to address issues of injustice (Slim 1997). 
However, after the increasing use of aid as a tool in wars such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
agencies were advocating a return to neutrality as a basic guiding principle in 
humanitarianism (Hilhorst and Jansen forthcoming). The principle of impartiality would 
work if agencies accept the conclusion that they need to withdraw when belligerents violate 
that principle, yet NGOs very rarely decide to not enter or withdraw if this principle is 
violated (de Waal 1997). The principle of humanity has seen less debate than the first two 
principles, although interpretations amongst organisations have differed ranging from 
material provision of aid alone, to dictating the non-negotiability of aid in war (Slim 1997). 
This moral positioning of agencies through principled action happens mostly to clarify its 
distinct role in contemporary wars. The position has become increasingly blurred by 
international military operations that were legitimized using the language of humanitarian 
needs. One example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing of 
Kosovo which was presented as a humanitarian intervention (Hilhorst 2002). The military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that often take place under the banner of humanitarian aid, 
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add to these complications in understanding what is humanitarianism and what is not.
5
 Critics 
feel that these increased linkages between the military and humanitarians has made aid 
workers more vulnerable to violence due to being perceived as political actors in conflicts 
themselves (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver 2006, 3). 
Leader (2000) challenges the universal character of these principles as a historical 
compromise between political-military realities and the concept of humanity. “What are now 
commonly referred to as ‘humanitarian principles’, notions such as neutrality and 
impartiality, were in fact only the conditions imposed on humanitarian agencies by the 
military elites of states in return for respecting which agencies would be allowed to operate” 
(Leader 2000, 12). He therefore argues that these principles should be continuously re-
assessed when applied in new contexts to understand how they gain meaning in specific 
situations and by different actors.  
The humanitarian world is shaped by different policies and standards on what entails 
good practice of humanitarianism. In 1994 the Code of Conduct was introduced by the 
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the ICRC in response to 
criticism on issues of fundraising and programming in the relief efforts in Sudan at the end of 
the 1980s (Gostelow 1999). A need for a more practical application of the Code of Conduct, a 
growing fear amongst NGOs for external regulation, as well as different agencies’ efforts on 
developing operational standards, together led to the Sphere project (The Humanitarian 
Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response) in 1998 (Walker and Purdin 2004). 
These documents not only list the principles that humanitarians should aim for in their policy 
and practice, it further sets minimum standards for humanitarian practice with reference to 
building on local capacities, participation of the target groups, specific vulnerabilities, etc. 
The Code of Conduct and Sphere have been intended to enhance effectiveness, quality and 
accountability in aid response (Gostelow 1999, Walker and Purdin 2004). Furthermore, the 
Sphere project has attempted to link a rights-based approach to the minimum standards, 
directing more attention to the rights and dignity of the people that receive aid, instead of 
viewing humanitarian aid purely from the supply side of the aid agencies (Walker and Purdin 
2004, 110). As such it has attempted to incorporate a more distinctive view on the efforts and 
capacities of people themselves. Although the Code of Conduct and Sphere provide 
principles and standards, they are not organisational guidelines. They are in fact the practical 
translation of the normative framework of humanitarian principles, which only gain meaning 
through the everyday application by aid actors. 
 
 
From Classic to Developmental Relief: the LRRD debate 
‘Classic’ humanitarian aid in practice consists of actions and interventions geared at saving 
lives and assisting people in need, acute needs that are followed by conflict as well as natural 
hazards, such as floods, droughts, earthquakes, etc. Although humanitarian aid is originally 
intended to provide short-term relief, over the last decade’s agencies are confronted with the 
need to look at strategies for long-term presence and interventions due to the changing nature 
of crises and conflict (Russo et al. 2008). In recent years we have seen humanitarian agencies 
shifting their mandates from “relieving immediate human suffering” to taking on more 
development oriented tasks. Where relief in its basic form is concerned with saving lives 
through provision of goods and basic services, and giving protection to affected populations, 
                                                 
5
 New forms of linking reconstruction with military operations under the banner of humanitarianism, like for 
instance Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), further complicate the position and work of relief agencies within 
international political and military settings. CIMIC operations are on the rise, where militaries do short 
humanitarian and development projects to “win the hearts and minds” of the civilians involved, to create 
acceptance for the military part of their operations. 
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“development connotes peace, justice, social equity and the absence of, or at least a declining 
trend in, ignorance, disease and poverty” (Smillie 1998, xx). According to Duffield (2000, 
101), “During the Cold War, relief and development were usually considered as separate 
activities. The former related to short-term help to allow societies to overcome temporary 
external shocks, such as, droughts or floods. The latter concerned long-term assistance to help 
societies modernise their infrastructures and economies”.6  
In the 1990s aid actors increasingly came to the realization that the sharp distinction 
between humanitarian and development aid was no longer helpful or needed in dealing with 
primarily natural disasters as well as the complex emergencies and protracted crises that 
agencies were faced with (Harmer and Macrae 2004, Russo et al. 2008, Duffield 2000). The 
African food crises in the 1980s led to a gradual shift towards prevention through linking 
relief to development (LRD) strategies (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005, Christoplos 2006). 
An understanding of these types of complex emergencies as not just short disruptions of 
normality, but rather deeply rooted and enduring social and political crises, demanded 
different responses from the aid community (Duffield 1994a, White and Cliffe 2000). The 
linkage discourse was taken on board by the UN in 1991 where relief activities were 
considered in support of recovery and development efforts (White and Cliffe 2000, 316). The 
term ‘relief to development continuum’ was coined by the UN to reveal this need for 
complementing the short-term approaches by humanitarian agencies with the long-term 
activities of development organisations for more effective interventions that benefitted 
societies on the long term. The rationale was that development aid could reduce the 
vulnerability of people to natural hazards and prevent future conflict, whereas humanitarian 
aid could provide the groundwork for future development interventions, as ‘a springboard for 
recovery’ (Harmer and Macrae 2004). The initial ideas on linking and the ‘continuum’ were 
followed during the 1990s by a proliferation of literature on how these two aid styles could be 
more complementary to each other and much debate amongst both humanitarian and 
development agencies as to how to deal with this changing reality in policy and practice. The 
idea of a continuum was quickly replaced by the notion of a relief to development contiguum 
instead, which acknowledged that societies in crisis do not tend to follow these phases back 
to ‘normality’ in sequence, but these rather happen simultaneously and overlap (Russo et al. 
2008, Duffield 2000, Christoplos 2006).  
The concept of rehabilitation was introduced to term the grey space and processes 
between relief and development, as criticisms were increasing over the supposed gap between 
the two distinct approaches, rather than the bridge that had been intended (Longley et al 
2006, Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). The approach is called Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Rehabilitation was intended to guide socio-
economic changes and to be used as risk reduction mechanism, for instance by promoting 
better land-management and agricultural systems (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005, 
Christoplos 2006). Post-conflict rehabilitation requires a shared vision among relevant 
stakeholders like state, people, private sector and civil society and is not a matter of simply 
rebuilding the country to pre-war conditions; of going back to ‘normality’ (Christoplos 1998, 
Pacheco 2002, Hilhorst 2007, Bakewell 2000, Barakat 2005). As this is usually a long 
process in which few quick fixes exist, this places considerable strain on the role and 
mandates of humanitarian organizations who become involved in LRRD approaches.  
                                                 
6
 In these definitions of humanitarian versus development by Duffield (2000), the emphasis on development aid 
concerning mostly infrastructure and economies seems somewhat incomplete. One of the most profound 
differences between the two approaches is certainly the degree of engagement with local and state institutions in 
order to fulfil the set objectives of aid programmes. Also, it denies the role development aid on social processes 
and change. 
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Much criticism on linking and continuum thinking was aimed at the fear that 
humanitarian core principles would be eroded by the increased push towards 
developmentalist thinking (White and Cliffe 2000). Duffield (1994a) in his critique on the 
LRRD saw the roots of the debate as following:  
“The linking debate is primarily an argument over resources, a defensive move by an 
institutional interest which fears for the object of its existence: stable societies that can 
sustain socioeconomic improvement. The shift in aid flow towards emergency 
spending has accentuated this crisis. Developmentalists have been forced to argue 
their centrality in a space that, in the past, was willingly abandoned to relief” 
(Duffield 1994a, 41).  
 
In his view humanitarian and developmentalists were claiming their space in the aid arena, 
and LRRD was a means to ensure their co-existence. Furthermore, LRRD was considered to 
approach the strengthening of local capacities and civil society in conflict settings in the same 
way as in natural disaster sites, neglecting complex political contexts. “As with a natural 
disaster, civil society is thought of as having no self-interest or agency. In relation to internal 
war, this is a big assumption” (Duffield 2000, 103). Although the literature and debate on 
LRRD continued, and received a new impulse after the 9/11 attacks in New York where the 
linkages between aid, security and political context were brought on board, LRRD practice 
has been slow to follow (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). “The bottom line - how aid 
funding is made available – is often most revealing of the extent to which brave policy 
statements on LRRD have actually been translated into practice” (Buchanan-Smith and 
Fabbri 2005, 36). 
In order to understand how relief, rehabilitation and development practices differ 
analytically and in practice, I present a table in which these concepts are distinguished by its 
main characteristics. This is not to deny the many grey areas in between these concepts as 
well as the fact that aid activities can take on aspects of all three approaches simultaneously. 
The characteristics of these phases and interventions presented here apply to the rural 
livelihood domain. 
 
Figure 1: Ideal-typical dimensions of relief, rehabilitation and development phases and 
interventions
7
 
 Relief Rehabilitation Development 
What people do -(Forced) migration 
-Sell assets 
-Deploy further 
survival/coping 
strategies 
-Resettle to areas of origin 
-Reconnect to physical and 
social environment 
-Recover assets and 
activities 
-Obtain 
employment 
-Sustain future 
and durable 
livelihood 
strategies 
 
Intervention 
characteristics 
-Short-term 
-Top-down 
-Distribution of 
material and logistics  
-Introducing participatory 
elements 
-Physical reconstruction 
-Long-term 
impact and socio-
economic change 
-Underlying 
processes 
Objectives of 
interventions 
Survival Rebuilding livelihoods Economic growth 
                                                 
7
 This table partly builds on the dimensions of relief and sustainable development, as presented by Frerks, 
Hilhorst and Moreyra (1999, 32). 
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Beneficiary 
focus 
Individuals/households Households/villages/society Villages/society 
Engagement 
with state 
Taking over basic 
service delivery 
Integrating services with 
government institutions 
Long-term 
integration with 
state plans 
Underlying 
assumptions 
-No local capacity 
-Undesirability of 
coping strategies 
-People have no assets 
left 
-Markets have stopped 
functioning 
-Dependency syndrome 
-Assets base is restricted 
-Agricultural production as 
key to livelihood recovery 
and development 
-Need for socio-
economic and 
institutional 
reforms 
-Strong state 
engagement 
 
One of the main differences between these approaches is that relief tends to focus on 
addressing individual vulnerabilities, whereas on the other end of the spectrum aid is aimed at 
society in general, with a strong focus on markets and engagement with state institutions and 
efforts. This follows from the aim of development aid for more sustainability and 
institutionalization of the implemented projects due to their long-term nature and objectives. 
Along the way, moving from the individual to household, village and finally society level, 
requires great adaptation and deliberation as to how inclusive the interventions get and to 
what extent the state becomes a partner in the process rather than a potential danger to the 
humanitarian principles of relief organizations.  
Another related problem with LRRD is that the concept implies that a process is being 
started which will lead to a clear finish, namely sustainable development and a return to the 
situation prior to crisis. Firstly, underlying causes of conflict often are entrenched in exactly 
those political and economic features of a pre-conflict period (Frerks 2004, 170). Secondly, 
there is no guarantee that the groundwork laid down by relief and rehabilitation efforts will 
actually be followed by development. Funding may simply run out, or other emergencies 
demand the attention of organisations to be focused elsewhere, the state itself may prioritize 
other matters in the meantime. This means that the process might be stopped halfway. It 
therefore can be questioned whether it is useful to start developing ‘linking’ activities when 
there is no clarity on whether those efforts will either be integrated locally, incorporated 
within state institutions, or taken over by other agencies more equipped to deal with 
developmental approaches. Practice has often shown that long-term impact assessments do 
not take place, even if the interventions started in the relief phase extend well into the 
development phase (Levine and Chastre 2004). Furthermore, there is danger that relief 
intervention logics are maintained far beyond emergency situations (Hilhorst and van 
Leeuwen 2004, 189). Also, needs might be extrapolated from the relief phase, which then 
inform future intervention directions in the rehabilitation and development phase. This will 
deny the efforts and activities that people themselves develop, and the changing needs for 
their future strategies.   
The decision to start more developmental relief projects requires deliberation on the 
part of humanitarian organisations about what this entails with reference to their status, 
organisational capacity and practice. Although on paper humanitarian and development aid 
seem to be more complementary and intertwined, the dichotomy still exists in the organising 
practices around the two approaches. Levine and Chastre (2004) show that for instance 
funding modalities do separate clearly between the two, making some interventions on the 
LRRD spectrum simply impossible for lack of funding. In terms of the financial and 
administrative organisation of humanitarian aid, not much has changed in the sharp 
separation between relief and development. Funding of humanitarian aid projects happens on 
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the basis of an assumption of short-term engagement, with an exception in situations of 
chronic food insecurity (Hilhorst 2007). In reality, humanitarian agencies increasingly end up 
implementing their programmes in countries for years, especially when faced with situations 
of protracted crises. Still, the largest percentage of humanitarian aid interventions focuses 
mostly on the following terrains: food aid, access to safe water, rehabilitation of health and 
sanitation facilities. The volume of relief aid budgets has increased rapidly during the last few 
decades, growing from 680 million USD (OECD, excluding food aid) in 1980 to 2.7 billion 
USD in 1996, signifying the increasingly protracted nature of crises around the world 
(Macrae 1999).  
Calls for LRRD approaches have increased due to the changing situations in which 
aid organisations find themselves. Development organisations are faced with natural hazards 
and outbursts of conflict in the areas they are working in, and complex emergencies and the 
increasingly extended nature of humanitarian crisis call for prolonged and diversified 
presence of humanitarian agencies. Although a sharp separation between relief and 
development is no longer a reality, and rather unwanted in my view, seeking and 
implementing linkages in practice poses considerable challenges to aid organisations. It 
requires organizational adaptation and consideration of the possibilities and limitations of 
such a new approach. Stronger engagement with state and local institutions is necessary when 
sustainability is the objective, yet countries in crisis often suffer from institutional weakening, 
making it difficult to implement more structural measures (Frerks 2004, 171). It demands a 
different mind-set amongst the staff, and a different way of viewing projects and programs. 
Instead of focusing on individuals and their vulnerabilities, deeply rooted economic, 
institutional and political processes in society need to be addressed. LRRD processes need 
long-term commitment which in the changing world of aid policy can never really be 
ensured. What happens to LRRD processes when they are abandoned prematurely? In this 
research LRRD activities have been analysed to understand how they complement people’s 
own efforts and strategies, and to see the difficulties in starting rehabilitation and 
development activities which have no guarantee of reaching a desired status of (sustainable) 
development. 
 
 
LRRD and assumption on communities 
What is apparent in the LRRD phases is the slow shift from a focus on the individual to 
society. The idea of community as a reference point for interventions that are considered to 
be more inclusive, becomes apparent in organizational discourses on Community-Based 
Disaster Risk Reduction, Community-Based Disaster Management, Community-Based 
Reconstruction, etc. They rely on the assumption that, even in times of prolonged political 
crises, communities as islands of self-help and strong networks continue to exist and 
function, and where community-based interventions will thus benefit all. In this paragraph I 
would like to challenge this powerful discourse on community, and especially its 
applicability in the Angolan context. 
In sociological research the concept of community as a unit of social organization is 
often central but at the same time is highly problematic in theoretical as well as practical 
perspective. Community is historically used in anthropological studies to denote the 
particular community of the researcher in geographical terms, but throughout the social 
science the term community is much more about social ties, networks, structures, shared 
history and belonging than about its spatial limitations and boundaries (Poplin 1979). Hillery 
(1955, 118) asserts that “community consists of persons in social interaction within a 
geographic area and having one or more additional common ties”. This definition does put 
focus on location, yet also calls attention to social interaction and common ties, thus some 
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level of interdependence that binds people in those specific localities. Many ethnographic 
studies start with a focus on one or more communities, yet it often remains unclear if they are 
dealing with a village or community instead. Although communities are used in 
(development and humanitarian) practice to define the geographical locations of “target 
groups”, its use in scientific terms has quite different connotations and has been approached 
with care. The use of the word community brings forth romantic and positive notions of a 
group of people that share the same beliefs and ties. In this research I want to apply a 
distinction in the use of village and community as being two separate things. The village in 
this regard is a spatially defined area in which people interact and share the same 
geographical space. Community on the other hand is a much more fluid collection of people 
that share something specific, which carries across time and space. This is, for example, 
closely observed in the strong ties that transnational diaspora communities have (Horst 2002).  
Day (2006) in his book on the use of community as a concept in social scientific 
theory and research notes that the term has been highly criticized over the years, yet it always 
comes back in social scientific debates. He refers to this common notion of villages in the 
following way, “As places in which agricultural work is done, villages tend to be looked 
upon as long established, slow growing, close to nature, and in harmony with their 
environment, surely the most ‘organic’ of human contexts” (Day 2006, 40). This might be the 
case in some villages, it can however be questioned to what extent this also applies for a 
village in Angola, with a volatile history of conflict, forced displacement and migration. Such 
villages might not be long established but rather a result of a sudden or gradual process of 
displacement of internal refugees, returnees, and labour migration. All communities are 
differentiated in terms of age, gender, needs, interests, power and economic positions. 
Furthermore, community also entails conflict and divisions as well as mutual interests to 
some degree (Day 2006).  
Crehan (1997, 10) in her study of two villages in Rural Zambia addresses the issue of 
community in the following way: “Rather than seeing Kibala and Bukama as two distinct 
communities, it may be better to think of the people of Kibala and Bukama as caught up in a 
whole range of different but entangled collectivities or communities, all of which were 
themselves socially differentiated, and which impacted on one another in complicated ways”. 
She therefore does not attempt to do a community study of these two villages but rather to 
show the inhabitants of those two villages as having all forms of interrelationships, 
themselves constituting small communities within the spatial localities.  
The fieldwork for this research has taken place in six selected villages in the province 
of Huila. Within the villages one might see people belonging to different communities, for 
instance through political affiliation, ethnicity, family ties, shared histories of displacement. 
Therefore, I use both concepts in which “village” points at the geographical collection of 
people, and “community” entails the various forms in which people are socially and 
historically connected with each other.  The villages were selected on the basis of 
geographical boundaries, and their histories in terms of humanitarian interventions. The 
people living in the villages did not have similar shared experiences of war, of interventions, 
of livelihoods and of labelling. They have different life histories and backgrounds, are 
positioned differently to the social institutions and networks affecting the intra-village power 
relations, and have different livelihood practices. They do not constitute a historically bound 
community, due to (forced) migration and displacement during the war. Brinkman (2005) 
shows how during the wars (both war of independence as well as civil war) populations were 
forcefully displaced by all warring parties. She refers to it as being a war for people, in which 
whole villages were captured, or ‘liberated’ as parties would call it, and villagers would be 
placed in resettlement camps. These targeting and resettlement practices are what Brinkman 
(2005, 58) calls “the destruction of village life”.  
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 Brinkman (2003, 212) offers insight into how during the Angola war categorization 
of people from the bush, village, and town gradually shifted and gained importance as a way 
of defining political identity. During the colonial period, town as a categorization had been 
added, next to various ways in which people in the rural areas distinguished varieties of bush 
and village life. With the start of the war villages were increasingly targeted, with people 
having to choose between fleeing to town or staying in the bush. Village life effectively came 
to a halt, and village as a category disappeared from discourse. During the war town and bush 
became the only defining categories, which had to do with the fact that towns had fallen 
almost completely in hands of the Portuguese and later those of the MPLA, whereas the bush 
was restricted to guerrillas and later on mainly the UNITA. The country was divided in terms 
of town and bush people, not just because of ideological affiliation but to the fact that parties 
cut off access from one area to another (Brinkman 2003; 2005). People were left little choice 
where to reside. Attempts to move into town from the bush, and vice-versa, could be seen as 
treachery and therefore punishable. These movements and forced displacements were 
differently termed by all actors, showing the different discourses around these practices but 
also showing the importance of the population as pawns of war. “Both parties were accused 
of ‘stealing’ or ‘catching’ people, civilian informants did not speak of ‘liberation’ or 
‘recuperation’” (Brinkman 2005, 67). Angola’s experience of war has had a tremendous 
impact on rural societies, making it even more problematic to view village inhabitants as ‘a 
community with shared interests and social ties’. This has repercussions for aid agencies that 
assume the existence of these community characteristics in the design of their programmes. 
 
 
The humanitarian arena 
When discussing policy and practice of humanitarian aid, the term humanitarian space is 
often used to point at some geographical, symbolic room for manoeuvring in which 
humanitarians can operate safely. Spearin (2001, 22) provides the following, normative, 
definition of humanitarian space that entails these above-mentioned elements: “a consensual 
environment where humanitarians could work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian 
ethic’s principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity”. In his article on humanitarian 
space, specifically highlighting Médecins Sans Frontières’ (MSF) use and conceptualization 
of the term humanitarian space, Robert DeChaine (2002, 362) offers the following definition: 
“a supposed boundless zone or zones of action in which challenges to traditional conceptions 
of sovereignty are made”. In his conceptualization of the term, humanitarian space refers 
mostly to humanitarian organisations, their room to manoeuvre, their actual physical space in 
which they operate and the way the humanitarian principles are applicable to the politically 
sensitive areas in which they operate. In the author’s observations and interpretations of 
MSF’s policy and practice, the concept of humanitarian space emerges in three themes: as a 
space for ethical and humane practice, a freedom to act, and a form of operational 
responsibility (DeChaine 2002). MSF ‘humanitarianize’ space, and in doing so, engage the 
public’s perception of humanitarianism which in turn fosters humanitarian engagement 
(DeChaine 2002). MSF’s formulation of humanitarian space makes it clear that this space is 
reserved only to humanitarian agencies, leaving aside other relevant actors that in 
combination influence aid interventions and outcomes, such as the state, the military, 
churches and aid beneficiaries. This is one of the shortcomings of the notion of a 
humanitarian space for which it has recently been criticized (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). For 
instance, the idea that the humanitarian space is distinct and separated from political space is 
being challenged by the way politics are played out and intertwined with humanitarian action 
(Kleinfeld 2007). Studying humanitarianism through the normative framework of principled 
action depoliticizes aid, and is regarded as insufficient to explain the political effects and 
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outcomes of humanitarian assistance in societies faced with crisis (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). 
Also, the role that aid recipients play in shaping the outcomes of interventions deserves more 
attention than the concept of humanitarian space currently allows. Therefore a new term has 
been introduced to encompass more the everyday realities of aid and how all the actors 
involved shape aid in practice: the humanitarian arena.  
Humanitarian space often focuses on the important role that humanitarian principles 
play in intervention and negotiating processes, yet this tends to foreclose the actual dynamics 
of assistance processes. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) propose that the study of humanitarian aid 
should be much more grounded on the basis of empirical data of how aid actually gets shaped 
in practice. How everyday practice of humanitarians are influenced by principles, and how 
these practices shape policies is well illustrated in the article by Hilhorst and Schmiemann 
(2002) on staff from Médicins Sans Frontières and their translation of humanitarian principles 
in everyday practices.  It shows how humanitarian principles are negotiated and interpreted 
by the people that eventually assess their appropriateness and applicability; the actors that 
shape humanitarian aid in everyday practice. Therefore, humanitarian aid cannot be 
understood by merely looking at the formulation of humanitarian principles as core to all its 
functions. 
Despite all the humanitarian policies and tools, the practical implementation of 
humanitarian work is ultimately dependent on the people that work in the field, and the way 
they translate these policies into their own mind-set. Policies are influenced by the people 
that implement those policies in practice and the way in which they interpret, define and give 
meaning to them. Policies are not pre-formulated conditions with fixed outcomes that are 
non-adaptable to the local realities they are implemented in. Rather, they depend partly on the 
people who have to implement them. In this research humanitarian NGOs are not viewed as 
set structures but as a collection of actors who do not simply convey an assignment from head 
office, but rather shape and give their own meaning to their work. Hilhorst (2003) states that 
NGOs are processes and not solid things, thus we should rather research how “NGO-ing” is 
done in practice than study an NGO as an object. Actors that represent a specific group or 
institution do not automatically act in the interest of those groups or institutions under which 
label they enter into the interface (Long 1999). Therefore, NGOs, just like villages, consist of 
a group of multiple actors with their own interests, knowledge and power, which shape NGO 
practices.  
For this research the study of the intended and unintended outcomes of humanitarian 
aid on rural livelihoods, entailed a study of the humanitarian arena in the context of Huíla 
province in Angola. It investigated how the different actors in the humanitarian arena 
negotiated and shaped humanitarian interventions in everyday practice.  
 “In studying humanitarian spaces as arenas our understanding of the dynamics of aid 
should focus on the manner in which actors engage with and respond to their 
surroundings. It requires a grasp of the formal dimensions of aid as much as what is 
happening between the lines and in informal daily interaction. By focusing on the 
everyday practices of aid it becomes clear how humanitarian headquarters claims to 
political neutrality and the application of universal normative values are negotiated 
through the micro-physics of power in humanitarian arenas” (Hilhorst and Jansen 
2010, 1137). 
   
The humanitarian arena does not consist of humanitarian agencies alone as it is often 
perceived, but rather focuses on all the actors involved in the aid arena, be it state, churches, 
aid beneficiaries and the military. Specific attention in studying the humanitarian space as 
arena is required for so called aid beneficiaries, in order to combat the prevailing idea of aid 
beneficiaries as passive receivers of aid. This image of beneficiaries denies the ways that 
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people seek and negotiate aid, using their agency to influence outcomes of aid processes 
(Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). By viewing humanitarian space as an arena in this research 
allowed for an understanding of the different actors that played a role in shaping 
humanitarian assistance processes, and the prominent role of local people herein. It made the 
investigation move away from a focus on humanitarian principles and programs as essential 
to aid outcomes, but rather viewing outcomes as an interplay between the life worlds of local 
people (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) and the everyday practices of assistance by other 
actors. It is crucial to see how interventions are negotiated and evaluated amongst all the 
different actors, and how they fit in with actors’ life worlds, experiences and knowledge on 
both sides, to understand how outcomes of aid interventions are shaped in everyday practices 
and encounters. When do aid actors consider their programmes to have been successful and 
when do local people consider interventions to have been successful? Based on what criteria 
are interventions assessed in this regards? How do these programmes get shaped in practice, 
and which meaning is given to them before, during and afterwards, by organisational actors 
as well as the people these interventions have been geared towards? This thesis will show 
who the different actors were that consisted of this arena over time, and how their interactions 
at the interface of this arena shaped the outcomes of aid on rural livelihoods in the province. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis is an analysis of the actors that made up the arena over the years, and 
explores the everyday practices and realities of aid in Huíla province.  
 
 
The interface between aid recipients and aid givers 
Linked to the idea of the humanitarian arena is the concept of a social interface which was 
introduced by Norman Long in relation to planned development interventions. The social 
interface was conceptualized as: “a critical point of intersection or linkage between different 
social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon 
differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found” (Long 1989b, 
2). The social interface follows from the actor-oriented approach that was also introduced by 
Long to point at the importance of actors and their agency in explaining how planned 
development and social change is never a linear and external process but rather a form of 
negotiation between social actors that all bring in their own meanings, negotiations, desires 
and needs into the process (Long 1989b, Long 1992). “Aid recipients” should not be seen as 
merely passive objects of interventions, but as active participants in the development and 
change process through their individual knowledge, power and interests (Long 1992).   
Furthermore, it is at these interfaces that differences in power and knowledge are also 
most clearly identified and understood, that explain how outcomes of interventions can be 
different than was conceptualized at the onset of development or humanitarian programming 
(Long 2004). Interface analysis is deemed to be crucial in order to understand aid 
interventions as transformational processes amongst the various actors, and not just a linear 
top-down and external intervention that is accepted without struggle or negotiation (Hebinck 
et al. 2001). The central idea is that policy, implementation and outcomes of interventions are 
not separated and linear processes, but rather are shaped in the interaction between the 
various actors through the meanings they give to it. “Interface analysis recognises that ‘the 
subject’ in rural change is knowledgeable and active” (Arce, 1993, 13). The interface in this 
sense is the symbolic space where actors meet and negotiate these interventions, transform 
them, and influence outcomes on the basis of their own agency. Agency is understood as “the 
capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the 
most extreme forms of coercion” (Long, 1989a, 223). Agency is a concept that directly 
counters the notion of aid beneficiaries as being passive bystanders to which the intervention 
‘happens’. They give meaning to interventions, and shape them to accommodate their own 
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desires and experiences. (Rural) social change does not happen to ‘them’, actors negotiate 
change according to their own agency. Interface analysis helps to understand these processes 
around interventions.   
Interface analysis requires the identification of the relevant actors around a 
certain intervention and consequent following of the process of implementation and the 
struggles that emerge. Interactions at the interface can generate conflict when the interests 
and power relations of the actors involved diverge (Long 1999). Outcomes of these 
interventions and interactions ultimately depend on the different actors perspectives, how 
they change over time, and which room for manoeuvre they have to do that (Bakewell 2000). 
An example of the usage of interface analysis in research put forward by Long (1989b) shows 
its relevance and applicability to the research objectives presented in this thesis.  
“We need to develop a sounder comparative analysis of the processes by which 
‘target’ and ‘non-target’ populations respond to planned intervention. Such an 
analysis would aim to explore how different types of households, peasant groups and 
communities (including both those directly and indirectly affected) develop strategies 
for dealing with the new circumstances they face due to the introduction of new 
development initiatives, Such an approach necessarily entails contextualizing the new 
types of choices generated by specific interventions within the framework of the 
livelihood and organizational problems faced by peasants and other classes” (Long, 
1989, 4). 
 
This research has aimed to follow the relevant actors and uncover how they 
participated in the different interventions taking place over time, and how policy, 
implementation and outcomes have evolved. It also shows people’s responses to these 
interventions, and how these outcomes continued to be shaped after the intervention ended. In 
order to compare different villages that have had varying degrees of aid encounters and their 
outcomes on livelihoods, interface analysis is highly applicable to the research. The interface 
in this research thus can be conceptualized as the whole range of actors making up the 
humanitarian arena in Huíla province: village inhabitants, state institutions, churches, the 
military and NGOs, and the interventions where these actors meet and negotiate the outcomes 
of aid interventions.  
 Long (1989a) discusses in the quote above how ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ populations 
respond to interventions, but the decision-making process to establish who is targeted and 
why, as well as the effects of targeting also deserves further analysis. Usually, the start of a 
humanitarian programme is marked by an assessment by the humanitarian organisation 
and/or the local governance structures, to identify the most vulnerable population group and 
associated needs. This targeting of specific groups is what I refer to in this research as a 
labelling process. “Labelling is a way of referring to the process by which policy agendas are 
established and more particularly the way in which people, conceived as objects of policy are 
defined in convenient images” (Wood 1985, 1). Labelling theory has most often been applied 
to the categorization of refugees in humanitarian policy (Zetter 1991, Zetter 2007, Bakewell 
2000). Labels are used for accountability towards donors and public, but also to enable 
developing and implementing programmes towards the most vulnerable, a more 
administrative purpose (Christoplos 1998).  As administrative devices, they have far reaching 
consequences for the people that either fall inside or outside these bureaucratic labels, and 
tend to shape reality accordingly. “Labels do not exist in a vacuum. They are the tangible 
representation of policies and programmes, in which labels are not only formed but are then 
also transformed by bureaucratic processes which institutionalize and differentiate categories 
of eligibility and entitlements” (Zetter 2007, 180). In this research context one can think of a 
manifold of labels like: Internally Displaced Person (IDP), refugee, returnee, ex-combatant, 
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female-headed household. Using these labels can have consequences for people’s 
relationships within communities (Christoplos 1998). Addressing people in terms of their 
perceived identities as IDP, ex-combatant or returnee might have no relation at all with the 
way people themselves view their identity and that of others. Bakewell (2000) shows that the 
Angolan population living across the border in Zambia actually did not recognize the 
distinction humanitarian agencies made by using the labels “refugee” or “economic migrants” 
to identify which group was eligible for aid and assistance. In the case of Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes ex-combatants will be labelled as a 
vulnerable group because of the stigmas they face within society and a loss of social 
networks (or social capital). Programmes aim to reintegrate them into society by offering 
them a stable livelihood (for instance through seeds and tools programmes and skills 
training). However, specifically addressing ex-combatants as target group in livelihood 
programmes and skills training may be perceived by the very people that were affected by the 
warring parties as rewarding ex-combatants for their behaviour during the conflict. Labelling 
people within communities can create divisions where these did not exist or were felt prior to 
the interventions, and therefore contribute to different perceptions on identity, belonging and 
society. Organisations label their clients in specific ways to be able to distinguish who are the 
most vulnerable groups within a specific context in order to formulate guidelines for targeted 
actions. Labelling is then used as an administrative device, which informs subsequent 
practices based on presumed needs of that particular group (Zetter 1991). Labelling practices 
in this case can lead to insufficient or even lacking needs assessments, as it is assumed that 
the labels speak for themselves. Consequently, interventions are then based on those 
unquestioned labels. This is exacerbated by the ‘culture of speed’ which is common in the 
humanitarian sector, but which no longer applies to many of the long-term aid interventions 
that some organisations are implementing (van Dijkhorst and Vonhof 2005).  
The ‘culture of speed’ mentality also stands in the way of incorporating beneficiary 
participation in organizational practice (Hilhorst 2002). Although the importance of 
participation is acknowledged as important tool and practice that guides the formulation and 
implementation of aid programs, gives beneficiaries increased ownership over the aid 
process, as well as ensures the enhancement of aid quality, it often is neglected. The lack of 
incorporation of beneficiary participation is still too often blamed on the emergency situation, 
even though aid agencies increasingly operate in long-term and post-emergency settings 
(Hilhorst 2002, 205). Also, the absence of direct participation in aid programmes has more to 
do with issues of power and control over aid processes and outcomes than on the perceived 
lack of capacity on the part of beneficiaries (Bakewell 2000, 111). Bakewell (2000) 
convincingly raises this issue, by highlighting that although relief programmes are designed 
in very top-down and non-participatory ways, local people use their agency to shape the 
outcomes of aid programmes in ways that suits their interests best. The interface between aid 
givers and aid recipients is one of unequal relationships of power, in which it is up to the aid 
giver who ‘deserves’ aid by fitting into certain categorization or labels, in which needs are 
assumed or interpreted and not assessed, and where participation of aid beneficiaries can be 
mere rhetoric but not practice. However, aid beneficiaries do no passively sit around and wait 
for aid to be delivered and view the outcomes later, they use their agency to shape processes 
of aid to best suit their own aspirations.  
 
 
Livelihoods 
 
This section discusses the concept of livelihood and livelihood approaches, as they have 
gained momentum in development and humanitarian studies over time. Increasingly, 
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livelihood approaches are used by humanitarian organisations, even in contexts where long 
term interventions and commitments that fit these approaches are difficult to realize. This 
section highlights some of these complexities surrounding the use of livelihood approaches 
by humanitarian actors. 
 
 
Conceptualizing a livelihood  
Scientific livelihood studies, characterized by their cross-sectoral and locally grounded 
nature, have existed for decades, although not having been labelled as such at the time 
(Scoones 2009, 173). The definition of livelihood as a way to explain how people make a 
living existed for quite some time, and increasingly was extended to be understood as the 
assets and capabilities that people possessed or required to make a living (Chambers and 
Conway 1992, Sen 1993, Ellis 2000a, Kaag et al. 2004, de Haan 2007, Scoones 2009). The 
term livelihood gives attention to the non-economic dimensions such as the social institutions 
and relationships that determine ways of making a living, as opposed to other ways of 
defining income generation (Ellis 2000b, 290-291).  
The household was mostly used as the social unit of analysis for livelihood studies as 
“the household is a site in which particularly intense social and economic interdependencies 
occur between a group of individuals” (Ellis 2000a, 18). The household does not necessarily 
entail a family in the strict sense of the word, but is a family-based unit of co-residence that 
share a major part of the household resources and activities (Ellis 2000a). Although the term 
household aims to encompass all members, the term has also been criticized for neglecting 
gender-based intra-household inequalities (Niehof 2004). Kaag et al. (2004) also point at the 
danger of excluding women and children as well as power relations from livelihood studies, 
as it would give a much too positive image of the livelihoods, neglecting issues of gender-
based power and access to resources. Gender, understood as the socially constructed roles 
and relationships between men and women, influence the type of livelihood activities that 
men and women can deploy (Moser 1993).  
Criticism on the lack of inclusion of institutions and social relations in the existing 
definitions, as well as increasing attention for the different type of assets and the access to 
these necessary for sustaining livelihoods emerged (Bebbington 1999, Ellis 2000a, de Haan 
2000a). In this thesis I follow Ellis’ (2000a, 10) definition of a livelihood as comprising the 
assets, activities and the access to these mediated by institutions and social relations that 
determine the living gained by an individual or household. Although in his definition Ellis 
distinguished the different assets by referring to ‘capitals’ I step away from these very 
economics centred and pre-defined labelling of assets, because this may lead to a tendency to 
treat them as boxes that need to be ticked. The strength in his definition lies in stressing the 
importance of access, as well as the institutions and social relations that shape the access 
people have to the assets and activities that constitute their livelihoods. Also, a view on social 
relations and institutions enables power relations to be revealed which further determine 
access, an issue that was neglected in prior livelihood conceptualizations (Kaag et al. 2004).  
The way power determines access and inclusion/exclusion to livelihood opportunities and 
assets should, according to de Haan (2007), be studied in the institutions that surround 
livelihoods, as it is in those institutions where issues of power are played out most visibly (de 
Haan 2007). 
 
 
Livelihood diversification 
Rural people often use livelihood diversification as a strategy to avert risks. “Rural livelihood 
diversification is defined as the process by which rural households construct an increasingly 
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diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order to survive and improve their standard of 
living” (Ellis 2000a, 15). Livelihoods in rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa often are assumed 
to centre on (subsistence) farming of just a few staple crops, and interventions geared towards 
supporting rural livelihoods follow this assumption. Many authors have written about the 
diversification of rural livelihoods (Ellis 2000a, Brons 2005, Bebbington 1999, Barrett et al. 
2001) into non-farm livelihoods and they point at the need to look beyond agriculture as the 
main livelihood practice in rural areas. “Despite the persistent image of Africa as a continent 
of ‘subsistence farmers’, nonfarm sources may already account for as much as 40-45% of 
average household income and seems to be growing in importance” (Barrett et al. 2001, 316). 
Bebbington (1999) criticized the one-sided focus on agricultural viability for peasant farmers 
in the Andes and access to resources, without taking into account the space and use of other 
livelihood options. Niehof (2004) furthermore, calls attention to on-farm diversification, and 
uses the example of a study in rural Ethiopia that revealed that people preferred cultivating a 
large variety of plants which was seen as a sign of status. Also, on-farm diversification 
further limits the risk of dependency on just one crop, in case of unavailable or 
nonfunctioning markets, or a failing crop, and decreases vulnerability to crop diseases. 
Risk aversion is seen as a key push factor that encourages people to diversify their 
livelihoods (Barrett et al. 2001). The absence of safety nets provided by governments, 
communities and relief agencies as well as diminishing returns on productive assets, missing 
or incomplete markets and coping with shocks further account for rural people’s reliance on 
(non-farm) income diversification (Barrett et al. 2001). Brons (2005), in his book on 
livelihood diversification in Burkina Faso, zooms in on the importance of non-farm activities, 
or supplementary activities as he calls it, for rural livelihoods. From his research it becomes 
clear that there is a wide variety of non-farm activities, such as beer brewing, cotton spinning 
and gold mining, although their contribution to the household economy is not as significant 
as expected and diversification is not automatically born out of risk aversion. He noted that 
people that were risk-averse actually had less diversified livelihoods (Brons 2005).  
The level and extent of diversification also differed between men and women. In his 
study he states that men tended to prefer specialisation and women would prefer diversifying 
their livelihoods. This might be related to what Niehof (2004) notes is the gendered 
differences in risk attitudes which influences the choices that men and women make in taking 
up diverse income-generating activities. Also, daily time allocation is a very important 
variable that influences income generation and diversification options, and this variable is 
particularly gender sensitive due to women’s daily responsibilities in for instance child care 
and the fetching of water and wood (Niehof 2004).  
In addition, Brons (2005) makes a strong case for the importance of individual 
preferences and strategies, instead of the tendency to explain all livelihood decision making 
processes from a focus on the household. Diversification or specialisation in the context of 
Burkina Faso seems to very much be an individual preference, and is also related to gender 
specific needs and choices.  Both household and individual strategies determine people’s 
livelihoods and the level of diversification. 
Livelihoods are not only highly dynamic; they are also not bound to one locality. This 
can be seen for instance in the work by Horst (2002) who shows the global connectedness of 
Diaspora communities with local livelihoods in Somalia, through the sending of remittances. 
Labour migration also underlines that livelihoods are not bound to one single locality. 
Migration is another key factor of livelihood diversification (Barrett et al. 2001). Bebbington 
(1999) addresses the issue of (labour) migration which should not be seen as merely a 
survival strategy for rural people but “part of an accumulation strategy (either in the form of 
housing or productive investment)” (Bebbington 1999, 2027). One of the positive aspects of 
migration, in addition to the material and monetary returns it provides, is that it also adds to 
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social capital. Migration ensures the formation of extended social networks on which people 
can draw when pursuing their livelihoods (de Haan 2000b). Ellis (2000a) identifies 4 types of 
migration as a way of livelihood diversification: 1) seasonal migration (migration related to 
peaks in agricultural activity); 2) circular migration (temporary migration related to needs in 
labour); 3) permanent migration; and 4) international migration. Migration centres on 
remittances (according to Ellis 80-90% of migrants send remittances) and migration as a way 
to remove another mouth to feed from the household (Ellis 2000a). Labour migration is 
highly prevalent in southern Africa.  
 
 
The emergence of the livelihood approach as a policy construct 
Following from the attention for livelihoods as a focal point in academic, policy and practice 
debates on poverty reduction and development strategies, livelihood approaches were 
formulated with an added objective of sustainability. The concept of a livelihood perspective 
or approach as is currently in use in development policy circles emerged in the 1990s (Ellis 
2000a, Scoones 2009). Livelihood approaches in (rural) development programmes were an 
answer to the macro-economic approaches in the 1980s as embodied by the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes prevalent during that time, as they tried to explain the different 
aspects of livelihood practices on a micro-level (de Haan 2007). Calls for more people-
centred approaches were made which included the multidimensional and micro level 
processes that affected poverty, rather than just focusing on the broader economic policies 
(Kaag et al. 2004). Development institutions have since then been trying to capture livelihood 
approaches in frameworks and tools. The Department for International Development (DfID) 
has been one of the most prominent advocates of a sustainable livelihood approach. Their 
conceptualization of livelihoods has become an influential policy construct over time. Their 
tool or framework is inserted below and emphasizes the different aspects that make up 
people’s livelihood, functioning as entry points which can be addressed by aid interventions 
in poverty eradication programmes:  
 
Figure 2: DfID’s sustainable livelihoods approach 
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Livelihood approaches adopted by development organisations are characterised by looking at 
assets (material and non-material), or resources and capabilities which are present (for 
instance social capital, financial capital, institutional infrastructure) and incorporating these 
assets into a framework from which the opportunities and constraints surrounding those 
particular livelihoods can be explained (Bebbington 1999, Chambers and Conway, 1992). 
These livelihood approaches focus on people’s agency instead of portraying them as mere 
victims, advocating a more participatory approach (Kaag et al. 2004). They also tend to be 
bottom-up in nature, with aid being channelled through NGOs instead of the state.  
Bebbington (1999) has introduced and called specific attention to the issue of cultural 
capital in DfiD’s  framework above by stating that: “Over and above the meaningfulness of a 
particular set of assets, then, there is a meaningfulness associated with the set of cultural 
practices made possible (or constrained) by the patterns of co-residence and absence linked to 
certain livelihood strategies” (Bebbington 1999, 2034). The concepts of cultural capital and 
social capital stress the non-productive assets that enable or constrain the pursuit of certain 
livelihoods. Although initially intended to be cross-disciplinary in nature, the livelihood tools 
and frameworks that were developed echoed a strong influence by economists through the 
inclusion of different ‘capitals’ and the asset pentagon (Scoones 2009, 177).  
Although livelihood approaches are still in use, over the last decade its instrumental 
and normative application to complex realities have come under further criticism. (Scoones 
2009). The above framework used by DfID (1999) has been criticized by Kaag et al. (2004) 
for not taking into account the complex dynamics of livelihoods, and the tendency that the 
approach tries to capture social reality in pre-defined schemes and diagrams. This could lead 
to ignoring risks, variations, opportunities and constraints that arise within livelihoods. 
“Indeed we advocate a conceptualisation of livelihood practices as embedded action and of 
livelihood as fluid, moving with changing circumstances and responding to but also 
influencing external conditions” (Kaag et al. 2004, 55). The fluidness of livelihoods is also 
further demonstrated by the importance of (seasonal) migration and remittances for (rural) 
households.  
The perceived strength of livelihood approaches in capturing local realities has at the 
same time been subject of critique. “Livelihoods approaches, coming as they did from a 
complex disciplinary parentage that emphasized the local, have not been very good at dealing 
with big shifts in the state of global markets and politics. In the frameworks, these were 
dumped in a box labelled ‘contexts’. But what happens when contexts are the most important 
factor, over-riding the micro-negotiations around access to assets and the finely-tuned 
strategies of differentiated actors” (Scoones 2009, 181). Livelihood approaches as a policy 
construct, through its tendency in capturing complex processes in pre-defined frameworks 
and tools have seemed to devalue the concept of livelihood as an analytical tool in academic 
studies, as if tainted. However, the value of using the concept of a livelihood in understanding 
and analysing the assets, activities and access that determine the way people and households 
make a living, is still relevant in locally grounded and cross-disciplinary academic studies. 
 
 
Livelihoods in conflict 
People’s livelihoods are affected in many ways during conflict, sometimes directly through 
displacement, the looting of assets by soldiers, or the inability to work on the land as it has 
become a direct place of fighting. They are also affected in more indirect ways by, for 
example, changing power relations, reduced access to markets and roads (Lautze 1997). 
People that are caught up in conflict not only suffer from lack of material assets, but power 
relations also undergo transformations during conflict that either help or hinder the pursuit of 
certain livelihood strategies. Refugees and IDPs get disconnected from social assets, losing 
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their families and networks through which they maintained their livelihoods prior to the 
conflict forcibly displacing them. Livelihood adaptation, diversification and de-
diversification of livelihood resources takes place in times of crises, with possible detrimental 
effects for the future of household’s livelihoods. Income sources might increase in times of 
stress due to diversification strategies, but this is often accompanied by the selling of assets 
and cashing in claims which in turn de-diversifies the household’s resources (Niehof 2004). 
At the same time, people try to pursue those strategies and activities that they have relied on 
before, or venturing into other activities if the opportunities present itself. They do no lose 
sight of the future, nor simply wait and see what will happen or whether relief aid will reach 
them. “Even in the worst of disasters, decisions made by disaster-affected groups reflect an 
awareness of life beyond the emergency” (Lautze 1997, 6). Livelihoods are not uniformly 
affected during crises. Just as people’s experiences with conflict are varied so are people’s 
responses. “People’s livelihood strategies depend upon a broad range of factors, including 
location, security regimes, the strength of local governance structures and social networks, 
and access to roads, markets and water. There is consequently a great deal of variability 
among areas, groups, and even villages and households within the same locale” (Collinson 
2003, 16). 
In her article on the way that refugees pursue livelihoods and their interactions with 
the host communities therein, Jacobson (2002) shows how refugees’ goals and aims 
pertaining to their livelihoods differ significantly due to the situation they are facing. 
“Refugees’ immediate goals are likely to include: physical safety from violence, the threat of 
violence, or intimidation; reducing economic vulnerability and food insecurity; finding a 
place to settle; and locating lost family members” (Jacobson 2002, 9). Assisting the 
livelihoods of refugees and IDPs requires a different approach by agencies than merely 
looking at protecting or replacing assets. It also needs to involve aspects of protection from 
violence, and creating a safe space to pursue livelihood strategies.  
In this thesis I want to address the difference between a coping strategy and a 
livelihood strategy, conceptualizing certain coping strategies as a household’s way to 
diversify the rural livelihood, making it less vulnerable to crisis and future shocks. Activities 
such as the collection of wild foods on intercropping are deemed coping strategies when they 
are employed in times of crisis, such as droughts, famines and conflict. Coping strategies are 
associated with short-term and risky behaviour that might compromise a household’s socio-
economic recovery after crisis. A livelihood strategy, on the other hand, is deemed a 
sustainable set of activities that do not compromise the household’s ability to recover (Ellis 
2000a). Labour migration during crisis is often interpreted as a coping strategy. The 
differences between labour migration and forced migration due to conflict can be rather 
artificially created based on outside assumptions. Migration in Angola might actually be 
perceived by humanitarian agencies as displacement, and therefore not taken into account as 
a way to diversify people’s livelihoods. Brinkman (2005), in her book on the history of 
people of South-East Angola, shows the significance that labour migration played for people 
throughout history. Many young men had labour ties with then Northern Rhodesia or went to 
work in mines in Namibia and South-Africa; many women were in trade-businesses along 
migratory route. Other reasons for people to move from one village to another were for 
instance for agricultural purposes but also due to “death, disease and witchcraft” (Brinkman 
2005, 29).   
Many livelihood approaches and frameworks, such as the one by DfID (1999) have 
the objective to make livelihoods more sustainable, that is to increase the ability to recover 
from and cope with (external) shocks, while at the same time maintaining and/or enhancing 
the capabilities and assets (Chambers and Conway 1992, Niehof 2004). Schafer (2002) has 
pointed at some difficulties within the livelihoods approach when it is implemented in 
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situations of conflict, especially regarding the issue of sustainability. For instance, how can a 
livelihood be sustainable when people rely on humanitarian aid? Jacobson (2002) therefore 
makes the case for a “livelihood in conflict” approach that instead of focussing on 
sustainability, looks at ways to reduce people’s vulnerability and risk: “In communities 
facing conflict and displacement, livelihoods comprise how people access and mobilize 
resources enabling them to increase their economic security, thereby reducing the 
vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict, and how they pursue goals necessary for 
survival and possible return” (Jacobson 2002, 99).  
 
 
Rural livelihoods and the war economy 
Not all livelihoods are negatively affected in times of war. The political economy of war 
approach calls attention to how some people benefit from war, and therefore have an active 
gain in maintaining the war economy. The political economy of war approach requires the 
analysis of the production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution during war, to 
capture the motivation and responsibility of those involved from a historical perspective 
(leBillon 2000b). Perpetuation of the war economy through conflict and violence can sustain 
certain people’s economic profits and power, thus creating a major incentive for continuation 
of conflict (leBillon 2000a, 2000b and 2001). War economies are linked to wider global 
networks of drugs, arms, resource and human trafficking, yet also appear in the normal 
everyday economic activities that people develop in times of war (Hilhorst 2007). War profits 
are not just gained by the warlords, but also on a much smaller scale by people that are trying 
to sustain themselves and their families during war by for instance trading their agricultural 
produce with soldiers and rebels. This feature of economies in conflict can also be termed the 
‘economy of survival’ (Hilhorst 2007).  
Nordstrom (2004) refers to the extra-state economy that becomes most visible in 
societies dealing with war as the ‘shadows’: “the complex sets of cross-state economic and 
political linkages that move outside formally recognized state-based channels” (Nordstrom 
2004, 106). These linkages demonstrate itself in various forms; from a network of arms 
smugglers to a street child vending illegal cigarettes. Whereas leBillon (2000b and 2001) uses 
the political economy of war approach to call attention to the power struggles around 
resources that sustain and prolong wars, Nordstrom (2004) demonstrates how the political 
economy of war is applicable to all economic layers of societies in conflict. It does not only 
concern the big businessmen that make huge profits from supplying rebels groups with 
necessary arms to continue waging war, as it is just as much about the people trying to 
survive on a daily basis by trading in goods that might be acquired through illegal channels. 
They are all part of international networks that in some way or the other gain power and 
economic profits through the war economy. 
Collinson (2003) draws attention to the coping or survival economy, from a political 
economy of conflict perspective on rural livelihoods. This explains the more micro-dynamics 
and localized effects of the war or shadow economy, in that it views issues of power and 
wealth in conflict from the perspective of rural people and the way they cope with the 
increased risk to their livelihoods in times of crises. She addresses examples of villages 
where subsistence agriculture might be complemented by smuggling or poppy cultivation as a 
way to spread risk and diversify their livelihoods, as well as the localized effects of a coping 
strategy of Coltan mining in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which affected 
agricultural productivity and increased food insecurity in the region (Collinson 2003, 15). 
The political economy approach is helpful in understanding these localized effects of conflict 
on livelihoods and increased occurrence of illegal activities.   
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Political and social exclusion are factors that undermine certain livelihood strategies 
and increase vulnerability (Collinson 2003). For instance, how does (perceived) political and 
social identity determine people’s access to aid? In this research political and social 
exclusion, but also processes of inclusion are analysed to understand how people’s livelihood 
opportunities have been constrained or enhanced, and how this also determined people’s 
access to assistance during and after conflict.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Livelihood interventions in humanitarian aid 
Humanitarian agencies tend to approach supporting livelihoods very different from their 
development colleagues. Development organisations usually try to support livelihoods on the 
basis of what people do themselves, and make small interventions to complement these 
efforts. Humanitarian organisations on the other hand tend to distribute assets on a large 
scale, due to the supply-side bias of the humanitarian sector (Christoplos 2006). Jacobson 
(2002) identifies two ways in which humanitarian agencies affect people’s livelihoods. First, 
there are the formal livelihood programmes ranging from the obvious income-generating 
programmes to restoring food security, education, health and sanitation services (Jaspars and 
Maxwell 2009). Second, informally agencies impact people’s livelihoods by the aid they 
provide which often is traded within communities and camps, as well as the jobs that 
agencies offer to people like for instance assisting in the logistics of a refugee camp. Whereas 
the first type of interventions is aimed at livelihoods directly, the second type offers more 
indirect, unintended and possibly very significant consequences for people’s livelihoods. In 
this research consequences of both these direct and indirect effects of aid are analysed.  
Jaspars and Maxwell (2009) identify three objectives of these direct interventions on 
livelihoods in situations of conflict and protracted crises. First they talk about livelihood 
provision, in which agencies try to meet the basic pressing needs of populations, where 
interventions are mostly consisting of food aid. Examples of these interventions also include 
cash transfers and food for work schemes. Second, livelihood protection is used as a way to 
protect or recover assets that people need to be able to continue with their livelihoods 
(examples are: diversifying livelihood opportunities, recovery of livestock and agricultural 
inputs). The last objective is called livelihood promotion, where the aims are focused on 
supporting institutions, people’s access and rights to land, and skills training (Jaspars and 
Maxwell 2009). In these three objectives a certain chronology or contextual analysis can be 
noted. Not all of these objectives can be aimed for in the same contexts and at the same stage 
in times of crisis. “Whilst in the first stages of conflict, the focus of interventions might be 
livelihoods provisioning, during protracted conflict it may be possible to incorporate elements 
of livelihood promotion. This will depend on the severity of the crisis, and must not 
compromise the principle of meeting immediate humanitarian needs first. It should be noted 
that livelihood promotion in this case is unlikely to lead to sustainable livelihoods, but rather 
attempts to address the constraints people face in carrying out their livelihood strategies, 
thereby helping to meet basic needs (Jaspars and Maxwell 2009, 9)”.  
Often relief agencies see livelihood assistance as a way to increase food security in the 
region of intervention, thereby reducing people’s reliance on food aid. This type of reasoning 
makes subsistence farming seem to be the most appropriate livelihood option for 
interventions; subsistence agriculture leads to household food production, therefore 
decreasing the necessity for reliance on food aid, and any possible surplus can be sold 
(Levine and Chastre 2004). The singular focus on food production as a livelihood 
intervention in rural areas is also related to the institutional gaps between government and 
research institutions, and NGOs in dealing with rural livelihoods. Barrett et al. (2001) 
describe this gap as follows: “Being nonfarm means that agricultural researchers and policy 
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institutions do not usually believe that it is in their ‘mandate’. Being rural, informal, and 
usually small-scale means that those involved in industry and employment policies and 
research usually eschew it for urban, medium-large scale, and formal enterprises” (Barrett et 
al. 2001, 327). Seeds and tools distribution tends to be the most popular intervention for 
various reasons; amongst others it produces tangible results to satisfy the needs of donors, 
seed companies profit from this intervention and will use their influence to ensure its 
continuation, seeds and tools project are manageable to agencies and make good publicity, 
etc. (Levine and Chastre 2004). Relief programs for livelihood support continue to rely on 
pre-set assumptions of the aid beneficiaries that influence these standard-package solutions 
(Christoplos 2006).  
Longley et al. (2006) have noted that very often livelihood interventions by 
humanitarian agencies are focused primarily on the distribution of seeds and tools, without 
analysing the further context of the farmer (maybe the farmer already has seeds, poor quality 
of provided seeds, etc.), and without taking into account broader livelihood practices than just 
agriculture.  Utas (2005) gives a striking example of an aid agencies’ skills training 
programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia which, maladjusted to the 
particular rural context, actually increased the urbanization amongst these unemployed youth. 
This example, together with the examples mentioned above on a too rigid look at agricultural 
interventions as main option for supporting rural livelihoods, uncovers the uniform and 
quick-fix thinking in humanitarian interventions on livelihoods, and the unintended outcomes 
they can have.  
 Reality however has changed for organisations, which see their work increasingly 
expanding into longer periods of time, from relief to recovery and rehabilitation. As 
mentioned before, livelihood programmes fit neatly into this agencies’ space shifting from 
relief to development. As far as livelihood programmes are concerned there are some clear 
examples of the differentiated view on what is helpful to men and what is helpful to women. 
The evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Tsunami disaster of 2004 has uncovered 
some of these striking examples. Livelihood approaches during the Tsunami response 
focused on restoring lost assets, but did not take into account the rehabilitation of trade and 
markets, which are primarily the work domains of women (Christoplos 2006). Women were 
given more stereotypical livelihood training, and perceived those trainings as more psycho-
social activities than efforts to restore their livelihoods (van Dijkhorst and Vonhof 2005). 
Fithen and Richards (2005) in their chapter on demobilisation of rebel group Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) fighters in Sierra Leone, also noted this gender-biased approach, in 
which young women that joined the RUF were not represented in demobilisation and 
reintegration programmes. This has various reasons, one of which was that these women did 
not let themselves be registered as ex-combatant out of fear of further stigmatization in 
society. Therefore they were largely left out of programmes aimed at livelihoods and skills 
training as a way to reintegrate ex-combatants into society. The research in Angola will take 
gender into account by looking at the different livelihood practices of both men and women 
and the way humanitarian aid has incorporated gender into their programmes. 
Humanitarian interventions that do not have a specific and direct livelihood aim can 
still have unintended consequences for people’s livelihoods as identified by Jacobson (2002). 
This was captured well by Anderson (1999) who advocated the ‘Do no Harm’ approach 
amongst aid workers to reflect on these unintended and negative effects of aid. It showed how 
external aid can reinforce and exacerbate conflict, and how it in some instances actually did 
harm instead of good to local economies and livelihoods. Amongst others she highlights that 
aid can reinforce market distortions, production and trading patterns when the distributed 
goods that are imported instead of procured locally (Anderson 1999, 42-43). In this way aid 
enters in direct competition with local producers and traders. Especially during the 1980s and 
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1990s examples of negative side-effects of relief aid were being brought to the forefront, 
indicating how relief aid was undermining local markets and local capacities, making people 
dependent on aid, as well as actually prolonging conflict (Macrae 1998, Hilhorst 2007, de 
Waal 1989, Harrell-Bond 1986). This was the case in Rwanda, where relief organisations 
were accused of not only feeding the militias that were responsible for the 1994 genocide 
enabling them to regroup in the refugee camps, but also placing them in places of power 
within the administrative structures of the camp from where they could further exert power 
over the refugees fleeing from the terror these militias had caused in the first place 
(Middleton and O’Keefe 1998, de Waal 1997). Criticism on especially food aid (especially in 
bilateral aid relations) also revolved around its use as political instrument by attaching certain 
conditions to the receipt of aid, and the dumping of agricultural surplus by some donor 
governments (Devereux 1993). Middleton and O’Keefe (1998) give a striking example of this 
point in the case of Somalia. The delivery of food aid by the UN as a response to the famine 
of 1991-1992 that hit Somalia had negative consequences for local food production. This 
local production had just resumed and was beginning to reach local markets again when the 
UN’s food aid distribution flooded these markets with cheap food, undermining people’s 
ability to resume their livelihoods (Middleton and O’Keefe 1998). In conclusion, 
humanitarian aid in practice has intended and unintended consequences for people’s 
livelihoods, and this research has analysed these possible outcomes of aid interventions. 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
This research starts from the life worlds of people to see how they cope and respond to crises 
by adapting their livelihoods accordingly. Livelihoods comprise the assets and activities that 
people employ to make a living, and the access to these (Ellis 2000a). Livelihoods change 
profoundly during conflict, in both positive as well as negative ways. People get stripped of 
their assets through forcibly selling them, looting and displacement. The political economy of 
war approach highlights that in time of crises not all livelihoods are affected negatively, 
people profit from instability. Processes of political and social exclusion and inclusion 
determine livelihood outcomes as well, and the access to assistance. Aid is one of the many 
strategies that people rely on for their survival in times of crisis.  
This chapter started with a historical overview of the emergence of humanitarian aid, 
its principles and practice. Furthermore, humanitarian practice has changed due to the more 
protracted nature of the crisis situations it operates it, making aid more long-term in nature. 
This has consequences on many terrains, as it requires different approaches that incorporate 
more development aims and practices, which poses many challenges. I have argued that 
strong engagement with the state, a shift from a focus on individuals to society, and the 
uncertainty of being able to finish the job demands extensive analyses, flexibility and 
consideration on the part of aid agencies that engage in relief to development linkages.  
I have argued that studying humanitarian aid through the normative framework of 
principles is not sufficient to understand its practice and outcomes since it neither gives 
attention to the multitude of actors that actually shape aid nor explains how outcomes are 
shaped through the interaction of these actors in everyday practice. The concept of a social 
interface in which actors meet and negotiate the outcomes of interventions through their own 
agency, is elaborated to show the symbolic space where aid agencies and beneficiaries meet 
and where the outcomes of aid are shaped. It is at the interface where people’s own livelihood 
efforts meet the policy and intervention constructs of aid. In this research I have analysed 
how these fit together or mismatch, and what the consequences are of these processes.
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Introduction 
 
Angola has lived through a long history of violence. Much of the literature on the conflict 
history focuses on the civil war that followed independence from the Portuguese in 1975. The 
civil conflict was dominated by fighting between MPLA and UNITA for control of the 
country, and ended in 2002 with the death of UNITA’s leader, Savimbi. During the post-
independence war, the country underwent rapid and profound social change. The different 
stages of the conflict were accompanied by new waves of population displacement, both 
internally and across borders, resulting in a multiplicity of humanitarian needs. In the post-
conflict period, the legacy of the war remains an important part of Angola’s socio-economic 
situation. It has resulted in the erosion of the economy, infrastructure, basic services and 
institutional capacity. People’s human and physical security continues to be threatened by 
high levels of poverty and vulnerability, fragile livelihoods, and factors such as the presence 
of landmines. This chapter looks at the history and experiences of conflict in Angola. It 
explores different aspects including the main actors in the conflict, the motivations and root 
causes, as well as its effects. Furthermore, the chapter intends to shed light on how such 
perceptions of the Angolan conflict informed the response of the international community to 
the war, in terms of conflict-resolution, the humanitarian response and post-conflict 
reconstruction. This chapter is based on a preliminary analysis of the history of conflict in 
Angola, carried out jointly with Maliana Serrano. The text has been adapted according to the 
specific analysis in each of our individual theses. The chapter consists of an analysis of the 
conflict dynamics, through a political economy and ethnographic lens, of the various stages 
of the post-colonial civil war. It draws on key literature as well as on interviews and 
fieldwork conducted independently in 2007 and 2008, in different parts of Huíla province. 
The chapter provides a review of key developments in the political life of the country, with 
attention to both the internal and external factors affecting the conflict. It is primarily 
concerned with the history of conflict after independence, but starts with a review of the late 
colonial period, from 1961, when the armed struggle for liberation officially begun.  
We argue that the Angolan conflict is the outcome of the interplay of several factors 
with varying relative importance over the years. We build on Richards´ (2005) ethnographic 
approach to war which stresses the importance seeing war as a social process, by focusing on 
its localized and everyday realities and manifestations. We partly draw on a political 
economy of war approach in order to analyse the production and distribution of economic and 
political power in the Angolan conflict, including by international forces (Le Billon 2000b). 
Our analysis furthermore highlights the role of socio-cultural institutions that influence the 
relations of power. Through the analysis of case studies from four municipalities in Huíla 
province, we demonstrate the role of these institutions (and the interaction between them) in 
the localised dynamics of conflict and how the big politics of war have been expressed and 
experienced in the everyday lives of local people over the years.   
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History of the Angolan war  
 
Although we focus our analysis of the conflict on the post-independence and post-Cold war 
periods, we find it important to contextualise it in the broader history of violence. Events that 
preceded this phase were crucial in shaping the political landscape that emerged at 
independence and therefore in understanding the dynamics of the civil conflict (Cramer 2006, 
Birmingham 1997). We therefore start by giving an overview of the late period of colonial 
occupation, from 1961 to 1975, during which the liberation movements were formed and the 
armed struggle for independence intensified. The dynamics of the civil war that followed 
were affected by internal political developments but also by the involvement of external 
actors and the available resources for financing the war efforts of both factions. These played 
an important role in defining the characteristics that determined the different phases of the 
conflict. In this chapter, we distinguish between the liberation war from 1961 to 1975, and 
between three different periods of the civil war. The latter have been defined according to 
major political markers, such as the signing of peace agreements or cease fires. They include 
the period from 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords; from the re-ignition of the war in 
1992 to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and from 1994 to the signing of the Luena Memorandum 
of Understanding in 2002. Nonetheless, we recognise that this represents only one of the 
ways in which the conflict history can be characterised and divided. Pacheco (2005) for 
instance refers to five separate wars during the conflict years: 1) the war of independence 
(1961-75); 2) the war for power between the three liberation movements (1975); 3) the civil 
war between MPLA and UNITA with foreign influences (1975- 91); 4) the aggression by 
South Africa in support of UNITA (until the 1980s when Namibia won independence and 
apartheid ended); and 5) the post-election war, following the rejection by UNITA of the 
election results, largely financed by natural resources and causing the greatest destruction 
(1992 – 2002). We found through our fieldwork that the way history is perceived and 
recollected depends on people’s localised experiences of conflict and of other events such as 
periods of hardship and instability resulting from droughts, floods, and other natural disasters, 
or from illness or loss of family members. 
 
 
Decolonisation and the liberation war: 1961-1975 
Angola’s contact with Europeans started some 500 years ago. The Portuguese reached its 
coast at the end of the 15
th
 Century, in search of profitable economic activities (De 
Maeseneer et al. 2008, 61). Prior to colonisation, Angola’s people already had a history of 
alliances, conflicts, networks of trade and population movements (Neto 2001, 30). Actual 
colonial occupation varied significantly across different parts of the country. Luanda’s 
occupation lasted 400 years, much longer than that of other cities. Huambo, which became 
the second most important city in the late colonial period, was only effectively colonised 
during 72 years (Neto 2001, 32). Intensification of the colonial occupation process and 
economic diversification came in the late 19
th
 century and effective administrative control 
over the whole colony came only after World War II (Malaquias 2007). This impacted on 
local populations through different forms of forced labour, taxation systems (hut tax) and the 
production of compulsory crops imposed by the colonial administration. Such measures led 
to the early revolts in Bailundo and Bakongo regions in 1902 and 1911-13 respectively (ibid). 
In 1961, in the northern province of Malanje, uprisings of cotton and coffee plantation 
workers, to large land expropriations and poor working conditions, marked the beginning of 
the struggle for liberation. This episode resulted in a violent response from the Portuguese. 
Between 250 and 1000 white planters and traders and thousands of black farm workers are 
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estimated to have been killed, and many more to have fled across borders (Birmingham and 
Meijer 2004, 13). The organised nationalist movements started to emerge in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. The MPLA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 
were established under the leadership of Agostinho Neto and Holden Roberto respectively. 
The MPLA drew its support from the Mbundu and the African and mulatto elite in the 
Luanda area, whereas FNLA was linked to the Bakongo peoples (Malaquias 2007). In 1966 
Jonas Savimbi established UNITA after leaving the FNLA and its Revolutionary Government 
of Angola in Exile (GRAE). Savimbi´s support came from the rural areas of the Ovimbundu - 
the major population group in the country. UNITA developed a system of self-reliance 
strongly linked to its support-base (ibid). As Birmingham (1997, 440) explains, the waves of 
violence after 1961 fed directly into the social mobilisation and support-base of the three 
parties. Educated and westernised Africans formed the MPLA following the persecution by 
white vigilantes in the aftermath of 1961. Conscripted labourers that fled to the highlands 
following killings by angry coffee-pickers, joined UNITA. FNLA drew support from the 
thousands of migrants that fled abroad, mostly to Zaire, following another violent wave, led 
in this case by the Portuguese. 
With the start of the armed struggle, the Portuguese stepped up immigration into 
Angola and expanded economic activities, rather than preparing for decolonisation. In the 
first half of the 20
th
 Century, immigration had been modest, but it was significantly increased 
from 1950 onwards. With the arrival of a quarter of a million Portuguese, Angola became one 
of Africa´s most dynamic colonies and the largest white colony in Africa after Algeria and 
South Africa (De Maeseneer et al. 2008, 24). The intensification of colonial expansion further 
dispossessed local peasants. In addition, populations were displaced at various times during 
the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of violence linked to the smaller scale guerrilla wars (Robson 
et al. 2006). 
 
 
Civil war: 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords 
Immediately after independence, which was negotiated between Portugal and the three 
independence movements, the three parties entered into conflict as they raced to gain control 
of the capital Luanda. This course of events was strongly shaped by the interference of 
external political players, within the context of the Cold War. The Angolan conflict at that 
time was a typical case of superpower struggle for influence and control. Cuba and the Soviet 
Union supported the MPLA. It is widely acknowledged that Cuba’s support was decisive for 
the MPLA’s control of Luanda at independence. The FNLA and UNITA were supported by 
South Africa and the United States, particularly the latter heralded as an anti-communist 
insurgency (Vines 2000). Other actors were also involved in the unfolding of events, 
including Eastern European countries and African nations. Guiné-Bissau sent troops to 
Angola in support of the MPLA (Pinto de Andrade 2010, Vines 2000).  
South Africa’s involvement in Angola, based on a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy, aimed at 
preventing support for Namibia’s independence movement South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO) and for anti-apartheid movements such as the African National 
Congress (ANC). It entailed aggressive invasions through the south of the country (Hodges 
2001). The Cassinga Massacre in Huíla province is a well-known example, in which the 
South African Defence Forces (SADF) killed hundreds in an operation allegedly targeting a 
camp of SWAPO members.
8
 The US’ support was initially covert given the approval of the 
                                                 
8
 Groups of Swapo members (as well as ANC members) went into exile in Huíla’s provincial capital, Lubango 
in the 1980s. in Lubango 700 Swapo members were suspected by Swapo leadership to be spies and held in 
detainment centres in the city, and who subsequently went missing (Saul and Leys 2003). Attacks on ANC 
members residing in Lubango by South Africans also occurred, with the case of Marius Schoon as a primary 
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Clarke Amendment in February 1976. The amendment was established in the aftermath of the 
Vietnam conflict and was intended to prevent the USA from giving aid to military groups in 
Angola. Nonetheless, it only partially limited US action and was unable to prevent financial 
support and the continued recruitment of mercenaries for destabilising activities (Britain 
1998). It was repealed in 1985 by the US Government, after which time the US openly 
stepped up its support to UNITA. The FNLA which had initially also been assisted by Zaire 
(and China) became weakened and soon disappeared, leaving the MPLA and UNITA as the 
two protagonists of the civil war for the following 27 years.  
The role of foreign (military) interference marked this period of the conflict, until the 
signing of the Bicesse Accords. While external influences did not themselves create the 
divisions within the liberation movements, they did provide both the means and legitimacy 
for the war proponents to be strengthened and for violence to escalate, fuelling and 
consolidating its dynamics in the proceeding period (Messiant 2004b, Meijer 2004, Brittain 
1998). In later years, when the churches emerged as important actors in peace-building 
efforts, they argued that it was the inability of the parties to reach consensus that allowed the 
internationalisation of the conflict. On this basis, they advocated that peace could only ever 
be achieved through dialogue between the parties (Comerford 2004, 34).  
Although both the MPLA and UNITA were ideologically based on Marxism, they had 
distinct support-bases and developed into different regimes. The MPLA had urban support 
and experience in major cities, and struggled to adapt itself to the rural realities of the people 
of the north and the highland regions of Angola (Birmingham 2003, 184). UNITA also 
followed a Marxist ideology and was organised around Maoist principles and practices of 
guerrilla warfare and self-reliance (Malaquias 2007). It has been described as having 
developed a society resembling a military dictatorship, controlled by a ‘Stalinist-type 
discipline’ and characterised by ‘truly totalitarian social relationships’ in which any tolerance 
was absent (Messiant 1994, 169-170). 
During this first period of war, fighting was mostly contained in rural areas where 
UNITA had its strongholds. External support had given it control of large parts of the south 
and central regions of the country (Hodges 2001, Hodges 2004). This contributed to 
increased urbanisation as people fled towards towns and cities. Only at the end of the 1980s, 
with the changes of the international context - the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the achievement of Namibian independence – did Angola’s strategic 
importance to the superpowers decrease, allowing for the first steps to be taken towards peace 
negotiations. At the end of 1988 a Tripartite Agreement was signed by the Angolan, Cuban 
and South African governments, committing to the withdrawal of Cuban troops by July 1991. 
This announcement, combined with the major battle of 1987/1988 at Cuito Canavale, in 
which neither side came out as the winner but South Africa suffered a ´psychological defeat´, 
led to the withdrawal of its troops from Namibia in 1989 (Vines 2000). In the aftermath of the 
Cold War, the dynamics and motivations for the conflict changed. It became increasingly 
apparent that it was turning into a personalized power struggle between ruling president Dos 
Santos and UNITA´s leader Savimbi (Douma 2003). In June 1989, the two parties attempted 
but failed to negotiate a cease-fire. During the course of 1990, negotiations led by a troika of 
Portugal, the US and the Soviet Union eventually led in May 1991, to the signature of the 
Bicesse Accords. These called for a cease-fire, demobilisation process, and parliamentary and 
presidential elections. They gave the MPLA the recognition as the legitimate interim 
government until the set up of elections (Vines 2000). The implementation of Bicesse was 
however, fraught with difficulties. There was widespread concern with the preparation of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
example. The prominent anti-apartheid activist’s wife and child were killed by a letter bomb at their apartment 
in Lubango, where they had sought safety from the South African security police. 
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elections, given the low demobilisation rates, particularly by UNITA. Nonetheless, the 
international community pushed for the scheduled date of September 1992. With 55% of the 
votes from a 92% voter turnout, the MPLA had a majority win over UNITA’s 33% (Britain 
1998, 55). Savimbi rejected the election results, leading to the suspension of the second round 
of presidential elections and the return to war. Attempts by the troika and the peace-keeping 
efforts of the UN to secure peace quickly evaporated due to the ‘deadly pursuit of military 
victory and hegemonic power’ by both parties, as well as the different interests of the 
international community (Messiant 2004b). Its role during this period was greatly criticised 
for the failure to establish and maintain peace through its two peacekeeping missions – 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) I and II, established in 1981 and 
1991 respectively.  
Margaret Anstee (1996), the UN’s Secretary General’s Special Representative for 
Angola from 1992-93, refers to Angola as the ‘Orphan of the Cold War’. She highlights the 
lack of international interest in the conflict after the Cold War, which translated into limited 
support for the UN to perform its role. Restrictions in mandate as well as lack of human and 
financial resources of its peacemaking and peacekeeping missions made the monitoring and 
enforcement of the peace process virtually impossible. The focus on the Bosnian conflict 
further contributed to the ‘invisibility’ of the Angolan crisis (Birmingham 1997). The fact 
that the second UN mission (UNAVEM II) had a budget of $18.8 million compared to the 
$430 million of the UN’s equivalent mission in Namibia, illustrates the modest commitment 
to the Angolan case (Paulo 2004, 29). External interests also influenced the course of the 
peace processes and its subsequent failure. The US’ intention to get UNITA to power was 
also seen as contributing to the rush towards elections, given their assumption that UNITA 
would win (Birmingham 1997, Messiant 2004b). With the victory of the MPLA however, 
UNITA was technically rendered as an illegitimate rebellion whilst the MPLA power was 
consolidated (Messiant 2004b).  
 
 
From 1992 to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol 
The post-election war of 1992 was unprecedented in its scale and intensity, with an estimated 
1000 deaths per day reported by the UN at the height of the crisis (Lanzer 1996, 19). It is 
often referred to as the ‘war of the cities’ as it reached major urban centres for the first time. 
By September 1993, UNITA was estimated to control some 70% of the national territory, 
including several provincial capitals (Accord 2004). As urban centres became unsafe, large 
scale displacement continued, leading to one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 1990s. 
With one in every three children dying before the age of 5, Angola became known as the 
worst country in the world to be a child (UNICEF 1999 in Ostheimer 2000). It was at this 
time that humanitarian efforts were scaled up considerably.  
During the course of 1993 and 1994 several attempts led by the UN and the Troika 
mediation team ended in deadlocks. After this tense period of negotiation they brought the 
warring factions together and eventually led to the adoption on the 20th November 1994, of 
the Lusaka ceasefire protocol. Crucially however, the Lusaka process was not able to address 
the deep mistrust between the two parties, a reason identified as key in its failure to achieve 
peace and in the unfolding of events after (Messiant 2004b).  
 
 
1994 to the Luena MoU in 2002  
After such tense negotiations the signing of the Lusaka protocol did not signify the end of 
violence, but rather created a situation of ‘quasi-peace’ (Hodges 2001). During the early 
years of its implementation, important political developments took place. The Government of 
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National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) was created in 1997, incorporating members of 
the opposition parties, including some 63 UNITA’s representatives in parliament. The 
National Armed Forces (FAA) also absorbed some of UNITA’s troops. (Vines 2000). In this 
climate of no peace, no war,  fighting and human rights abuses were still widespread (Robson 
2001, 4). Once again, the international community was unable to revert the situation, despite 
the deployment of its third peace keeping mission (UNAVEM III) in 1995. The clear lack of 
political commitment to the implementation of Lusaka by the warring parties and particularly 
by UNITA, eventually led the United Nations Secretary General (UN SC) in June 1998 to 
reinforce sanctions against UNITA. The first sanctions had been passed in 1993, banning the 
sale of arms and fuel. New sanctions ranged from restrictions on travel to the freezing of 
bank accounts and the banning of the purchase of UNITA diamonds (Hodges 2004, 178). 
Notwithstanding critics of the potential impact of the renewed sanctions on conflict 
resolution, their focus on diamonds as UNITA’s main source of funding, reflected the 
growing importance of natural resources in the understanding of the conflict dynamics. These 
had become particularly important after the collapse of the Bicesse Process and the 
withdrawal of assistance from external political actors. Moreover, insider accounts revealed 
that the effects of the sanctions were felt within the UNITA regime. As explained by a 
UNITA official working closely with Savimbi “It was the sanctions that destroyed the armed 
faction of UNITA and culminated in the surrender of UNITA in the cities. Initially there 
wasn’t a lot of concern because we could organize the people to do this and that for us. But 
the people also needed other things to live and work and these things, like salt, eventually ran 
out. Our money abroad was frozen. Many UNITA people in embassies and key positions 
began fleeing their posts and coming to join us in the bush.”9  
By mid-1998, the peace process was once again in crisis as the government grew 
increasingly impatient with UNITA whilst UNITA in turn accused the Troika of pro-
government bias. In August the government ended the peace process and stopped dealing 
with UNITA, adopting a ‘war-for-peace’ approach and reverting once again to full-scale war. 
A new faction of UNITA (UNITA-Renovada) was established by former UNITA 
commanders, which the government considered its only legitimate negotiating partner 
thereafter. The UN observer mission United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) 
which replaced UNAVEM III in June 1997, was ended in early 1999 (Paulo 2004). This last 
stage of the conflict was characterised by the intensification of the fighting. The impact on 
local populations was aggravated due to the tactics of conflict towards guerrilla warfare and 
scorched earth practices. From this point onwards, areas under UNITA control were no 
longer accessible to the humanitarian community until the official end of the war, almost four 
years later. The significance of this for the humanitarian situation of people in these areas is 
discussed in other Chapters. Several security incidents such as the shooting down of two UN 
planes in December 1998 and January 1999 (ibid, 30) indicated that UNITA would no longer 
secure humanitarian access. As UN sanctions on UNITA were tightened and the government 
stepped up its military offences in the course of 2000, UNITA was further weakened loosing 
several of the strategic areas under its control. With the limited results of the international 
community in negotiating peace, the national churches gained prominence at this stage, as 
advocates for peace-building, conflict resolution and human rights. As Comerford (2005) 
explains, the churches contributed to a shift in the notion of Angola’s conflict as a ‘war 
against the people’, through initiatives like the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola 
(COIEPA) and the Congress for Peace. Other actors such as civil society organisations, 
associations and NGOs, the media and political opposition parties, made up a ‘civic 
                                                 
9
 Interview with ex-UNITA official, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.  
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constituency’ that established a peace movement. They saw peace not as non-fighting, but as 
the creation of a just and equitable society (Comerford 2004).  
Angola’s conflict eventually came to an end, not through negotiation and settlement 
of political differences, but through military victory. Savimbi was killed in combat on the 22 
February 2002 in Moxico, and peace negotiations were set in motion by the government 
immediately after. The GoA’s priorities included an amnesty for those directly involved in 
the conflict, the demobilisation of UNITA soldiers and their reintegration in society. This 
process culminated in the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Luena, on 
the 4
th
 April 2002 – the official date of the establishment of peace. In this instance, the 
involvement of the international community in the mediation of negotiations was minimal. 
With the exception of the Cabinda Enclave, the Luena MoU has become the marker of peace 
in Angola, which has been effectively maintained and consolidated ever since. The 2008 
legislative elections have been considered by many as the ultimate indicator of short-term 
stability. The MPLA won with a huge majority of 81.7% of the votes from a voter turn-out of 
87% (HRW 2009). Luena has not been uncontroversial however. As several commentators 
have pointed out, just like Bicesse and Lusaka, the Luena MoU was agreed between the 
warring factions, without the participation of other political, civic and religious actors. This 
compromises the ability to accommodate the wider interests of society, and may undermine 
future democratisation processes as power continues to be concentrated within the governing 
elite (Messiant 2004b, Griffiths 2004, Comerford 2004). According to Vidal (2006a), the 
uneven power-balance between MPLA and UNITA at the time of Luena, came to 
characterise the multiparty political system in Angola since.  
The history of conflict in Cabinda warrants specific attention outside of the discussion 
of the broader civil war, because although not completely separate, its conflict developed its 
own dynamics and attests to the need to understand conflict locally. The province of Cabinda 
is an enclave separated from mainland Angola to the North, by the Congo River. Cabinda has 
long been a strategic and highly contested territory given its natural mineral wealth, 
particularly oil and to a lesser extent, diamonds. The Cabinda issue has regularly come under 
the spotlight in recent years. During the 2010 football African Cup of Nations (CAN), 
Cabinda made international headlines as it became the site of a violent incident when in the 
lead up to hosting some of the games, a road convoy taking the Togolese team to Cabinda 
city suffered an armed attack in which 2 people were killed. The attack was claimed by a 
faction of the separatist movement FLEC - Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of 
Cabinda, specifically known as FLEC/FAC (FLEC/Armed Forces of Cabinda). The incident 
highlighted the continuation of violent contestation in the region and of local grievances, 
despite the national peace discourse dominant since 2002. Official developments in the 
politics of the conflict have been experienced rather differently in Cabinda from the rest of 
the country. The interlude of peace created by the Bicesse Accords of 1991 was not felt in 
Cabinda given that FLEC was not part of the deal. This was repeated in the 1994 Lusaka 
process. In addition, the Luena MoU of April 2002 did not result in an immediate cease-fire 
in Cabinda as was the case in the rest of the country. In October of that year, the GoA was 
still launching its ‘final’ counter-insurgency campaign in the province, before entering into a 
series of talks with the FLEC leadership (Accord 2004). In 2006, the GoA signed a peace 
agreement with FLEC/Renovada, the officially recognised faction of the movement. The 
agreement established an amnesty and called for the demobilisation and integration of 
individuals into the FAA. Other factions were left out and were not recognised by the GoA, 
which branded them as criminal groups (Monteiro 2010). A recent Human Rights Watch 
publication quotes that “between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 people were 
arbitrarily arrested by the military in Cabinda and accused of state security crimes.” (HRW 
2009). Previous reports from human rights organisations show a similar pattern of violence, 
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and the government response to the attack on the Togolese team has been considered heavy-
handed, with military intervention and several arrests. Yet, attention to this incident has done 
little in the way of further scrutiny of the political situation of the province, as the GoA 
labelled it as the work of bandits and terrorists (IRIN 2010c). “It turned an embarrassing 
situation into an occasion to be shown as a member of the fight against terrorism, with the 
blessing of the international community, thus managing to reinforce its international 
legitimacy.” (Monteiro 2010, 11). Moreover, developments in the course of 2010 in the 
organisation and leadership of the exiled factions of FLEC, have sparked new tensions 
between the separatist movements and the GoA. N’Zita Tiago, the new leader in exile in 
France, called on the population to continue the struggle for sovereignty of the region (IRIN 
2010b). These movements reject the peace accord, while the government continues to deny 
the actual existence of the FLEC as an organised movement that threatens security (IRIN 
2010a).  
This overview of the history of the Angolan conflict has brought to the forefront the 
different actors and motivations involved in the dynamics of conflict over the years. It shows 
that during the various phases of the war the dynamics of conflict changed as a result of the 
interplay of both internal factors and the external political environment and interests. 
Moreover, the legacy of the colonial regime and anti-colonial struggle also influenced the 
course of events after independence. The relative importance of the international response to 
the conflict varied with time, but clearly became intertwined with political developments that 
shaped the conflict.  
 
 
A political economy and socio-institutional approach to Angola’s war 
 
The political economy approach to war refers to “analysing the production and distribution of 
power, wealth and destitution during armed conflicts, in order to expose the motives and 
responsibility of those involved, within a historical context” (le Billon 2000a, 1). Conflicts 
are not simply understood by looking at ideology or state control, rather they encompass 
much more complex processes and issues of power. Also, conflict does not only lead to chaos 
and destruction, some groups gain socially, politically and economically from maintaining a 
situation of war which in turn can drive processes of social transformation (Duffield 2001). 
Warring parties are rarely homogenous groups that fight over one shared issue or ideology, 
they are a collection of individuals that each have their own motivation to continue a conflict.  
 
 
The political economy of Angola’s war 
In the case of Angola, much attention has gone to the economic elements for the start or 
continuation of the war, but recent works see these as only one aspect of the development of 
war. Angola’s exports have been largely limited to its oil, which together with diamond 
reserves, have been objectives of control during the war due to the monetary resources they 
generated to sustain military action. Hodges (2004) has written extensively about the 
economic drive for the continuation of war in Angola. He contends that control over 
resources made the continuation of the war possible, rather than being the cause of the 
conflict, as the eventual control over resources became a driving factor for both parties. “It 
was a war driven by personal ambition, mutual suspicion and the prize of winning or 
retaining control of the state and the resources to which it gave access” (Hodges 2004, 18). 
Moreover, such control implied opportunities to exercise patronage and could be a reason for 
UNITA never to seek secession of its territorial stronghold (Howen 2001, 20). Cramer (2006) 
notes in turn that it is not so much about the commodities as it is about the social relations 
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that shape the role of commodities throughout the conflict. Sogge argues that the theory of 
resources leading to political chaos is not so in Angola, given that “mere plunder and 
oppression to the neglect of statecraft has never been the MPLA approach” (2010, 3). He 
contends that a sophisticated centrally-managed patronage system has allowed the 
distribution of wealth in a way that has actually been stabilising. In Angola, there was a 
relatively neat division between the warring factions whereby the government controlled oil 
resources whereas UNITA had access and control of large diamond areas, a resource much 
more suited to guerrilla style structures. Without the presence of the natural resources in 
Angola the war could have ended sooner due to the lack of financial back up for military 
expenditure, and taking away a strong incentive for power (Le Billon 2001). The sanctions 
passed on UNITA, as described earlier, were based on this logic. At a certain point, the 
government even used access to diamonds as a negotiation tool with UNITA, by offering 
them a large diamond area in return for the control of other places (Hodges 2004). The 
troubles in the Cabinda enclave can also be seen as an example of a conflict where control 
over resources motivates the desire for secession. As le Billon (Le Billon 2000a) describes it, 
the desire for sovereignty of this province can be related to the fact that benefits from its oil-
wealth flowed mostly to outsiders, motivating the rebel faction FLEC to seek secession, and 
explaining why a peace accord did not run parallel to the rest of the country.  
The political economy of war starts from the premise that globalisation, state failure 
and war profits are important themes that influence the course of modern-day conflict (Le 
Billon 2000b). Globalization refers in this sense to the increased effects of the global 
economy on states internal affairs, which is why le Billon (2000b) asserts that the term intra-
state wars is misleading as it denies the international economic linkages that have powerful 
effects on how conflicts are played out and find their financial sources as well as access to 
arms. Cilliers (2001) argued that in order to end the Angolan conflict, the international 
political and business communities would have had to seriously engage in the clean-up of the 
oil-sector, as it served as the basis for the consolidation and conservation of power with the 
ruling elite. Sogge’s analyses of the Angolan context over the years have highlighted in 
particular the role of external economic interests, primarily linked to oil, in the creation of 
Angola’s extroverted political economy and its contribution to war, corruption and poverty 
(Sogge 2007, Sogge 2006, Sogge 2009). He therefore argues that ‘global good governance is 
also needed’ to address Angola’s development challenges (Sogge 2006). “In a context of 
economic recession and decline of external support, the state has often been left as little more 
than an instrument of power for the ruling group, rather than a provider of public goods and 
arbiter for social justice. What this amounts to is state failure – the erosion of the state’s 
sphere of competence, its power and legitimacy” (Le Billon 2000b, 3). In this perspective, 
state failure is seen as much as a driver of conflict as it is its outcome.  
Le Billon (2001) points at a combination of factors concerning identity politics, 
unequal distribution of wealth, and opposition against colonial rule as primary factors that 
started the conflict. He further focuses his analysis into the course of the conflict on 
resources, geo-political and ideological influences during the Cold War, and the personal 
dynamics between the two leaders and their entourages (ibid). Access and control over oil 
and diamond reserves became especially important after the end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent withdrawal of international financial backings to both parties (Hodges 2004). The 
extent of the monetary importance of both oil and diamonds for both parties, as well as the 
unequal budget availability for military spending amongst them, become clear from the 
following figures: in 1998 the oil revenues for the MPLA government totalled some 3 billion 
USD per year, whereas UNITA gained 500 to 600 million USD annually from its diamond 
resources (Hodges 2004, Le Billon 2000a). Especially UNITA’s ability to secure financial 
sources for continuation and even intensifying of war after the Cold War ended, and despite 
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UN sanctions on its diamonds, according to Duffield (2001) is an example of the complex 
processes of social transformation and adaptation. However, near the end of the conflict in 
the beginning of 2000, UNITA increasingly had trouble keeping control of its diamond 
territory, resorting to trading the stock they had retained until that point, which only gave a 
revenue of some 100 million USD per year (Hodges 2004). This was linked  to the GoA’s 
increasing military successes over UNITA, lack of investment in new mines, as well as the 
UN sanctions on UNITA’s diamond trade (Le Billon 2001). This decline in UNITA’s 
revenues contributed to the MPLA’s victory over UNITA in 2002.    
The spatial distribution of oil and diamonds made a military victory of either party 
over the territory of the other difficult. Thus, a political and military standoff resulted. 
Significantly, those with an economic stake in the management of these resources profited 
from the status quo. Le Billon (2000a) explains: 
“Similarly, lax controls on export licensing allowed UNITA to sell diamonds through 
government controlled channels, with handsome profits for officials and middlemen 
facilitating this laundering. In this type of relation, opposing parties may have an 
interest in prolonging a profitable military stalemate in order to preserve economic 
interest that could be threatened by a total victory and subsequent peace” (le Billon 
(Le Billon 2000a, 30). 
 
The element of war profits can be fundamental in explaining the political and economic gains 
that can be derived from continuation of war rather than a victory. A state of war and disorder 
can be a favourable climate for profitable activities and financial gain for a whole range of 
people caught up in the war context. Keen (1998) points at a variety of these more short-term 
economic benefits that can be accrued in war by combatants, leaving aside the struggles to 
take control over oil and diamonds. These benefits can be obtained through pillage, 
protection money collected by local warlords, controlling trade, and stealing aid supplies 
amongst others. His analysis sheds light on the potential benefits that war can create for 
some, and how ‘winning a war’ is not always the preferred outcome of violence and conflict 
to every party involved. Keen (1998) finds that war can also be seen as an alternative system 
of profit and power. This argument holds more true for elites and people in positions of 
power already, than the rural poor to which conflict rarely offers opportunities but rather 
causes destruction, displacement, loss of life and livelihoods. 
Le Billon (2000b) argues that “the state of poverty and distress of most Angolan 
people show that they have not been considered as relevant to the political economy of the 
conflict and the interests of the belligerents”. We would argue that they have in fact been of 
importance in the political economy of war and interest of the warring parties, as we showed 
above, but that as far as war profits go, indeed they have not benefitted from the mineral 
wealth the country has to offer. Firstly, because the benefits from those resources during the 
war were used for further funding of the war machine instead of basic service delivery for the 
population. Secondly, after the war oil revenues especially were still distributed to a small 
percentage of the population, namely what le Billon (2000a) calls the oil nomenklatura, 
which are the state and private companies and some powerful elites closely allied to the 
President of Angola. These processes of empowerment of a few and the disempowerment of 
the majority of Angolans shaped social relations (Sogge 2007).  
Another motivation for the MPLA government to continue a state of war, according to 
le Billon (2001) was linked to the political and economic reforms it would have had to 
implement in a post-war situation. As corruption and economic mismanagement was 
somewhat masked under the banner of a conflict situation, peace time would require a more 
accountable and legitimate state, where state budgets would come under increased scrutiny. 
War in this regard offered a state of abnormality for governance structures in which budget 
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expenditures that could not be accounted for, or were redirected from basic service delivery 
for instance, could be blamed on the war situation. As it turned out however, this argument 
did not hold up in the post-war, given that the GoA continued to reject negotiations with the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the war and until 2010. This is 
linked to its reluctance to increase international accountability on the national budget and 
financial flows, mainly from oil exports, to service delivery and social sectors.  
 
 
The local political economy of Angola’s war and social institutions 
Political economy of war does not just play itself out on state and international (economic) 
levels, but rather gets shaped and sustained in everyday practices of rebel groups, militaries 
and the people that are affected by war on an everyday basis.  The incentives to continue war 
were growing throughout the years, with the increasing discoveries of Angola’s natural 
wealth’s like oil and diamonds. But with it, the impact of the war on local economies 
continued to grow as well. In the rural areas it became a war of controlling people as well as 
resources. War tactics meant that people were the resources, be it as soldiers, human shields 
or agricultural producers (Brinkman 2003). People were forced to choose sides, participate in 
the war as soldiers, and start producing crops to feed the soldiers from either sides, depending 
on who was controlling the areas. Especially UNITA was known to kidnap people and force 
them into agricultural labour. At the other side, MPLA was known to have conducted a 
‘scorched earth policy’ so as to effectively cut off access to food for UNITA rebels, while at 
the same time destroying peoples livelihoods and forcing them to abandon the rural areas. 
“The fact that the troops are extremely poorly paid, and often paid months in arrears, has also 
meant that, during the war, the government soldiers, like their counterparts in UNITA, had to 
live off local populations, through pillaging and extortion” (Hodges 2004, 74).  
 A very insightful view on the micro-economic networks that arise during a war, and 
actually thrive on a state of war, has been offered by Nordstrom (2004) in her book on 
violence, power and international profiteering with Angola as an example. Her work unveils 
how extra-state war economies function on all levels in society, where ordinary people profit 
from the lack of state control and shadow networks develop involving both ordinary 
commodities as well as resource and arms trade. “Shadows, as we define them, refer to the 
complex sets of cross-state economic and political linkages that move outside formally 
recognized state-based channels. We use the term shadows (rather than ‘criminal’ or ‘illegal’) 
because the transactions defining these networks aren’t confined solely to criminal, illicit, or 
illegal activities, but cross various divides between legal, quasi-legal, and downright illegal 
activities” (ibid, 106). By describing people’s stories from an ethnographic perspective she is 
able to give a compelling picture of the size of the informal economy during wartime as well 
as the extensive networks that are needed to trade diamonds from Angola. Wartime 
economies do not just play out through big international networks, but are also part of local 
economies where goods are traded for instance between the local populations and soldiers. 
Although economies are severely disrupted in wartime, there is continuity in the way people 
try and maintain some normality in their lives and livelihoods (Hilhorst 2007).  
We subscribe to this type of analysis that considers how power and resources are 
played out and affect the course of conflict, as well as the role of socio-cultural institutions in 
shaping conflict. The role of the traditional authorities, of existing relations of trust or 
patronage, are all key in defining the distribution of power and resources at the local level. 
Even the political economy approach, which focuses on the role and interplay between 
resources and power, is engrained in socio-cultural institutions. Social institutions and power 
relations affect conflict dynamics and develop beyond and irrespective of political or 
economic motivations alone. An observation that le Billon makes in relation to the impact of 
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war on Angola’s population seems to hint at an overreliance on economic rationality versus 
consequences of war and violence. “While the war has had a dramatic impact on many 
people, it is worth noting that the vast majority of the population has been sheltered from the 
direct consequences of war. Most of their suffering arises from economic mismanagement 
and a lack of employment opportunities” (ibid, 34). Le Billon’s point denies the effects of the 
war on especially the rural population, as the high number of civilians deaths from direct 
violence or hunger can hardly be blamed on economic mismanagement. There is a need to go 
further than a political economy of war analysis and its focus on a market-oriented 
explanation war. Moreover, a socio-institutional approach to war implies a focus on the local 
level, where the forces of the broader conflict interact with local norms and power relations, 
and the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped. Bakonyi and Stuvøy’s (2005, 361) analysis is 
an alternative to rational economic or rational-political explanations of war economies. “In 
addition to examining the functions of violence for economic purposes, the role of social 
institutions, norms, and rules for the behaviour of actors and for their economic activities in 
war must be addressed. […] The conduct of economic activities is not isolated from patterns 
of authority, and thus, the market can neither be the sole nor the central institution of war 
economies”. They argue that such explanations on the one hand ignore the role of social 
institutions by reducing the motivation for violence to individual economic gains. On the 
other hand, they do not take into account that despite the forces of globalization on conflict, it 
is at the local level that the competition from globalised economies is negotiated and that 
violence is therefore influenced by local institutions and actors on the ground. Where we 
diverge from their analysis of the Angolan case, is in their claim that UNITA drew 
considerable legitimacy from its social welfare services and its support with the 
administration of villages in exchange for food (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005, 369). As the case 
studies of the proceeding section will demonstrate, such services were very limited in time 
and coverage as they were reserved for those with direct links to the military regime within 
UNITA’s headquarters. Additionally, the practice of feeding troops with the produce of local 
people was frequently referred to as abusive and violent, involving informal taxation or 
outright pillaging, rather than as a neat ‘division of labour’ as the authors label it. Our case 
studies also reveal how local actors through their strategies shape the micro-dynamics of 
conflict. In other words, we draw on the notion of agency of individual actors, in line with 
Long´s actor-oriented approach (1992), to analyse how local actors, both perpetrators and 
victims of violence, shape and respond to violence.  
 
 
Multiple realities of the Angolan conflict 
 
Richards (2005) argues that further research on conflict should focus on war as a social 
process in order to understand what actually happens in practice, rather than trying to uncover 
one particular root cause for it. Trying to attribute assumed root causes to wars obscures the 
variety of elements at play during conflict, which also change over time. Causes of conflict in 
Angola must be sought in combinations of different internal and external elements, as well as 
the historical power void left by Portuguese colonialism, as newly formed parties struggled to 
take control over the country. The Cold War influenced the course of the Angolan civil war 
tremendously, but the violence did not end together with the demise of the international 
influence in the conflict. Moreover, what the reason for fighting in one locality was, might 
have had no connection at all in explaining violence in another area. Individual loyalties in 
civil wars are often more informed on locally based cleavages than on these impersonal 
discourses of war, or connected to local and personal conflicts (Kalyvas 2001). Focusing on 
everyday realities of war instead of on root causes, allows for an analysis of how these 
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localized factors of conflict play out and connect to the macro processes of war. This 
corroborates Richards’ (2005) case for an ethnographic approach to war, in which these 
societal processes that cause war to happen and continue should be studied in practice to 
better understand the dynamics at play in times of conflict. Although this research did not 
take place during the war, understanding how conflict affected people´s lives, livelihoods and 
capacities was key to the study of aid in conflict. We were interested in grounding the 
analysis of conflict in the local experiences of the conflict, by collecting people´s narratives 
and perceptions. By looking at localized and multiple realities of war through four case 
studies, we uncover the meaning of war for the people that were affected by it on a daily 
basis. In this section we focus on the everyday realities of war, to understand how political 
events at the macro level unfold on the ground, and connect with local processes and 
dynamics of war. We are specifically interested in the diversity of experiences and 
perceptions of conflict through the everyday life of local populations. The intensity of the 
fighting varied considerably over the 27 years of conflict and across Angola´s national 
territory. It therefore produced quite distinct localised effects. Nevertheless, the impact of the 
war on local people can be characterised by some more generalised processes. These included 
population displacement, urbanisation and the abuse by both parties of civilian groups. In 
Huíla alone, the number of displaced people by September 2002 reached between 191,000 
and 315,941, according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
and MINARS, respectively. The greatest concentration of displaced people was found in the 
municipalities of Chipindo, Kuvango, Quilengues and Caconda (Porto et al. 2007, 31). In 
addition to physical displacement, the loss of assets, forced recruitment of soldiers and 
women, the collapse of basic social services and infrastructure, the breakup of communities 
and families and of rural institutions of solidarity, all had a great impact on people’s lives and 
coping capacities (Robson et al. 2006).  
These different contexts are presented in the next section in our review of four 
municipalities of Huíla province. These four municipalities are the fieldwork areas of the two 
PhD projects on which this chapter is based. The data presented in these four case studies was 
collected over a period of one and a half year in various villages in the municipalities. Semi-
structured and open interviews, life histories and surveys were used to collect people’s 
experiences with conflict and its localised dynamics and effects on their everyday lives. The 
four municipalities represent various positions in terms of the political situation (government 
or UNITA controlled), the nature of displacement, the degree of urbanisation, the intensity of 
direct fighting and the overall effects on the everyday life of local people. 
 
 
Chipindo 
Located 460km to the north-east of Lubango, along severely disrupted road infrastructure, 
Chipindo is likely the most remote and isolated município of the province. It has little in the 
way of a formal economy and most local people live from subsistence agriculture and basic 
trade for non-food items.  
Chipindo is known for the severity of the conflict on its local people, as it was situated 
at the centre of the territory contested between the warring factions. It remained under the 
control of UNITA for most of the duration of the war, with only occasional attempts of 
takeover by government forces. The first large waves of displacement started in the early 
1980s. In the northern area of Bunjei, people recall the deterioration of security and living 
conditions being marked by the take-over of the mission-hospital of the Igreja Evangélica 
Congregacional de Angola (IECA) by Cuban troops. This foreign interference in the war was 
seen as damaging for their situation. In addition, the local mission and its workers had played 
a crucial role in supporting the local population in terms of access to health and education 
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services, already during the colonial period. The departure of foreign missionaries due to 
insecurity and the physical take-over of the mission, directly impacted on people’s welfare. 
Over the years, areas like Bunjei became completely deserted as people fled primarily to the 
‘bush’ rather than camps. Official government figures estimate that 98% of the current 
population are ex-IDPs, although we did not come across a single individual who had not 
been displaced. For the majority, displacement became a permanent condition as they spent 
as long as 15 or 20 years on the move. Many were born and raised in displacement, in 
UNITA-controlled territory. 
Many youngsters were forcibly recruited by UNITA as soldiers, whilst other 
individuals were abducted to work for the regime in its Jamba headquarters. The main targets 
were skilled people, such as health workers and teachers. Many of these people were (staff) 
members of IECA’s local mission. On the one hand, they made up the educated elite with the 
skills needed by UNITA. On the other, UNITA’s links to the protestant church meant that 
IECA members were seen as brothers and sisters, and were given preferential treatment. 
Some young men were spared from military life because they were sons of IECA, and should 
be educated to become the future leaders. Bakonyi & Stuvøy (2005) describe the use by 
UNITA of its links to the protestant church to mobilise support and gain legitimacy. The 
experience of the conflict years of individuals within the UNITA regime and their families 
was significantly different from those of others displaced to the bush. Despite their violent 
recruitment, they were given access to basic services such as schooling, healthcare, food and 
physical security, until UNITA started to weaken at the end of the 1990s. The remainder of 
the population fended for themselves, mostly through farming wherever and whenever 
possible. They were often required to contribute part of their harvest to the regime, or to work 
on communal lavras (fields) for their food production. Basic services were non-existent and 
people had no access to any form of external assistance throughout the war. They attempted 
to reproduce village life through smaller settlements and by electing new traditional 
authorities. In the post-war years, as people returned to their areas of origin, leadership 
positions sometimes had to be renegotiated as old and new leaders came to cohabit the same 
communities. Although tradition normally reinstates the original soba, tension between 
individuals emerged in some communities, particularly where competing individuals were 
aligned with opposing political parties.  
The localised experiences of the conflict for Chipindo’s population, broadly followed 
the military developments of the conflict, in terms of displacement and violence. However, 
people’s accounts reveal that often they were unsure of who was persecuting them, 
particularly after the 1998 return to war, when both UNITA and the government resorted to 
their exploitation and brutal treatment. From 2000 they were constantly on the run, unable to 
retain assets, produce food or build shelter. In the final months of the war, hundreds of 
thousands were forcibly rounded up by the FAA into make-shift camps.
10
 Most striking about 
the conflict experience of this region is that contrary to dominant perceptions of the civil war, 
it was at the time the conflict ended that the population suffered the greatest humanitarian 
impact. Bunjei was infamously referred to as a ´cemetery town´ at that time (Messiant 
2004a). “Chipindo experienced the worst of the immediate post-war humanitarian crisis with 
very high levels of disease and mortality.” (Porto et al. 2007, 37). Aid in this area does not 
figure as a direct contributor to changing social relations during the conflict, given that it was 
unavailable throughout that time. The legacy of partisan politics that shaped the conflict are 
very much alive in Chipindo, reflecting its strong links with UNITA. As part of the national 
                                                 
10
 According to early NGO assessments, the population of Caquela bairro (a major IDP reception area in 
Bunjei) went from 1,500 in February 2002 to 24,000 by August 2002 ZOA & ADESPOV 2002. Projecto de 
emergência com deslocados e reassentados em Bunjei: Relatório de Progresso, Setembro a Novembro 2002. 
Lubango: ZOA Refugee Care. 
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reintegration and reconciliation programme, the government has allocated several jobs to ex-
UNITA cadres, namely in local health services. However, recent appointments of school 
teachers are said to be discriminating against local teachers because of their links to UNITA. 
IECA has re-emerged as an important actor in local development, although still struggles to 
assert its neutrality and avert co-option by politics. 
 
 
Caluquembe 
From 1975 onwards, war only slowly started affecting people’s lives in Caluquembe 
municipality, located in the North of Huíla province. First, it became increasingly difficult to 
access the area, due to fighting along the access roads. Goods were not coming in anymore, 
and people from surrounding areas started moving towards the municipal center to find food 
as it became more difficult to continue producing food, either due to lack of inputs or because 
the area became the site of active fighting. During the 1980s the municipal center, 
Caluquembe-Sede, expanded substantially due to the influx of IDPs from other provinces, as 
well as from neighboring remote areas where troops were starting to fight each other. During 
the 1990s the influence of UNITA in Caluquembe expanded, and the area continued to 
encounter conflict and violence, especially before and after the 1992 elections. The 
Caluquembe hospital and Igreja Evangélica Sinodal de Angola (IESA) mission had become a 
battleground for both troops. As Savimbi had a connection and affinity to this church, having 
been educated on an IESA mission school himself, the mission and hospital struggled with 
issues of neutrality throughout the war. Christians were assumed to be in support of UNITA 
due to their religion, and staff of the hospital and mission were asked to show their support to 
UNITA in aiding the troops. In 1993 UNITA effectively took over the hospital and mission. 
The hospital administrator watched the local population loot the hospital equipment, and after 
the war went from door to door to reclaim the goods. In 1994 the hospital and mission 
became the target of government bombing, after which MPLA regained control over the 
town, hospital and mission.   
 Depending on who you ask, the situation changed positively or negatively after 1994. 
For people that sympathize with MPLA the re-occupation of Caluquembe in 1994 by the 
government, ensured they could start living and working in town again. For people that were 
linked to UNITA, 1994 became a moment of displacement. Also, (assumed) connection to 
UNITA informed the access to aid that people had. For instance, the soba of one village near 
Caluquembe-Sede was said to have been ignored by local administration and aid 
organizations due to his affiliation to UNITA. UNITA received the majority of the votes in 
Caluquembe during the 1992 elections, which was an uncommon occurrence in the rest of the 
province (Schot 2009). During and after the war, UNITA retained a certain power and 
legitimacy in the region. The local government administration of Caluquembe consisted of 
both MPLA and UNITA representatives, also as part of the Government of National Unity as 
had been proposed in the peace agreements. Tensions in local government were high 
however. In 2004, a UNITA municipal administrator mysteriously disappeared, fuelling 
rumors and tensions between members of the administration linked to either of the 2 parties 
(Schot 2009).   
Caluquembe town grew throughout the war. New neighborhoods were formed with 
refugees from surrounding areas. People were confined to the town as the roads had become 
too dangerous to travel on, and the surrounding bush was too dangerous to enter. People were 
not able to access their lands, or would do so in groups during the day, only to head back at 
night to the town to seek its relative safety. Firewood was collected within 10 kilometers of 
the town, leaving it deforested to this day. Displacement occurred in different directions, 
largely depending on party affiliation. For instance, most of the population from the villages 
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of Camucuio and Cue 1 which are located relatively far away from the municipal center and 
are considered to be in ‘the bush’, fled to the municipal town and stayed there for many years 
as their region had been taken over by UNITA. On the other hand, Catala, a village along the 
main provincial road and close to Caluquembe-sede, was deserted during the war as its 
inhabitants fled together with UNITA troops after Caluquembe-Sede was re-occupied by 
government troops in 1994. Some people from this village were also sent to so called ‘re-
education camps’ by MPLA for several years if suspicion of UNITA affiliation had fallen on 
them. These displacement movements brought along the curious situation that people from 
‘town’ stayed in the deserted villages in the ‘bush’, which had been left behind by the people 
that in turn fled and occupied the empty houses in the towns. 
Caluquembe is an example of an area that was severely contested by UNITA and MPLA and 
suffered the consequences. The local hospital and evangelical mission became central sites 
where war politics were fought out. Party affiliation remains a hotly debated issue in local 
politics and beyond. Displacement in Caluquembe occurred in different waves and directions, 
linked to the political outcomes of the war and real or perceived party affiliation.  
 
 
Matala  
Matala, located in the south-east of Huíla, is traditionally an agricultural municipality 
consisting of farmers and herders. A large proportion of its population now live in and around 
Matala town (Sede) in roadside peri-urban bairros, and their livelihoods depend primarily on 
informal business (negócio). Matala town is one of the most thriving municipal capitals of 
Huíla with significant state and private sector investment.
11
 Throughout the war, it remained 
under government control and was never occupied by UNITA. Today the MPLA remains 
dominant in local government offices and popular support. As an MPLA secretary of a local 
bairro explained, “UNITA representatives can come here all they like, but nobody goes to 
listen to them, they are not wanted here”. Compared to other municipalities, there seem to be 
few (outspoken) ex-UNITA combatants in Matala. The town itself was never directly 
disputed in combat, because it was fiercely protected by a government army base, partly to 
safeguard the major hydro-electrical dam. However, fighting reached its outskirts at various 
times. The external influence on the civil war was witnessed directly by the local population, 
when Cuban troops in the 1980s helped the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of 
Angola (FAPLA) to secure the area against UNITA. The relative security of Matala 
transformed it into a major reception centre for IDPs fleeing from neighbouring areas during 
the conflict and in its immediate aftermath.
12
  
Displacement affected the socio-economic makeup and relations of the area 
significantly, as various waves of IDPs arrived over the years. Matala’s population today is 
ethnically very diverse as a result. People’s experience of displacement was varied, according 
for instance, on their origin or time of arrival. Only those that lived within the relatively safe 
areas around town were never completely uprooted, as in the case of Monhanamgombe 
village. Yet, many recall several periods of having to ‘sleep’ in the bush, to escape night-time 
attacks to their villages. First wave IDPs arrived in the early 1980s and were hosted by local 
resident populations, mainly from the Muhumbi ethnic group. Through traditional practices 
of solidarity and mutual help, they were usually given land by the local sobas and assisted by 
residents with (free) seeds and the use of animal traction in exchange for labour. Local sobas 
thus carried significant power, even vis-à-vis the sobas of the displaced communities. As land 
                                                 
11
 The local economy benefits from its geographical location between Cunene province (bordering Namibia) and 
Lubango, and on the Namibe-Lubango railway line. 
12
 Moreover, because of its political situation Matala hosted the official state administration of Cunene province, 
which abandoned its post due to heavy fighting with South African troops. 
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became scarcer in later years, IDPs had to rent it and/or work for locals for as little as 
2kg/day of maize flour. Many became fully dependent on humanitarian aid. Over the years, 
first wave IDPs were thus able to establish themselves in the area and secure their 
livelihoods. They became the ‘better-off’ IDP group with the (economic) power to help later 
arrivals. Many have been unwilling to return to their areas of origin with the end of the war.  
The post-election war of 1992 was remembered as the period of greatest population 
influx. Residents of neighbouring comunas within Matala municipality, were forced to seek 
refuge in town from military attacks that reached their villages. Local residents of Mupindi 
community (Micosse comuna) fled to the Sede multiple times, usually on a temporary basis, 
ranging from a few days to a few months. They were mostly absorbed by family members 
rather than joining the swelling crowds in the IDPs camps of Visaka, Ndjenvei, Chipopia and 
Kanjanguiti. Many of today’s bairros and villages were created as reception areas for IDPs 
which became permanent settlements. Bairro KM15 was created in 1984. Today it is one of 
the largest in population terms
13
 and has its own state health centre and school. Other 
communities such as Calumbo, emerged from the initiative of local government to relocate 
IDPs from overcrowded areas to those where more land was available. These settlements led 
to a certain ‘segregation’ of ex-IDPs in the current demographics of Matala.  From the mid-
1990s Matala also became a hub for the distribution of relief aid by aid organisations. 
Initially, (food and medical) aid was exclusively targeted at recent IDPs, but as the general 
situation deteriorated, resident and older IDP groups also became eligible. Perhaps as a result 
of this change, we found few accounts of conflict between resident and IDP groups over 
access to aid. It was generally accepted that those that had lost everything were in greater 
need. With specific reference to the impact of aid, some individuals reported frustration with 
the long procedures and corrupt practices that emerged with its distribution. Humanitarian aid 
significantly empowered traditional leaders such as the sobas and village secretaries, by 
giving them the responsibility of defining beneficiaries. This enabled patronage and 
corruption in some instances. Matala suffers from a high crime rate and from rampant cattle 
theft. Victims often blame this on outside youth from neighbouring areas, where many IDPs 
have settled. Moreover, Matala’s urbanisation problems stem directly from war induced 
displacement. Road access is so poor that ‘in some areas you can’t even remove the coffin of 
a dead body.”14 
This case shows that conflict can develop localized dynamics, even where direct 
fighting is not involved. In Matala, the effects of large-scale displacement were behind the 
changes in the socio-economic conditions and in power relations, between residents and 
IDPs, within different IDP groups, and between people and their leaders. Its historic 
importance as a government-controlled area continues to influence its prosperity in the post-
war. 
 
 
Chibia 
Chibia is a municipality located in the dry southern part of the province. Its original 
inhabitants are Nyanekas who rely mostly on cattle breeding, and do some occasional 
agricultural production when the rains allow for it. The semi-arid region suffers from drought 
once every decade, which is usually followed by famines. This was also the case in 
1988/1989 when a drought combined with unavailability of food stuffs and agricultural inputs 
due to the war, led to widespread hunger. Chibia wasn’t a center of contention between 
MPLA and UNITA as other municipalities in the province had been. Most people were able 
to remain in their villages throughout the war, as they didn’t come under direct attack. Most 
                                                 
13
 The total population size is 4,200 individuals, but reached 6,000 at the peak of displacement.  
14
 Interview with Municipal Administrator, 24 April 2008, Matala. 
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of the relatively large number of white settlers however, left the town from 1975 onwards and 
with them many of the shops closed, limiting the access people had to food, agricultural 
inputs and machinery and credit.  
 From the start of the war in 1975 displaced people from other parts of the province 
started to settle in Chibia due to its relative safety. A large area around the municipal center 
was vacated to allow displaced people to settle there. Within this area, Bairro 11 de 
Novembro is a neighborhood, consisting of a group of about 500 people belonging to the 
Ovimbundu ethnic group, who were displaced from Quilengues (municipality in the center of 
the province). They were resettled to Bairro 11 de Novembro by the government after fleeing 
to Lubango from Quilengues in 1994.  In 2003, after the end of the war in Angola, the GoA 
in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) started a resettlement 
program.  About half of the community members of Bairro 11 de Novembro made use of this 
program while others decided to stay in Chibia. The main reasons for staying were lack of 
resources to restart their livelihoods back in Quilengues, having found livelihood 
opportunities in Chibia, but also out of fear for the parliamentary elections of 2008, as one 
inhabitant mentioned: “we have seen the confusion after the elections of 1992, we will wait 
and see what the elections of 2008 will bring”.15 Some families made use of the resettlement 
program to Quilengues, only to return to Chibia after some time as they found that life was 
better for them there. Another factor that played a role in their decision to return to Chibia 
was that on return many found that their plots of land had been confiscated by other refugees 
who had settled in their villages of origin since they themselves had become displaced. 
With the arrival of the displaced in Chibia, local conflicts over land between displaced 
and resident populations started to erupt. Also, some resident populations resented the fact 
that only displaced people from different parts of the country were given aid by humanitarian 
organizations, while they felt an equal level of suffering due to droughts and subsequent 
periods of hunger. An inhabitant of Chibia noticed that the arrival of displaced from other 
ethnic groups influenced the Nyaneka population to adopt some of their socio-economic 
practices. “The Ovimbundu have a lot of different skills, they practice masonry, carpentry, 
and own bakeries. Nyanekas normally only do some agriculture if nature allows them. The 
Nyanekas only practice agriculture during the rainy season. After the rains finish they will 
wait for 6 months for the new rains to start, and in between the rains tend to their cattle. The 
Ovimbundu actively search for alternatives in case agriculture fails, they always have some 
type of job to do, they will use that in between time to work as masons or carpenters. They 
started up some small industries and businesses here in Chiba. This ensured that the 
Nyanekas also had some more job opportunities. Now you see that some Nyanekas are doing 
the same, and opening up small businesses”.16  
Although the municipality was mostly spared from the same level of violence and 
destruction as seen in other parts of the province, the population also had to deal with the 
consequences of war, most significantly with hunger due to cyclical periods of drought 
combined with lack of food and agricultural inputs. Tensions between IDPs and resident 
populations erupted over land and availability of aid. At the same time, interaction with 
groups of displaced has also caused some socio-economic changes to occur amongst the host 
population.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Interview with Teresa Losinga, Bairro 11 de Novembro, 27 July 2008. 
16
 Interview with Zé Carlos, Chibia-sede, 24 July 2008. 
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Analysis of the case studies 
Much of the current profiles of these municípios result from how their populations lived 
through the conflict. Stories collected in different parts of Huíla province reveal that the war 
affected people’s lives to different degrees, in terms of empowerment and disempowerment 
processes, displacement, and access to socio-economic institutions.  
The political outcome of violence between the two parties in the various localities, 
meant a constant reshuffling of local power relations. Other factors stemming from the 
conflict, including displacement and access to aid, also altered social relations. Traditional 
leaders were key in the distribution of resources among populations, including the allocation 
of land to IDPs and the access to humanitarian supplies. In some cases, leadership positions 
came under contestation in the post-war period when rural communities were (re)constituted.  
Displacement was a widely used response to conflict, although it took different forms 
and directions. In some cases such as Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia it become permanent, 
in others such as Matala and Caluquembe it was a daily commute to hide from night raids. 
Whereas the overall perception is that people mostly flee from bush to town, these cases have 
shown that the opposite was also true. Displacement is sometimes informed by (real or 
perceived) party affiliation depending on which party had control over the region at that 
particular time. However, very often it is a matter of finding security, regardless of who the 
perpetrator is.  
The period after the 2002 peace agreement saw the return and resettlement of people 
to their areas of origin on a massive scale. However, we found that some people chose to 
remain put, irrespective of location or age, in a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the 
outcome of the elections of 2008. The violent outcome of the 1992 elections left a deep mark 
on people´s perception of the meaning of elections in securing peace. Furthermore, some 
displaced had also established new livelihood opportunities for themselves, that made a 
return to their areas of origin and former livelihoods less desirable. This also impacted on the 
socio-economic developments and local power relations between resident and displaced 
population, as in the case of increased competition between the Nyaneka and Ovimbundo of 
Chibia. In Matala, first wave IDPs became established and economically better-off than later 
arrivals, primarily due to their access to land and the help of resident communities. They 
make up the majority of people permanently settled in the area.  
We found that people’s experiences and memories of violence, are not always linked 
to the macro labels and political developments of war. They often refer to everyday 
encounters with other forms of violence such as looting, banditry or cattle theft. For 
Chipindo’s population, the worst of the humanitarian crisis was not during, but after the end 
of the war. Moreover, suffering during war is also not always a direct consequence of 
political violence, but just as much to do with local events such as droughts. As the case 
studies show, the manifestations of the conflict and the nature of violence varied considerably 
in different localities, thereby creating micro-dynamics of war. The practices of the two 
parties and their treatment of people were far from uniform. UNITA provided for those 
directly under its regime, but it also forcibly abducted the same people. MPLA partly 
protected people in Matala, but equally abused those living in Chipindo to isolate UNITA. 
Similarly, people’s resources to address their basic needs were very different. Many didn’t 
access relief aid at all during conflict, either due to security restrictions or because of 
perceived links to UNITA. Others were helped by resident populations with land or seed, 
albeit only in the early phases of war. Empower and disempowerment processes were very 
much informed by party affiliation, whether real or assumed. While these cases show that the 
effects of war are very localized and context specific, the impacts on people’s lives and 
livelihoods were widely felt. The conflict affected everyone in one way or another, either 
directly through violence, or indirectly through diminishing assets and services. 
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Conclusions 
 
The duration of the civil war had deep effects on the lives of local people, their livelihoods 
and institutions, at the centre of our research agendas. In this chapter we have analysed the 
history of the Angolan conflict and at its multiple manifestations, in order to shed light on its 
impact on the socio-economic realities of the country. By reviewing the course of events and 
major developments over time, we have demonstrated that at different stages, various internal 
and external forces came into play, and the motivations and dynamics of the war changed. 
This had varying effects on the lives of people. In its initial phase the conflict was understood 
as a proxy-war of the superpowers of the Cold War. However, as we have argued, these 
external influences interacted and played into internal dissonances, which had already 
developed under colonial rule, at the time of the establishment of the nationalist movements. 
As the international political context changed, the internal motivations and forces for conflict 
became more apparent, changing the character of the conflict. The historical experience of 
violence, including that of the colonial regime played a vital role in the way that Angolan 
society was transformed, in how the national movements were formed and in how the civil 
war developed.  
We have proposed a perspective on conflict that takes into account the workings of 
the political economy of war, which focuses on the role and interplay between resources and 
power. However, we have also argued that economic activities and the control of resources 
are engrained in socio-cultural institutions, and that the role of such institutions must be 
considered in the study of conflict. A socio-institutional approach to war implies a focus on 
the local level, where the forces of the broader conflict interact with local norms and power 
relations, and the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped. As such, in this chapter we have 
argued to look at everyday realities of war to understand how conflict plays out locally. This 
builds on Richards’ (2005) ethnographic approach to war which advocates the need to 
understand war as a social process by studying its various dynamics in practice.  
Our four cases of different municipalities demonstrate the diversity in experiences and 
perceptions of conflict and how they connect to macro-processes of war. The manifestations 
of conflict varied across time and space, based on a number of factors beyond just political 
affiliation. The micro-dynamics of conflict and its localised effects reflected and transformed 
existing social relations and institutions, as seen in the interactions between IDPs and 
residents, political and military actors, or traditional leaders and their communities. Failing to 
understand these differentiated everyday realities often results in assumptions about people’s 
needs during conflict, so that the (humanitarian and political) responses tend to be rather 
standardised. Moreover, it can lead to a failure to recognise existing local capacities where 
these exist, for example in areas or periods of relative stability. On the other hand, the need to 
define a response strategy to conflict often leads to the labelling of individuals and groups 
into categories established along certain divisions: UNITA versus MPLA/Government areas; 
urban/city versus rural/bush people,  displaced versus resident populations, (ex)-combatants 
versus civilians, etc. A look at the everyday realities of conflict quickly reveals that these 
categories are in fact fluid. Although displacement led to rapid urbanisation, it also involved 
population flows in various directions, including within rural areas. Many IDPs in these areas 
survived from informal trade rather than subsistence agriculture, as is often assumed in aid 
interventions that equate livelihoods support to agricultural recovery. Generalisations about 
specific population groups and assumptions about their needs have continued to inform post-
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war reconstruction efforts whereby similar aid interventions are promoted in highly 
differentiated contexts.  
In conclusion, we propose an understanding of the Angolan war i) as a social process, 
influenced by social relations and historically determined institutions, and ii) with multiple-
realities and micro-dynamics influenced by individual and localised grievances. 
66 
 
67 
 
4. History of rural economic developments, livelihoods and 
policies 
Introduction 
Economic policies and developments during colonial times 
Colonial policies and rural livelihoods 
Livelihoods in conflict, 1961-2002 
Conclusions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the colonial history of the rural society, economy and livelihoods in 
Angola, and specifically Huíla province. It starts with a characterization of Portuguese 
colonialism, and the major economic developments and policies during the colonial rule in 
Angola. Furthermore, I translate these economic policies by the Portuguese in Angola to the 
regional application and effects on rural economies and societies. People’s everyday 
experiences with the colonial institutions and policies in their villages are presented, to create 
understanding of how major colonial policies shaped people’s everyday lives. The interaction 
between white settlers and the African population was defined by forced labour practices, 
uneven competition on markets, and exploitative trading practices of the so called ‘bush 
traders’. Yet, at the same time older Angolan generations maintain that the end of colonialism 
also diminished the availability of trade, commodities, industry and credit in the rural 
economy. In the last section in this chapter, an historical timeline is presented highlighting 
periods of colonialism, independence, and various stages during the civil war, to show how 
changes in rural society and livelihoods were informed by these events. The importance of 
this chapter for the thesis is that studies on Angola have often focused solely on the conflict 
period, and do not take into account what happened during the pre-independence period. 
However, the colonial history in Angola has co-shaped the future in setting parameters and 
forming expectations around rural livelihoods. The chapter is based on both (historical) 
literature and archive material as well as data from fieldwork in Lubango, Caluquembe and 
Chibia. 
 
 
Economic policies and developments during colonial times 
 
This section discusses the major economic policies and developments during the Portuguese 
colonial history in Angola, to understand the underlying assumptions of policies and how 
these affected and shaped rural society and livelihoods. It also shows some specific 
characteristics of Portuguese-style colonialism and colonial policies. After a general history 
of Portuguese colonialism in Angola, and the main economic developments, more 
regionalized information will be presented in this chapter.  
 
 
Main economic drivers following a historical timeline 
The territory of modern-day Angola was initially inhabited by groups of Khoi-San, until 
Bantu migration from the North pushed them towards the southern African Kalahari region. 
When the first Portuguese arrived in the region of Luanda and the more northern regions of 
Angola, they met with the Bantu Population of the Congo Kingdom. Pre-colonial economic 
activity in Angola by its Bantu populations consisted mainly of livestock rearing and crop 
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cultivation, such as sorghum and millet, as well as some occasional fruits and vegetables 
(World Bank 1991). Although Angola was “discovered” as early as 1483 by Diogo Cão on 
his way to find a sea route to India, the region around present day Luanda wasn’t colonized 
further by the Portuguese until 1575, and the country only became an official Portuguese 
colony in the 19
th
 century. Angola wasn’t a very popular place for settlement to most 
Portuguese. During the first centuries of Portuguese presence in Angola, the white settlers 
going to Angola mostly consisted of so called degredados, or convicts (Bender 1978, 
Hammond 1975). This decreased steadily until the Second World War, at which time it was 
estimated that 20 per cent of all white settlers in Angola were former convicts (Birmingham 
2006). The climate was considered unfavourable for white settlement, and white women were 
even nearly absent until the end of the 19
th
 century (Bender 1978, Hammond 1975).   
From the start of their conquests, Portuguese colonial policies focused mostly on 
using the revenues of trade to support the infrastructure development in Portugal itself 
(Clarence-Smith 1979). Angola was seen as a highly profitable overseas territory for 
Portugal. However, Portugal, itself a relatively poor country in comparison to the rest of 
Europe, lacked sufficient industry and capital to fully exploit the natural resources that 
Angola had to offer, even until well into the 20
th
 century (Bender 1978). The World Bank 
(1991) broadly distinguishes 3 different economic periods in Angola through its exports over 
time. The first being the transatlantic slave trade directed mainly towards Brazil, followed by 
the coffee exports primarily to Portugal, and the third being oil exports to the US that have 
dominated the most recent years of Angolan economic developments (World Bank 1991).  
The slave trade dominated the first period of economic policies by Portugal in its 
conquested regions, straight from the start in the 16
th
 century. Sugar plantations in Brazil and 
Sao Tomé became the point of destiny for an estimated 2.5 million Angolans throughout the 
period of slavery. The slave trade in Angola was mostly conducted between the merchants 
living on the coast and the African chiefs from the interior (World Bank 1991). The 
abolishment of slavery was a gradual process. First, slave exports were abolished in 1838, 
ending the profitable transatlantic trade of slaves from Angola to Brazil. The Portuguese 
officially adopted this prohibition on the transatlantic slave trade, but at the same time 
introduced various laws that accommodated the colony’s need for a cheap labour force before 
the abolishment of all forms of slavery would come. From the white settler communities 
much resistance grew towards the foreseen end of slavery, and creative policies and practices 
were designed to deal with this event, as the following quote from Bender (1978) shows:  
 
“New guises were found under which to continue the old labour practices. For 
example, the 1875 legislation, supposedly designed to further refine categories of 
freed slaves, introduced a vagrancy clause which considered all ‘non-productive’ 
Africans as ‘vagrants’ and therefore subject to non-paying labour ‘contracts’. The 
determination of ‘productivity’ was usually left to local administrators, who had no 
difficulty finding enough ‘vagrants’ to meet the settlers’ demands for free labour” 
(Bender 1978, 139).  
 
Only the complete abolishment of slavery in 1878 made an official end to slavery in Angola 
itself, although concealed slavery in the form of forced labour continued. No longer called 
slaves, African labourers were now serviçaes or contratados, who would sometimes forcibly 
be contracted by plantation owners for labour contracts of 2, 3 years or more. They would 
usually be paid in kind and work for 12 hours a day, often far removed from their families 
and areas of origin (Birmingham 1978). The system of forced labour that was introduced by 
the Portuguese after the official abolishment of slavery, as a way to continue providing cheap 
labour forces to the plantation owners, maintained similar inhuman conditions as slavery. In 
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1954 an estimated 10 per cent of the African population in Angola were considered to be 
contract workers, and some 35 per cent of these contract workers died during their 2 year 
contracts (Bender 1978). Forced labour as a new form of slavery was only ended in 1961 
after the revolts on plantations in the north of the country, which marked the beginnings of 
the war for Angolan independence. 
As revenues were no longer coming in from the traffic of slaves outside of Angola, 
attention was focused on seeking other export means in Angola, as well as the idea of 
creating an overseas market for Portuguese industry itself. However, apart from the export of 
Portuguese wine and rum to Angola, Portuguese industry had little to offer to the African 
market (Bender 1978, Birmingham 2006).  Alternatively, Portugal focused its attention to 
introducing a plantation system reminiscent of that of Brazil. The worldwide rubber boom 
ensured Angola’s first primary export product since the end of the transatlantic slave trade, 
and led to a countrywide production from 1870 until 1915 (World Bank 1991). Due to the 
growing rubber production in South East Asia in the 1910s, rubber prices dropped and 
reduced profitability for Angola (Clarence-Smith 1979). Rubber production slowly fizzled 
out until the mid-1920s when it was replaced by coffee as the number one export commodity.  
Coffee production had been increased slowly in the 19
th
 century, also in anticipation 
of the abolishment of the slave trade. Coffee exports grew until the 1890s when Angola could 
no longer compete with Brazil on the global coffee market (Birmingham 1978). In the 20
th
 
century coffee production was resumed, and increasingly became Angola’s most important 
exporting commodity, with which the newly discovered diamonds could not compete. Coffee 
was the number one export commodity for Angola from 1946 until 1972, and was a driving 
factor behind the enormous increase of white settlers to Angola during this period (World 
Bank 1991). Although coffee production was practised both by white settlers and African 
farmers, land and labour issues continued to be decided in favour of the white settlers, even if 
fears existed about possible revolts by the African peasants (Birmingham 1978). Birmingham 
(1978), in his article on the history of the Angolan coffee industry in the district of Cazengo, 
quotes the conflict that surrounded the coffee industry (and eventually contributed to the 
peasant revolts of 1961 that officially marked the start of the struggle for independence) as 
example of colonial experimentation: “The system of credit which they (Portuguese traders) 
offered was usually ill-defined, but coffee trees and land were the essential security. This 
meant that at each crisis caused by drought or crop failure the trader took over the land from 
the producer. The spasmodic bankrupting of small African producers and the consolidation of 
landed estates by white immigrant traders remained a central feature of the economy of the 
Angolan coffee zones at least until 1961” (Birmingham 1978, 34).  
At the end of the Portuguese colonial influence in Angola, a resource was discovered 
that proved to become the powerful engine behind Angola’s post-independence economy, 
continuing to this day. In the 1950s and 1960s oil was discovered in respectively the Kwanza 
Basin and off the shore of Cabinda province (Le Billon 2007). Production soon started and by 
1973 oil had surpassed coffee as the major export commodity in Angola (Hodges 2001). Due 
to these increasing oil revenues the World Bank (1991) called the financial situation of 
Angola at the time of independence in 1975 “excellent”, although they noted this situation 
quickly changed due to the consequent collapse of distribution networks and production. 
After independence oil continued to be the number one export commodity of Angola, and 
much has been written about the role this resource played in financing and even prolonging 
the civil war that ensued after independence (Hodges 2001). For more on the role of oil in the 
Angolan war I refer to chapter 3.  
 One specific commodity deserves a special mention in this section on colonial 
economic history: alcohol. In much literature on the history of Portuguese colonial history, as 
well as from interviews during my fieldwork, the issue of alcohol as an important trading 
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commodity comes back repeatedly (Hammond 1975, Bender 1978, Birmingham 2006, World 
Bank 1991). Already in the pre-colonial period alcohol was a trading commodity. The palm 
tree was especially cultivated by African peasants to produce a liquor called malufo, and was 
one of the few handmade commodities at that time (World Bank 1991). Alcohol was seen as 
“the driving force of colonial penetration” (Birmingham 2006, 14), and played an essential 
role in the Angolan slave trade. Inland chiefs provided new slaves in return for aguardente, a 
local type of rum made from sugarcane. The slaves themselves were given alcohol to ensure 
they were kept under control during their transport to their new destination, and would sign 
their slavery contracts with less resistance under the influence of alcohol (Birmingham 2006). 
Since the 1850s white settlers had started to grow sugarcane to produce aguardente, whereas 
African producers were distilling similar types of alcoholic beverages from maize, pineapple, 
and sorghum (known under names like macau or kizangwa, etc.). When the Portuguese 
started treating their colonial territories as potential markets to export their own industrial 
goods, rum and wine became the principal export commodities to Angola. Meanwhile, local 
production of aguardente had risen to 15 million litres a year by 1899 (Hammond 1975). 
With the introduction of custom restrictions in 1892, Portugal attempted to make Angola a 
closed market for its wine exports, increasingly fighting the local manufacturing of alcoholic 
beverages (World Bank 1991, Bender 1978). Also due to increasing international pressure to 
fight alcoholism amongst African populations, aguardente production was banned in Angola 
effectively in 1911, enabling Portuguese winemakers to increase the exports of their, often 
inferior quality, wines to Angola. With reference to this trade of alcohol to its colonial 
territories, Bender calls it a classical example of imperial exploitation that had tremendous 
effects on society. “In large parts of Angola, Africans were unable to trade their cattle or 
agricultural produce for anything other than wine. Wherever this occurred the Africans had 
little incentive to expand crop production or increase their herds. Thus, the centuries old 
dependence on alcohol as the major item of trade in Angola enriched metropolitan interests 
and brought large profits to bush traders and a number of Portuguese businessmen in Angola; 
but economic development suffered in both the African and European sectors and alcoholism 
became one of Angola’s principal social problems” (Bender 1978, 147). Alcohol use of the 
African population also became a concern for the colonial authorities as it affected the health 
and efficiency of the labour force of the white settlers. Recommendations were therefore 
made to start handing out cooked meals to the labourers on the plantations, instead of paying 
them in cash or in food, as this might be traded for alcohol (Mendes 1958).  
The effects of the Portuguese alcohol exporting policy, and linking trade with alcohol 
by the Portuguese can still be seen in Angola. Alcohol dependency is widespread both in 
rural and urban areas, crosscutting all classes and sectors of current Angolan society. 
Portuguese wines still make out the largest share on stock in Angolan supermarkets and 
restaurants. Also, to this day locally brewed liquor is a highly valued trade commodity in 
rural areas. Women mostly brew alcohol from maize or sorghum, and either sell it at the 
market or on the side of roads, but people also get paid for day-labour on fields of others in a 
fixed quantity of liquor. During fieldwork in the rural villages, I came across ingeniously 
designed liquor distilleries, as well as large buckets of fermenting drinks in nearly every 
village I visited. 
 
 
Regional colonial expansion and policies 
The economic activities that became prominent in the Portuguese colonial territories 
depended heavily on the resources and possibilities that were to be found in each region. 
During the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in Angola, most white settlement was 
concentrated in and closely around the capital Luanda. For other parts of Angola, white 
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settlement in those times was barely noticeable. For example, in 1846 Luanda’s European 
population consisted of a total of 1601 people, compared to 39 people in Benguela, and 20 in 
then Moçamedes, current day Namibe (Bender 1978). These were also all coastal towns, 
leaving a vast inland territory yet to be explored and exploited. Coastal settlement was 
considered to be essential in the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in Angola, because 
of the transatlantic slave trade with mostly Brazil.  
Instead of farmers, the Portuguese state could only find degredados that could be sent 
to Angola to oversee commercial farming and industries for natural resource extraction, to 
increase Portuguese control over the more distant parts of the overseas territory, and to 
expand colonial markets for Portuguese exports (Bender 1978, Clarence-Smith 1979). Only 
during the 19
th
 century did the Portuguese expansion into the interior commence. This search 
for other colonial settlement areas was linked to the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, 
and the need for Portugal to increase revenues by introducing a taxation system for the 
African populations, as well as setting up a plantation sector equivalent to that in Brazil, 
which was lost by the Portuguese when it became independent in 1825 (Clarence-Smith 
1979).  
For the south of Angola this type of white expansion started in the 1840s, with 
Moçamedes as the second chosen place for white settlement after Luanda. Moçamedes was 
deemed to be of a suitable climate for settlement because of the absence of mosquitos that 
were linked to the high number of deaths amongst white settlers from malaria. After an initial 
wave of some 500 white settlers coming to Moçamedes around 1849 consisting mainly of 
Brazilians, the white settler population soon shrunk by half when they discovered that the 
desert-like climate and lack of fresh water limited the options for agricultural ventures and 
led to many crop failures (Bender 1978). Some of these settlers decided to resettle to Huíla 
province where the climate was deemed more suitable for agricultural production. The initial 
group of settlers in Huíla province halfway the 19
th
 century did not expand much in the 
following years, and consisted of a few Germans, Brazilians, and 55 Boer families from 
South Africa (Urquhart 1963, 131). To most Portuguese the prospect of going to the inlands 
of Angola and starting a farm was not sufficiently appealing, instead they preferred to stay in 
the urban areas (Hammond 1975). The Portuguese state had to provide some financial 
incentives to emigrants in order to increase the number of settlement areas and thus be able to 
extend its control over the vast Angolan territory. Agricultural settlements were heavily 
financed by the Portuguese administration, as well as the actual travel to the overseas 
territories.    
The southern coast of Angola, primarily the coastal towns of Moçamedes (current 
name Namibe) and Porte Alexandre (current name Tombua) in the province Moçamedes 
became important economic drivers for the fishing industry of Angola, and major exporting 
markets for dried fish (Clarence-Smith 1979). For Huíla province it meant a colonial 
economic policy that focused mostly on agriculture, due to the availability of rich water 
sources and fertile lands. Also, the cool climate of especially the Huíla Highland district was 
considered to be especially suitable for white settlement. However, many of the first white 
settlers in the province never entered into farming activities, instead preferring to go into 
public service, run shops and conduct trade which could be more lucrative and required less 
physical activity (Hammond 1975, Galvão 1929). The fact that the Huíla region was quite 
isolated due to the existence of only one access road, made settlement there less desirable for 
many Portuguese (Medeiros 1976). A group of around 300 Boers from the Transvaal region 
in South Africa had already settled in the Huíla Highlands at the end of the 19
th
 century, and 
had been given lands by the Portuguese. This group of settlers continued to grow steadily, 
and relied mostly on their transport and hunting activities, rather than use their lands for 
large-scale farming. The Portuguese government decided to counter the ever growing 
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presence of the Boer population in the region, as it represented a threat to Portuguese 
sovereignty in the southern part of the Angolan territory, by encouraging Portuguese 
settlement there, most notably by a group of 1500 small farmers from the island of Madeira 
(Clarence-Smith 1979, Medeiros 1976).  
Next to groups of Boers and Portuguese settlers, Huíla province also saw many white 
missionaries in the rural areas. A famous example of a missionary station in the province is 
the Swiss evangelical mission of Helí Chatelain in Caluquembe, which was founded in 1897. 
Although the initial objective of the Swiss missionary was to fight slavery in the region, the 
mission post in Caluquembe soon became an important trading post in the region for the 
African farmers and Boers. The anti-slavery fight was somewhat abandoned as to not disturb 
the trading relationships that the Swiss missionary had established with the Boer population. 
Much has been written about Helí Chatelain and his mission post in Caluquembe, most 
famous being the literature by Birmingham (1998) and Péclard (1995). More information 
about this mission post, and its transformation into an important regional hospital, as well as 
its political position during the civil war, can be found in chapter 5. 
 
 
Colonial policies, institutions and practices for rural livelihoods  
 
This section examines the colonial policies, rural institutions and livelihood practices that 
historically existed in Huíla province. Colonial policies and institutions affected people’s 
rural livelihoods in many ways, they set the boundaries in which people were able to move 
and make decisions on their livelihoods. Especially policies regarding forced labour, planned 
white settlement, and agricultural and industrial activities affected people’s choices as well as 
the commodities that were available for production and trade. This section gives an overview 
of some of these colonial policies and institutions and the way they affected people’s lives in 
Huíla province.   
Colonial economic developments in Angola were introduced in the previous section 
and will be complemented in this section by micro economic developments and how these 
played out in the rural areas and on rural livelihoods, as well as the everyday experiences and 
encounters of people with the colonial system. The role of the Portuguese rural economic 
colonial system on the lives and livelihoods of people in the province will be elaborated by 
using data from interviews, fieldwork in Chibia and Caluquembe, archive material and 
literature.  
The period discussed here mostly comprises the last century of Portuguese colonial 
rule, as most information gathered and available pertains to that specific time. It was during 
this last century (1850-1975), that colonial expansion increasingly affected people in Huíla 
province. Before this time the interior of Angola had not been explored extensively, although 
people had had previous encounters with colonial expeditions, or occasional wars between 
the Portuguese and local tribes. But after 1850, as white settlement rapidly increased, so did 
the colonial socio-economic and political frameworks that started to dictate everyday life in 
rural Huíla province.  
 
 
Agriculture and forced labour 
Policies on livelihoods during the colonial era were very much focused on increasing the 
profits in goods and monetary returns that overseas territories offered to the Portuguese 
economy. In order for the commercial expansion of the plantations to take place, and to 
satisfy the labour need of the white farmers, the system of forced labour was introduced as 
replacement for slavery which had been officially abolished in 1878. The new labour code 
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introduced in 1911 by the Portuguese government distinguished between two different types 
of forced labour workers: voluntários (those who entered into labour contracts without state 
engagement) or contratados (those who had been forced by the state) (Clarence-Smith 1979). 
More women than men worked on plantations, as they were thought to have more experience 
and skills with agricultural production, and because their salaries had been set lower in the 
new forced labour contracts. They were housed on the plantation grounds and usually worked 
from sunrise to sunset (Clarence-Smith 1979). 
One of my interviews with an elderly man in Chibia, Mr. Manuel, gave a personalized 
historical perspective on white settlement in that municipality, and the role that the fazenda 
(big commercial farm) played on labour relations as well as migratory patterns of slaves in 
the area.  
 
The area or bairro (neighbourhood) near the municipal centre of Chibia, which is now 
referred to as Fazenda Amélia is one of the oldest neighbourhoods in the municipality. 
The area used to be a big commercial farm owned by Portuguese settlers. People from 
the neighbouring province of Namibe were brought to the fazenda to work as slaves. 
The slave trade happened on an extensive scale during that period, and people were 
brought in from all over the Angolan territory, including the more northern provinces 
of Angola, from where the Kimbari people of Luanda originated of which some ended 
up in Chibia.  Fazenda Amélia was privately owned by a Portuguese settler called Dr. 
Santos. The area was massive, reaching from the road towards Jau until the Huíla 
river. At the fazenda they produced mostly wheat, maize and sugarcane for 
specifically the production of aguardente. There weren’t any machines and 
agricultural instruments available, so all the work on the land was done by manual 
labour. Many people from the Chibia region worked at Fazenda Amélia. 
The family of Mr. Manuel has a long labour history at the fazenda. Mr 
Manuel’s mother was born in 1901, at that time her father was already the supervisor 
of the fazenda. His father was a mestiço and lived most of his life in Alta-Bimbe, 
Humpata but was born in Chibia. When his father was 36 years old he left Chibia to 
go to Humpata. He had been a technician at Fazenda Amélia but started his own farm 
in Humpata. Mr. Manuel’s father and grandfather both worked at the Fazenda Amélia, 
until the fazenda closed because its owner, Dr. Santos, left the country in the 1950s.  
On the 5
th
 of October 1914 Fazenda Amélia officially stopped using slave 
labour. Most of the former slave labourers who had been working at the fazenda, 
continued to live in the Chibia region either after termination of their labour contracts, 
or when the fazenda closed down. By that time they had already spent long periods of 
time away from their areas of origin.   
 
This personal history allows us to see how the slavery turned into a system of forced labour, 
and how it functioned in practice. It also shows how people were disconnected from their 
areas of origin and found it hard to reconnect after the end of slavery. 
Whereas many people were taken from other parts of the country to work as forced labourer 
on fazenda’s in Huíla, as described above, opposite population movements also took place. 
Many people in Chibia entered into these serviçaes contracts for various reasons. The main 
ethnic group in Chibia are the Nyaneka-Humbi, whose central livelihoods revolve around 
agro-pastoralism. Cattle rearing was the central feature of the local economy and rural 
livelihoods during colonial times, and agriculture satisfied further subsistence needs, when 
the climate allowed for it. The payment that was received after termination of a forced labour 
contract was often used to purchase more livestock. 
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African farmers were allowed a more or less autonomous food production until the 
1930s, and produced mainly to satisfy subsistence needs. In the Huíla Highlands, where 
predominantly Nyaneka people lived, cattle rearing was the primary livelihood activity. 
Cattle was an important asset, both for subsistence needs and the trading of hides and 
manure, as well as forming a steady monetary unit (Clarence-Smith 1979). Agricultural food 
production was the second major livelihood activity in the south of the province after cattle 
rearing, but was the most important activity in the north of the province amongst the 
Ovimbundu. The differences in livelihood possibilities between the two regions are mostly 
defined by favourable climates and access to water. Farming was a predominantly female 
endeavour. Men occasionally cleared plots of lands, but sowing, cultivation and harvesting 
were considered to belong to the women’s work domain. Men on the other hand were 
involved in activities such as: hunting, iron- and woodwork, carpentry, and long-distance 
trading (Heywood 2000). For farming, little use was made of agricultural tools, save the 
plough. For crop production a system of shifting cultivation was practised, in which 
cultivation on alternating plots of land would allow the soil to recover its fertility during the 
fallow periods. Use was made of a diverse range of plots of land that was available to them, 
in which four different types could be distinguished: “Ocumbu - house garden, Onaka - low-
lying lands along streams, Ombanda - plots sloping up from the river, and Epia - clearings in 
the forest” (Heywood 2000, 10). These plot types are still distinguished to this day, and 
especially the Onakas are considered essential for practising horticulture due to the proximity 
to rivers, and therefore easy access to a water source. The African population did not make 
use of irrigation systems. Rather, they practiced rain fed-agriculture, made use of rivers by 
locating their fields most favourably to it, and relied on the crops planted on the Onakas to 
overcome the dry season (Urquhart 1963, Heywood 2000, Medeiros 1976). Pre-colonial land 
was communally owned and through customary law, with usufruct rights regulated through 
the sobas who would appoint land, sometimes in return for food or labour. Land could be 
inherited if the soba chose not to intervene in the process. Usufruct rights only pertained to 
men, women were not considered to have rights over land, and also did not inherit land 
through this system (Medeiros 1976). If land was abandoned for some time, often because 
soil had become depleted, people would be able to use it after asking permission from the 
former user first (Medeiros 1976, 416-417). With the introduction of new land legislation at 
the end of the 19
th 
 century by the colonial authorities this land had been categorized as 
‘vacant’ next to privately or state owned land (Clover 2005, 351). Although this 
categorization recognized the existence of land tenure by the African population, the colonial 
state did not extend property rights over it, enabling the expansion of land ownership for 
plantations by new Portuguese immigrants in the 20
th
 century (Clover 2005). “At the height 
of the colonial period there were 300,000 colonial families who occupied 4,5 million ha of 
land and used only 11 percent of this, against while 4,3 million traditional families occupied 
4,5 million ha of land and utilised 60 percent of this” (Clover 2005, 354).   
Crop production for the markets had started slowly in the 1840s, but was boosted by 
the introduction of maize as a cash crop in the 1910s. Maize production was mostly a female 
endeavour, and enabled women to produce sufficient amounts for household consumption as 
well as some surplus for the markets (Heywood 2000). However, the African peasants found 
it increasingly difficult to compete on markets with the white settlers who had government 
backing in different forms (policies, power, institutions, input and further financial 
incentives). First of all, they sometimes saw themselves displaced from their lands by the 
arrival of new white settlers. Secondly, they also had to deal with uneven competition due to 
the white settlers’ advantage on the markets deriving from improved access to water through 
irrigation, inputs and financial and technical assistance. In Huíla during the 1920s it was 
noted that local traders had migrated with the arrival of more white settlers, much to the 
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disappointment of the Governor of the province who had wanted them to “mobilize their 
resources to establish regular trading with the Europeans” (Galvão 1929, 135). In the 1920s 
and 1930s there were some further developments in the rural economy, which made the 
African population increasingly turn from trade to agricultural production of cash crops like: 
maize, beans, wheat and sometimes rice (Heywood 1988, Clarence-Smith 1979). One of the 
developments that stimulated production of cash crops was the arrival of the Benguela 
railway, linking Huíla province to the port of Namibe, thus creating the possibilities to export 
agricultural produce more easily (Heywood 1988, Gadiot 2006). With the establishment of 
the railway the number of white settlers along the railway line grew as they saw more 
opportunities for commercial farming and trade. Over the years white settlement in the 
province grew, and by 1927-1928 the European population consisted of 4.1 per cent of a total 
population of 125.764 (Galvão 1929). 
As colonial expansion was to be realized through the development of agriculture the 
demand of the white farmers for forced labourers to work on the fazendas increased. A 
workforce of forced labourers had become easier to obtain by white settlers as a result of 
some new colonial policies that had impoverished and limited the options available to the 
African population. Since the establishment of the “New State” government by Salazar in 
Portugal in 1933, a renewed nationalist and imperialist focus commenced, which led to new 
colonial policies affecting Angola. These new policies had increased the demand for forced 
labour and limited the access of African populations to their own local markets, leaving trade 
mechanisms entirely into the hands of colonial institutions (Heywood 1988). Although 
agricultural production rose, the prohibition of trading on African markets in favour of rural 
colonial institutions, limited access to cash for African farmers. Colonial hut taxation, which 
required each African male to pay a certain amount to the Portuguese authority for each hut 
he owned, had at first been payable through agricultural commodities. However, as the tax 
amount increased substantially and became payable only in cash, many among the rural 
population became indebted,  thus becoming unable to meet taxation demands and therefore 
running the risk to be enlisted as forced labourer until the debt had been paid off (Heywood 
1988).  
Alternatives to forced labour were not explored by the Portuguese government 
although it realized that the exploitative nature of the system needed to change or be 
abolished, as an article by Mendes (1958) about the productivity of native population in Huíla 
and Namibe shows. In the article Mendes voices concern about the increasing migration of 
native populations from Huíla to work in the mines in South Africa and current day Namibia. 
There, they would work under contract for 18 months and would be paid three times more in 
comparison with the labour contracts in Angola. On their return to Huíla, they would invest 
their cash earnings in cattle for instance, and could still enlist for the mines two more times. 
After three of these mining contracts, they usually had sufficient financial capital for their 
household survival to avoid being drawn into forced labour contracts in Angola. Mendes 
(1958) also added the risk of illness and accidents related to the work in mines, as well as the 
decrease in births due to the long duration of contracts as factors further reducing the future 
work force. Thus, migration to South Africa limited the availability of the native work force 
in Huíla for various reasons, and therefore the white settlers and colonial institutions in Huíla 
were looking into the possibility of investing in more agricultural machinery to cope with the 
lack of manual labourers (Mendes 1958). Investment in agricultural machines was deemed a 
more viable option at that time, instead of critically investigating and improving the labour 
contracts and financial remuneration for the African population. The Governor of Huíla in 
1929, Henrique Galvão, responded negatively to a request from the Portuguese Delegation of 
the League of Nations when asked to respond to a questionnaire about a review of the system 
of forced labour and awarding more rights to the African population. As a new labour system 
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for the African population would go against the economic interests of the white settlers, 
revolts among these were not imaginary. Hence, Galvão justified his resistance to reforms 
with the humanitarian motive of protecting the African population against violent resistance 
from the white settlers (Galvão 1929)
17
.  
 
 
Colonial institutions and rural livelihoods 
With the end of slavery, and the colonial expansion into the interior of Angola in search of 
alternative profitable economic activities, the Portuguese government started pushing for 
planned white settlements in the rural areas from 1900 onwards. To attract more interested 
Portuguese farmer immigrants to Angola, financial incentives were created by the Portuguese 
government. These incentives included payment of the travel expenses for the whole family 
to Angola, allotment of a plot of land, provision of a house, seeds, cattle, technical assistance, 
and even a small allowance to help the white farmers cope financially during the first period 
of their stay. Many of the Portuguese immigrants to Angola did not have any farming 
experience, and those who did were often poor farmers who did not bring a starting capital, 
and wanted to make quick money before returning to Portugal. Some of these planned 
settlements quickly failed due to the lack of capital and technical experience with African 
soils and crops (Bender 1978). The large agricultural planned settlements that were put in 
place by the Portuguese government were called colonatos. There were colonatos across the 
larger part of Angola, especially in the areas that were deemed to have a favourable climate 
for both white settlement and agricultural production.
18
 Plots of lands were assigned to, most 
often, a group of colonos (Portuguese settlers) who started plantations assisted by a forced 
labour force from the original peasant communities in the area. Huíla had a few of these 
colonatos scattered around the province, differing in size and importance. One of the villages 
where my fieldwork took place was the site of a former small colonato, led by a Portuguese 
engineer. Some of the elderly in the village of Cue 1 in Caluquembe municipality, still 
remembered the colonato structure well, and had worked there themselves. Land, water and 
agricultural inputs were divided amongst village members. The distributed seeds needed to be 
returned to the colonos after harvesting. Any surplus harvest could either be retained by the 
labourers, or traded back to the colonos for other goods. This left the colonos with harvests 
gained through free labour.    
In 1961 the government of Portugal decided to install a new institute in Angola that 
was intended to control the agricultural planned settlements in rural Angola, called the Junta 
Provincial de Povoamento de Angola (JPP). The JPP had as objective regulating the 
settlement of white farmers, as well as Cape Verdean immigrants in order to increase 
agricultural production. Increasingly feeling pressured by the struggle for independence and 
unrest among African populations, the JPP aimed for more multi-racial settlements, and 
included a military component to these settlement structures by explicitly inviting former 
Portuguese soldiers to enlist as new settlers in the Angolan territory (Bender 1978). One such 
colonato, which included this multi-racial component has been subject of an extensive study 
by Gadiot (2006). This colonato was located in the village of Lossolo, in Caconda 
                                                 
17
 Interestingly, Henrique Galvão during the 1940s became a firm opponent of Portuguese colonialism, 
specifically regarding its forced labour policies that encouraged the exploitation and maltreatment of the native 
population. He was later suspected of organizing a coup to install a moral alternative Portuguese government in 
Angola in opposition  to Salazar’s regime. 
18
 The colonato of Cela, located in the Central Highlands is a well-known example of a large agricultural 
settlement (Hammond 1975, Bender 1978). The initial plan for Cela had been to settle 1700 Portuguese families 
there, giving 45 acres of land to cultivate to each family. The results were disappointing however, as only 300 
families stayed in Cela, and the large investments never paid off. Also, its policy of not hiring any local 
workforce, created much resentment amongst the African population (Bender 1978). 
77 
 
municipality. The colonato in Lossolo was started rather late, especially in light of political 
developments in Angola in the early 1960s that created much resistance amongst the Angolan 
population towards new expansions of colonial policy. In 1964 land was appropriated and 
houses built to accommodate the new colonos: a mix of Portuguese settlers with Cape 
Verdean immigrants. The objective for this colonato was to become a multi-racial and 
modernised agricultural society” (Bender 1973, Kuder 1971, cited in Gadiot 2006). As the 
liberation struggle became increasingly fierce, the Portuguese settlers left the colonato to 
seek refuge in the cities, until most of them left the country for good in 1975 when 
independence was declared. Most Cape Verdeans on the other hand stayed at Lossolo, 
claiming Angola had become their land now, and that they would fight together with the 
population to defend it. But by 1983, due to increasing pressure from the MPLA-led 
government, all Cape Verdeans had disappeared from Lossolo (Gadiot 2006). Although 
integration of Cape Verdeans in Lossolo society developed rather well, at least fulfilling one 
of the objectives the Portuguese had set for the new colonato, the Lossolo colonato did not 
become a prime example of modernised agriculture as the Portuguese had envisaged it. 
Rather, the Cape Verdeans were deemed to have adapted too much to the agricultural 
techniques that the African farmers had employed over time, as their own agricultural skills 
proved rather limited. The Lossolo experiment led to a decision by the colonial government 
to abandon further efforts in recruiting Cape Verdeans for settlement in agricultural 
communities such as the colonatos (Gadiot 2006). 
Another important colonial institution that guided cereal production among 
specifically the African farmer societies were the cereal marketing boards, supervised by the 
Instituto dos Cereais de Angola (Angola Cereal Board). These institutions were established to 
control all wheat and maize production by African farmers. All cereals produced by African 
farmers were sold through this institution, and it regulated the prices for these commodities 
which were far below the prices that African farmers would be able to get on the normal 
markets (Heywood 1988). The drop in income from cereal production because of these fixed 
prices, compounded by depleted soils caused by this extensive cash crop production, and 
confiscation of fertile lands by white settlers, led to an increase in labour migration by 
African males (Bender 1978).   
Agriculture and trade were the predominant livelihood activities, interacting at the 
local markets, where agricultural produce could be bought and imported goods sold (World 
Bank 1991). As shown before, these types of markets were effectively prohibited by the 
Portuguese government, leaving the African rural population few alternative spaces for trade. 
One alternative for these markets was the emergence of so called bush traders or musseque 
merchants (World Bank 1991). These Portuguese shopkeepers operated in either the ‘bush’ 
(rural areas), or the ‘musseque’ (urban neighbourhoods or slums inhabited by Africans), and 
effectively dominated all trade, import and export, credit, and agricultural seeds. They were 
known to exploit the African population in various ways, in order to round up enough capital 
in a short time span enabling them to start a more comfortable life elsewhere (World Bank 
1991). Although it gave African farmers access to credit, the system supporting it was 
inherently exploitative in nature. “Transactions were based on the barter of goods, the value 
of which was set by the bush trader. Because Africans had practically no access to sources of 
credit, they were forced to rely on the bush trader for credit to purchase goods between 
harvests. The refusal of most traders to allow Africans to pay off their debts in cash prevented 
them from selling their products in the government-run rural markets (which usually paid 
higher prices, but did not extend credit). Furthermore, without access to the middlemen from 
whom the bush trader bought and sold goods, Africans were tied into a system in which they 
had to sell their products to the local bush trader, or not sell at all” (Bender 1978, 191). So, 
even though the bush trader provided a source of credit, the constraints placed on getting the 
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credit and paying off the debts, impoverished the African farmers further and limited their 
options of trading elsewhere.  
 
 
Everyday rural life under the Portuguese  
During fieldwork in both Chibia and Caluquembe municipalities, I collected stories from 
village elders about their own experiences and the village history under the Portuguese 
colonial system. These stories either focused on experiences of being conscripted as serviçaes 
to work on plantations in the north of the country, with the rural colonial trade systems that 
existed prior to independence, or the planned agricultural settlements known as the colonatos. 
In this section of the chapter I would like to present some of these life histories concerning 
people’s experiences with these colonial economic features which impacted their lives and 
livelihoods on an everyday basis. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the production, use and trade of alcoholic 
beverages were controversial, and at the heart of many encounters between the local 
population and colonial settlers. In Chibia, the production and trade in alcoholic beverages 
continues to be present in all aspects of everyday life, as it was during colonial times. A local 
brew of sorghum, known as macau, is made in many of the villages and neighbourhoods in 
the municipality, primarily by women. In the middle of the collection of huts, some big 
plastic containers of 50 litres stand in the sun, filled with the milky white brew. Villagers 
themselves and passers-by stop to drink a cup, sometimes paid for in cash but most often with 
a tradable good like food. This trade and use of macau has a long history in Chibia, and 
during colonial times macau was a commodity that was at the root of many disputes between 
local villagers and the white traders in the municipality, and hence became subject to colonial 
control.   
“In the time of Joao de Almeida19 almost all land was worked on by hand, there was 
hardly any livestock. Crops like beans, potato and sweet potato were introduced by 
the white settlers. During the colonial times one of the major income-generating 
activities, next to agriculture, was the illegal distilleries of Macau, which is a strong 
liquor made from massambala (sorghum). We would make it at home and sell it, but 
we were being hunted down by the police. You would risk 6 months of jail if they 
caught you making macau. The white shopkeepers would only sell you 5 kilos of 
sugar per day, so you had to go and visit all the different shops to get enough sugar for 
the macau. The shopkeepers did not want you to make and sell macau, to protect their 
own business of selling (Portuguese) wines. You would have to sell and drink the 
macau deep in the middle of the bush to prevent the police from finding you. In 1971-
72 this changed a bit, we were allowed a little more freedom to do what we wanted. 
The municipal administrator at that time was a bit more progressive with regard to 
education and livelihoods of the black population. Another activity at the time was 
selling eggs and goats. In the colonial times all the fields were filled with wheat, and 
also some onion and garlic”. (Interview with 93-year old man from a Nyaneka 
Kimbo). 
 
As the experience above shows, the brewing of macau was seen as an illegal activity by the 
white traders that wanted to protect their own source of income. With the prohibition of 
aguardente production in 1911, the Portuguese farmers in Chibia had already suffered when 
their wide scale sugarcane production could no longer be used for aguardente distilling and 
                                                 
19
 João de Almeida was governor of Huíla province from 1908-1910 and had his residency in Chibia-Sede. The 
town was named after him (Vila João de Almeida) in 1927, and given its current name, Chibia by the time of 
independence in 1975.  
79 
 
its subsequent selling to the African population (Medeiros 1976). They had turned to selling 
fortified Portuguese wines instead. Increasingly, the local brewing and selling of macau made 
from sorghum was seen as a threat to the Portuguese market, and was being controlled by the 
police and through sugar rationing by Portuguese shopkeepers. The intensification of 
sorghum cultivation in Huíla was actually discouraged by its Governor in 1929 as the crop 
would be used for the production of macau (Galvão 1929). To this day, macau is not sold in 
any of the bars in the municipal centre of Chibia, it remains confined to the bush. 
 Mr. Zé Carlos, an inhabitant of Chibia and son of a former Portuguese shopkeeper in 
town recounted the trading that took place in his father’s shop before independence. His 
father owned a shop in Chibia-sede and sold goods such as wine and rice on credit. People 
paid him back with the maize and sorghum that they produced. Mr. Zé Carlos appreciated the 
trading system and says that since independence and the disappearance of these types of 
trading posts, people are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain forms of credit. This 
sentiment was also voiced by Mr. Domingos from the village of Camucuio in Caluquembe 
municipality. He remembers the presence of the Portuguese shop traders in his village as a 
time when at least the availability of goods and trade was greater in comparison to the war 
and post-war period.  
“In 1930 Camucuio received its name by the first Portuguese man that settled here to 
open a shop and started doing business with the local people. In 1955 a second 
Portuguese arrived in Camucuio, soon after which more Portuguese followed. In 
November 1975 all the white settlers fled Camucuio. Before they left we had many 
more agricultural plots, rain, goods, and we were able to trade a lot of our own 
produce at the shops of the Portuguese. The quality of our produce was also much 
better because we had access to oxen, rain and agricultural inputs.” 
 
His opinion seems to have been shared by many older people I came across from the rural 
areas where fieldwork took place. They found that in comparison to the current post-war 
situation, people were better off during the pre-independence years under colonial rule when 
it came to the availability of goods, industries, employment and trade. At the same time, as 
the experience in Chibia on macau production above showed, the extensive control of the 
colonial regime over everyday activities of the local population affected their self-
determination and freedom. The everyday encounters between the local population and the 
colonial regime in these villages was marked by both loss of personal freedom over activities 
and labour and at the same time a rural economic network that ensured more economic 
opportunities. So, even though relationships were unequal and exploitative, colonial 
structures provided a form of economic safety nets through which goods, employment and 
trade benefitted some people. When this disappeared with the start of the civil war people had 
to cope with the gap formed by the withdrawing colonial system and a newly formed state 
which was yet unable to provide a new socio-economic safety net.   
 
 
Rural economic developments and livelihoods during colonialism and conflict: 1961-
2002 
 
This section presents the historical timeline of how the conflict in Angola (pre-independence, 
the socialist era, and the fiercest part of the conflict until 2002) evolved and what effects 
these three different periods in the conflict and the ensuing differing policies and contexts 
meant for rural economic development and livelihoods in Angola.  
During the 1950s nationalist movements emerged calling for independence from the 
Portuguese, and local resistance against plantation owners and poor labour conditions started 
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growing. This resulted in an outbreak of violence in 1961 by peasants revolting against the 
white plantation owners in the north of the country. This marked the start of the war for 
independence from Portugal that lasted until independence was achieved in 1975, only to lead 
the country straight into a destructive civil war that continued until 2002. During these almost 
41 years of intermittent war, the rural economy and livelihoods of rural inhabitants were 
severely affected and shaped by the conditions and constraints that the wars and often 
consequent displacement brought with them. Colonialism and conflict define the parameters 
in which people can move freely and make choices regarding the livelihoods they wish to 
pursue within the availability of resources that they have. This section explains the changes 
that occurred in rural livelihoods in Huíla province during colonialism and conflict, with a 
focus on the type of policies and institutions that existed during these periods that guided the 
development of these livelihoods.  
 
1961-1975: rural economy and livelihoods during the independence struggle 
Calls for self-determination started growing during the 1940s and 1950s, initially mostly 
amongst the Angolan urban elites (Sogge 2006). During the 1950s groups calling for 
independence from Portugal had slowly become more politically organized with the 
foundation of nationalist liberation movements such as the MPLA and União das Populações 
de Angola (UPA). These political formations coincided with a growing unrest under peasant 
populations about the bad working conditions and payments on the plantations, and the 
forced cotton cultivation by the Portuguese authorities (Cornwell 2000). The start of the 
liberation war in Angola was violently marked by the Baixa de Cassanje revolt in the cotton 
sector in the Northern province of Malanje, on the 3
rd
 of January 1961. The revolt coincided 
with a recession in Angola’s economy, which affected the coffee, fishing and cotton 
industries heavily, leading to increased unemployment amongst African workers, as well as 
falling prices and salaries not being paid (Cornwell 2000). Le Billon (2007) links the 
founding of especially the MPLA with the discovery of oil in 1955 and Portuguese 
annexation of Angola as an oversees province in 1951. The World Bank (1991) makes a 
connection between the formation of the liberation movements and the coffee boom and 
subsequent influx of the Portuguese into the country. The coffee plantation system required 
more forced labourers, whereas the increased Portuguese settlers’ presence coincided with the 
growing economic exploitation of the local population in the interior through the practices of 
the so called bush traders. “In 1960, in the north of the country, the coffee boom led many 
settlers to apply constant pressure to enlarge their plantations, disregarding the rights of the 
black owners. Simultaneously, deprivation and discontent in the countryside was attributed to 
the high prices charged by the traders in the hinterland and the low quality of the products 
they sold. While the resentment towards the bush traders was common in the whole territory, 
native property rights were more respected in the rest of the country than in the coffee 
growing region”. (World Bank 1991, 160). According to Bender (1978), the bush traders had 
the image of being thieves and racists who exploited the African population where they 
could. Stories of balance scales being fixed when weighing cattle and produce, and paying 
extremely low prices for agricultural produce that the African farmers brought to the shops 
were common. The resentment against the bush traders was also known within the colonial 
structures, but not much was done about it (Bender 1978).  
The rise of the nationalist movements articulating the need for independence, and the 
revolts of 1961 in which some 2,000 white settlers and 50,000 Africans were killed, 
demanded not only an armed response from the Portuguese government but also colonial 
policy changes (Bender 1978). The first policy change came in the subsequent abolishment of 
forced labour practices and land expropriation by white settlers in September 1961, as a first 
attempt to restore some peace in rural African societies. Secondly, steps were taken to 
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abandon inherent racist elements from the system by opening up the possibility for equal 
access to social, economic and education institutions to the African population. And thirdly, 
in order to keep the African populations out of reach of the nationalist movements, the 
Portuguese government started resettling them in villages, controlled by army and secret 
police. The latter two approaches were eventually incorporated into one, where resettlement 
programs for entire rural communities were implemented to bring both development to and 
exercise control over the population (Bender 1978). Next to the approach of resettlement to 
counter the expansion of nationalist movements and demands for independence, the 
Portuguese government tried to introduce some reforms in colonial policies. It started 
allowing more Angolans access to secondary education and employment in public 
administration, to try and correct the racial imbalance in these sectors (World Bank 1991).    
The rural resettlement of the African population that eventually affected some 1 
million people commenced in 1967 as Portugal’s major response towards the nationalists call 
for independence. A further distinction was made between strategic resettlement (camps with 
barbed wire fences to limit the access of national movements to the population) and rural 
resettlement (unfenced villages) (Bender 1978). For the Ovimbundu of central Angola, which 
includes northern Huíla province, this type of resettlement was directly countering their own 
development to venture outside of village structures in search of improved economic 
opportunities. Diverse factors as soil erosion, overpopulation and cash crop production of 
maize, beans, coffee, and wheat had increased the need of the Ovimbundu for larger 
landholdings, instead of the small plots of land that were assigned through community 
structures (Bender 1978, Possinger 1973). The rural resettlement schemes ran counter with 
these developments and directly affected cash crop production by the Ovimbundu. For the 
Nyaneka populations in the south, the resettlement schemes were also detrimental to the 
maintenance of their livelihoods, and their social structures. Pastoralist societies, accustomed 
to herding their cattle over vast stretches of land and not used to living in village structures, 
now were forced into fixed villages, while the white settlers often took over the abandoned 
land to start large-scale cattle ranching. The Portuguese resettlement policies in response to 
the Angolans struggle for independence thus constrained the rural economy and rural 
livelihoods even further.    
 
 
1975-1991: rural economy and livelihoods and the socialist policies of the post-independence 
state 
When independence was declared in November 1975, a mass exodus of Portuguese from the 
country ensued. As there had been little investment in education and formal skills for the 
African population by the colonial regime before independence, the country was faced with a 
severe lack of technically skilled personnel and management (Kofi 1981). Small businesses, 
commercial farms, manufacturing industry and the rural trading system disappeared and 
economic sabotage took place by fleeing Portuguese, leaving the country in a deep economic 
crisis (Hodges 2004, Le Billon 2007, Bhagavan 1980). The departure of the Portuguese led to 
what Sogge (2006) calls the ‘goods famine’ in rural societies, where no products were 
leaving the areas, but also no essential commodities such as agricultural inputs were coming 
in. With the disappearance of colonial structures from the country, the white merchants in the 
rural areas also departed. Although they were the symbol of colonial oppression, racism and 
exploitation of the African population, the absence of the so called musseque merchants and 
bush traders, meant that certain exploitative yet important rural trade mechanisms ceased to 
exist. As seen in the previous section on peoples’ experiences with the colonial system, the 
goods and credit could no longer be obtained through the bush traders after 1975, and this 
system was not replaced by other trading mechanisms to support the rural economy. This in 
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part had to do with the fact that the declaration of independence in 1975 was directly 
followed by a struggle for power amongst the nationalist movements, starting a destructive 
civil war that lasted until 2002. Financial means of the Government of Angola were thus 
mostly turned towards feeding the war machine, instead of making investments in the rural 
economy to support further employment possibilities, agricultural production, industries and 
trade (Le Billon 2007).  
When independence was achieved the official rhetoric on the country’s economic 
development strategy of the new MPLA-led Angolan government was that agriculture should 
be considered as the base, with industry as a dynamic factor (Young 1988). Furthermore, it 
stressed “the centrality of state ownership of productive resources and overall state control of 
the economy” (Young 1988, 170).  The MPLA had strong ties with the Soviet Union who had 
backed their fight for independence, and continued supporting the party in keeping the other 
political parties like FNLA and UNITA at bay in their quest for power. MPLA’s political 
ideology was strongly based on Marxism-Leninism, which in turn influenced their approach 
towards dealing with the country’s economic downfall after independence, due to the loss of 
business and commercial agriculture in the country. The economy was nationalized and 
followed the centralized planning features of the Soviet Union’s economic system. However, 
the centralized planning system failed due to misallocation of resources and inefficiency, 
which in turn affected the little industry still standing (Hodges 2004). Meanwhile, oil 
production and export was still on-going, whereas agricultural industry and trade fell into 
disregard, creating a clear division in the country with Luanda as an oil enclave where 
business was carrying on, but leaving the rural area and economy neglected (Hodges 2004, 
Le Billon 2007). With the withdrawal of colonial structures, the rural economy, distribution 
and transportation system collapsed, leading to food shortages (Bhagavan 1980). In order to 
deal with these food shortages, the MPLA-led government turned its attention to stimulating 
productivity of the abandoned large commercial farms by replacing machinery and 
supporting further mechanization (Kofi 1981).  As peasant cultivation was considered 
backward, the state promoted a process of villagization in order to support modern 
agricultural development, but also to be able to provide social services to the dispersed rural 
population. Although large state farms were considered to also have a positive effect on 
peasant ways of production that were considered backward, in reality little efforts were made 
to connect the two ways of production (Young 1988). Furthermore, no efforts were made to 
commercially link rural and urban areas, moreover the state was nationalizing private 
wholesaling and even effectively limiting market activities (Young 1988, 178). The rural 
development strategy thus mostly consisted of state controlled large farms and nationalizing 
commerce, with little attention towards market and industry development or supporting 
peasant production in these rural areas.  
Agriculture is influenced by conflict in many ways, such as the destruction of 
infrastructure, lack of access to markets, credit, and agricultural inputs. Furthermore, 
outbreaks of violence caused mass displacement of the population. The extensive use of 
landmines from the start of the colonial war in 1961 by all warring parties involved made 
large parts of agricultural land inaccessible. The Angolan war also affected the choices for 
crop production that people had. In a study by Paulo Filipe for Norwegian People’s Aid 
(2005) about land tenure and land rights in Kwanza Sul province, changes in the types of 
crops that were produced during conflict occurred. One significant change was that of coffee 
production. Until 1976 this was one of the most important cash crops that Angola exported, 
but since then saw a steady decline. Primary reasons for this decline were the initial exodus 
of white farmers and accompanying migrant workers from other Angolan regions, and the 
ineffectiveness of the state’s efforts to nationalize the coffee industry (Hodges 2004). Also, 
the war disrupted most of the production and marketing processes for coffee and affected its 
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distribution and transportation channels. Due to the fact that coffee is a long-term crop, 
needing up to five years for the plant to mature and start producing, is wasn’t feasible 
anymore for African farmers to rely solely on this crop during conflict. Therefore, coffee 
production was increasingly replaced by cereals and other food crop production, such as 
maize, which need a much shorter period (Filipe 2005). Direct effects are summed up well by 
Hodges (2004, 94), as: “Food production was adversely affected by the collapse of the 
colonial market system in 1975 (due to the mass departure of the comerciantes do mato), the 
disruption of urban-rural trade by the war, the large decline in the rural proportion of the 
population (due to the exodus to the towns), the states post-independence focus on promoting 
unviable state farms and trading companies rather than peasant producers and private traders, 
and a pricing system (for agricultural commodities until 1980s and for foreign exchange until 
the late 1990s) which discriminated against rural producers in favour of imports and urban 
consumers”. Most of these government approaches to the rural areas, as well as the effects 
that the war had on the rural economy continued to play a sinister part in the next period from 
1991-2002, even when the state started abandoning its Marxist ideology that dictated the 
policy decisions like the reliance on state farms instead of smallholder producers.  
 
 
1991-until now: changing political ideology, mass displacement, and post-conflict rural 
rehabilitation  
In 1990 the MPLA abandoned its Marxist-Leninist ideology that had made its mark on its 
policy and approach towards the rural economy. The abandonment of the socialist policies 
was instigated not only by the breakdown of relations between the ruling MPLA party and 
the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, the latter’s diminishing influence, but also by 
pressure from within the party. A combination of growing disappointment with the effects of 
centralized planning on the economy, as well as the emergence of class interests within 
Angolan society led to the disconnection of MPLA with its political ideology (Hodges 2004). 
This shift in ideology was followed by the introduction of multi-party democracy and the 
allowance for a growing civil society in the country. The period from the beginning of the 
1990s until 2002 also marked the most violent and destructive period of the Angolan civil 
war. Where the rural economy and livelihoods had already been heavily affected initially by 
the changing economic policies of colonialism to Marxist-Leninism and the first period of 
war until 1991, the intensified war until its sudden end in 2002 also took its toll. Mass 
displacement took place during the 1990s, mostly from the rural areas towards the relative 
safety of urban and peri-urban areas. Rural livelihoods were abandoned during the war or 
became increasingly difficult to sustain due to the lack of infrastructure, transport, goods, 
finances, inputs and assets. Local markets stopped functioning, affecting the entire rural 
trading system, and food production was increasingly geared towards subsistence of the 
household. In 1993-1994 MPLA’s practice of surrounding cities with minefields, after which 
UNITA would add another layer to prevent access to food and firewood severely affected the 
population’s farming options, making farming a potentially lethal activity (Vines 1997, 23). 
Agricultural production in Angola therefore has plummeted in the last few decades and is not 
expected to regain its previous strong position in Angola’s economy.  
In the 1960s agricultural goods made up 56% of the total export of Angola, whereas in 
1994 94% of the export consisted entirely of crude oil (Ferreira 2006). Ferreira points at the 
necessity to move away from the over-reliance on crude oil and export, to ensure a broader 
livelihood improvement for all: “Of highest priority is the recovery of agricultural 
production, beginning with basic food stuffs for domestic consumption before turning 
attention to export crops” (Ferreira 2006, 28). The underlying assumption here is that 
agricultural production for local markets will be more beneficial to local people’s food 
84 
 
security than focusing on increasing the export of crude oil, however profitable this might be. 
Most of the national income derived from oil has not left the capital city of Luanda, and few 
investments in a diversified rural economy have been made. According to Le Billon it is 
exactly because of the abundance of oil that the rural economy has been left in the state it is 
in today: “Arguably, the availability of oil revenues meant the Angolan ruling élite cared 
little about the collapse of the rest of the economy, in particular that of the hinterland” (Le 
Billon 2007, 147). The oil sector has absorbed most skilled personnel in Angola, yet only 
employs 10.000 Angolans in total therefore creating little employment opportunities for the 
whole population (Le Billon 2007, Sogge 2006). Although oil in Angola has created 
opportunities and wealth for a few, its revenues were not yet used to invest in a more 
diversified rural economy, and might have even obstructed such developments taking place. 
As oil replaced agriculture as the main source of income over the last decades, attention to 
the revitalization of the rural economy is not necessarily the main priority when state income 
is already ensured through oil.  
The main formal institutions that deal with the support and promotion of livelihoods 
in rural Angola can be summed up as markets, municipal administration frameworks, and 
village networks and structures. All three have been severely affected by the conflict, due to 
displacement, violence and the government’s funding of the military instead of making 
investments in other realms. After the war ended rural policies focused on resettlement, 
establishing food security and reconstruction of infrastructure. The state had relied heavily on 
the national and international NGOs to assist in the delivery of basic services in the rural 
areas during the war (Christoplos 1998). Aid organizations aimed to restore some of the 
functions of, for instance, the agricultural and veterinary institutions, or have even taken over 
these functions temporarily. Directing their interventions towards community structures, 
associations, and sometimes access to markets, they tried to replace some of the structures for 
rural livelihoods that had been considered lost during the long conflict. Especially community 
structures were revived, or (re)created to function as community seed banks. But these aid 
efforts towards food security and assistance to rural livelihoods were only slowly being 
accompanied by a state’s approach to revitalizing the rural economy. In line with the 
changing ideology of the government towards a more market-oriented economy, a return to 
parastatal organizations for agricultural support and marketing has been declared unwanted, 
the more so since they never were able to fulfil those tasks in the past. Yet, as the private 
sector so far has been largely absent from the rural areas, calls for more state involvement in 
farmers support for inputs and marketing have been made (Kyle 2005). So far, revitalizing 
the state’s rural extension services has been done in close cooperation with the national and 
international NGOs that operate in those regions. However, with the recent withdrawal of 
these organizations, the absence of private sector investments, and a state that seems more 
pre-occupied with the oil sector and the rebuilding of roads and urban centres than with its 
rural policies, revitalization processes go largely unassisted. The future of rural socio-
economic development in Angola thus depends on rural people’s ability to cope with crisis 
and poverty and develop their own initiatives as they have been doing so far, making the 
most of the resources and opportunities at hand.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter discussed Angola’s history with specific reference to the rural socio-economic 
developments and how they were shaped and influenced over the years by colonialism and 
conflict until now. Colonialism and its economic policies and institutions had profound 
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negative effects on rural societies by indebting the local population through taxation, forced 
labour contracts, land grabbing and uneven competition.  
With Angolan independence and the withdrawal of the colonial rural structures in 
1975, the rural trading system where Portuguese shopkeepers and traders basically controlled 
all movements of goods, produce and credits collapsed. Even though the trading system was 
fraught with many exploitative elements towards the African populations, its collapse was 
destructive for the rural economic landscapes. The bush traders weren’t replaced by an 
Angolan trading system due to the outbreak of civil war and a different economic ideology, 
leaving rural people without the agricultural inputs they had relied on before, and marketing 
and distribution channels for their produce ceased to exist. To this day, rural people would 
talk with a hint of nostalgia about the period before the civil war, when colonial institutions at 
least enabled them to have access to credit, seeds and tools, and employment. This nostalgia 
however doesn’t imply nostalgia to colonialism per se, but can be seen as a testament to the 
next level of dispossession and lack of access to essential goods and commodities during the 
destructive civil war. 
Understanding Angola’s colonial history is essential in the analysis of the country’s 
rural development today. Rural livelihoods and institutions have been co-shaped by the 
parameters which the colonial state set and enforced during its rule. As Angola was engulfed 
in a destructive civil war straight after reaching independence, many of these parameters were 
left unchanged due to the state’s preoccupation with war. Meanwhile, Marxist ideology for 
some time informed the GoA’s strategy of prioritizing centralized state farms over peasant 
production, and nationalizing and even suppressing rural-urban commercial linkages. The 
pre-independence years have had a strong influence on the state’s conceptualization of the 
rural economy today, as demonstrated in its post-conflict reconstruction plans. For instance, 
as Portuguese colonial expansion in Angola also had focused mostly on major cities and ports 
along the coast for the first few centuries, so have reconstruction programs implemented 
since 2002. As seen, there are hardly any functioning and diverse rural economy and rural 
institutions left after years of colonization and conflict. Also, recent economic development 
statistics in Angola have indicated that the primary motor and focus of the economy remains 
oil, perpetuating the continuing neglect for improvement of rural economy, institutions and 
livelihoods. Colonialism and conflict have altered the rural socio-economic landscape 
profoundly through exploitative policies, violence, destruction of infrastructure and 
displacement.  
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Introduction  
 
This chapter presents a case study of the municipality of Caluquembe in Huíla province, 
zooming in on three selected villages. The case study analyses the past and current livelihood 
practices of the village inhabitants. The history of each village is presented, highlighting 
social and economic histories of the localities and the effects of war. By looking at the 
different critical events in village and personal life such as: war, displacement, migration, and 
aid interventions the changes in livelihoods are made visible. Specific reference is made to 
the encounters people have with aid and aid deliverers. The chapter is based on interviews 
with NGO staff, local administration and other key figures in the area, as well as on 
interviews and surveys of inhabitants of the three villages.  
This chapter investigates the different aid interventions that have taken place in 
Caluquembe municipality, to see how they changed in focus depending on how the conflict 
played out. Also, this case study of Caluquembe will allow for an analysis of how linking 
relief, rehabilitation and development worked out in practice. Because Caluquembe has seen 
a long and wide-ranging aid presence during and after the war, the case study allows to see 
what outcomes these different types and stages of aid have had on the livelihoods of people 
the fieldwork villages. Specifically the chapter will address the research questions on 1) 
people’s past and current livelihoods and how have they been affected and influenced by 
crisis, and 2) how different aid interventions influenced and transformed the livelihood 
options that people have nowadays?  
This chapter will argue that Caluquembe provides an example of an externally driven 
type of recovery in the context of post-war Angola. Conflict and displacement have 
diminished the resources people had to produce sufficient and diverse agricultural goods, 
conduct trade or find alternative sources of income. This combined with an externally driven 
approach by NGOs to livelihood recovery has led to a rural society with a limited variety of 
uniform livelihood options that remains vulnerable to shocks.  
 
 
Introducing Caluquembe 
 
This section serves as an introduction to Caluquembe municipality. It argues that 
Caluquembe historically has been the centre of active conflict, and therefore in particular 
affected by mass displacement, loss of assets, resources and livelihood opportunities. The 
area’s violent history and political importance is also marked by the events unfolding at one 
of the town’s principal features, the IESA mission, church and hospital.  
Huíla province is administratively divided into fourteen municipíos (municipalities), 
each headed by a municipal administrator who is the government’s representative on 
municipal level. These fourteen municipalities are subdivided into forty-five comunas 
(communities) each with their communal administrators, and which in turn consist of 
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povoaçoes (usually a collection of villages), aldeias (one village), and bairros 
(neighbourhoods). The soba is the traditional leader or chief of the village, who mediates and 
acts as local judge, but also performs certain rituals when necessary, for instance in the case 
of drought as is shown in this chapter. The soba also enjoys formal legitimacy to a certain 
extent and supposedly receives a monthly fee from the government, although in practice this 
is often not the case (Tvedten and Orre 2003, 48).    
Caluquembe
20
 is a municipality that lies in the north-western part of the province, and 
its local municipal administration is located in Caluquembe-sede, the capital town of the 
municipality. Caluquembe municipality currently has approximately 247.000 inhabitants, of 
which about 100.000 live in Caluquembe-Sede. The entire municipal area consists of 4000 
km2. The majority of the inhabitants of the Caluquembe municipality are of Ovimbundu 
ethnicity. The area has been the site of much conflict between MPLA and UNITA, mostly in 
the ‘bush’, but also in the municipal centre itself, with the MPLA carrying out an aerial 
bombing in 1994 to try and chase UNITA out which had taken over control over the area.  
The reasons for selecting Caluquembe as one of my research sites were that it had 
been more affected by conflict and displacement than some other municipalities in the 
province, and because of the continuing presence of NGOs that had been and were still 
making interventions geared towards the recovery of livelihoods. Furthermore, the 
comparison between the municipalities of Chibia (see next chapter) and Caluquembe was 
also particularly interesting because of the different livelihood options due to climatic 
differences. Caluquembe mostly relies on rain-fed agriculture, whereas Chibia is semi-arid 
and livelihoods traditionally revolve around agro-pastoralism. Driving through Caluquembe 
municipality the landscape is characterized by maize fields scattered throughout seemingly 
abandoned bush. There is an asphalted road that links Lubango to Caconda
21
, which runs 
through Caluquembe-sede. During the rainy season this road was scattered with large muddy 
potholes that would increase the travel time from Lubango to Caluquembe from four hours 
(dry season) to six or seven hours. At the same time, some areas of land next to the road had 
still not been demined. At the end of the fieldwork large road repair projects were on-going 
with the intention to reduce travel time on this stretch of road to only three hours.  
 I made several trips to villages in the municipal area, either with or without the 
presence of NGO staff. After interviews and visits with NGOs working in Caluquembe, I 
identified three villages in the area in which I conducted the comparative fieldwork, through 
interviews and surveys. These villages were Camucuio, Catala and Cue I. The three villages 
differed in terms of location and accessibility, history of conflict and displacement, and aid 
interventions. In the next section I will introduce these villages in depth and describe their 
histories. 
 
 
History of Caluquembe town 
Although most literature on Caluquembe deals with the colonial and post-colonial era, the 
municipal history goes back much further. A local historian offered me the following account 
of how Caluquembe was founded:  
“The name Caluquembe signifies ‘don’t lie, tell the truth’, and derives from a man 
named Caluquembe that arrived there from Chiyaka (an area in Huambo province). 
He was a hunter of elephants. He was following a group of elephants until he reached 
a mountain (present day Caluquembe). Then, he organized a group of people and 
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 Also known as Kaluquembe or Kalukembe. 
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This road also links to the surrounding provinces of Benguela and Huambo, and was once an important 
highway that connected southern and northern Angola. Reconstruction efforts are ongoing to return this 
important function for Angola’s overall transport network. 
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founded Caluquembe. There were already people living in the area so he asked the 
soba if he could bring his family to stay with him in Caluquembe. Soon thereafter 
they gained control over the area and the municipality was given its present name. His 
official administrative power came to an end with the expansion of Portuguese 
colonial rule into Angola’s interior. It is not known when exactly the Portuguese took 
over.”22 
 
The first registered encounters with the Portuguese that have been noted by Murray Childs 
(1970) were of a war between the Caluquembe Kingdom and the Portuguese between 1774-
76. Despite the ensuing Portuguese colonization the traditional power structures in 
Caluquembe have remained largely intact, functioning in parallel to the newly imposed 
colonial administrative structures. And contrary to what Porto (et al. 2007) argue when they 
note that these traditional authority structures only survived in the south and central parts of 
the province where the conflict was less pronounced, Caluquembe still has most of these 
traditional authority structures in place. To this day Caluquembe municipality has a king, 
next to the municipal administrator that represents the modern-day authority structures. The 
current king of Caluquembe has been in power from 2005 onwards, following a line of rule 
that dates back to the founding of the Caluquembe kingdom around 1740 (Murray Childs 
1970). Together with sobas from the area he holds regular meetings in front of the 
mission/hospital entrance, discussing relevant topics concerning Caluquembe and any further 
issues that the sobas bring to the meeting. These meetings also aim to report any forthcoming 
issues from the various villages to the municipal administration.
23
 Furthermore, the king is 
also responsible for organizing important ceremonies, of which I will give an example later in 
this chapter.  
Caluquembe municipality is part of the region that Clarence-Smith (1979) defines as 
the Caconda Highlands, which essentially comprises of current day Caconda and 
Caluquembe municipalities. In 1960 the population of this region was estimated to consist of 
260.000 people and the main cash crops at that time were sisal, cotton, tobacco and coffee 
whilst maize and livestock were mainly used for subsistence purposes (Clarence-Smith 
1979). Wheat also played an important role in the colonial economy of Caluquembe. Archive 
records from the Huíla District Delegation of Agriculture and Forestry show that the amount 
of distributed wheat seeds (247700 kilo’s) in 1966/67 was almost 10 times higher than for 
maize (29930) and 8 times higher than the amount of distributed bean seeds (38530) 
(Delegação Distrital de Agricultura e Florestas da Huíla 1967). Wheat has ceased to play an 
important role in cereal production since 1975 with the departure of the Portuguese which 
affected the availability of seeds. Livestock has always been an important asset, especially 
oxen that made it possible to cultivate large plots of land. Livestock rearing for meat was 
more important in the southern parts of the province where agriculture was less successful 
due to the semi-arid climate.  
During the colonial period, Caluquembe saw a considerable number of Portuguese 
settlers who owned small shops, bakeries or rural trading posts. In the comuna of Vila Branca 
a sausage factory was located that offered some job opportunities as well as trading 
possibilities for people who were rearing pigs. Although the factory hasn’t been operational 
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 Interview with Daniel Camosso, staff member of the Sector of Education of the Municipal Administration, 
Caluquembe, 20 August 2007. 
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 During my presence at one of these meetings with the King and sobas from the region, I was given a list 
containing a timeline of kings of Caluquembe. The list of kings of Caluquembe went back to Dumbo 
Satchiyambo, who was considered to be the founder and official first king of Caluquembe. How far back this list 
stretched was difficult to say, the dates of the succession of kings had only been written down from 1902 
onwards. 
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since it was destroyed in 1991, people continue rearing pigs as they used to do in the past. 
Caluquembe used to have a fair amount of coffee production, either on large commercial 
fazenda’s or by individual smallholders. During the war coffee production ceased and is 
almost non-existent today.  
 
 
The Caluquembe mission and hospital 
One of the central features of Caluquembe-sede is its hospital, which is said to have been one 
of the best hospitals of Angola during many years, also for a large part during the war. They 
were able to keep functioning with relatively high quality standards throughout most parts of 
the war, and many high-ranking people seeking medical assistance were flown in from 
Luanda. The hospital is run and administratively linked to the mission of the Igreja 
Evangelica Sinodal de Angola (IESA). This mission has its origins in an earlier missionary 
station founded in 1897 by Swiss missionary Helí Chatelain. The history of Helí Chatelain’s 
travel through Angola and founding of the missionary station in Caluquembe has been 
featured in many historical accounts of authors such as Birmingham (1998, 2006) and Péclard 
(1995, 1998). His missionary activities, and more specifically his extensive trading with Boer 
populations, and negotiating with the Portuguese colonial authorities and the Catholic Church 
on issues of slavery and trade, were main features of the articles written about his life. He 
initially named his missionary station Lincoln, after the American president that abolished 
slavery, to highlight his intention to protect African population against slavery (Birmingham 
1998). This created resistance from the Portuguese colonial regime, but his stance on 
colonialism itself was in effect not so different to those of the Portuguese. “He also had 
difficulty in recruiting supporters willing to accept his thesis that colonization did represent 
the road to liberty for Africa’s peoples and that one had to be patient and pragmatic while 
waiting for the benefits of ‘civilization’ to trickle down” (Birmingham 1998, 352). In the 
years following the establishment of Lincoln, Chatelain increasingly distanced himself from 
his initial anti-slavery activities. His missionary station became a trading post with the Boer 
populations of the Huíla Highlands.  
Many Swiss missionaries followed Chatelains footsteps at the mission in 
Caluquembe, through the so called Alliance Missionaire Evangélique Suisse (AME). In 1942 
one of these Swiss missionaries from AME, Dr. Brechet, arrived in Caluquembe and he 
founded its hospital on the mission grounds in 1947. In 1964 AME was transformed into the 
IESA church.  The process of transition from a mission station to an independent Angolan 
church was evaluated differently by the various stakeholders. Whereas Dr. Brechet in 1972 
had called the transition a completed and brotherly process, the director of IESA in 1982 on 
the other hand stressed the fact that this transition was not fully completed yet as the foreign 
missionaries were unable to accept the church’s full autonomy (Péclard 1998).  
The Caluquembe hospital has historically been an important reference point for 
healthcare in the area, and a base from which many missionaries gave medical assistance to 
the population throughout the war. With the arrival of UNITA troops in Caluquembe in 1992 
the Swiss missionaries fled, and the hospital was abandoned. The former hospital 
administrator witnessed the destruction and subsequent raiding of the hospital by the UNITA 
troops as well as by the local population from close by.
24
 In 1992 he and his family had to 
flee when UNITA took control of the region and he was not able to continue working at the 
hospital. He subsequently moved into a house 100 metres from the entrance of the hospital, 
from where he would witness what was happening. From 1992 until 1994 the hospital was 
occupied by UNITA, and most of the (expatriate) staff fled. The hospital continued 
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functioning to a certain extent during that time, and would for instance receive patients from 
the DRC that arrived through the humanitarian corridors which had been put in place by the 
ICRC. In 1994 the first government plane arrived carrying out a bomb attack forcing UNITA 
to flee. The first bomb fell at 30 meters from the hospital. In 1994 the government re-
occupied Caluquembe, and the Angolan Red Cross was the first organization to supply the 
hospital with medicines, enabling it to become operational again. A Canadian missionary 
doctor remembers the raiding of the hospital as follows:  
“The commander of the MPLA troops in 1994 said to his soldiers ‘you haven’t 
received salary in the last 8 months, go and collect it yourself’. After this the whole 
hospital of Caluquembe was robbed of its equipment. One nurse was able to move 
some equipment and supplies to the leprosy department, considering that no soldier 
wanted to enter that area of the hospital.”25  
 
In January 1995 the Canadian missionary witnessed some of the stolen equipment from the 
hospital in Caluquembe being sold on the streets of Lubango. At the same time, one 
missionary nurse remembered that the destruction and looting of the hospital equipment had 
also taken place by the local population and staff of the hospital themselves. The hospital 
administrator himself went past all the houses of the people whom he knew had stolen 
equipment from the hospital in order to return them. 
The mission, hospital and IESA church in Caluquembe had been struggling with their 
political neutrality throughout the war. Savimbi was linked to the IESA church, and felt that 
the people of Caluquembe would welcome him as a saviour of the people. One high-ranking 
IESA member in Caluquembe invited Savimbi to the mission and gave him a grand tour and 
celebration dinner, and recommended the people to vote for him. During his election tour in 
1992, Savimbi was driven around in an IESA car through Caluquembe district (Schot 2009). 
IESA members and missionaries struggled with these political linkages. A missionary nurse 
working in Caluquembe from 1976 until 1992 witnessed these problematic linkages from 
close by. In 1992 she wanted to put the Red Cross symbol on the hospital, to accentuate the 
hospital’s neutrality, but was hindered by MPLA who saw the hospitals and IESA’s 
connection with UNITA as a sign that it was not neutral at all. She was unable, as she 
explains, to continue working at the hospital when staff from the church got involved in the 
termination of pregnancies at the hospital that were the result of young girls being forced into 
sexual relationships as part of UNITA rituals. She fled Caluquembe together with the other 
Swiss missionaries in 1992, but remained in Angola. In October 1993 the Swiss missionaries 
officially separated themselves from the IESA church, starting the Solidariedade Evangelica, 
to underline their independence and political neutrality. They continue working with IESA, 
but operate independently. The hospital became fully equipped and operational again after 
the war, with IESA’s headquarters moving to Lubango. The IESA mission continues to 
operate in Caluquembe, mainly through its bible school and educational training for nurses. 
Unfortunately, IESA’s linkages with UNITA were difficult to shed, and IESA members were 
considered traitors during and after the war.  
 
 
Conflict in Caluquembe 
When the war started in 1975 the white settlers moved out of the Caluquembe area and 
countryside. This had direct effects on the local economy and availability of resources. From 
1975 onwards people started fleeing to Caluquembe-sede, especially from the “warm” areas 
where troops from both parties were stationed. Fighting had already taken place in the area 
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from 1975 onwards, but was intensified in 1983 when UNITA was in control of most of the 
surrounding rural areas around Caluquembe-sede. In 1991 UNITA occupied Caluquembe for 
45 days, trying to set up administration in town (Ruigrok 2007, 92). In 1992, after the 
elections and return to war, UNITA again occupied Caluquembe-sede for a period of two 
years. On the 4
th
 of October 1994 the government bombed parts of Caluquembe-sede, 
especially the mission and hospital, and re-established control over Caluquembe-sede and its 
local administration. The surrounding areas however remained contested grounds between 
UNITA and MPLA troops, causing continued displacement of population from these remote 
villages (Ruigrok 2007). The local administration of Caluquembe for a long time consisted of 
both MPLA and UNITA representatives as part of the Government of National Unity created 
in 1997, as stipulated in the Lusaka peace protocol. The cooperation between MPLA and 
UNITA members in local government did not run smoothly however, and in 2004 the 
UNITA municipal administrator mysteriously disappeared, fuelling tensions between 
members of the administration (Schot 2009). The political tension in local government also 
affected the aid organizations working in the municipality: 
“The Caluquembe area was UNITA territory, and had a UNITA administrator but the 
rest of the local governance structures were MPLA, this made governance very 
difficult. For example, when ZOA stated that they wanted to open the base in 
Caluquembe, the local authorities wanted to be involved in decision making about 
which local staff we would hire, if we had not accepted this we could not have started 
the base.”26 
 
People from the municipality fled to other parts of the province or sought refuge in 
and close around the municipal centre, usually within a 10-20 kilometre radius from the town 
which was still considered to be relatively safe.
27
 Population displacement in Caluquembe 
was further aggravated by the scorched earth policy of MPLA. MPLA was burning 
agricultural fields to force the rural population and UNITA soldiers to come closer to the 
cities to look for survival options there. People did not know if what they had been sowing 
would actually survive until the harvest period.
28
 At the same time, landmines did prevent the 
use of some land around the town centre. Currently some fields next to the provincial road 
between Vila Branca and Caluquembe-sede remain inaccessible due to the known presence of 
landmines. Caluquembe is still considered one of the critical areas in the province that needs 
demining efforts.  
Displacement within Caluquembe municipality occurred in different directions, often 
depending on stages of the conflict, occupation of the region by one party or the other, and 
real or perceived party affiliation. For instance, most of the population from the villages of 
Camucuio and Cue 1 fled during the 1980s when UNITA troops were closing in on the 
municipal centre and resided in the surrounding ‘bush’ where these villages were located. 
Catala, on the other hand, located close to Caluquembe-sede and along the main provincial 
road, was completely deserted only after the MPLA reoccupied Caluquembe in 1994. From 
1995-1997
29
 the entire population of Catala fled together with UNITA, with half of the 
inhabitants staying in abandoned villages in the ‘bush’, such as Camucuio. These 
displacement movements led to the curious situation in which people from ‘town’ resided in 
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 Interview Sander Schot, former Program Advisor ZOA Caluquembe, Lubango 21 April 2007. 
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 At the end of the conflict, between 2000 and 2001 this security perimeter around the municipal capital 
increased from 20 to 40 kilometres. 
28
 Interview Sander Schot, former Program Advisor ZOA Caluquembe, Lubango, 21 April 2007. 
29
 This period coincides with the ceasefire and peace accords of the Lusaka peace protocol, from 1994-1998. 
Whereas the inhabitants of Catala were never displaced during the war, they were forced to flee during 
peacetime. 
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the deserted villages in the ‘bush’, and vice versa. Interestingly however, no mention has 
been made by inhabitants of villages, government institutions and NGOs of land conflicts in 
Caluquembe. As displacement had occurred in different directions people were sometimes 
confronted with IDPs having settled in their villages. This however did not result in enduring 
conflicts over land as was happening in other parts of the country. Also, land grabbing has 
not occurred as in the case of Chibia, which I will elaborate in the next chapter. People have 
been able to maintain more or less similar sizes of land as before and during the war, with the 
main difference being not having sufficient oxen that facilitates an augmentation of the land 
under production. 
The map below indicates the displacement processes in Huíla, as well as accessibility 
of the areas and presence of humanitarian organizations. It shows how people from 
neighbouring provinces and municipalities came into the Caluquembe area, as well as the 
accessibility of Caluquembe for humanitarian agencies. 
 
Figure 3: Map of displacement processes in Huíla province 
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(Source: map taken from a Provincial Evaluation Group on Vulnerability, May 2002) 
 
Current socio-economic profile of Caluquembe 
In the municipality of Caluquembe there are about 2000 formally employed people, most of 
them teachers, health workers, and government representatives. Currently, the biggest formal 
employer in the Caluquembe region is the educational sector. This especially pertains to 
youth. Every year about 100-200 youths are recruited as teachers in the Caluquembe 
municipality. The health sector comes second as one of the main employers in the region due 
to the regional function of Caluquembe hospital. However, the majority of the population 
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relies on agriculture or small scale trade. The small industries and shops that used to give 
access to necessary resources for agriculture, provide job opportunities, and offer incentives 
to produce specific crops or rear livestock, are no longer there. People in Caluquembe feel 
that despite years of peace and various programs and interventions focusing directly or 
indirectly at livelihood recovery, the options to find diversified livelihoods remain limited. 
This pertains specifically to youths, who find that their livelihood options are limited to 
agriculture. Unfortunately, they have either lost those skills during displacement in urban 
areas, or feel disconnected from rural life altogether. 
The Caluquembe market place is one of the most vibrant features of the town today. 
In 1982 a small market place emerged opposite the entrance of the hospital. However, when 
at the beginning of the 1990s Caluquembe came under attack by UNITA and MPLA troops, 
trading at the market came to a halt due to security reasons. In 1999 the current Caluquembe 
market was opened, where a variety of goods are being traded, increasingly so by the lack of 
shops in the municipality. All inhabitants are allowed to rent a vending spot on the market for 
100 kwanza per day (1 euro). Most agricultural produce from the villages is traded at this 
market.  
Industrial development in Caluquembe is non-existent. One of the problems 
associated with starting industrial development in modern-day Caluquembe, according to the 
head of the department of economy and production of the municipal administration,  is that 
when there is a problem with equipment, machines or electricity supply, there are no places 
nearby to find spare parts or mechanics to fix the problem.
30
 Production will come to a 
standstill in that case. 
War and displacement changed the livelihood options people have in the region. Not 
only did certain opportunities disappear, new ones were introduced. Due to displacement, 
people encountered other traditions in the regions where they found refuge during the war. 
Certain cultural traditions became less strict, open to interpretation and change. This is 
illustrated by the following comments from the head of the department of economy and 
production of the municipal administration in Caluquembe-sede: 
“When people fled during the war to other areas they also encountered different 
lifestyles and livelihoods from the ones that they were used to in Caluquembe. When 
they returned to their area of origin after the war they would take those different 
livelihoods along. Now you see other traditions appear. For instance, women are now 
allowed to climb into trees to collect honey from beekeeping. This used to be 
culturally unacceptable in the past. This difference comes from the encounters of 
people from this region with people from the Nyaneka tribes in the south of the 
province. At the same time the habits of the Nyaneka also changed through our 
presence in their areas. Another example is that now the practice of paying dowry is 
on the increase, which was never a tradition in the Caluquembe region.” 
 
Displacement makes people acquainted with different livelihoods, and sometimes challenges 
and transforms certain gender roles as well.  
  
 
Encounters with aid interventions  
 
Caluquembe saw a wide range of humanitarian and development NGOs, churches and state 
institutions assisting the war-affected population over the years. The humanitarian situation 
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 Interview João Bernesse, head of the department of economy and production of the Caluquembe municipal 
administration, Caluquembe-sede, 07 February 2008. 
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was considered to be particularly grave due to the widespread displacement of people from 
the surrounding villages, who found themselves in the middle of fierce fighting between 
UNITA and government troops throughout various periods of the war. Furthermore, the 
municipality had become difficult and unsafe to access by roads, and the area had been 
mined. When access to the municipality was improved, especially at the end of the war, it 
created an influx of a variety of aid agencies. Caluquembe continues to have an aid agency 
presence to this day, although especially the international NGOs have closed their programs 
in the area. The current exit strategies for the aid agencies is to hand over their programs to 
the local Agricultural Development Station (EDA), who intends to push forward the idea of 
increasing agricultural cereal production as its main strategy for poverty reduction and 
creation of sustainable rural livelihoods in Caluquembe. This section discusses the history of 
aid interventions in Caluquembe, and their diversity in focus and areas. 
 
 
Assistance to Caluquembe 
The Caluquembe area has seen many interventions ranging from emergency relief to more 
long term development aid, continuing to this day. Due to the effects of the intense conflict, 
and as many of the displaced from Caluquembe were part of resettlement programs after the 
war it became one of the focal points for different types of aid in the province. Also, from the 
point of view of cost-effectiveness, Caluquembe was easier to reach than a municipality like 
Chipindo that had been equally affected by the conflict, but required a 15-hour drive 
compared to the 5 or 6 hours that it would take to reach Caluquembe from Lubango. During 
the 1980s aid was mostly distributed through local churches or state institutions like the 
MINARS. Malnutrition at this time was not occurring frequently, as food was still being 
produced. Non-food items, such as clothes, had however become increasingly difficult to 
obtain. Therefore, food was being traded for non-food items through local church 
organisations. MINARS started distributing food and other essentials to the displaced people 
that began to arrive within the town’s perimeters and were unable to produce food 
themselves. New neighbourhoods in Caluquembe-sede sprang up due to the influx of 
displaced people seeking safety and protection. One of these neighbourhoods that continue to 
exist to this day is bairro Havemos de Voltar, meaning “we must return”31. The 
neighbourhood started to form in 1982 on what used to be agricultural fields, when the war 
became more intense, and people were killed in the bush and forced to flee to towns. Most 
people in the neighbourhood originated from the provinces of Bié and Huambo, and 
neighbouring municipality of Chicomba. The first group to arrive there in 1982 came from 
Chicuma in Benguela, and they remain the largest group to this day. As people were arriving, 
the MINARS started handing out food and clothing in the neighbourhood. 
32
 
The municipality had become affected by a drought and subsequent famine in 1989, 
and food aid was handed out at the time through the churches, including some foreign 
missionaries working at the Caluquembe Hospital who obtained food aid through World 
Vision and World Relief Canada, as well as a private Angolan company that made 80.000 
tonnes of beans available through the IESA mission. In the 1980s the conflict had already 
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 This is also the title of a poem written by Agostinho Neto, Angola’s first president, in 1960 in which he 
describes the natural beauty and wealth of Angola and how Angolans need to return to their own country when 
independence has been achieved. 
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 At this moment only about 70 families are left in bairro Havemos de Voltar. The current inhabitants indicate 
that they would like to return to their areas of origin one day, but do not have enough money or livestock to take 
with them in order to start a new life there. Some also awaited the outcomes of the parliamentary elections of 
September 2008, as many had been displaced or fled following the previous parliamentary elections of 1992, the 
results of which had been contested by UNITA and formed the starting point of one of the most brutal period in 
the Angolan civil war. 
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caused displacement, but not yet at the scale of the 1990s, when the town doubled in size 
(Schot 2009). 
With the 1991 Bicesse peace accords in place, coinciding with the departure of Cuban 
troops and introduction of a multi-party democracy in Angola, a more visible and active civil 
society was able to develop. National NGOs started working throughout the country, and 
international NGOs were able to gain access to Angola. In 1991 the newly founded Angolan 
NGO Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiental (ADRA) started working in 
Caluquembe with a programme that focused on peace and development. They implemented a 
resettlement programme for displaced people by handing out agricultural inputs. The project 
was interrupted when the war broke out again in 1992, but ADRA was asked to return to 
Caluquembe when the war ended in 2002 to continue the projects they had started in 1991. 
World Food Programme (WFP), Caritas and the Red Cross were the other main organizations 
to enter Caluquembe in 1993. At that time UNITA was still occupying Caluquembe-sede, and 
the town was only accessible by air. There were less goods coming into town because of the 
fact that the roads had become inaccessible; littered with landmines and military roadblocks. 
Assets were stolen by soldiers coming into the area, and people were killed on the roads. In 
1993 the Angolan Red Cross was able to enter to the town and started restocking the 
abandoned hospital with medicines and equipment and handing out food aid. WFP arrived 
once every two weeks to distribute cooking oil, maize, beans and blankets. This was mostly 
organized through the Canadian branch of the Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF), who 
played an important role in aid distribution during the time that Caluquembe was hardly 
accessible by road. Attacks on humanitarian convoys on the road between Lubango and 
Caluquembe also made the role of MAF in food aid delivery more important. Food aid 
initially was being distributed at the airstrip located in the middle of Caluquembe-sede. 
Caritas also started working in 1993 and handed out oil and maize to the affected population. 
IDPs arriving in Caluquembe could build clay-block houses according to a fixed lay out, with 
a small adjacent garden where they would be able to produce a sufficient amount of maize for 
household consumption (Schot 2009).   
The real influx of NGOs started from 2001 onwards when the occurrence of violent 
encounters between MPLA and UNITA diminished in Caluquembe. The Dutch relief 
organization, ZOA Refugee Care, had already wanted to start programs at the end of the 
1990s, yet did not get security clearance. In 2001 however it was finally able to enter 
Caluquembe district and started water, sanitation and road rehabilitation projects (Schot 
2009). The road rehabilitation works were implemented through a food-for-work scheme, 
which continued for 2 years after which 180 km of road had been improved.
33
 Displaced 
people who originated from Caluquembe began returning in 2002, just before the start of the 
new agricultural season, and NGOs assisted these returnees through distribution of food and 
other household essentials to bridge the period until the first harvest (Schot 2009). This was 
coupled to an approach of establishing food security through the distribution of seeds, tools 
and in some cases agricultural inputs and livestock. These types of projects have dominated 
the aid response in Caluquembe.  
 
 
Practices of targeting in aid interventions 
Humanitarian practice in emergencies involves targeting of vulnerable groups, by labelling 
individuals to fit certain pre-set criteria for interventions (Bakewell 2000). Distinctions are 
made between “IDPs”, “most vulnerable”, “returnees”, “female-headed households”, “ex-
combatants”, etc. There is a concern that these labels to describe, categorize, and then target 
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individuals for interventions might become self-perpetuating in the sense that people start 
using these labels themselves in order to gain access to valuable resources they are entitled to 
according to the set of criteria put forward by humanitarian organizations (Bakewell 2000). 
One example of a frequently used label is that of “most vulnerable”. It is often put forward to 
gear interventions to the people who are perceived to be worst off in communities, but this 
label is complicated to define, and at times the process and outcomes of selection of people 
fitting into the category are highly political. During the fieldwork this label was put forward 
most frequently by organisations to indicate which beneficiaries constituted their specific 
target group. When asked further, these groups usually consisted of people who had recently 
returned to their areas of origin. It can be questioned, however, whether this is a reliable 
indicator of vulnerability. People do not always return home empty-handed, and have often 
remained in towns to accumulate resources before they decide to return. This means that an 
urban setting actually provides them an opportunity to accumulate assets. Even if 
organisations have decided which criteria define people’s vulnerability, it remains vague as to 
how this is dealt with in practice.  
In Caluquembe, during the period of food aid the selection for targeting was mostly 
done through a registration process, of which some people say they had been denied entry 
because they had registered too late. After the end of the war in 2002 food aid was followed 
by programmes geared towards resettlement of IDPs and establishing food security, whereby 
organizations became increasingly specific in the targeting of their beneficiaries. The 
municipal administration would be responsible for assigning NGOs to specific areas and 
villages. Most NGOs followed a similar approach when starting their interventions in villages 
and selecting the potential beneficiaries. They would ask the soba of the village to select the 
most vulnerable people in their village. For instance, NGOs would indicate that they 
specifically sought female-headed households, returnees, ex-combatants, subsistence farmers, 
etc. The soba would then provide a list of about 250 people that he considered met those 
criteria. Organizations working in the realm of food security distributed the agricultural 
inputs, and set up a village committee that overlooked the reimbursement and rotation 
processes. People were expected to reimburse part of their harvest to a community seed bank, 
coordinated by these village committees, in exchange for the agricultural inputs and use of 
oxen. The oxen would rotate throughout the group of beneficiaries to ensure that every 
household had a chance to plough their fields when necessary. This system of rotating oxen 
didn’t work well in every locality. Sometimes the number of distributed oxen was considered 
to be too little for the amount of land under cultivation, making it difficult to plough the land 
on time.  
For ex-combatants, aid programmes were different. In order to facilitate their 
reintegration into their areas of origin, special aid programmes were designed and 
implemented which had a predominantly economic focus. The state’s institution Institute of 
Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (IRSEM) was responsible for overseeing 
the reintegration process of ex-combatants since the Bicesse peace accords of 1991. Together 
with some NGOs they offered ex-combatants a variety of options to ensure socio-professional 
reintegration into society. After 2002 the soldiers were stationed in demobilisation camps 
located in the north of the province, after which they were registered and receive 
documentation. If they chose to return to their areas of origin they had to register with the 
local municipal administration as soon as they arrived there. The municipal administration 
would then redirect them to the local IRSEM office. When ex-combatants returned to their 
villages of origin in Caluquembe, the reintegration process started with the development of a 
plan in collaboration with IRSEM.  Ex-combatants could choose from a variety of skills 
training courses, educating them as carpenters, masons, locksmiths, plumbers, mechanics, 
and electricians. After finishing a specific course they received a work kit and further 
98 
 
assistance in setting up their own business. Furthermore, they could also choose to construct 
schools in their own villages, earning a salary of $50 for six months (Ruigrok 2007, 94). A 
reintegration package could also consist of agricultural seeds and tools. The local IRSEM 
coordinator was positive about the reintegration process in Caluquembe:  
“The reintegration process is mostly social in nature, focusing on harmonization of 
economic, social and productive life. The demobilized soldiers only know how to 
fight, you have to change their past spirit. At this moment Caluquembe municipality 
has 1087 registered Luena demobilized soldiers. Every village in the area will have 
demobilized soldiers living there. We hear very little stories about local conflict 
arising because of failed reintegration. Especially in villages where schools are built 
by demobilized soldiers you see no problems at all, because the whole village gains 
something from that.”34 
 
Although in this interview he stressed the social nature of the reintegration process as 
essential, in practice reintegration was dominated by economic and productive strategies for 
reinsertion into society (Ruigrok 2007, 95). Within villages people found it difficult to 
indicate if there were ex-combatants living in their villages, and often were unaware of 
IRSEM’s work. In Cue 1, for example, people would point vaguely at another side of the 
village to say that they knew there were one or two ex-combatants living there but weren’t 
able to name them or tell me whether they had been fighting alongside UNITA or MPLA. 
Social reintegration and reconciliation have not been aspects of ex-combatant reintegration 
processes. The main focus has been on increasing their economic productivity on return in 
their villages. 
NGO’s practice of requesting sobas to select 250 people from the villages as the most 
vulnerable, placed a considerable amount of power in his hands. In one village a Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) was conducted as part of a programme evaluation, about a year after 
goods had been distributed. The evaluation uncovered that in fact the village chief had 
actually retained most of the distributed aid (consisting of livestock, seeds and tools) for 
himself. Not all areas and villages in the fieldwork region received (equal) assistance for the 
resettlement programmes and recovery of livelihoods. Some areas were deemed more 
vulnerable and conflict-affected than others, and sometimes the decision to assist or not was 
suspected to be the result of a strained relationship between community leaders. This was the 
case for a neighbourhood (bairro) in Caluquembe that fell under the authority of a larger 
village. Former staff of an NGO that had implemented a programme in that village recounted 
how power struggles amongst sobas had led to the denial of aid to the neighbourhood in 
question:  
“When our NGO arrived in the village, the soba of the village refused that they would 
also give any aid to the people in the bairro, which is why the bairro actually never 
received any aid from NGOs. This is possible because the soba of the village is a soba 
grande, and the soba of the bairro a soba pequeno.
 35
 Therefore the soba of the village 
can make decisions with regards to aid being distributed to the bairro.” 
 
Although from the onset of this research I assumed that the labels that aid agencies 
use were relevant within villages I studied, used to indicate who was better off or not, the 
reality was different. I found that in the fieldwork villages people did not refer to each other 
as being better off due to the fact that they had been labelled as returnee or demobilized 
soldiers, rather people found it difficult to indicate to me who these labelled individuals were 
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 Interview with Luis Joaquim, IRSEM coordinator, Caluquembe, 06 February 2008. 
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 Literally a soba grande means a big chief, whereas a soba pequeno is a small chief, in this case the small 
chief is the neighbourhood’s traditional leader.  
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in the village. When they talked about future needs they did not differentiate between “us” 
and “them”, they indicated that needs were community-wide instead of different for one 
group than the other.  
Targeting in practice did not follow the objectives of the NGOs to reach the most 
vulnerable in communities. Actual distribution was subject to a sense of community whereby 
there was no “us” and “them” but distribution was done more or less for everybody that had 
farming experience and ambitions. However, placing the selection of beneficiaries as well as 
the distribution of aid in the hands of sobas could lead to access to aid and aid resources 
being rather easily diverted through power games by the soba. The debates that surround 
labelling of aid beneficiaries in that labels become self-perpetuating and can lead to intra-
community conflicts in the case of ex-combatants for instance, were shown not to be relevant 
in this research. 
 
 
Current aid strategies in Caluquembe 
At the time of the fieldwork there were nine NGOs implementing programs in Caluquembe, 
some of which had a field office in town. From these nine organizations three had a purely 
humanitarian mandate, one had a mixed mandate, and the other five were developmental in 
focus with a specialisation in agricultural development. All of them had already been working 
in Caluquembe for many years, and all had distributed seeds and tools in different 
communities in the area. Because of their agriculturally focused mandate, these NGOs were 
in close cooperation with the local extension service office the Estação de Desenvolvimento 
Agrário (EDA, Agricultural Development Station). This section of the chapter analyses this 
interface between aid agencies and local government institutions, and EDA specifically.  
EDA’s are the local representation or field stations of the Instituto de 
Desenvolvimento Agrário (IDA, Agrarian Development Institute) which in turn falls under 
the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development (MINADER). The EDA’s are 
responsible for providing extension services to the rural population, and sometimes this 
includes handing out agricultural inputs. They give training and agricultural demonstrations, 
also providing livestock vaccinations in partnership with the local veterinary station. EDA’s 
were initially introduced in the 1980s to support peasant associations with technical, material 
and marketing services, but for a long tie remained largely ineffective. “They face the same 
problems as all institutions set up to serve agriculture, notably a lack of training, an excessive 
centralization, and a lack of resources” (World Bank 1991, 232). Kyle (1994, 11) noted that 
EDA’s role in extension was mostly theoretical, as field presence was only noticeable in the 
south of the country due to the effects of foreign assistance there. In 2005 there were only 54 
functioning EDA’s with staff totalling 1000 that needed to cover the entire rural areas of 
Angola (Kyle 2005, 48).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
EDA selects the village they and NGOs work in, dependent on the plans that the 
government has for the region. The same type of problems that the World Bank noted in the 
early 1990s, seem to have continued in the post-conflict period. In 2007, the EDA in 
Caluquembe tried strengthening cooperation between them and the NGOs that were operative 
amongst farmers in the area. The cooperation consisted of sharing office space, and a further 
arrangement with several agencies in the area in which some NGO staff members would 
work at the EDA in Caluquembe part-time, aimed at a close sharing of information and 
expertise. This was part of a strategy for decentralization and better cooperation and 
integration of aid projects with the relevant government institutions. The vision behind it was 
that the agricultural development work of the NGOs complemented the work of the EDA and 
that, once the NGOs closed down, the EDA would take over the agricultural projects to 
warrant continuity in the projects. The EDA therefore had a good overview of the different 
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activities in the area. In the beginning of 2008 the coordinator of the EDA in Caluquembe 
identified the following major obstacles to agricultural development in the area: lack of 
livestock, no crop diversification and lack of commerce
36
. He therefore actively encouraged 
NGOs that had those skills and plans, especially regarding commerce and access to markets, 
to start aid programs in Caluquembe. The local farmers complained about lack of commercial 
opportunities, as they were struggling to sell their produce for a price enabling them to buy 
other necessities for the household. Although one NGO in Caluquembe was trying to restart 
coffee production in the area, it was still in an experimental phase at the time, and wasn’t 
expected to create considerable opportunities for commercialization and income generation 
for the smallholder farmers in the near future.   
One of the objectives of cooperation between the NGOs and EDA was for EDA to 
take over these food security programs and encourage further agricultural development in the 
Caluquembe region. At the time of the fieldwork, however, EDA did not have the sufficient 
resources and capacity to fully take over the role that the NGOs had played for so many 
years. Most international NGOs had started to leave Caluquembe, closing their offices, and 
sometimes officially handing over their programs to either the municipal administrations, the 
EDA, or to local partner organizations. The focus of strategies for livelihood interventions 
remained on pushing agricultural development through increasing cereal production, and not 
so much through crop diversification or commercialization. Broader livelihood interventions 
that did not necessarily focus on subsistence level farming were non-existent, except for those 
that targeted ex-combatants through skills training programs. Another, more participatory and 
alternative approach towards agricultural assistance was being tried by the international 
NGO, CARE, which started working in Caluquembe in 2007. They were planning to 
introduce the concept of Farmer Field Schools; forming groups of small-scale farmers within 
villages for shared learning and training on issues of soil conservation, seed storage and 
selection. They also aimed to encourage and assist the selling of maize harvests for better 
prices by taking out the middlemen in the marketing chain, and to introduce a micro-credit 
component and small business creation for women especially.  
In Caluquembe, post-war recovery assistance for livelihoods has been a process 
mostly implemented by NGOs. The state was involved in the process, by allocating the 
villages where NGOs could start implementing their aid programs. NGOs identified the 
packages of aid they could provide, and the state indicated where these packages would go to. 
Little is known about needs assessments having been carried out in the villages. Therefore, 
recovery programs are based on assumptions and aid availability, rather than expressed needs 
and/or a comprehensive regional development plan. 
 
 
 Comparing the villages and changing livelihood practices over time  
 
This section is based on fieldwork done in the villages of Cue 1, Camucuio and Catala, and 
the comparison between them. In this research the three selected villages were the cases 
which were compared on the basis of historically significant phenomena such as the influence 
of colonialism, encounters with and effects of conflict, the availability of aid and 
reconstruction programs, and (changes in) livelihoods.  This comparison reveals the 
similarities and differences there were amongst people in the way they made a living and 
coped with important events, and what role aid interventions have played in this process. This 
allows for an analysis of a variety of social, economic, institutional and political factors that 
determine the outcomes of livelihood recovery processes.  
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 Interview with Sr. Belito, EDA coordinator, Caluquembe-sede, 13 December 2007. 
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The selection of villages started by gathering information about the specific context of 
conflict and aid in the municipality. On the basis of interviews with NGO staff and other key 
persons in Caluquembe, I selected three villages that differed in terms of their histories of 
conflict and displacement, and with the amount of aid interventions that consequently took 
place. In terms of population size they were more or less similar, around 300 people each. 
Between June 2007 and February 2008 I made repeated visits to these three villages, 
accompanied by research assistants that would help me conduct the surveys and translate 
from the local Umbundu language to Portuguese. On average, some 25% of the inhabitants of 
the three villages would speak both Portuguese and Umbundu. Permission to do interviews in 
the village would always have to be obtained through the municipal administration, and local 
sobas. The willingness to grant this permission and freedom of doing interviews differed 
from village to village, according to the perceptions on the research of these sobas and the 
extent to which they wanted to exert their power and control over the type of information that 
I would be collecting. I used the surveys, conducted amongst 48 households in the three 
villages, most often as an entry point for more in-depth open interviews. Often, more 
members of the household of the interviewee would participate in answering the questions, or 
elaborate on a certain issue within the survey or ensuing interview. Sometimes I would come 
back to the same household after some weeks if I felt that the first meeting had left some ends 
open that were interesting enough to follow up. Observation of the everyday practices of 
people in these villages, combined with recording their history, surveys, and additional 
information acquired through municipal or NGO reports or interviews with their staff, 
enabled the social, economic and historical dynamics to be drawn and compared to 
understand how they influence and shape the way its inhabitants cope during crises and make 
a living.  
 
To give an idea of the different characteristics of the three villages I present this table below.  
 
Figure 4: Characteristics of the three fieldwork sites in Caluquembe 
 Cue 1  Camucuio Catala 
Location 22 kilometres from 
Caluquembe-sede, 8 
on asphalt road and 
14 on dirt road/small 
paths 
45 kilometres from 
Caluquembe-sede, 
20 on asphalt road 
and 20 on dirt-road, 
bordering Chicomba 
municipio 
20 kilometres south 
from Caluquembe-
sede, situated at 
asphalt road between 
Caluquembe and 
Lubango. 
Colonial 
history 
Portuguese came to 
Cue 1 in 1950 and 
started a colonato 
that functioned until 
1975 
Used to have some 
Portuguese settlers in 
the village, with 1 or 
2 small shops 
Portuguese settlers 
resided mostly in 
neighbouring Vatuco 
History of 
displacement 
Half of the 
inhabitants fled 
during the 1980s. 
The other half 
between 1996 and 
2002, as the area was 
occupied by UNITA. 
Almost all stayed in 
Caluquembe-sede 
during displacement, 
Almost all 
inhabitants of 
Camucuio were 
displaced from 1983 
until 2003. They 
mostly stayed in Vila 
Branca, Negola and 
Lubango. Some 
returned in between, 
only to be displaced 
Almost all 
inhabitants of Catala 
were displaced from 
1995 until 1997. 
Half of the 
population fled into 
the bush together 
with UNITA, while 
the other half stayed 
in Caluquembe-sede. 
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and returned after 
2002. 
again in 1996. 
Further 
characteristics 
Access to water from 
river Cue. 
Irrigation 
opportunities due to 
presence of river 
Located on both 
sides of the road, 
with a little market 
place 
 
The objective was to make a comparison between three different villages, specifically based 
on their encounters with aid interventions. So whereas Cue I was one of the villages that had 
received relatively many aid interventions over time, Catala had not. The reasons for this, 
NGO staff said, was due to their locations (Cue I was relatively difficult to access, whereas 
Catala was located next to the provincial road), and related levels of perceived vulnerability. 
Although aid interventions typically focus on the more accessible areas for logistical reasons, 
in the case of Cue 1 and Catala this logic seems to have been reversed. The assumed 
heightened levels of vulnerability in Cue I as opposed to Catala were difficult to ascertain in 
hindsight. Catala nowadays seemed to have more possibilities for commercial activities due 
to its location and new small market, in comparison with the other villages. Whether these 
possibilities also existed during the war is unclear. Villages were selected to receive 
assistance through the local administrations office, and it cannot be completely excluded that 
political motives would play a role in defining which village would receive aid and which 
village wouldn’t. 
 
 
Camucuio 
The first visit I made to Camucuio was in June 2007 when I joined an evaluation visit of 
Caritas to the village. The village consisted of small clay houses with grass roofing, spread 
out through a densely forested area. The river Cuio ran violently next to the village, and was 
said to be dangerous due to the crocodiles present. Next to the jango
37
 a straight path ran 
through the village on which some eight Portuguese colonial houses stood. None of these 
houses were in use any longer, their roofs had collapsed and trees and bushes were growing 
inside. One of the houses had until recently been used as the village school, but was deemed 
to be unsafe, and was being replaced by a newly built school.  
In 1930 Camucuio received its name from the first Portuguese man that settled there 
to open a shop and started doing business with the local people. The name of the village is 
derived from a story about the very first man that put a stick over the river Cuio in order to 
cross the river and reach this place. In 1955 a second Portuguese settler arrived in Camucuio, 
soon after which more Portuguese followed. The effects of the withdrawal of the Portuguese 
after independence and the subsequent experiences with war, was recounted by an inhabitant 
of Camucuio:  
 
“In November 1975 all the white settlers fled Camucuio. Before they left we had 
much more fields, rain, goods, and we were able to trade a lot of our goods at the 
shops of the Portuguese. The quality of our produce was also much better because we 
had access to oxen, rain and agricultural inputs. The war was very bad in Camucuio. 
UNITA troops were stationed here, they were very bad people. I have seen many 
women being attacked during that time. We fled to Quipungo in 1987 after the 
government came to the village and told everyone to flee. We took all the stuff that 
we could carry with us and walked for four days to Quipungo. We could only walk 
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 Community meeting place, characterized by a round open wooden construction with grass roofing. 
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during the nights, because it was too unsafe during the day. We came back to 
Camucuio in 2002.”38 
  
About 75% of the village population fled in 1983, when UNITA first entered the Caluquembe 
area and resided in the bush near Camucuio. The majority of these people settled in Vila 
Branca and Negola in Caluquembe municipality, and returned between 1992 and 1995. 
During this first period of displacement people from Camucuio were suffering from hunger: 
“we were just like people from Somalia during that time”.39 In 1996, they were all forced to 
flee once more to Negola until the end of the war in 2002. A few people decided to stay in 
Camucuio throughout the war, but they fell into the hands of UNITA. When the displaced 
population returned to Camucuio in 2002 those people were gone, and the village had been 
left deserted.  
When the NGOs arrived in the village, the whole population received aid, irrespective 
of different levels of vulnerability. There were some demobilized soldiers in the village, from 
both MPLA as well as UNITA. They were actively involved in building the new school, as 
part of their reintegration process, as many had received skills training as carpenters and 
masons. At the time of the fieldwork Caritas was the only organization still working in 
Camucuio, and their activities were focused on supporting the construction of the school, and 
rehabilitating an irrigation canal from the Portuguese era that would facilitate agricultural 
production in the village. Caritas was making plans to further rehabilitate an old wooden mill 
used to grind maize into maize flour that had been constructed by the Portuguese in 1935. 
The mill had been abandoned and had become useless and its construction even dangerous. 
Some people in the village also do some occasional labour on surrounding fields of 
others for which they would get paid 5 kilos of maize per day. Fishing takes place on a small 
scale, due to the fact that the river is considered to be dangerous, with strong currents and 
presence of crocodiles. Some individuals had managed to find ways to transport some locally 
produced goods to sell in neighbouring communities and even as far as Lubango, but this was 
highly dependent on availability of cash to pay for the taxi-fare, or finding a ride on the back 
of a passing truck. Trading options were also facilitated by having family members in 
Lubango, with whom the trader could stay. 
  
 
Cue I 
Cue I is a village that lies on a mountain range overlooking the valley through which the river 
Cue runs. In 1950 Portuguese settled in the region and “founded” Cue I, II and III. In the 
same year a Portuguese engineer settled in Cue 1 and started a colonato with the help of a 
few Angolans he had brought along. They took a large tract of land near the river and divided 
it in little plots, and set up an irrigation system to cater for all those little pieces of land. 
Colonatos are a form of large-scale colonial agricultural schemes, where the Portuguese 
colonial authorities would use inhabitants for free labour purposes. The colonato would be 
headed by white settlers, overlooking the scheme, indicating the type of crop being planted, 
and overseeing the taxation in the form of a fixed exchange of seeds into harvest. The 
population of Cue 1 started working for the colonato as well, while at the same time 
maintaining the work on their own plots of land. They would get 100 kilos of wheat seeds 
from the colonato leaders. After the harvest they would have to give back 120 kilos of seeds 
to the colonato, but would be allowed to keep any surplus harvest for themselves. They could 
also opt to sell the surplus harvest back to the colonato. If, for instance, they needed soap, the 
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 Interview with Domingos Mupembe, 31 January 2008. 
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 Interview with Veronica Tchela, Camucuio, 07 July 2007. 
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colonato managers would purchase soap from town and then trade it within the village for 
surplus harvest. The colonato in Cue 1 functioned from 1950 until 1975. One elderly man 
that I interviewed in Cue 1 remembered the system very well.
40
 He didn’t see it as an 
oppressive colonial system, but rather as an opportunity to obtain some more work and 
income for the household. When I later asked him about the variety of NGO interventions in 
the village, he listed the colonato as an NGO. He likened the colonato system to that of an 
intervention done by the Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA) in 
2002 that focused on creating farming associations, with a reimbursement system that didn’t 
differ that much from the colonato taxation system. 
About half the population of Cue 1 fled in 1983 and 1986 with the arrival of UNITA 
troops in the area. The other half fled in 1997 when UNITA’s presence in the village 
prevented people from working on their lands. All of these displaced people from Cue 1 
resided in Caluquembe-sede, and remained there until the war ended in 2002. To give a short 
example of how people’s lives during the war in Cue 1 meant a constant reshuffling, going 
back and forth, and finding some way to sustain oneself during displacement I introduce the 
story of Sr. Domingos: 
 
Sr. Domingos was born in 1962 in Cue 1. He talks about two wars, the first war 
lasting from 1975 until 1990, the second one from 1996 until 2002. His mother died 
when he was 5, and his father was taken away by UNITA troops in 1985, and never 
returned. This happened to many families in the village. Some men came back after 
the war but did not want to talk about what happened to them during that time. Sr. 
Domingos also does not know what happened to his father, but now believes that he is 
dead. In 1983 the war was very intense in the area and many of the village inhabitants 
fled to Caluquembe town, which lies some 25 kilometres away. They were allocated 
some small garden plots, or worked on the fields of others in town. In 1991 there was 
a “mini-paz” (mini-peace) and everyone returned to the village. In 1996 the war 
resumed here, but much more intense than before. In 1997 the village again fled to 
Caluquembe town. After this Sr. Domingos went to the province of Namibe to work 
for a construction company and came back to Cue I after the war had ended in 2002. 
This is when he started working on his fields again to start producing food.
41
 
 
According to one person from Cue 1 there are demobilized soldiers from UNITA 
living in the village, but: “Nobody knows them. Some might admit that they are former 
UNITA soldiers, but this would only result in arguments within the village”. Caritas, ZOA 
and CLUSA all started aid programs in the village when the people returned to Cue 1 in 
2002-2003. A school and a health post were constructed by ZOA, and almost all NGOs 
handed out seeds, tools and occasionally oxen. Also, community development groups were 
set up through which aid was channelled, and with the intention that it would function as a 
community support network. 
Cue I nowadays consists mainly of small scale farmers of maize and beans. They 
mostly trade food items within the village. There used to be coffee production in the village, 
before 1975. There is only one man that lives close to the village who is currently trying to 
start coffee production again. But people are still hoping to pass the knowledge of coffee 
production on to future generations, and to restart coffee production themselves as it has a 
much bigger value on the markets than maize, creating better income possibilities. The 
former coffee producers in Cue 1 had to stop producing in 1997 when the whole village had 
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to flee. When they returned in 2002 all the coffee fields where destroyed. Currently, the 
livelihood options are limited to small scale farming, with little high value crop diversity. A 
woman from Lubango who was born in Cue 1 recently started building a village shop, selling 
and trading some household essentials for local produce. 
 
 
Catala 
Catala is a village that falls under the comuna of Vatuco. The village is divided by the main 
provincial road connecting Lubango and Caluquembe. Catala lies some 20 kilometres from 
Caluquembe-Sede, and 3 kilometres from Vatuco which has a health post. Catala used to 
have a health post, but it had been destroyed in 1983 with the arrival of UNITA troops in the 
area. The village was deserted in 1995 with the arrival of the MPLA troops in Caluquembe-
sede. Half of the population of Catala fled to other villages, more remotely located in the 
bush. The other half stayed in Caluquembe-sede. People started returning in 1997-1998 to 
Catala and found most of the village destroyed, or displaced people from other villages living 
in their houses.
42
 The houses no longer had roofs, they had to start rebuilding the village from 
scratch. They were able to start producing food again right away, but this time only without 
their oxen.  
The former nurse of the health post in Catala recounted his personal experiences 
during the war period, especially highlighting the consequences of his political affiliation. He 
kept me guessing whether he had actually or allegedly been affiliated with UNITA. In 1975 
he and his wife arrived in Catala to work at the health post in the village. As a nurse he would 
sometimes give first aid at people’s homes. At that time the only healthcare in the region was 
the health post in Catala and the hospital of Caluquembe. In 1978 his wife started working at 
the local school and continued working in the fields. They usually cultivated maize, 
vegetables and sweet potato. Mr. Nambi was sent to a re-education camp in Namibe for three 
years by the MPLA. This was a normal procedure for the MPLA when they had doubts about 
one’s party alliance. He came back to Catala in 1979. In 1983 UNITA advanced into the 
Caluquembe region, and occupied Catala. The assistant-director of the health post of Catala 
fled to Caluquembe-sede, and the health post was completely destroyed in 1983. Mr. Nambi 
was offered a job at the hospital of Lubango, but he refused. The war was too fierce and there 
was the possibility of being transferred to a very distant place afterwards where the chances 
of attacks would be too great. His uncle had been transferred to a faraway village during the 
war, attacked and killed. They lost one son during the war. He disappeared while walking 
back home from Lubango to Catala. This happened in 1994 during the big MPLA offensive 
in Caluquembe. They have never heard from him since, or heard what exactly happened to 
him. They think he probably came across a troop of soldiers (either MPLA or UNITA) on his 
way back. On the 4
th
 of October 1994 Caluquembe was taken over by the government. Mr. 
Nambi and most people of Catala fled to the bush together with UNITA troops. Catala was 
completely deserted at this time. They stayed in Chiluandi, a village some 20 kilometres 
away from Catala, and returned in 1997 to find the village destroyed. 
Catala currently has a small market along the side of the main road with some bars 
and shops selling local agricultural produce, drinks, as well as locally made traditional reed 
mattresses. The market is controlled by the village soba. Although in principle all the 
inhabitants, both men and women, are allowed to sell their produce there, sometimes people 
hand over their produce to the soba who sells their goods and gives them other items in 
return, such as soap. Buyers are mostly truck drivers that travel between Lubango and 
Benguela or Huambo. The little market started two years ago but so far it is said not to 
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generate much income yet. Inhabitants of Catala can sell their produce without paying a fee, 
which is not the case at the big market of Caluquembe where a daily contribution is 
demanded for the vending spot. The fields of Catala show a lot of maize and beans. 
Furthermore, almost every house has some fruit trees in the yard, mostly mango- and citrus 
trees.  
 
 
Comparing the villages in terms of aid and livelihoods  
In this section of the chapter I present an overview of aid interventions in the three villages, 
and the types of livelihood activities that people employ.  
 
Figure 5: History and type of aid interventions in Caluquembe 
 Cue 1  Camucuio Catala 
Aid 
organizations 
in years 
-ZOA 2002-2007. 
-Caritas 2002-2006. 
-Clusa 2002-now. 
-Caritas 2005-now. 
-Alisei 2004. 
-ZOA 2003. 
Food aid By ZOA and Caritas in 
Cue 1.  
20% of the 
respondents 
received food aid 
in Camucuio from 
Caritas. 
None. 
Seeds and 
tools 
50% of the respondents 
received maize and bean 
seeds, agricultural 
instruments.  
90% of the 
respondents 
received maize, 
bean and sorghum 
seeds, and 
agricultural 
instruments. 
50% of the 
respondents 
received maize 
and bean seeds 
and agricultural 
instruments 
during one 
distribution 
round. 
Livestock Oxen were distributed, 
through a rotational 
system by all three 
NGOs. 
Goats were 
distributed to 90% 
of the respondents. 
A few oxen were 
distributed. 
Rehabilitation 
works 
Health post and school. Health post, 
irrigation canal, 
mill. 
None. 
Other None. None. Blankets, pans, 
plates and cutlery 
hand-outs. 
Community 
groups/associ
ations 
ZOA set up a CDC 
(Community 
Development 
Committee), which has 
stopped functioning. 
Clusa tried setting up 
farmer associations. 
Community 
development 
group, set up by 
Caritas. 
None. 
Able to 
produce food 
next to food 
All but one of the 
respondents indicated 
they had produced food 
Yes. Not applicable. 
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aid next to receiving food 
aid. 
Able to sell 
produce next 
to food aid 
All but one of the 
respondents indicated 
they had been able to 
sell food next to 
receiving food aid. 
One respondent 
was able to sell 
food next to 
receiving food aid. 
Not applicable. 
What produce 
was sold? 
Primarily maize and 
beans. One respondent 
was also able to sell 
sweet potato, another 
was able to sell 
vegetables. 
Maize. Not applicable 
 
From this overview of aid interventions it becomes clear that the amount of aid that the three 
villages received differed considerably. Whereas Cue 1 has seen both different organizations 
and different interventions take place, the population of Catala received a limited amount of 
goods during one distribution visit by ZOA. The interventions in Cue 1 ranged from the 
distribution of seeds, tools and oxen, to construction and rehabilitation of a school and health 
post. Also, an attempt was made to set up a community institution through which it was 
envisaged that aid would be channelled, it would function as a support network for the entire 
community, and community development issues would be discussed. However, most 
households made no reference to these groups during the interviews. Other groups, such as 
associations have often been abandoned during the war. However, almost all households are 
part of a church in the community, through which assistance is organized if the household 
encounters difficulties in terms of health for instance.  
 All households in the three villages indicated that they practised agriculture as their 
main livelihood activity. In terms of the type of crops that were produced not many 
differences amongst the three villages were noted. Maize was the principal crop which every 
household produced. Furthermore, from the 48 households only 8 did not produce beans. Of 
these 8, 7 lived in Catala and 1 in Cue 1. It should be noted that in all three villages maize 
and bean seeds were distributed, although Catala only received them during one distribution 
round, whereas the other villages received long-term support, in the case of Cue 1 by various 
organizations. Fruit production and horticulture were activities practised on considerable 
scale in both Cue 1 and Catala, but not in Camucuio. Fishing on the other hand was practised 
by over half of the households in Camucuio, but not in the other villages. A woman in 
Camucuio explained that she has a little box-construction with which she catches fish in the 
river Cuio.
43
 Once a week she catches some 20 fishes, which her son sells at the market in 
Caluquembe-sede. Usually fishing is done by the women, and/or the children in the 
household. Apiculture on the other hand is only practised by men. The division of labour 
concerning agriculture and livestock is more or less equally divided. The men most often 
plough the fields, whereas the women sow them. The women on the other hand are 
responsible for the grinding of maize into flour, which is very labour intensive and often is 
done twice a day. 
The number of households that own livestock varied considerable amongst the three 
villages. In Cue 1 80% of the households owned one or more oxen, compared to 27% in 
Camucuio and 27% in Catala. The aid programs that were implemented in Cue 1 account for 
the differences. Small animals such as goats, chicken and pigs were owned by most 
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 Interview with Joaquina Chilepa, Camucuio, 05 February 2008. 
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households in the three villages. Only inhabitants of Camucuio had received goats from an 
NGO, but small animals seemed to have been retained or bought/traded by most of the 
inhabitants in the three villages irrespective of the aid interventions. Especially chicken 
would be sold on the market if the household was in direct need of cash, for instance to pay 
for healthcare or education.  
Only 5 members of the households in the villages have obtained formal employment 
in the municipality. There are two nurses and a teacher in Catala, one nurse in Camucuio and 
one nurse in Cue 1. Other members of the households have found formal employment in 
places like Lubango and other provincial capitals. Skilled labour is only found amongst 
household members in Catala, where two masons, a carpenter and a blacksmith practise their 
skills mostly in the village itself, often in return for food. It is unclear if these skills were 
acquired through a training program as part of the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. 
Trade takes place in the villages itself, for instance by making and selling bread and 
charcoal, or selling surplus harvests at the market in Caluquembe-sede. From the respondents 
in Camucuio, 72% were selling a part of their produce, mostly maize and beans. In Cue 1 
80% of the households were able to sell excess produce of maize and beans, mostly at the 
market in Caluquembe-sede. In Catala, only 55% of the households were able to sell produce. 
And although Catala has its own small market place, half of these households were selling 
their produce at the Caluquembe-sede market instead. Only some fruit, sweet potato and 
vegetables were sold at the Catala market, but other produce such as maize and potatoes were 
brought to Caluquembe-sede.  
In terms of the differences in livelihood activities between 1990 and now, the 
respondents most often mentioned the fact that in 1990 they still had sufficient oxen which 
made work on the fields easier. With oxen they were able to prepare bigger fields, which also 
increased the harvests. Most oxen, however, were stolen by thieves, or left behind when the 
inhabitants had to flee. Furthermore, many mention that they were collecting firewood and 
working in the fields of other people to gain some additional income and food for the 
household. The differences in activities and life in general between 1975, the year that the 
civil war started in Angola, and now were recalled by the elderly household members. They 
indicated that at that time they had access to diverse goods, foods, animals and trade, which 
made life and agricultural production easier and more diverse. As one respondent 
commented: “Life was much better. We had wheat, soy, peanut and cassava. Now we can’t 
get those seeds anymore”. There were shops close by, or even in the village itself, and 
commodities were cheaper. Also, because they still had sufficient oxen, they were able to 
produce more. Some of the elderly men had done skilled labour at the time, but could no 
longer practise these skills due to their age. 
 All livelihood activities in the three villages are based on agriculture. There are 
differences in the range of crops, although maize and beans are produced by almost all 
households. These are also the crops that are sold most often, the quantity of which differs 
amongst the villages. The households in Cue 1 were able to sell the most of their surplus 
harvests of maize and beans, in comparison to the other two villages. People in Catala on the 
other hand seemed to have more options in terms of formal employment and skilled labour, 
which could be linked to the relative proximity to Caluquembe-sede. Any significant 
correlation between the scale of aid interventions and an increase of the diversity in 
livelihoods cannot be found. Rather, it can be noted that in a village like Cue 1 which has 
seen the most aid programmes implemented, there is very little diversity in livelihoods and 
crops. In all the three villages people indicated that their options for diversifying their on-
farm livelihoods as well as obtaining non-farm livelihood options were limited.  
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Externally driven recovery 
 
In this section I will elaborate on the case of Caluquembe as an example in which post-
conflict livelihood recovery has been characterized by an externally driven approach by 
NGOs. I will argue that the uniform approach to livelihood recovery has led to a decrease in 
livelihood options as well as increased vulnerability to shocks such as droughts, pests, labour 
shortages, failing commodities’ supply, etc. Furthermore, I address the difference between a 
coping strategy and a livelihood strategy, and argue that what has sometimes been interpreted 
as an undesirable and unsustainable coping strategy, is in fact a way to diversify the rural 
livelihood to make it less vulnerable to future shocks. I use labour migration as an example of 
a livelihood strategy that might be interpreted as a coping strategy instead (by formulating it 
as displacement), but which can have very positive outcomes on the household’s socio-
economic position.  
 
 
Externally driven recovery of livelihoods in Caluquembe 
As an approach to supporting livelihood recovery after the war and in the process of 
resettlement of IDPs in Caluquembe, humanitarian and development actors focused on 
developing and strengthening food security through agricultural development. From the start 
of these livelihood interventions in 2002/2003, assistance programmes followed a uniform 
approach to food security and livelihood recovery by providing people with seeds, tools, and 
sometimes livestock. The seeds that were chosen were selected on the basis of locally 
preferred staple foods of mostly maize and beans. These crops had survived the war and 
seeds were still freely available, unlike other historically produced crops like wheat and 
coffee.   
In Kalonhohá however, a small village some 10 kilometres from Caluquembe-Sede an 
elderly man has managed to hold on to coffee production to this day. I want to recount the 
story of Sr. Oscar here as it exemplifies how some people struggle to hold on to one’s 
knowledge, experience and passion for a livelihood despite all the adverse circumstances that 
war and displacement brought.  
 
Senhor Oscar 
Sr. Oscar was born in Kalonhohá in 1933. His father was a pastor who was 
transferred to a mission in Chicuma, in Caluquembe municipality. It was in Chicuma 
that Sr. Oscar planted his first coffee in 1952. In 1979 Sr. Oscar’s house in Chicuma 
had slowly been turned into a warehouse filled with harvested coffee beans, with no 
available buyers or transportation means. In 1990 the price for one kilo of Arábica 
coffee was 157 kwanza, nowadays he can only get 77 kwanza. In 1998 soldiers came 
to Chicuma and put his house on fire, in which all his coffee had been stored. The 
house collapsed after the fire and the whole village smelled of coffee. In 1999 he fled 
into the bush with his wife because of this incident and the fact that war was 
becoming more fierce in the area.  
 
He still owns a big fazenda in Chicuma, has a house and staff, and sometimes stays 
there for a week. When they left Chicuma in 1999 and settled back in Kalonhohá in 
the same year, he immediately started planting coffee. Now he has about 3,000 
plants around his house in Kalonhohá and another 6000 on his fazenda in Chicuma. 
Every June he can harvest some 1,000 kilos of coffee beans. He now has 500 kilos of 
coffee ready to be sold. The problem with coffee production is that it takes a long 
time before the first harvest is ready, only after two years the plant will give the first 
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two cans of beans. A coffee plant can continue to produce for 100 years. He knows 
some plants in Chicuma that were planted in 1940 and are still producing.      
 
The governor of Huíla has visited Sr. Oscar, and wants to help him with the 
production of coffee. Sr. Oscar shows me a letter written by the Governor on 2 
February 2007, in which he states that he supports the plan of Sr. Oscar to introduce 
and start coffee production in Chicomba and Matala. Sr. Oscar wants to present this 
letter to the Minister of Agriculture to get further backing for his plans to restart 
coffee production in other parts of the province.   
 
He can’t sell his coffee at the market in Caluquembe, because no one wants to buy it, 
not just the beans but the roasted and ground coffee too. He needs transport so he can 
bring his produce to the factories in Lubango. He has some 100 kilos lying ready to 
be transported. Sr. Oscar does not want to stop producing coffee, because he says 
that would destroy Caluquembe. “Coffee is life”. 
 
Sr. Oscar has been able to maintain his livelihood, even throughout times of crisis and 
adversity. His passion and dedication to coffee production made him maintain this 
particularly risky livelihood throughout war and displacement. In Caluquembe he is seen as 
an example who inspires NGOs and others to start experimenting with different crops again. 
One NGO in Caluquembe has approached him to share his knowledge in other villages where 
they plan to re-introduce coffee on a small scale as a way to diversify their livelihoods over 
the next few years.  The re-introduction of coffee production in the region is done on a small 
scale, and not as an immediate strategy to replace other crops entirely. As coffee plants take 
2-3 years to start producing their first harvests it will take time before profits can be made. 
However, the NGO indicated that they would like to introduce coffee, particularly with 
female beneficiaries, both to create an alternative and more profitable livelihood in the future, 
and to diminish the labour burden that especially crops as maize and beans put on women. 
Organizations that were active in the Caluquembe region selected villages in 
conjunction with the provincial and municipal administrations. Seed banks were created in 
order to build local seed reserves, and organize reimbursement schemes for future harvests. 
The intention was that villages would become self-sufficient in agricultural production, 
enabling food security to be strengthened. The way in which decisions on type and objectives 
of intervention were made, was explained by a former NGO director working in Caluquembe 
as follows: 
“We started at the family level, with the objective to enable people to sustain 
themselves. We knew what people made a living from and that they continued to want 
to live off the land. There was a minority that included carpenters and so on, but we 
oriented ourselves only at the majority. We focused on the ‘how’ rather than on the 
‘what’ people needed. That part we already knew – seeds, tools, cattle. This was clear 
even for a foreigner, so we didn’t have to research that again. We wanted to recover 
what was already there, the livelihoods from the past.”44 
 
With the destruction of the trading system during the war, people chose to pursue 
those crops that they knew would be able to feed their families on the short-term, without the 
need to use cash and procure food elsewhere. However, people in villages explained that even 
though they now had been producing sufficient foods to sustain themselves, they still found 
themselves unable to meet any further household demands because of the lack of cash. 
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 Interview with former Country Director ZOA Angola, Utrecht, 15 July 2009. 
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Revenues from maize and beans are low. Furthermore, maize in particular is a rather labour 
intensive crop, where women also play important and time-consuming roles in the grinding of 
maize into fuba (maize flour) after harvesting. The revenues at this particular time hardly 
outweigh the time and effort that it takes to produce, prepare and sell the maize on the local 
markets. Very little attention was given by NGOs to commercialization options. People did 
not have the means of transportation to get their produce to markets in urban areas where 
their produce might fetch a better price. Instead they found themselves competing at the local 
Caluquembe-Sede market, where there are vast quantities of maize and beans on offer. 
Inhabitants of Camucuio did not produce sufficiently to be able to sell large quantities. 
Therefore people mainly engaged in local trading to obtain items like salt, oil, and soap.
45
 
They either went to Caluquembe themselves, or waited for the “trading men” from 
Caluquembe who would stop by the village to do the trading there. Trading men were those 
people that had the financial and transportation means to trade local produce and transport it 
to urban markets such as in Lubango or Huambo.   
 Lack of industries and other livelihood resources, made farming of maize and beans in 
effect the only livelihood option that exists to this day in Caluquembe. These crops are highly 
vulnerable in times of drought, leaving people with very little alternatives to fall back on 
when a harvest actually fails. This same concern was already raised by various NGOs even 
before the war ended, as noted in the chapter on displaced people in Huambo province by 
Birkeland and Gomes (2001). “In some of the villages in which the displaced are resettling, 
the returning population and NGOs working in agricultural extension such as ADRA-
Angolana, OIKOS (Cooperação e Desenvolvimento) and Development Workshop, organize 
agricultural campaigns to repair and build irrigation systems, propagate seeds, and introduce 
and promote greater varieties of produce. The latter is founded on a concern for food security 
and future access to cash income. With a greater variety of crops, the resettled population will 
be less vulnerable to changes in rainfall patterns and thievery” (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, 
42).  
For ex-combatants the livelihood options are extended to include skilled labour and 
small businesses due to the skills training programmes that were on offer through IRSEM in 
collaboration with certain NGOs. Nevertheless, the general lack of cash in the region makes it 
difficult for people to make investments in other terrains, be it commerce or any type of 
industrial development. Because livelihood interventions were so uniformly geared towards 
reaching food security through seeds and tools, and because of the lack of follow up in these 
food security programmes, be it micro-credit, crop diversification, or alternative livelihood 
options, the people in Caluquembe had little choice in how to rebuild their livelihoods. 
Overall, current livelihoods in Caluquembe are agriculturally-based, mostly practised on a 
small scale, production of a small variety of crops, with low or no inputs. Surplus harvest is 
either reserved for next years, or traded or sold in the villages or at the Caluquembe-sede 
market. But the income this type of agricultural generates is hardly sufficient to make 
investments in other areas and thus diversify and strengthen the household economy. During 
a focus group discussion in Vila Branca with the NGO Agromarket, this lack of diversity was 
discussed by the participants. They found that they had limited marketing options due to the 
fact that they were only producing maize and beans, of which there is an enormous amount 
on offer on local markets. They felt the need to diversify their produce.
46
 Most people in the 
villages indicated that there are few possibilities for livelihood diversification, and that their 
livelihoods remain in a fragile state, vulnerable to shocks and events such as the 2007/2008 
drought in the area. Thus, a very uniform rural society is in a sense sustained or even 
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 On average people would trade maize for the following quantities: 5 kilos for 1 kilo of salt, 15 kilos for 1 litre 
of oil, and 10 kilos for 1 bar of soap. 
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 Fieldvisit with Agromarket in Vila Branca, Caluquembe, 14 June 2007. 
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recreated. Livelihood diversity decreases people’s vulnerability to deal with shocks to their 
livelihoods (Ellis 2000b). Rural survival depends on the ability to fall back on a range of 
activities if one of these activities fail for whatever reason. Therefore, it can be said that 
strengthening rural livelihoods by only focusing on increasing agricultural production on a 
very narrowly defined base might leave these livelihoods more vulnerable to food insecurity 
in the case of future shocks. This is further explained below in the section on vulnerable 
livelihoods. 
 
 
The difference between coping strategy and livelihood strategy 
During conflict and displacement people in Caluquembe struggled to maintain the resources 
that made up their livelihoods. But, confronted with fighting and ensuing displacement they 
lost the opportunities to continue their jobs, trade and agricultural production. They 
developed various other activities that are often referred to as coping or survival strategies 
rather than alternative livelihood strategies. In this section I will argue that in fact there is a 
blurred line as to what constitutes a coping strategy as opposed to a livelihood strategy. 
Coping strategies are perceived as a sequence of steps that households take to deal with crisis 
(Ellis 2000a, Corbett 1988). An example of such a sequence of steps that households can take 
is presented by Ellis (2000a): first livelihood diversification takes place, then available social 
capital is tapped, some household members might migrate temporarily, assets such as 
livestock are sold, and finally the abandonment of land, house and so on (Ellis 2000a).  A 
coping strategy is characterized by risky behaviour, short-term, and a non-preferred route to 
sustain a household. A livelihood strategy, in contrast, is considered to be sustainable in 
nature, comprising of multiple assets which can be used to deal with future shocks without 
compromising the household’s ability to recuperate (Ellis 2000a).  
People that had been forced to take refuge in and closely around Caluquembe-sede, 
because their villages had become targets during the war, saw their options to make a living 
diminishing. Some would try to continue working on their plots during the day, and return to 
the town area at night to avoid being caught by troops at night. Another option would be to 
seek day jobs at the few large commercial farms that were still operational. One day of work 
would be usually rewarded in kind, for instance three kilos of maize. Collecting firewood 
around town, and then selling it as charcoal, would be yet another option. Some of the most 
common survival strategies that IDPs in neighbouring Huambo province developed were 
similar to the activities that people in Caluquembe undertook during the war: collecting 
firewood, charcoal burning, working the fields of others, and trading fruits and vegetables 
(Birkeland and Gomes 2001). Most of these activities have continued after the war, although 
much less time is dedicated to them. 
Livelihood diversification in Caluquembe, especially through non-farm activities, was 
hardly incorporated in the humanitarian and development actors’ livelihood interventions, 
although ACF, working in the neighbouring municipality of Chicomba, have started to 
support beekeeping activities that were started by farmers during the war as a coping strategy. 
A staff member of ACF at the same time was afraid that their program was becoming too 
“maize and beans” focused, but that mandate forced them to do so, as well as an effort to 
minimize risk:  
“Our program only includes an agricultural focus, with no attention for alternative 
livelihoods. It would be better to include an industrial component so that people can 
actually start making more profits on their produce, but this does not fit within the 
ACF mandate. ACF offices in other countries do include livelihood component 
besides just agriculture, they include for instance income-generating activities. 
Usually ACF supports existing agricultural practices, primarily production of maize 
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and beans. Some older generations of people in Huíla still produce wheat, but I feel it 
is too risky to try and introduce this on a large scale or introduce other new crops. 
This should be done by government institutions and not NGOs.”47 
 
Ellis (2000b) makes a distinction between livelihood diversification out of necessity 
versus choice. Necessity for livelihood diversification usually occurs by event, when a 
changing situation or shock forces people to seek other ways to secure household income. 
Choice is when cash availability or market opportunities arise to make investments on other 
terrains viable options. Diversification of livelihoods out of necessity can be seen as a coping 
strategy, but they do not always result in negative livelihood outcomes. An activity that may 
have started out of necessity, may result in a broader livelihood base. For instance, if some 
members from a household are forced to seek work on farms of others, they may choose to 
continue doing so in times when work on their own farms does not require as much labour. 
Collecting mushrooms, or beekeeping activities may not feed a family directly, but could be 
required to generate the additional cash necessary to make investments in other parts of the 
household economy. Selling charcoal can have negative side-effects on the environment in 
the long term, but might make some necessary cash for the household to ensure that children 
have access to better education in the near future.  
Studies on migration in Africa have for a long time focused on potential negative 
effects of migration, and although family, traditional leadership and social bonds can be 
weakened it does not lead to a breakdown of rural societies as a whole, as has been argued 
(McDowell and de Haan 1997). Migration and remittances can have very positive outcomes 
on rural livelihoods through the cash and goods flows stemming from it, as well as the 
economic, social and political transformations that migration can bring (de Haan 2000, Horst 
2002, Savage and Harvey 2007). The research in the three villages uncovered some of the 
effects of displacement and migration. Of the 48 households in the three villages, 17 had one 
or more children that had migrated out of Caluquembe municipality. Often they resided in 
Lubango, Luanda or in other Angolan provinces, and all of them had found formal 
employment or had become commercial traders. Many young people from the villages had 
either stayed behind in the areas where they had ended up during the war, or chose to find 
employment in Lubango or other urban centres after the war. They indicated that they either 
had lost their agricultural skills during long periods of displacement, or found life in rural 
villages without health and education facilities too harsh. In Camucuio, people felt this lack 
of a younger generation but also saw the positive sides of this type of migration, especially 
possible remittances generated from employment. The young people that had been able to 
find employment in urban areas often sent parts of their salaries or goods to their family 
members in Camucuio. Remittances can be defined as “income (in any form) received by a 
household in one distinct place, from individuals or households living in another place” 
(Savage and Harvey 2007, 3). Of the 17 households in the villages that had children who had 
migrated and found employment, 7 of them received remittances in the form of cash and/or 
goods. Also, a shop was being constructed in Cue 1, where local produce could be traded for  
household essentials, by a woman who had migrated to Lubango but whose family was still 
living in Cue 1. Although this might not fall under the strict definition of remittances, it could 
bring a type of income or even employment to the family, but also benefit the entire village at 
the same time. Also, use was made of the trading networks that people had established in the 
urban areas. For instance, one young man who during the war had been displaced and settled 
in Lubango, had found work at the Joao de Almeida market, one of the biggest informal 
markets in Lubango. Having resettled again in Camucuio, he now made regular trips by taxi 
                                                 
47
 Interview with Livio Mercurio, Food Security Coordinator ACF, Lubango, 07 March 2007. 
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to Lubango, taking with him local produce which he could then sell at Joao de Almeida 
market through his former network of vendors.
48
  
As shown above in the example of Camucuio, migration can lead to the development 
of much needed networks of support and trade which benefits both household and village. 
Cain (2003) also noticed this in relation to increased urbanization in Luanda, where IDP’s 
were unwilling to return to their rural areas of origin and give up their stakes in the urban 
informal economy. With some of the household members choosing to stay behind new 
economic linkages and networks were formed connecting the rural to the urban areas (Cain 
2003, 8-9). Migration can lead to social networks being affected both negatively and 
positively at the same time.  
Migration is often overlooked as a livelihood strategy, and regarded as a coping or 
survival strategy. Mass migration is often seen as a first indicator of famine and starting point 
for relief programs, acting as a sign that other household responses to cope with crisis have 
failed (Corbett 1988, 1099). However, it is difficult to ascertain what is migration or 
displacement in times of crisis. What is in fact labour migration to urban centres might be 
interpreted as displacement instead. Also, displacement might actually turn into labour 
migration if people were forced from one area by war and encountered employment 
possibilities in another area. The decision to then return to their areas of origin after the 
security situation improves is highly dependent on the livelihood assets and options that they 
feel they can pursue there.  
 
  
Vulnerable livelihoods 
During January/February of 2008 I made one of my last fieldwork visits to Caluquembe. This 
visit coincided with a drought occurring in the region. Normally, rains should start around 
November, allowing the crops to grow and be ready for harvesting in June, but this season the 
rains were late to start. In December 2007 a rainfall of only 19mm was recorded which was 
significantly below average. Because of the drought a delegation of the governmental 
department on Segurança Alimentar (Food Security) was expected to arrive from Luanda to 
visit the EDA of Caluquembe. They planned to inspect the most critically drought affected 
areas in Caluquembe. The plans were made to set up a rapid response system, allowing 
droughts to be signalled earlier so as to allow a more rapid response to it. The local EDA 
coordinator indicated that if the situation of the lack of rains would not improve soon it was 
expected that there would be hunger again within the ensuing six months.  
In every village I visited, people started conversation about their fears for the future 
because of the lack of rain. They indicated that they didn’t have sufficient food reserves to 
rely on for the coming year until the next possible harvest. Selling available reserves from the 
previous years was put on hold. Rain, or the lack of it, was the recurring theme throughout all 
the interviews. In the village of Catala the soba told me about a rain ceremony they had held 
a few days earlier.  
 
A mountain cave, about 40 kilometres away from Catala, in the area between 
Camucuio and Cue 1, constitutes a shrine which contains four skulls and skeletons of 
important ancestors. A delegation went there, consisting of five soba grandes 
including the King of Caluquembe, some sobas pequenos from the region, and 
villagers as well. When they arrived at the cave they took the skulls and skeletons 
from the cave and washed them. The sobas had taken white cloth with them in which 
they dressed the skeletons and skulls. They slaughtered a goat there which they had 
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brought along. They drank the three garafaos (old wine bottles of 5 litre each) of 
aguardente. According to the soba of Catala they had been told after the ceremony 
was finished that the rains would start on the 5
th
 of February.  
 
The first rain started falling on the 1
st
 of February, and it continued raining non-stop until the 
afternoon of the 4
th
 of February. Although it had finally started raining, the natural hazards 
did not end there. In March much of the remaining crops were eaten by a pest of the Lagarta 
Militar (African Armyworm or spodoptera exempta), that affected most of Huíla province. 
This pest occurs naturally in the region, but the extent of it was not comparable to earlier 
years. The worm occurred in such big numbers that it ate away most of the crops people had 
planted. No measures were taken or available at the time to combat the pest. The Ministry of 
Agriculture started introducing sweet potato and cassava crops to prevent widespread hunger. 
As there is a general overreliance on maize as staple food in the province, the Ministry went 
on to distribute these crops in some municipalities to prevent a reoccurrence of this situation 
the following year. As these natural hazards affected those very crops that people relied on 
the most for their livelihoods, the effects on rural life were enormous. It laid bare the 
vulnerable state of rural livelihoods in this region, and the dependence on such a limited 
variety of livelihood options. It becomes apparent that the aid interventions that were geared 
towards supplying people with only seeds and tools, were inevitably falling short of creating 
sustainable livelihoods that included a level of disaster preparedness. The outcomes of the 
interventions rather enhanced the risks to increased vulnerability when this uniformly shaped 
rural livelihoods system is confronted with shocks such as natural hazards.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has started with an introduction to the history of Caluquembe municipality. It 
has shown that the municipality was heavily affected by conflict, control over the area was 
violently fought over by MPLA and UNITA, creating several waves of displacement in 
different directions: from town to bush and vice versa. With reference to people’s past and 
current livelihoods and how they were affected by crisis I want to highlight the varying and 
profound effects that the war has had in this area. It caused destruction of the area’s 
infrastructure, and made industry and trade come to a standstill, also diminishing the 
availability of employment, seeds and other agricultural inputs. Furthermore, displacement 
and looting by troops led to the loss of many household assets and livelihood options. People 
were forced to give up farming, and start collecting firewood, working on farms of others, or 
seeking other alternative strategies for household survival during the war and consequent 
displacement. In this chapter I have argued that some of these strategies to diversify the 
household’s livelihood options have led to positive outcomes on the rural economy in 
Caluquembe. Labour migration for instance has given access to remittances, and created new 
social networks through which trading was enhanced.  
In terms of the influence of different aid interventions on the livelihood options that 
people have nowadays, the case study of Caluquembe provides an understanding of aid 
processes along the LRRD line that have been left unfinished. Initially only food aid was 
available for the affected population, but towards the end of the war this was complemented 
with an extensive seeds and tools assistance programming from a large variety of aid actors. 
Especially these seeds and tools programmes have in the long term led to what I call a 
process of externally driven recovery. Because of the uniform approach to rural livelihood 
recovery, the choice of seeds to be distributed, and the lack of follow up, rural Caluquembe 
has a rather narrow livelihood base. Because of the undiversified crop production, people 
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within villages now have to compete with each other to get the same type of produce sold or 
traded at the same locations. As Ellis (2000b) notes, diversified livelihoods are often not as 
vulnerable as undiversified ones. And his remark rings especially true when confronted with 
the drought and pest as Huíla had seen in the beginning of 2008. It uncovered that rural 
livelihoods in Caluquembe are undiversified, and therefore lack the capacity to cope and be 
prepared when faced with a failed harvest.    
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Introduction 
 
This chapter represents a case study of Chibia municipality, its past and current livelihood 
practices and histories of villages and inhabitants. The chapter is based on interviews with 
NGO staff, local administration and other key figures in the area, as well as on interviews and 
surveys conducted with inhabitants of three villages. By looking at the different critical 
events in village and personal life; war, displacement, migration, socio-economic histories 
and aid, the changes in livelihoods are drawn. Specific reference is made in terms of the 
encounters people have with aid and state institutions.  
As opposed to Caluquembe, Chibia has been significantly transformed by the 
Angolan government’s post-conflict reconstruction plans. The municipality is in close 
proximity to Lubango, and located along the recently rehabilitated highway connecting the 
province with Namibia. Furthermore, the municipality has been the stage of some far 
reaching economic and infrastructural projects instigated by the state, such as the building of 
the Gangelas dam, and the Sogangelas agricultural development project. These reconstruction 
projects have contributed both to positive outcomes on livelihoods, such as employment 
opportunities, as well as negative consequences as relocation of the population which 
affected people’s access to land and water.  
This case study on Chibia shows the outcomes of self recovery and state recovery of 
livelihoods, instead of the mainly externally driven type of recovery by NGOs as happened in 
Caluquembe. The population of Chibia, both the original inhabitants as well as the displaced 
people that settled there during the war, have re-established themselves and their livelihoods 
during and after the war, largely without any assistance from aid agencies. Only in more 
recent years have state reconstruction efforts targeted the municipality, with diverse outcomes 
on livelihoods. This chapter therefore investigates these processes of self-recovery and state 
recovery  
 
 
Introducing Chibia  
 
This section serves as a general introduction to the second municipality where my fieldwork 
took place. Chibia lies in the south-western part of the province of Huíla and is in close 
proximity to the provincial capital of Lubango. The reasons for choosing Chibia as a 
municipality for fieldwork are related to some specific issues that make a comparison with 
Caluquembe interesting. The context is markedly different from that of Caluquembe, due to 
the fact that Chibia only encountered the results of conflict (for example, displacement, lack 
of basic services, and lack of commerce and access to agricultural inputs and credit), whereas 
Caluquembe found itself in the middle of conflict. Furthermore, whereas the influence of aid 
agencies in Caluquembe is especially strong, in Chibia it is the Angolan state that has a 
strong presence and whose reconstruction programmes have influenced people’s livelihoods 
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in both positive and negative ways. This comparison helps us to understand the importance of 
different forms of aid, and the way people themselves find ways to recover their own 
livelihoods.   
 This section starts by introducing the main characteristics of Chibia municipality as 
well as the people living in the region, their ethnic and cultural backgrounds and tradition, 
and the history of the region with specific reference to the period of colonization. 
 
 
Characteristics of Chibia municipality 
The municipality of Chibia lays in the south-western region of Huíla province, with the 
municipal capital, Chibia-sede, at approximately 40 kilometres south of Lubango, the 
provincial capital. The municipality has some 140.000 inhabitants spread out over a surface 
of 5,281 km². The town of Chibia-sede is divided in half by the main road that connects 
Lubango with the border of Namibia, some 400 kilometres further south. The municipality is 
part of the so called Huíla Highlands, an area that includes Humpata, Lubango, Huíla and 
Chibia and reaches altitudes of over 1,500 meters at some locations (Clarence-Smith 1979). 
The climate is semi-arid, and therefore more favourable for pastoralist activities than 
extensive rain-fed agriculture, although a mix of the two activities is mostly practised by the 
inhabitants. The municipality is well known as a source of good quality livestock and meat, 
which is sold on the Chibia market, located some 10 kilometres south of the municipal centre, 
along the road to the town of Santa Clara, which lies at the border with Namibia. Livestock 
that is traded on the Chibia market is supplied to most of the other parts of the province, as 
well as beyond the provincial borders. 
At the time of the fieldwork Chibia-sede is a vibrant centre that is under 
reconstruction. Roads are being rehabilitated, houses and (commercial) buildings repaired 
and constructed. Among them is a school for professional training. There are some small 
shops, bakeries and bars. These businesses are most often owned by descendants of 
Portuguese settlers that either remained in Chibia during the war, or returned after 2002. Land 
ownership in this area is mostly regulated through customary law and communally owned. As 
Chibia is a predominantly pastoralist society, large amounts of land are needed for herding of 
livestock. Land that was abandoned by the Portuguese that left the area in 1975 automatically 
became property of the Angolan state. With two land laws passed in 1992 and 2004, land 
rights for the rural population has become increasingly weakened (Clover 2005). Although 
the latter land law included the recognition of traditional land rights, it reinforced the state’s 
possibility to repossess community land for ‘private utility’ motives (Clover 2005, 360). 
Many members of the elite from Lubango own land in Chibia; both the governor of Huíla 
province and the Director of the Provincial Department for Water own fazenda’s in the 
municipality. It was said that at one point a land conflict had arisen between local agro-
pastoralists and a large landowner in the area, an Angolan minister. A human rights NGO that 
reported on the matter was denied further access to Chibia by the government.
49
 Conflicts 
over land have occurred mostly in the southern pastoralist regions of the province. As this 
chapter will show, access to land and water had become increasingly problematic in Chibia 
with the implementation of the state’s reconstruction projects.    
The city seems to be developing in part also because of the presence of some 
international road construction companies, which have based themselves in Chibia from 
where they repair the important road linking Lubango with Namibia. When the fieldwork 
started, in May 2008 rehabilitation of the road between Lubango and Chibia had just started. 
The trip to Chibia was done on a dirt road running parallel to the main road, often taking 1 to 
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 Interview with Zé Carlos, local historian, Chibia, 16 July 2008. 
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1.5 hours to bridge the distance of 40 kilometres. At that time many accidents happened on 
the road, especially with the candongeiros (taxi buses), which often speeded to compensate 
for the time lost due to the road works, in order to gain the same amount of income from their 
daily fares between the two cities. The road works were completed exactly at the time when 
the fieldwork in Chibia was finished, in August 2008. The speed with which the road work 
had been rehabilitated was quite remarkable, in comparison with other road rehabilitation 
projects in the country, and people in the province speculated that this had to do with the 
expected visit of Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos in August, preceding the 
presidential elections at the beginning of September 2008
50
. People in Chibia expected that 
trade opportunities and overall commerce would really take off again as soon as the road 
between Namibia and Lubango would be fully functioning. 
 Furthermore, the town has a railway station, which was part of the Moçamedes 
(Namibe) railway line constructed in 1961. The branch of the railway on which Chibia lies, 
was 120 kilometres long and connected Lubango to Chiange. The Moçamedes railway 
formed an important means of transportation of agricultural produce, minerals extracted from 
mines, and other goods between Huíla and Namibe. The railway was abandoned during the 
civil war, and was no longer in use at the time of the fieldwork. However, in 2009 the railway 
became the site of controversy as reconstruction of the railway in Lubango had started, which 
led to the forced eviction of mostly IDPs by the provincial government, and the demolishing 
of their homes without notice or alternative housing on offer (Orre 2010, 2). This example of 
the Angolan state’s attitude towards prioritizing reconstruction of infrastructure over social 
and economic development of the poor does not stand alone, as this case study of Chibia will 
uncover.    
 
 
Inhabitants and tradition 
The majority of the population of Chibia municipality consists of the Nyaneka-Humbi ethnic 
group, who predominantly practice pastoralism (Urquhart 1963). Whereas in the North of the 
province, Umbundu regions, people live in village structures with houses placed next to each 
other, in Chibia people mostly live scattered over vast distances. They live in so-called kimbo 
structures, which are a collection of houses surrounding a central square where the (extended) 
families live, and kimbos in Chibia are separated from each other by large plots of land. 
Nyaneka-Humbi traditionally follow a matrilineal system, in which the household head is the 
oldest male of the family who is guardian over his sisters and their children. In the case of 
death of the household head, the inheritances go to the children of his sisters, not to his own 
children (Estermann 1957). 
The Chibia region has 4 kings, who function as sobas in their areas. They are the 
traditional authorities and act as cultural representatives. The Angolan state doesn’t officially 
acknowledge any formal authority of the kings. People can ask them for advice but they can’t 
make any legally binding decisions. During colonial times, the influence and power of the 
sobas was already said to be diminishing. The population would increasingly seek to resolve 
issues by consulting the colonial authorities. This was said to be due to social transformation 
that took place through colonial expansion in the Chibia area (Medeiros 1976). Rather, the 
kings are consulted on spiritual issues, for instance to perform rain rituals. On the 15
th
 of 
August, each year, the rain ritual starts in Jau. An ox leaves from Gambos (municipality that 
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 It was rumored that president Dos Santos was not pleased with the state of reconstruction in Huíla during his 
visit to the province, and even cut his visit short. He officially opened the road connecting Lubango to Chibia, 
and was expected to perform more of these official openings of buildings that had only partly or hastily been 
finished. The running joke among people in the province at this time was that the president left on the plane 
back to Luanda with wet cement still stuck to his shoes. 
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lies to the south of Chibia) and visits all the imbalas which are the settlements or residences 
of the sobas in the region (Urquhart 1963). It is a week of tradition and the ritual is meant to 
appease the spirits. This tradition has a long history, and was practised well before colonial 
times. The role of the king in Chibian society was expressed during an interview with an 
inhabitant of Chibia-sede as the following: “The king is like a second god. You do not see 
him walking on the streets. You need to request an official audience with him. For instance, if 
you want to cut down a big tree you first ask permission from the soba, and if the issue can’t 
be resolved you go to the king”.51 The king of the Chibia-sede region died three years ago, 
but until now no replacement has been realized as these processes usually take up to five 
years. A new king is usually selected on a hereditary basis, and as Chibia is part of a 
matrilineal society it can only be a cousin, not a son. The oldest cousin will usually become 
king.  
Other ethnic groups that are found in the Chibia region are: Umbundu from the North 
that have mostly settled in Chibia due to displacement during the war, Nganguela, and Khoi-
San. There are an estimated number of 5,000-6,000 Khoi-San living in Angola, and spread 
out over 3 provinces: Huíla, Cunene and Cuando Cubango (Estermann 1956, OCADEC et al 
2007). The Khoi-San are considered to be the first inhabitants of Angola, before the Bantu 
tribes entered. Although groups of Khoi-San live scattered over most of the Southern African 
region (predominantly in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia) they share parts of their 
culture, customs, and livelihoods with other Khoi-San communities. Traditionally a group of 
hunter-gatherers, they increasingly find it difficult to maintain these livelihoods, due to, for 
instance, restrictions on hunting areas and forced relocations.
52
 In Angola, the hunting-
gathering activities have been restricted due to the war. It wasn’t possible to have access to 
all areas any longer, due to attacks and the presence of landmines. Furthermore, most wildlife 
had fled from Angola during the war and are only very slowly returning to the area. A 
considerable number had been shot and eaten by the troops. Before the war started the Khoi-
San still mostly maintained the traditional hunter-gatherer lifestyle, and had a pragmatic 
relationship with the Bantus. They were trading animal products with their Bantu neighbours. 
But during the war most Khoi-San lost their habitats, they were displaced. Many fled to 
Namibia and South Africa during the war. An NGO working with Khoi-San in Huíla 
estimates that before the war there were some 10,000 San in Angola.
53
 From the 1930s 
onwards they started practising small-scale agriculture as well to complement the food 
derived from hunting and gathering, because their access to the national parks had become 
restricted. Hunting has become prohibited in Angola, although no monitoring takes place. 
The Khoi-San face several difficulties in Angolan society. They have had trouble claiming 
certain rights, pertaining to land or education. For instance, most Khoi-San children, as the 
adults, do not possess a cédula pessoal (identity paper) which is essential in order to attend 
schools.  
Characteristic features of the municipal centre Chibia-sede are the many old 
Portuguese colonial houses, shops, and churches that have remained in relatively good 
condition. It is a visible reminder of the fact that Chibia used to have a large white settler 
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 Interview with Paulo Manuel, Chibia-sede, 30 May 2008. 
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 The issue of forced relocation of Khoi-San was most prominently brought to the fore in the court case that a 
group of San presented against the government of Botswana in 2004 claiming that their relocation from the 
national Kalahari Game Reserve had been forced, by terminating basic services and effectively cutting off their 
access to hunting lands, and that they had thus been pressured into abandoning their nomadic lifestyle 
(Saugestad 2005)The case drew a lot of international attention, especially after a claim by Survival International 
that extraction of diamonds in the area was behind the government’s decision to cut off access to the area. The 
Khoi-San eventually won their legal case, but reports are still in the news about detainments of Khoi-San that 
are not able to show the hunting permits that the government of Botswana has since made them to apply for. 
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 Interview with Benedito Quessongo and Daniel Gaspar, staff of OCADEC, Lubango, 20 August 2008. 
121 
 
community during the colonial period, in comparison to the few settlers in most of the other 
municipal centres in Huíla province. Chibia was considered to be one of the more important 
centres of white settlement in Huíla in 1929, when 49 commercial white farmers resided there 
(Galvão 1929). The good condition of the colonial buildings is also due to the fact that Chibia 
was mostly spared from attacks and active conflict throughout the war. Another indicator of 
the history of white settlement in Chibia, compared to for instance Caluquembe, is the large 
mulatto community still present in Chibia. 
 
 
History of Chibia 
Before the colonial settlers arrived, Chibia was locally known as Chivia. The region was 
mostly populated by the Nyaneka- Humbi. Little information or literature is available about 
the history of Chibia before white settlement. In 1881 a group of Boers from South Africa 
had started settling in the Huíla Highland region, and were given land ownership by the 
Portuguese colonial administration. They were engaged in some small-scale trading with the 
local populations, and employed some of them to work on their farms. To counter the 
growing influence and presence of the Boer population in this region (some 1000 more Boers 
had migrated to the region by 1928) the Portuguese colonial administration invited 
Portuguese immigrants, mostly from the island of Madeira, to settle in the same region 
(Clarence-Smith 1979). The increasing presence of white settlers caused pressures on land 
availability, cutting off the Nyaneka from lands that they used to let their cattle graze. With 
the arrival of the group of colonial settlers from Madeira in 1888, the village (or povoação) 
was officially founded and renamed to São Pedro da Chibia. In 1927 the status of current 
Chibia-sede was elevated as to become a municipal centre, called Vila João de Almeida. The 
name was derived from João de Almeida who arrived in Angola in 1889 to assist the 
Portuguese with defeating the local resistance to colonization. He was governor of Huíla 
province from 1908-1910, and had his residency in Chibia-sede. During the First World War, 
the international conflict was also affecting the Chibia region. The Portuguese were fighting 
the Germans at the Angolan border with Namibia in present day Ondjiva. The cavalry with 
artillery would move along the Chibia road, and use the town to get food reserves for their 
travels, affecting people’s own food reserves and causing a famine. The town was given its 
current name, Chibia, when independence was reached in 1975.   
One of my interviews in Chibia was with Manuel Chacomo, a man of 93 years old, 
who had lived in Chibia all his life and was known to have a lot of historical knowledge of 
the region.  Below I would like to present the history of Chibia, and particularly the first 
encounters with colonialism and the effects it had on tribal representation in the area, as 
Manuel Chacomo told it to me: 
 
Mr. Chacomo starts telling the history of Chibia with the arrival of João de Almeida 
who was the official founder of the town. Before his arrival there were already some 
white settlers in Chibia, mostly evangelical and catholic missionaries. After that the 
merchants came, followed by the colonial settlers. When João de Almeida arrived he 
gathered all the regional elders for a meeting. He explained that Chibia was about to 
see the arrival of a group of unknown people from Portugal. The African inhabitants 
had to go to the ports of Benguela and Namibe to await their arrival and help them 
travel to Chibia. This meant that they needed to use Tipoia (a wooden contraption 
meant to transport goods) to get all the belongings of these settlers to Chibia by foot. 
When the white settlers arrived in Chibia local people got frustrated, but João de 
Almeida said: ‘You shouldn’t get frustrated, they are bringing along wonderful goods, 
like machetes, axes, pickaxes, and hoes’. Only the ploughs were brought in later. The 
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first groups settled in the area called Mucanja, where now the airport of Lubango lies. 
After that they spread to other parts of the province like Huíla and Chibia. Little by 
little they settled here. 
 
Among the first inhabitants of Chibia there were many conflicts. This changed with 
the arrival of the religious missionaries, who calmed the people down a bit. The word 
of God prepared the way for the arrival of the white settlers. Before João de Almeida 
you already had people living at Chibia-sede, like the Nyaneka-Humbi, Mucubais and 
Kwanyama. João de Almeida told them that the area would be occupied by 
Portuguese settlers. When the response of these groups was that they did not want 
those people to come because the land belonged to them, João de Almeida replied that 
the people who wanted to continue living on their land would have to pay an imposto 
(taxation). The Kwanyama and Mucubais refused to pay that, and left the land. Only 
the Nyaneka-Humbi agreed to pay and stayed in the area. During the time of slavery it 
was also mostly the Nyaneka-Humbi that were subjected to the slave trade. They did 
not resist this and said: ‘it is no use to resist and fight this’. The Mucubais went to the 
mountainous and desert like area bordering the province of Namibe. They were able 
to adapt well to life in the mountains, which the white settlers weren’t. The Mucubais 
do not eat fish, pork or chicken because they live like nomads, which made it easier to 
adapt to the new surroundings. The Kwanyama went all the way down south to 
Cunene.    
 
Before colonial expansion took place in Chibia, slavery already existed amongst the 
inhabitants of the region. People from neighbouring areas were captured and forced to work 
the agricultural plots of the slaveholders. Different plots of land were cultivated, according to 
the household size. There were separate plots for the man and for his wives. Slaves were 
captured from neighbouring regions to work the man’s plot which is usually the largest in 
size, but with the abandonment of slavery the size of the man’s plot became reduced to a 
small field (Urquhart 1963). Normally plots of land in the bush were cleared to produce 
crops, such as maize, sorghum and millet for own consumption. These plots would be 
abandoned after some time to allow the soil to regain fertility. Cow dung was used to fertilize 
the soil, after which mostly maize and beans was planted. Only when the land became less 
fertile would sorghum and millet be planted, as these crops were less profitable (Medeiros 
1976). However, agriculture took second place to cattle rearing. A large herd of cattle was a 
sign of the household’s wealth and prestige within the Nyaneka society (Medeiros 1976). 
Agriculture was predominantly a female endeavour, males would only sporadically visit with 
their machetes to clear the fields. The herding and milking of cattle on the other hand was a 
male activity. Large cattle owners sometimes selected herders amongst relatives or friends, 
who were rewarded with milk, or a cow or calf for their work, making it possible for them to 
accumulate a herd of cattle themselves (Urquhart 1963). With the arrival of white settlers, 
other crops were introduced, such as: wheat, potato and vegetables (Estermann 1957). 
What Urquhart (1963) called “intertribal raiding” for the purpose of slavery was 
halted with the arrival of the white settlers in the region, although slavery by the Portuguese 
subsequently took its place. The ‘productive’ African population was forced to work on the 
farms and plantations of the Portuguese owners, without pay and only being given a meal a 
day. After slavery had officially been abolished in Angola in 1878, a system of forced labour 
was introduced, which was also in use in Chibia (Clarence-Smith 1979). Many people from 
the southern parts of Angola were working on fazendas in the Northern regions. However, 
also in Chibia itself this took place. The livelihoods of inhabitants of Chibia were historically 
centred on agriculture and pastoralism. The youngest generations however, worked on the 
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coffee and sisal fazendas in the north of the country under contract, or in the fishing 
industries of Namibe. These contracts could last for 1, 2 or 5 years. After that period the 
contract was automatically ended, only after which payment took place. That money was 
taken back to the kimbos in Chibia to purchase more livestock, or to start one’s own kimbo. 
Another important livelihood strategy amongst young men was labour migration to the mines 
in present-day Namibia, where they were able to earn 3 times as much salary a month than 
they would on Portuguese owned fazendas in Angola. In 1958 the migration of the 
indigenous labour force was of great concern to the colonial government, who investigated 
the options for mechanical agricultural to deal with the diminishing work force (Mendes 
1958).  
Influence of the large white settlement that formed in Chibia is still visible today, 
demonstrated by the European character of the town’s infrastructure. The socio-economic 
history of Chibia is further marked by encounters between the white settlers and the original 
inhabitants of the region, predominantly the Nyaneka-Humbi, as well as with displaced 
Umbundus that sought refuge in the municipality during the civil war.  
 
 
Encounters with conflict and aid interventions  
 
This section analyses the way conflict affected their lives of people in Chibia, and the history 
and types of aid interventions. Even though it was never at the centre of fighting, Chibia saw 
direct effects of the conflict in a number of ways. Very concretely this started with the high 
number of displaced people (mainly from the northern and eastern parts of the province) that 
were seeking its safe surroundings or were placed there by the Government as was the case of 
the people of Bairro 11 de Novembro. The war also had effects on livelihoods and 
employment options, as access to Lubango was hampered by lack of transport, white settlers 
moved away and took their businesses and trading opportunities with them, access to seeds, 
credit and fertilizer became restricted, etc. WFP’s policy to buy food from within the country 
that was intended for distribution elsewhere proved a positive step for the farmers in Chibia. 
As Chibia is prone to recurring droughts, it did depend on additional food distribution itself 
during some periods in the war, most notably 1989/1990 and 1998/1999. The occurrence of 
drought and ensuing plague of the Lagarta Militar worm destroyed many of the crops during 
the agricultural season of 2007/2008, yet did not lead to renewed food distributions or other 
(aid) interventions. 
 
 
Chibia during conflict 
When the war started most white settlers living in Chibia left the town, often to (re-) establish 
themselves in Portugal. Other notable effects of the war on Chibia society and particularly on 
livelihoods included the loss of access to credit and trade options, compounded by the closure 
of industries and shops at the departure of the white settlers. For instance, wheat production 
had come to a standstill when the war broke out, due to the lack of seeds. Normally, these 
seeds had been provided for by the colonial state. Also, the materials and machinery needed 
for wide scale wheat production broke down or were stolen during the war. Chibia mostly 
suffered from the consequences of war, but hardly found itself in the middle of the battle 
itself as was the case in Caluquembe for instance. Just as in all other parts of the country, 
Chibia had supporters of all three liberation movements at the start of independence, who 
opposed each other, sometimes in violent ways. One battle took place, when the South 
African SADF forces ran into the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola 
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(FAPLA) troops and (suspected) Cuban troops on their way to try and capture Lubango 
during the start of the civil war in 1975 (George 2005). 
With the start of the conflict displaced people from other areas and provinces fled to 
this region. Since 1975 the areas surrounding the town were vacated to accommodate the 
groups of displaced people. The displaced people that arrived in Chibia went to live in the 
surrounding areas mainly, not in Chibia-sede itself. Their arrival did result in some local land 
conflicts between the displaced and the original inhabitants of Chibia. The first big waves of 
displaced people arrived in Chibia from 1979/1980 onwards until 1985, and mostly 
originated from the provinces of Bié, Huambo, and from the Huíla municipalities of 
Chipindo, Cuvango, Caluquembe and Caconda. The biggest displacement camp in Chibia 
municipality was located in Lufinda, a town some 30 kilometres to the east of Chibia-sede. It 
was established in 1982/1983 and housed some 300 families. After the mini-peace of 1991 
some 30% of those families went back to their areas of origin, the rest remained in Lufinda. 
However, after 1992 with the failure of the parliamentary elections and return to war, many 
displaced people arrived again at Lufinda. The state provided some aid whenever new people 
arrived at the camp. They don’t receive assistance anymore today because they are 
considered to have settled and adapted well in Lufinda. Next to the displaced arriving in 
Chibia, there were also people fleeing from Chibia. In 1992, when the conflict reignited after 
the parliamentary elections, some inhabitants fled across the border to Namibia and Zambia. 
These refugees had mostly been UNITA supporters who were afraid that they would be 
targeted by MPLA supporters in Chibia and blamed for the renewed conflict. 
Unlike other municipalities in Huíla, Chibia was not an area under siege by the 
warring troops. Although people in Chibia have also lost assets during the war due to forced 
selling in order to pay for other household necessities, as well as the fact that household 
goods were increasingly more difficult to obtain due to transport and commerce restrictions, 
they did not suffer from asset stripping as some of the more war-affected regions in Huíla 
did. This has certainly played a role in decisions on the part of humanitarian organizations for 
the locations of intervention and the type of assistance.  
 
 
Drought and hunger in Chibia 
The semi-arid region of Chibia has historically been highly vulnerable to recurring droughts 
and ensuing hunger. Chibia lies in a very dry region, the available water flows out to the sea 
through the province of Namibe. There is very little rainfall throughout the year. The 
droughts have become part of life in Chibia. Natural hazards also had effects on the history of 
colonial expansion in the region of the Huíla Highlands. Between 1863 and 1869 droughts, 
locusts plagues and cattle diseases made the first Portuguese temporarily abandon their 
settlement at the Nyaneka homelands. However, a prolonged drought between 1879 and 1884 
intensified the struggles over land between the Portuguese and the Boer population, which 
eventually led to the withdrawal of the Boers from the region (Dias 1981, 366-367). When 
the droughts were especially severe in their effects on crop production and food reserves, the 
population of Chibia was faced with hunger. One inhabitant of Chibia described this 
phenomenon in the following way:  
“Hunger strikes in Chibia every 10 years, and always during the years ending with an 
8. 1988/1989 was a very bad year due to the combination of drought with war, and in 
1998 we had a famine as well. Now in 2008 we are hungry again due to the drought 
and the plague of Lagarta Militar that destroyed our remaining crops”.54  
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He explained that people would cope with these famines by eating the tubers of the Mutunda 
tree, if the cereal harvests failed. The use of Mutunda during years of hunger has a long 
tradition. By using only the female tubers of the tree they would be able to make a porridge. 
During famines people died because of eating the male tubers as well, which caused food 
poisoning. The Mutunda tree is considered to be sacred in the region, and no one would 
consider cutting the tree for firewood. He also remembered the famine that hit the region in 
1978 as a consequence of drought, and compared it to that of 1989/1990:   
“In 1978 there was a famine, but no aid came. People went to Cunene to try and buy 
some massango (millet). In order to buy bread you had to wait in line during one day 
to be able to pick up some bread the next day. There was no food or clothing; there 
were rows of people everywhere. The famine and general situation in 1978 were much 
more difficult (than the one of 1989/1990), but strangely enough people didn’t die. In 
1990, however, many people died from hunger. People were getting diarrhoea from 
bread that was coming in from Namibia.” 
 
The droughts in the region appear to be cyclical and inhabitants of Chibia have tried to find 
ways to adapt to the droughts and consequent famines. As is shown in the next section, food 
assistance commenced only at the end of the 1980s and again at the end of the 1990s, when a 
combination occurred of drought, famines, and effects of conflict. During the time of the 
fieldwork the inhabitants of Chibia were faced with another drought that had affected their 
crop production. Although this drought had been a ‘normal’ one considering the cyclical 
nature, the effects were detrimental due to the pest of the Lagarta Militar that followed. 
Many farmers had seen their remaining crops destroyed by the worm, and indicated that they 
were using their built-up reserves in order to be able to buy food for the household. MINARS 
was considering giving food assistance to affected households, but this had not taken place 
yet at the time of the fieldwork. 
 
 
Aid interventions in Chibia 
Chibia overall has seen little aid interventions take place, due to the fact that the southern part 
of the province was not as severely affected by the Angolan conflict as much as the other 
parts were, and mass displacement nor resettlement processes took place. The few aid 
interventions that targeted Chibia started at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s 
and were instigated by widespread droughts and consequent famine in the region. WFP at 
that time was the main agency implementing assistance to the drought-affected populations 
through distribution of food aid.  Increasingly so, WFP coordinated and implemented the 
relief programmes in Chibia in cooperation with MINARS. Some inhabitants of Chibia also 
remember the Eduardo Mondlane foundation that handed out maize in that period.
55
  
Most relief programmes were initially intended exclusively for the groups of 
displaced people that had settled in the Chibia region. However, some inhabitants from the 
Nyaneka kimbos recalled having received food assistance during some years when drought 
was affecting Chibia more heavily. Seeds and tools programmes, or livestock distributions 
weren’t commonplace in Chibia. WFP continued their food assistance in Chibia from 1990 
until 1996, with some follow up to specific groups of IDPs, and drought affected households 
throughout the rest of the 1990s and beginning of 2000. The municipality benefited from 
WFPs policy to procure food for assistance locally. They bought some 3,750 tons of maize 
from farmers in Chibia between 1992 and 2002, and had been planning to buy an additional 
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4,000 tons of maize in Chibia in 2002 (Dixie 2002, 27). After WFP withdrew from Chibia, 
MINARS took over the responsibility of food distribution. After the war ended in 2002 more 
aid programmes were started by MINARS to assist IDPs in the resettlement process to their 
areas of origin. At the same time Angolan refugees who had stayed in Namibia and Zambia 
for large parts of the war were returning to Chibia, from where they originated. MINARS 
assisted them by handing out food, blankets and machetes. At this moment, food assistance is 
only continuing in three Khoi-San villages in Chibia. There have been some other small 
NGOs working in Chibia, but their activities mainly consisted of the construction of schools 
or health posts. Soon after the emergency phase finished, assistance to Chibia from aid 
agencies has ceased. The Director of the local EDA formulated this as follows: “The NGOs 
that were working in Chibia were mostly doing palliative care. When the war and the 
emergency period came to an end they all quit their programmes. They did not have an exit 
strategy. There was no room for sustainable development planning.”56  
 One person made reference to what he called a system of asking help specifically 
from the white settlers in Chibia: “The word we use is esmola. Esmola means asking for help 
from others: begging. This system only started with the arrival of the white settlers. You 
would knock on their doors and they would give some bread or something else and then say 
sai, sai (go away, go away). Before the whites arrived we were unfamiliar with esmola. You 
only call it esmola when the white people give you something”.57 Because of the community 
structures in Chibia, where people tend to live very dispersed and there are hardly village 
structures to speak of, people tend to rely mostly on their direct families when they need 
assistance. 
 The Angolan institute that deals with the reintegration of ex-combatants has also been 
active in Chibia. One of my interviews was with a shoemaker who was assisted with his 
profession by IRSEM. He joined the MPLA troops in 1978, but stepped on a mine and lost 
one of his legs in 1979 whilst fighting in the province of Cuando Cubango. Ever since then 
the predecessor of MINARS, the State Secretariat for Social Affairs, has given him a monthly 
subsidy. In 1997 he also received a kit to start up his shoemaker store, a business which he 
actually already started himself in 1994. To continue doing this business is becoming 
increasingly hard. With the introduction of cheap Chinese shoes, people are starting to get 
used to throwing their shoes away instead of getting them fixed when they get damaged. He 
is the only person in Chibia that has a shoemaker store, although there are some non-skilled 
shoemakers around the market.  
 During the time of the fieldwork a new school for professional training had been 
opened in Chibia-sede. It was the result of partnership between the Italian NGO Intersos, and 
the Director of the Provincial Department for Water (DPA). The history and development of 
this school were recounted by a representative of Intersos as follows:  
“The idea for the School for Professional Training in Chibia was already developed in 
1998 by DPA. DPA felt that they didn’t have enough capable people within DPA 
itself, which is why they wanted the school to focus on training their own people. But 
at that time it was still war, so the implementation was difficult. After the war DPA 
knocked on Intersos’ door for support. We thought it would be better to open up the 
school for a wider audience. Which is why we now also offer training programmes for 
metalworkers, carpenters, plumbers and electricians. We gave all the necessary 
machines for this. The idea is that the participants follow a course of 6 months and 
after completion they receive a kit with which they are able to start their own 
business. Entrance is open for everyone, and we want to actively select candidates 
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from the rural villages, 2 or 3 persons from each village. The idea is that they practise 
their skills in Chibia, and not move to Lubango, but you can’t entirely force that on 
people. We don’t have official age criteria, but we do aim to work primarily with 
youths. We have groups of 30 people for each course, and it is without charge. The 
participants earn some money with the things that they make during the course, like 
chairs and tables.  We also want to start courses for women in the future. The reason 
why we don’t have that yet is because the original idea was to train only DPA 
people”.58  
 
The project shows that Chibia is in the government’s focus. In comparison to Caluquembe, 
Chibia is better positioned in terms of state projects that focus on enhancing employment 
possibilities in the region, outside of the agricultural domain. This could be explained by 
Chibia’s proximity to Lubango, but also by the personal connections that some government 
officials have to Chibia through ownership of fazenda’s in the region and other economic 
ties. 
 
 
Institutions and services in Chibia 
The collapse of basic services and institutions occurred in Chibia during the war in Angola, 
as well as a breakdown and neglect of infrastructure. First of all, the exploitative yet 
important trade and credit mechanisms, industries and commercial farms disappeared when 
most of the white Portuguese settlers left Chibia in 1975. This affected the entire rural 
economy by lack of incoming goods and inputs, the inability to obtain credit, and the 
disappearance of employment opportunities at the Portuguese-owned industries and shops. 
Although the Angolan government tried filling the vacuum by nationalizing most of these 
industries and commercial farms following the centralized planning feature of their initial 
Leninist-Marxist ideology, this policy failed and was abandoned as capacity for management 
was weak and the war increasingly absorbed most of the state’s attention and financial 
resources (Hodges 2008). Trade nowadays almost exclusively takes place at the Chibia 
market which has grown considerably over the years and is one of the most important sites of 
trade in livestock in the region. Cows are bought by middlemen and local merchants on the 
market and then resold to slaughterhouses, or to buyers from all over the country. Young 
livestock are bought by local farmers who raise them and resell them at the market once they 
have reached a certain weight. Livestock are most often sold at the end of the rainy season 
when they are most healthy and well fed (Dixie 2002). Because of the proximity to Lubango, 
most surplus agricultural produce is sold at the informal markets in Lubango, as 
transportation is facilitated by the rehabilitation of the main road. 
In terms of agro-pastoralism support and development, the main state institutions are 
the EDA, the Veterinary services and the Institute of Forest Development (IDF). EDA’s 
primary objectives in Chibia are: eradicating hunger, preparation of the agricultural 
campaigns, improving training for farmers, and forming groups and associations to obtain 
credit. Furthermore, they have a role in the distribution of seeds and inputs to various 
farmers. In the words of the local EDA coordinator, the selection of farmers and distribution 
of seeds in villages is done in the following manner:  
“EDA tries to identify the farmers that are willing to practice agriculture. We 
are now at the stages of sensitisation. The selection of the aldeias where we work in 
and the families within those aldeias is done by the soba, who will indicate which 
family is entitled to aid. He will distribute the seeds and inputs to his people. The soba 
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can tell us who is a good worker in the village and who isn’t. That is the criterion that 
we use to distribute seeds, rather than who are the most vulnerable. The state used to 
import potato seeds, but it was stopped as the benefits were negligible. The seeds that 
EDA is distributing originate from Zimbabwe and South Africa. We are waiting for 
the seeds to arrive, they are stuck in Lobito. Maybe we will start handing out local 
seeds because farmers know their characteristics better. But how are we going to get 
local seeds? In order to obtain local seeds for distribution we need technical 
knowledge. If we would be able to make more use of local seeds the country would 
develop rapidly.” 
 
Even though the EDA in Chibia lacks the extensive NGO network that the EDA in 
Caluquembe has, they rely on the same targeting system in the villages by letting the sobas 
decide who is entitled to assistance and who is not. The difference in targeting objective and 
practice however is that where NGOs aim to assist the most vulnerable in villages, the EDA 
favours those farmers that are deemed the most successful in obtaining good harvests from 
the seeds that they have received.  
The IDF falls under the coordination of MINADER, and their primary objective is the 
management of forestry resources in Angola. In practice they mainly monitor the use of wood 
to make charcoal, in order to fight desertification of the area. According to an inhabitant of 
Chibia the institute lacks a conservation strategy:  
“Their only activity is giving out permits to cut trees to make charcoal. They earn lots 
of money that way, which they divide amongst themselves. There is no conservation 
vision behind that.”59 
 
Other state institutions that play important roles in Chibia are MINARS and Ministry of 
Health (MINSA). Furthermore, the personal link of the Director of the Provincial Department 
for Water with Chibia, as his hometown, is reflected by the inauguration of the School for 
Professional Training. Although initially intended to train DPA employees, it now caters for a 
wider clientele in Chibia.  
This section has shown that, even though Chibia hasn’t been an actual battleground 
during the war, it has suffered from its effects. This was compounded by the cyclical 
droughts and famines that would occur regularly in the region. The effects of the conflict 
decreased people’s capacity to recover from droughts. Next to food assistance, little aid has 
been handed out, or on a one-project basis like the construction of a school or health post. 
Although the civil war affected their agricultural production because of the incoming IDPs’ 
ever growing encroachment upon their lands, lack of machinery, seeds and other agricultural 
inputs, no systematic distribution of seeds and tools or other types of livelihood interventions 
have taken place. Therefore, aid in Chibia has been mainly relief oriented, with no linking 
processes to rehabilitation and development by NGOs. That has been left mostly to the state’s 
domain, with different beneficiaries and objectives and varying outcomes, as is shown in the 
next section.  
 
 
The role of the state in Chibia 
 
In this section I want to highlight a case that reflects the strong role of the state in Chibia. 
Local governance structures have been left more or less in tact during the war. Unlike 
Caluquembe, Chibia has only had MPLA representatives in local administration throughout 
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the war and after. Also, because its close proximity to Lubango, reconstruction programmes 
have been more extensively implemented. These reconstruction efforts from the Angolan 
state have affected the population of Chibia in various ways. First of all, the highway linking 
Lubango, and the rest of the country, to Namibia passes through Chibia-sede and was 
rehabilitated at the time of the fieldwork. Benefits have been drawn from the road 
reconstruction works, both by improved access to Lubango as well as the temporary 
employment possibilities it created. The construction companies working on the 
rehabilitation of the road, are based in various locations along the highway. Most companies 
working along these roads are from Portugal, Brazil and/or China, employing the engineers 
from those respective countries. In between the municipal centre and the livestock market of 
Chibia a base was constructed for these companies. They enable some form of employment 
for mostly young men from Chibia. This often consists of unskilled or semi-skilled (day) 
labour, without formal contracts. Also, this type of employment is limited in time, as road 
works around Chibia are nearing its completion, after which the construction companies will 
dismantle their base and move on to other road rehabilitation projects in the country.   
In the case of Chibia some curious side-effects of national reconstruction have been 
noted as well.  Although one would expect that a better road network is beneficial for the 
commercialisation of food crops, the following example points at an unexpected negative 
effect. A commercial farmer was complaining about the fact that whilst he had hundreds of 
kilos of onions rotting away on his field as he wasn’t able to sell them to the supermarkets in 
Lubango, he was seeing big Namibian trucks filled with onions pass him by on the highway 
connecting Chibia to Lubango.  
 The national reconstruction projects have negatively affected some of the local 
population in other ways as the following case will show.  
 
 
Sogangelas 
The Sogangelas agricultural project is currently being presented by the Angolan Government 
as a prime example of modern agricultural development in the country, and a means to 
combat unemployment and poverty. The objective of the project was to create at least 300 
jobs in the sectors of agriculture, industry and commerce (Jornal de Angola 2010). This 
project started in 2005 with the reconstruction of the Gangelas dam some 20 kilometres away 
from the municipal centre, by the Government of Angola in cooperation with a Chinese 
construction company. Building of the damn had started in 1975, but was almost immediately 
halted by the start of the civil war in the same year. During the early 1990s Russians had been 
invited by the Angolan government to resume the project, but when the conflict restarted 
after the 1992 elections, the Russians engineers had to abandon the Gangelas construction 
plans. The renewed construction of the dam was followed by the appropriation of a plot of 
land of around 6,000 hectares that was being prepared for large-scale production of cereals, 
horticulture and fruits. Irrigation canals totalling 24 kilometres ran through the terrain. The 
Sogangelas agricultural development project was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
conjunction with the Provincial government of Huíla, and is managed by a state-owned 
company called Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Perimetros de Angola (SOPIR) which 
obtained credit from China for the project in Chibia. SOPIR was created by the government 
to specifically deal with the overall management of irrigation projects in the country, and 
address issues of farmer participation and underfunding. Under SOPIR’s management the 
contracted workers usually have 70% shareholding. Operational costs were envisaged to be 
shared between SOPIR and the agricultural workers, with agricultural workers paying user 
fees and SOPIR being responsible for maintenance of the irrigation structures (African 
Development Fund 2005).  
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Although the Sogangelas project has been initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
cooperation with the Provincial government, and managed by the state-owned company 
SOPIR, locally Sogangelas is known as the EDA-project. The EDA office in Chibia carried 
out a market study to see which agricultural crops would be most profitable to start producing 
on such a wide scale. The Director of the EDA in Chibia felt that the project should focus on 
wheat instead of maize, because of its potential for bigger profits, and not enter into 
competition with small scale farmers in the same region who are selling their surplus maize 
on markets as well.
60
 The intention was that the project would distribute small plots of 
irrigated land to interested big and small farmers in the area. Pilot production started in 2008 
using some smaller size plots of the land, focusing mostly on maize, beans and some 
vegetable crops. In 2009, a further 29.000 fruit trees were planted, mainly orange, tangerine, 
lemon and mango. The harvest during the agricultural season of 2009/2010 had been only 
half of what had been expected, due to severe rains and lack of funds for fuel to keep the 
generators of the irrigation system running. (Angop 2010) In 2010 74 small and big farmers 
had been employed by the project to cultivate the pilot plot. Sogangelas indicated in the same 
year that they would need a further investment of 28 million Kwanza (300.000 USD) in order 
to supply the farmers with seeds, fertilizers, as well as fuel for the generators of the irrigation 
system (Angop 2011). It seems that the role of EDA in the project is minimal. The local EDA 
Director did not make any reference to EDA’s involvement in the project, other than the 
implementation of a market study, the results of which seem to have been rejected by the 
project’s management as shown by the initial focus on maize production.   
All people living and working on the Sogangelas premises were relocated by the state. 
But not everyone has received compensation for their lost land and houses, its disbursement 
often depending on whether or not they had left their lands and houses within the allowed 
time limits. Most people I interviewed seemed to be interested in taking part in the project, 
next to maintaining their own livelihood activities. However, who was going to be eligible to 
participate, as well as the conditions pertaining to profit sharing were not known at that time. 
One woman living in one of the Nyaneka kimbos had become “displaced” as she called it 
when the Sogangelas agricultural project appropriated the area, where people had been living 
and had their plots of land.
61
 She also had been cut off from the irrigation system, and 
consequently had seen her agricultural production options diminished. At the same time, her 
husband had found some employment at the same agricultural project that in her own words 
had displaced her. In another Nyaneka kimbo that was located close to the project the story 
was largely similar: 
“The big EDA project started 3 years ago, which is when they started removing 
people from the land. The first few people that left their lands got a good 
compensation for it. But the people who refused to leave and stayed to wait and see 
what would happen hardly got compensation from EDA. I left my kimbo one year 
ago, because it was located in the middle of the EDA field. I would like to start 
working a piece of the EDA land as well.”62  
 
For the people living in Bairro 11 de Novembro, the start of the Sogangelas project meant the 
end of their agricultural activities. The land and water they had been using until that time had 
been assigned to Sogangelas. Furthermore, due to the reconstruction of the existing irrigation 
channels in the area, access to water had been cut off for other households. Access to water 
has not only become problematic for the people that live closest to the Sogangelas terrain. 
The reconstruction of the irrigation canals in Chibia has affected many other farmers in the 
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region. Like Mr. Sililo, a local farmer who had been using water from an irrigation canal 
from colonial times: 
“Until one year ago I was able to always irrigate all of my fields, because I had access 
to the irrigation channel across the street. But one year ago the Chinese came and 
reconstructed the channel, cutting off my access. Now I’m struggling to have enough 
water.”63 
 
The Sogangelas project has aimed to create employment possibilities, and some 
inhabitants have benefited from it, but a number of negative results have been noted, such as: 
 So far only 74 farmers are participating in the project, whereas many more 
have actually seen access to land and water disappear. 
 Only a small portion of the cleared irrigated land is currently in use, and the 
project is already said to be suffering from lack of finances. 
 The crops that are produced so far are in direct competition with the produce 
of local farmers, and are in contradiction with the advice of the local EDA 
station. 
 
The state’s involvement in assistance and reconstruction in Chibia is strong, especially when 
compared to other municipalities in the province. This has provided the population with some 
additional livelihood opportunities. At the same time it has actually led to a part of the 
population becoming disconnected from their livelihoods, and has reversed some of the 
results of earlier assistance programmes, as in the case of Bairro 11 de Novembro where 
seeds and tools programmes have become useless due to a sudden lack of land and water. The 
long-term outcomes of the state’s Sogangelas project on employment and economic 
development of Chibia are still unclear. The project however symbolizes the presence of a 
strong and visible state, which is socially and economically transforming modern-day Chibia. 
It highlights the state’s preference for large-scale, high-tech and commercial agriculture, as a 
strategy to rural development in the country, instead of focusing on a more inclusive and 
wider reaching plan to fight rural poverty and support smallholder farming. Sogangelas can 
be seen as an example of ‘development aggression’, in which local people become victims, 
not beneficiaries, of government’s grand schemes for modernization of agriculture, industry 
and commerce (Casiple 1996, Heijmans 2004). These projects then result in man-made 
disasters which undermine people’s livelihoods in ways that are often more difficult to 
reverse than if displacement had occurred because of war or natural hazards (Heijmans 2004, 
124). 
 
 
Comparing the villages and changing livelihood practices over time  
 
This section presents the comparative analysis of fieldwork done in three villages in Chibia 
municipality. I will give an overview of the main characteristics, events and issues of the 
three sites, combined with personal stories of what livelihoods in these villages look like, 
what they have in common and where they diverge. This will be placed within the broader 
context of conflict, displacement, aid interventions, and the socio-political issues that are at 
play. This entails a historical description of each village, the main events, and the shaping and 
reshaping of livelihoods depending on the context people have found themselves in. The data 
is mostly derived from open and semi-structured interviews, and to a lesser extent from 
surveys in the three villages. 
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The fieldwork in Chibia lasted from May 2008 until August 2008. All the fieldwork 
sites were relatively well accessible from Lubango. The fieldwork in Chibia started with 
interviews with relevant stakeholders from NGOs to state institutions (both in Lubango as 
well as in Chibia-sede) to understand the history of conflict and aid as well as other 
characteristics in the region, and subsequently select three different localities that could serve 
for a good comparison in terms of different livelihoods, histories, and encounters with 
conflict and aid. From the start this selection process and the characteristics of the villages 
were very different from what I had experienced in Caluquembe. Whereas in Caluquembe the 
three villages had, to a certain degree, been very homogenous in terms of histories, ethnic 
backgrounds, type of livelihoods and even crop production, this was not at all the case in 
Chibia. This has strengthened and widened the reach of the comparative research 
considerably. With such diverse people’s backgrounds, livelihoods and the recovery of 
livelihoods can be analysed from all sorts of different angles; be it ethnicity, history of 
displacement and conflict, access to aid, and the role of the state, etc. It deepens the 
understanding of the diversity in experiences with conflict and aid, as well as the multiple 
ways and circumstances in which people recover their livelihoods and the different factors 
that play a role in this process.  
Bairro 11 de Novembro was selected as an example of a village that had received 
different types of assistance through agencies and institutions present in Chibia during and 
shortly after the conflict. The kimbos of the Nyanekas that were closely located to Bairro 11 
de Novembro, were selected on the basis of the lack of assistance they had received 
throughout the war and after. Nonguelengue was selected because of the continuing 
distribution of food aid and other types of assistance, which had only started in 2007 and was 
continuing to this day.  
 
Figure 6: Characteristics of the three fieldwork sites in Chibia 
 Bairro 11 de 
Novembro  
The Nyaneka 
Kimbos 
Nonguelengue 
Location 7 kilometres from 
Chibia-sede, 
opposite the 
Sogangelas 
agricultural project 
separated by a dirt 
road. 
Within 20 kilometres 
around Chibia-sede, 
most of them located 
next to the 
Sogangelas 
agricultural project 
and dam.  
50 kilometres to the 
east of Chibia-sede, 
accessible only by 
dirt road, bordering 
the Bicuari National 
Park 
Ethnicity Ovimbundu from 
Quilengues 
Nyaneka-Humbi Khoi-San 
History Neighbourhood was 
created in 1994 by 
MINARS for a 
group of displaced 
from Quilengues 
Inhabitants had 
recently been 
relocated by the 
Sogangelas project. 
Village was created 
in 2007 by MINARS 
to resettle the Khoi-
San  
History of 
displacement 
All the people living 
in the village fled 
from Quilengues in 
1993-94 and were 
resettled in Chibia in 
1994. 
Not during the war, 
but now some 
families say they 
have been displaced 
due to the 
Sogangelas project. 
People were 
relocated to 
Nonguelengue in 
2007. 
Further 
characteristics 
Access to water and 
land cut off by start 
Heavily affected by 
drought and pests 
Access to land and 
water is limited, 
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of new agricultural 
project 
during 2008 drought of 2008 
affected the village. 
 
 
Bairro 11 de Novembro 
Bairro 11 de Novembro is a neighbourhood in the municipality of Chibia consisting of about 
200 displaced people from Quilengues (municipality in the centre of Huíla province). They 
fled on foot to Lubango in 1993-1994. MINARS directed them to Km 16 which is a big 
roundabout 16 kilometres south of Lubango where many displaced at that time were settled 
by the government. When the displacement camp became very crowded, people were dying 
from hunger and illness. The Angolan government then decided to resettle the people from 
Quilengues in the especially for that purpose created neighbourhood Bairro 11 de Novembro 
in Chibia in 1994. The neighbourhood lies along a dirt road to Chibia-sede, and opposite the 
irrigated plots of the Sogangelas project. Immediately next to the neighbourhood, the head 
office of SOPIR is located, which manages the Sogangelas project.  
The inhabitants of Bairro 11 de Novembro received food aid from WFP and the GoA 
through MINARS from 1994 up to the first 3 months of 2003. At the end this aid programme 
was transformed to a food-for-work scheme whereby the beneficiaries built a school in the 
neighbourhood in exchange for food. In one instance they received maize, sorghum and 
millet seeds, tools, and blankets from the Angolan NGO Mafiku. In 2003 the GoA in 
cooperation with the IOM started a resettlement programme. About half of the inhabitants of 
Bairro 11 de Novembro made use of this programme and were resettled in their areas of 
origin in Quilengues, while others decided to stay in Chibia. The main reasons for staying 
were lack of resources to restart their livelihoods back in Quilengues, having found some 
kind of job in Chibia, but also fear for the parliamentary elections of 2008: “We have seen the 
confusion after the elections of 1992, we will wait and see what the elections of 2008 will 
bring”.64 Some families made use of the resettlement programme to Quilengues, only to 
return to Chibia after some time as they found that life was better for them there, despite the 
lack of agricultural options. Another factor that played a role in the decision of some to return 
to Chibia was that on return they found that their plots of land had been confiscated by other 
refugees who had settled in their villages of origin since they themselves had become 
displaced. 
Since the start of the land appropriation and preparation for the Sogangelas project, 
opposite of the Bairro 11 de Novembro neighbourhood, its inhabitants lost access to land and 
were unable to pursue their regular agricultural production. The only agricultural activities 
that they could continue were confined to the small plots of land they had available next to 
their houses. However, as the houses have been built with little space in between them, 
agricultural production is practically negligent. The people of Bairro 11 de Novembro say 
that they have not received compensation from this project, because they do not have any 
documents showing the right to use that land. Without access to land, agricultural livelihood 
options were limited. People of Bairro 11 de Novembro now have developed a diversity of 
livelihood activities, outside of agriculture. They have found either day-jobs or regular 
employment, for instance with one of the construction companies that are currently 
rehabilitating the main road to Lubango. Two of the interviewees had found employment at 
the head office of SOPIR, located directly next to the Bairro 11 de Novembro. Some men 
practice semi-skilled labour like masonry and carpentry. The women mostly make macau (a 
local beer or liquor made of sorghum, also important as a form of local currency) which they 
sell to passers-by, tend to the small agricultural plots next to their houses, or do small 
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business at the Chibia market. The market is located some 10 kilometres from the 
neighbourhood, and especially women from the village do business at the market, purchasing 
pigs for instance and reselling them after they fattened them. There is no cattle in the village, 
and theft of small animals is mentioned as a problem in the village. 
 
 
The Nyaneka kimbos 
For my research in Chibia I selected Nyaneka kimbos that were all located around the terrain 
of the Sogangelas agricultural development project. Some of the inhabitants of the kimbos 
had been affected directly by this project, having had to abandon their plots and sometimes 
their houses, to make room for this project. I visited 4 different kimbos, consisting of 
extended families, often of some 20-30 people in total. The families consisted of the 3 or 4 
wives of the household head, and their children.  
Most households had received food assistance from WFP at some point, mostly 
during the war. They recall receiving food, especially during the 1998/1999 and the 
1989/1990 season, because of the severity of the drought those years. No mention is made of 
ever receiving seeds, tools or livestock. The food aid distribution had been an incidental 
occurrence. Some people obtained employment in Lubango during the war, but found it 
increasingly difficult to maintain these jobs when the war intensified. There were no taxi-
buses driving between Lubango and Chibia as there are now. And hitching rides with the 
trucks that moved between Namibia and Lubango was becoming nearly impossible during the 
war.   
In Chibia these kimbos lie at great distances from each other, and not in village 
structures. This has to do with the need for grazing land for livestock, close to the family 
kimbo. Although rearing livestock is an important livelihood activity in this region it is 
almost always complemented by agriculture. One could say that agriculture is the source for 
people’s direct daily food needs, whereas livestock is considered as a savings account, which 
will only be tapped into in times of crisis and immediate need for cash. For women, small 
business and trade at the Chibia market, or selling foodstuffs to passers-by from the kimbo, 
provides a source of additional income to the household. The women do some small trade by 
reselling rice, making fuba and selling it, buying meat at the market, frying and selling it, and 
the making and selling of macau. But selling these goods is always subject to negotiation 
with the male household head as the following quote from a woman in one of the kimbos 
shows:  
“Sometimes we make macau, when we have sugar. We only sell it from the house, not 
in the marketplace. Now we can only make the macau with sorghum, because the 
maize harvest failed. Sometimes we also sell fuba and other items from the house like 
meat. If we need to buy shoes for the children we sell some macau for income. In 
August and September there might be some maize again, but your husband will beat 
you when you go out to sell maize, you need his permission to sell items from the 
household”.65   
 
Furthermore, one household is producing sugarcane, and sells it at the market in Lubango. It 
is not uncommon for children from the households to go and live at the kimbo of the 
grandparents, to assist them with agricultural production and livestock rearing. Also, some of 
the children have been able to find employment in Lubango, as teachers or drivers, and send 
remittances home.  
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During the period of fieldwork people were recovering from the drought and ensuing 
Lagarta Militar (African Armyworm or spodoptera exempta) pest that had destroyed many of 
their crops in the area. 
66
The Lagarta Militar plague is a relatively normal occurrence in 
Chibia, however this year the amount of worms had been overwhelming, and the pest had 
mostly attacked cereal crops such as maize, sorghum and millet. At the height of the pest the 
ground was covered by the worms, eating away any vegetation they could find. The 
inhabitants of Chibia indicated this had had severe impact on their livestock as well. The 
Lagarta Militar had caused livestock to die this year. Firstly, because sufficient grazing lands 
were more difficult to find because the worm had attacked most vegetation. Secondly, one 
woman explained that if a cow ate one of those worms, it would die within 3 to 4 days.
67
 And 
thirdly, people had to sell their livestock in order to obtain food for the families after their 
crops had failed. No large-scale pest control by distributing or spraying pesticides had taken 
place.  
 
  
Nonguelengue 
Nonguelengue is a small village in Tchicuatiti comuna, located one and a half hour driving 
from Chibia-sede. Only accessible by small dirt paths, it lies adjacent to the fazenda of the 
Director of the Provincial Department of Water. Close to a mining company for granite, a 
small path of about 5 kilometres long leads to the village. The Tchicuatiti region is rich in 
minerals, explaining the presence of mining companies that are extracting granite and iron 
ore. In 2004 there was talk in the Angolan media about possible presence of diamonds in the 
area. Nonguelengue is a village of Khoi-San inhabitants that consists of 42 families, 
comprising of 118 people. They have been relocated there by the government in May 2007. 
Until the time of their relocation they had lived dispersed in a nearby area bordering the 
national park Bicuari.  
The people in Nonguelengue say they never encountered conflict directly, but rather 
noticed the effects of the war when they saw the wild animals moving away from the area, 
affecting their ability to hunt for their livelihoods. In 2006 MINARS started distributing food 
aid to displaced people in Tchicuatiti and decided to also start distributing food to the Khoi-
San living in the area. When I asked why the government had started food aid distribution at 
that time specifically, people in the village could not indicate a reason or situation that made 
food aid more necessary at that particular time. The rationale of MINARS behind the ensuing 
relocation in 2007 was to improve the families’ living standard, make aid delivery more 
effective, and ensure a livelihood of crop production that was deemed more sustainable than 
hunting and gathering.  
At this moment MINARS only distributes food aid in three Khoi-San communities in 
the region. The inhabitants of Nonguelengue receive food aid by MINARS, in a food-for-
work scheme. They would receive food for the construction of their own houses in the 
village, and for preparing plots of land. Their houses were finished and the plots of land 
weren’t in use by the time of the fieldwork, but food aid was continuing as they had not been 
able to produce their own food at the time. Every week they received 10 kilos of fuba, 10 
kilos of rice, 1 litre of oil, and 2.5 kilos of beans per household.  They also received 10 heads 
of oxen from MINARS. These oxen originally came from Bibala, and were not accustomed 
to the Thicuatiti environment. As a consequence, 8 of the oxen died soon after. Some seeds 
and machetes were handed out, but due to the bad agricultural season the people were forced 
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to eat the seeds and sell some of the machetes. The IESA church handed out clothes in the 
village. 
 The families would, before the relocation took place, only meet up for collective 
hunting trips as they did not live in a village structure. They went on walking trips twice a 
day to hunt for wild animals and collect foods, such as honey. Both men and women worked   
the fields of their Nyaneka neighbours, in return for 2 kilos of maize or 1 litre of alcoholic 
drink a day per person. Furthermore, most of the inhabitants also had plots of land on which 
they cultivated some maize, beans, sorghum and millet. At this moment, most activities that 
take place in the village are related to their traditional hunter-gatherer lifestyle, even though 
availability of wild animals is limited. They sometimes manage to catch a cabra de mata 
(wild deer), and are able to collect honey. This is furthermore complemented with occasional 
day labour in the fields of their Nyaneka neighbours, as well as the production and trading of 
artisans’ goods. Most women in the village make kimbalas (reed baskets) and some men 
make agricultural tools which they trade with the Nyaneka neighbours. They had started 
clearing some plots of land, but so far had not received seeds for the next agricultural season. 
The formal explanation on the part of the Angolan state, and MINARS specifically, to 
relocate the group of Khoi-San to Nonguelengue, was their unsustainable lifestyle as hunters 
and gatherers. These traditional livelihoods were unwanted, and therefore the relocation was 
deemed to pave the way for these people to start more agriculturally based livelihoods. 
However, the distributed seeds had already been eaten and many of the agricultural 
instruments sold, due to the fact that no land (titles) had been made available in conjunction 
with the relocation, and a drought had occurred. So therefore, parallel to the relocation, the 
government had started distributing food aid until they were able to start agricultural 
production. The people of Nonguelengue were relocated following the state’s rationale to 
promote more sustainable livelihoods, yet were left completely dependent on food aid 
instead. Furthermore, the hunting-gathering lifestyle in their former location had for some 
time already been complemented by the agricultural activities that the state was promoting. 
Yet now, due to the inability to practise agriculture they had been forced to return to hunting 
and gathering as a way to complement the erratic food distributions by the state. The rationale 
and practice behind the relocation of the Khoi-San to Nonguelengue are contradictory, and 
the priority that the state has given to the Khoi-San in the light of all reconstruction and 
recovery needs in the country is remarkable. As one inhabitant of Nonguelengue explains the 
state’s focus on Khoi-San: “The state’s pretext is that we were suffering, but I think they just 
wanted control over us”.68 
  
 
Comparing the villages in terms of aid and livelihoods  
In this section of the chapter I present an overview of aid interventions in the three villages, 
and the types of livelihood activities that people deploy. 
 
Figure 7: History and type of aid interventions in Chibia 
 Bairro 11 de 
Novembro  
Nyaneka kimbos Nonguelengue 
Aid 
organizations 
in years 
-MINARS 1994-2003 
-WFP 1994-1998 
-Mafiku 1997 
-WFP 1986, 1998, 
1999 
 
-MINARS 2007-
now 
Food aid By MINARS and WFP Occasionally by 
WFP 
By MINARS 
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Seeds and 
tools 
All of the inhabitants 
received maize, 
sorghum and millet 
seeds, agricultural 
instruments during a 
single distribution by 
Mafiku.  
None Seeds, and 
agricultural 
instruments by 
MINARS, which 
have been eaten 
and sold. 
Livestock None None A few oxen were 
distributed, but 
most of them 
died. 
Rehabilitation 
works 
A school through a 
food-for-work scheme. 
None. Houses through 
food-for-work 
scheme. 
Other Blankets from Mafiku. None. Clothes from 
IESA. 
Community 
groups/associ
ations 
None. Farmers 
associations, not 
connected to 
NGOs. 
None. 
Able to 
produce food 
next to food 
aid 
No. Yes. No. 
Able to sell 
produce next 
to food aid 
No. No. No. 
What produce 
was sold? 
Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. 
 
All of the households in the three villages have had encounters with aid throughout the war 
and after, which was mostly limited to food aid and an occasional seeds and tools distribution 
though. Only the Nyaneka kimbos had received food aid because of droughts, but never 
received other types of aid. The other two villages have both received seeds and tools, but 
due to circumstances have not been able to use these or pursue any significant agricultural 
activities. In comparison with Caluquembe, the few seeds and tools distributions that took 
place in Chibia were small and had no follow up. No community groups were formed, nor 
seed banks. Small animals were not distributed either. Only the population of Nonguelengue 
received 10 oxen, of which 8 have already died. Although Chibia remained relatively well 
accessible during the war, it seems that most of the international aid agencies based in 
Lubango have not developed any activities in these villages, except for WFP. 
 Agriculture as a livelihood activity is practised on different scales in the three 
villages. The households in the Nyaneka kimbos produce cereals, fruit and vegetables. 
However, their production had been negatively affected recently by the Sogangelas project, 
and the drought combined with the Lagarta Militar pest. In Bairro 11 de Novembro only 
some households produce cereals on a very small scale, in their garden plots. In 
Nonguelengue no agriculture is practised at all. The same goes for livestock and small 
animals. Whereas the households in the Nyaneka kimbos all own cattle, the households in the 
other two villages do not. Small animals are furthermore only held in Bairro 11 de Novembro 
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on a small scale, with the purpose to resell them at the market.  Fishing does not take place, 
and only the people in Nonguelengue occasionally practise beekeeping. 
 Not a single household member from Nonguelengue has found formal employment, 
and unlike people from the other villages occasionally do day labour on fields of their 
neighbours. The households in the other two villages have found employment, most often in 
Chibia itself, and sometimes in Lubango. Furthermore, there are some men in Bairro 11 de 
Novembro and the Nyaneka kimbos that practise skilled labour. In Nonguelengue on the 
other hand all women do artisan work; making kimbalas and selling them to their Nyaneka 
neighbours. 
 Most households in the three villages trade either surplus produce or other goods. 
Whereas the women of Nonguelengue only trade kimbalas with their neighbours, the women 
in the other villages sell a variety of goods from their houses, or at the Chibia market. This is 
also dependent on location, as both the Nyaneka kimbos as well as Bairro 11 de Novembro 
find some benefit in their proximities to the Chibia market as well as the road construction 
companies that are present in Chibia-sede. Only one household in the three villages received 
remittances; one Nyaneka family received cash from their son who had obtained a job as a 
driver in Luanda. The division of labour in the villages is such that women are primarily 
responsible for agriculture and trade, whereas men find formal employment, skilled labour 
and tend to their livestock.  
  For people in Bairro 11 de Novembro live has changed considerably since 1990, as 
one inhabitant comments: “It was war and I didn’t sleep, but at least I was at home and we 
had some more farming conditions there”.69 During that time they still had access to their 
fields and oxen, yet now they find that they have more employment possibilities: “it’s better 
now, because at least I have a job”.70 The people from Nonguelengue, have also had to 
abandon their livelihood activities of 1990, and have so far not been able to secure any 
employment possibilities or alternative activities. For the households of the Nyaneka kimbos, 
life has changed the least. They have continued with more or less the same livelihood 
activities, although one household member noted that life was better in 1990 as there were 
more employment possibilities at that time. Between 1975 and 1990 no major changes in the 
type of activities that people deployed  were noted. However, one respondent of a Nyaneka 
kimbo remembered that in 1975 they were still working in farmers’ associations which she 
considered hard work for little income, and that she felt more free to pursue different 
activities now.
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Overall it seems that only the Nyaneka kimbos still maintain mostly agro-pastoralist 
livelihoods, complemented by formal employment and trade. Earning capacities in Bairro 11 
de Novembro consist of a mix of trade, employment and skilled labour. Due to their recent 
relocation to the village of Nonguelengue, the Khoi-San have as of yet not had the 
opportunity to secure (sustainable) livelihoods for themselves, due to lack of land, water and 
seeds and tools. Therefore, they are still dependent on food distributions by MINARS, the 
little trading of their handicraft products they manufacture, occasional day labour on the plots 
of their Nyaneka neighbours, and some hunting and gathering of honey and wild foods. 
Trading for the Khoi-San is limited to the little trade they do with their Nyaneka neighbours. 
However, in the other two villages trade is an important, predominantly female activity which 
takes place in several spaces: within the village, at the Chibia market, and even extended to 
the markets in Lubango. Livelihoods in Chibia are no longer primarily agriculturally based, 
but have become diversified through trade and employment possibilities. These changes in 
activities however have not always been voluntarily made, as certain circumstances, such as 
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droughts and reconstruction projects and relocation have made it difficult to pursue 
agricultural activities. 
 
 
Current livelihood strategies: self recovery and state recovery in Chibia 
 
This section discusses the current livelihood strategies that people employ in Chibia. This 
section argues that livelihoods that have been affected directly and indirectly by conflict in 
Chibia have gone through a process of self-recovery, in the sense that people have mostly (re-
) established themselves during and after the conflict, and that aid has played a minimal role 
in assisting these processes. Furthermore, state recovery processes in the form of 
reconstruction projects have had an impact on the socio-economic development of the region, 
with both positive and negative consequences for livelihoods in Chibia.  
 
 
Current livelihoods in Chibia 
The lack of employment possibilities in Chibia were described by one woman I interviewed 
in a Nyaneka kimbo as follows: “There are no permanent jobs here, no contract labour. There 
is “desemprego tradicional” (traditional unemployment). People sit around all day waiting for 
a job opportunity. If you are lucky you can find a job that lasts from the morning to the 
afternoon”.72 However, in comparison with Caluquembe the number of household members 
in Chibia that had been able to obtain formal employment was far higher. In Caluquembe 
(formal) employment was almost only obtained through migration, whereas Chibia offered 
more opportunities. So far, reconstruction programmes have been able to extend the 
possibilities of day labour, but especially formal long-term employment within these projects 
remains difficult to obtain.  
Cattle rearing has always been an important livelihood strategy for the people living 
in the Chibia region. Although agriculture is practised mainly for their own food supply, 
livestock is a strong trade commodity and the number of cattle one owns is considered to be 
the prime indicator of someone’s wealth. Livestock is mainly traded when people need cash 
for funerals, clothes, and in case of illness for instance, although it was noted that especially 
the younger generations are more inclined to sell livestock in order to make investments in 
other livelihood activities (Dixie 2002). They rarely use livestock for own consumption, but 
rather trade it at the market when cash is needed. The main crops under production in Chibia 
are: maize, beans, peanuts and vegetables (like tomato, onion and garlic) and most of these 
products are sold at the Chioco market in Lubango, whereas livestock is mostly traded at the 
local Chibia market (Dixie 2002). One can also find many fruit trees in the region, as well as 
sorghum and millet production. Livestock and crop production continue to be the most 
practised livelihood strategies in Chibia municipality. 
 Trade is practised by almost all households in the three villages: in the village itself, 
with neighbouring villages, at the markets in Chibia and in Lubango. The products that are 
traded are diverse, ranging from surplus harvest, to homemade liquor and food, and kimbalas. 
Youth from the kimbos now also look for opportunities in the cities like Lubango, especially 
since the failed agricultural season of 2007/2008. Since then, inhabitants of Chibia also 
mentioned an increase in livestock theft, a phenomenon that has always been common in the 
region. Furthermore, people have been increasingly procuring employment with the 
construction companies that are present in Chibia. 
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Self recovery and state recovery 
Post-conflict recovery of livelihoods in Chibia has followed markedly different processes 
than the type of externally driven recovery as seen in Caluquembe. Chibia hasn’t encountered 
the same amount and type of NGO interventions which targeted recovery of livelihoods 
directly. No large-scale seeds and tools distributions have taken place. Livelihoods in Chibia 
were affected by the conflict in many ways; employment possibilities diminished, access to 
necessary inputs, credit and goods became limited as well as the access to markets in for 
instance Lubango. Furthermore, due to recurring droughts in the area the households 
remained vulnerable to crop failure. With the arrival of displaced people in the region, the 
inhabitants were suddenly faced with pressure on land . For the displaced people arriving in 
Chibia, like the inhabitants of  Bairro 11 de Novembro, assets had been lost during 
displacement, and they had to restart their lives and livelihoods in a new place without 
support from family, networks, or aid agencies. Recovery mostly occurred unassisted, as the 
effects of the war became less pronounced in the area and new livelihood opportunities 
appeared. 
 During and after the war, people in Chibia have been able to maintain their 
livelihoods of agro-pastoralism although some elements have been adapted such as choice of 
crops. Looking at livelihoods in Chibia today, one can see a diversity of options, from small 
trade, agricultural production and livestock rearing, day jobs, formal employment, commerce 
with Lubango markets, etc. Inhabitants of Chibia have recovered their livelihoods 
independently of aid interventions. They have been able to sustain most of their core 
livelihood activities during the war, due to the fact that violence and displacement did not 
affect their households directly. For the people of Bairro 11 de Novembro this was 
considerably different. They became disconnected from their livelihood through 
displacement, and have not been able to revive their agriculturally based livelihoods since 
arriving in Chibia, due to lack of land and water. At the same time, they have been able to 
develop a diversity of livelihood activities, ranging from small trade, skilled labour and 
formal employment, which has enabled them to fulfil their household needs. These activities 
have been developed within an environment that has offered them a broader range of 
perspectives compared to other areas of the province, where livelihoods are more restricted to 
a specific type of agriculture. Self recovery in Chibia means that people themselves have 
established a variety of livelihood activities, without having been targeted directly by aid 
interventions aimed at livelihood recovery.  
Chibia’s location close to Lubango has facilitated the implementation of national 
reconstruction programmes such as road rehabilitation and the Sogangelas agricultural 
development project. The role of the state in Chibia has been influential, either through 
personal linkages of the provincial political elite in the area, as well as through a number of 
large scale reconstruction programmes that were implemented. This strong influence has had 
both negative and positive consequences for people’s livelihoods. On the one hand it has 
created several job opportunities, mostly for the male population of Chibia, improving 
transportation means between Chibia and markets in Lubango, as well as increasing Chibia’s 
visibility as an emerging area for agricultural development. On the other hand, these projects 
have displaced many of the local farmers, cutting people off from access to water and land, 
mostly affecting smallholder farmers in the area. This process of state recovery in Angola has 
been marked by an overreliance on large-scale infrastructural forms of reconstruction, instead 
of a vision and strategy on rural development through assistance to smallholders. This has 
come to dominate the Angolan government’s actions in the post-conflict reconstruction 
phase. As Orre noted with reference to the forced evictions in Lubango to make room for the 
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reconstruction of the railway: “The event thus illustrates the government’s reconstruction 
strategy centred on the fast development of large-scale infrastructure in a process which 
seemingly shows little concern for the more immediate needs of the vast masses of the urban 
and rural poor”(Orre 2010, 3). The state in Angola has continuously followed this line of 
mostly infrastructural development as a way to reconstruct the country in the post-conflict 
period, as will be further analysed in chapter 8 of this thesis. Furthermore, in the case of the 
state’s interventions in Nonguelengue, any self recovery that had occurred in the post-conflict 
period was reversed due to the state’s relocation and the inability of the state to provide the 
means, context and conditions in which the inhabitants could sustain themselves and their 
households. Under the heading of supporting more modern and sustainable livelihoods, these 
people have been cut off from land and resources with which they were able to survive in the 
first place, instead becoming reliant on the state’s food assistance.   
How livelihoods develop in the future, and whether the people of Chibia will continue 
to see their livelihood options grow depends on a number of elements, including the 
continuation of  the national reconstruction programmes, further attention for trade and 
commerce of agricultural products,  and the ability of people to adapt to the recurring 
droughts and pests. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although Chibia hadn’t been at the centre of fighting, the region experienced the 
consequences of war, such as the  large number of IDPs  settling in Chibia, lack of goods and 
basic services, and recruitment of soldiers. Major aid interventions never took place in 
Chibia, apart from occasional food assistance by WFP and MINARS which was in the first 
place made available because of the cyclical droughts and famines that hit the dry Chibia 
region rather that the effects of war. Large-scale seeds and tools distributions, as in the case 
of Caluquembe, therefore took place on a very limited scale, primarily focused on the 
displaced populations residing in the area. Assistance to Chibia was therefore mostly relief 
oriented, consisting of an occasional goods distribution, without much interaction or 
cooperation with local authorities.  
The comparative research in Chibia was done between three very different villages in 
terms of ethnicity, history of displacement, livelihoods and aid interventions. The comparison 
showed that especially in terms of effects on livelihoods, the village that had received the 
most assistance in the past (Bairro 11 de Novembro) seemed to have the most diversified 
livelihood options. However, the agriculture-biased type of assistance doesn’t seem directly 
related to the livelihood activities that developed and which were for a major part far from 
being agriculturally based (even after the distribution of seeds and tools). The only village 
still receiving assistance, Nonguelengue,  was hit not by war, but by modernity.  
Livelihoods in Chibia comprise of a mix of activities ranging from agriculture, cattle 
rearing, to artisan activities, (formal) employment, semi-skilled labour, and much trading. 
Although the livelihood options differ from one locality to another, they all seem to have 
more differentiated patterns than livelihoods in Caluquembe. As I argue in this chapter they 
are the results of processes of self and state recovery. National reconstruction programmes 
have contributed to a day labour type of employment, and given some farmers the 
opportunity to participate in the new agricultural development project of the government. 
However, as noted in this chapter, the rehabilitation of the road as well as the agricultural 
project had both positive and negative effects on people’s livelihoods. Reconstruction 
discourses by the state are strongly influenced by a view on rural development through large-
scale infrastructure and commercial projects, viewing traditional livelihoods as unsustainable 
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and unwanted. This has influenced the interface between local people and the state, in which 
top-down approaches to reconstruction have meant a blatant disregard for people’s developed 
activities and little space for negotiation.  
The population of Chibia have managed to realize a type of self recovery of 
livelihoods without NGO interventions that targeted household’s livelihood recovery directly. 
No linking processes from relief to rehabilitation and development took place. Rather, 
rehabilitation and development were firmly in the hands of the state, which chose a markedly 
different approach than aid agencies, and actually in some instances reversed the efforts of 
aid agencies by rendering seeds and tools distributions useless. State involvement on the 
other hand has both expanded options for a few, and forcibly closed options for others.  
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Introduction 
 
This chapter contains an overview of the history of aid in Angola, linking the various aid 
actors and interventions to the course of the Angolan conflict. It investigates how 
humanitarian access in Angola was negotiated, what its policies were, and how it became 
politicized, and used as bargaining tool for both warring parties. The chapter then identifies 
the variety of different actors that were part of the humanitarian arena in Huíla province and 
analyses how aid was shaped in the everyday practices of organisations active in Huíla. From 
interviews, observations in the field and offices, and written information, a picture emerges 
about the history of humanitarian aid in the province, its changing discourse, policy and 
practice over time. Specifically, the interpretation of humanitarian principles in practice is 
highlighted. Analysis of negotiations and interaction at the interface between aid givers and 
aid beneficiaries further show how quality of aid is assessed and how organizational 
discourses shape perceptions on aid beneficiaries and consequent interventions.  
A comparison is made between two Dutch organizations, one with a humanitarian and 
the other with a development mandate. The comparison will show the different approaches 
used, not just programmatically but also in terms of partnerships and exit strategies. This 
highlights the specific problems that aid agencies in Angola have faced in reassessing their 
country presence, and how these problems have affected LRRD processes.  
 
 
History of humanitarian aid in Angola
73
  
 
This section of the chapter serves as a background and introduction to the history of aid in 
Angola, after which the chapter will zoom in on the various aid actors, with a specific focus 
on the everyday practices of aid in Huíla province. 
 
 
Figure 8: Timeline of conflict, peacebuilding efforts and aid interventions in Angola 
Period Aid Interventions International 
peacebuilding 
Actors 
Aid Providers 
1961-1974 
War for 
Independence  
 
Aid delivery to 
refugees in Zaire  
 -Local church organizations 
-UNHCR 
-UNIC 
1975-1989 Large refugee flows 1981: UNAVEM  I -Local churches 
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each of our individual theses.  
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Cold War  to Zaire and Zambia established  UNDP 
-UNICEF 
-WFP 
-ICRC 
-MSF 
1990-1992 
Civil war and 
Bicesse 
Accords,  
Assistance to 
displaced and 
drought-affected 
people, 
demobilisation of 
soldiers, 
reconstruction  
Troika: Portugal, 
Cuba, USSR 
 
1991: UNAVEM II 
established 
Special Relief Programme 
for Angola (SRPA): large 
influx of humanitarian 
organizations. UNDP is 
lead agency. 
1992-1994 
Civil war 
Emergency relief 
and health 
programmes 
1993: UN SRSG 
made responsible for 
humanitarian and 
peacekeeping 
operations 
Limited humanitarian 
coordination 
-WFP 
-UNHCR 
-ICRC 
-Caritas 
1993: DHA set up 
Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Unit in 
Angola (UCAH) 
1994-1998 
Lusaka 
Protocol 
Demobilisation and 
reconstruction (food 
aid and food-for-
work programmes)  
1995: UNAVEM III 
established 
1997: MONUA 
replaces UNAVEM 
III 
 
 
UCAH in charge of 
demobilisation 
1997: DHA becomes 
OCHA 
Humanitarian agencies 
have access but limited in 
some areas. 
1998-2002 
Civil war 
Emergency relief 1999: MONUA 
withdrawn 
UNOA created 
 
2000: COIEPA 
1999: PNEAH
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 established 
-WFP 
-ICRC 
-UCAH 
UNITA areas inaccessible 
2002-now 
Cease-fire 
Reconstruction and 
rehabilitation 
2002: UNOA 
replaced by UNMA   
Both humanitarian and 
developmental 
organizations 
Source: Compiled from various sources (Ball and Campbell 1998, UN archives, Gorman 
1994, Richardson 2000, Robson 2003, Duffield 1994b) 
 
The long-lasting and multi-dimensional character of the Angolan crisis resulted in the 
presence of a wide variety of aid actors with different mandates, perceptions and practices. In 
this section, the focus is on the history of aid interventions and the room for manoeuvre aid 
actors had with reference to the dynamics and shifting politics in the different phases of the 
conflict. The humanitarian arena is not limited to international agencies, but also of other 
major players in the humanitarian arena such as Angolan NGOs and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), the churches and the government. The emergence, interaction and 
interfaces between these actors are analysed in this section. 
                                                 
74 National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) 
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1961-1989: constrained room for humanitarian manoeuvre  
This period of war in Angola was characterized by a minimal presence of Angolan and 
international NGOs due to the political environment which restricted the emergence of 
Angolan NGOs as well as keeping doors closed to the international NGOs. The GoA 
influenced coordination and allocation of aid, yet lacked the funding to reach rural areas. An 
increased military expenditure ultimately led to amongst others an erosion of social service 
delivery by the state.  
In 1961, when the war for independence commenced, the affected population 
primarily fled to neighbouring Zaire (now DR Congo) where they were assisted by church 
organisations and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Gorman 
1994). Within its borders, despite evidence of famine conditions already occurring at the 
beginning of the 1980s, Angola only started receiving significant international humanitarian 
aid at the end of the decade, as is reflected in the fact that in 1988 as few as six international 
NGOs were present in the country (Duffield 1994b, 33). During the Cold War, national 
NGOs were effectively banned by the government whereas international NGOs were 
discouraged from entering Angola. UN agencies such as United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and WFP were at this time operational primarily in 
government areas (UNHCR was the exception) (Lanzer 1996) and appeals were launched by 
the UN´s Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO - later turned into DHA and then OCHA). 
The only international organisations working in UNITA controlled territory were the ICRC 
and MSF. ICRC also worked in MPLA areas and set up its offices as early as 1975. In 1979 it 
started its first orthopaedic centre and in 1981 began distributing humanitarian aid to 
Angola’s displaced (ICIHI 1986). ICRC had to work with two Angolan Red Crosses until the 
Bicesse Accord – one from the government side and the other created by UNITA as a 
strategy to access external aid resources (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). MSF’s activities started 
in 1983 with a French mission, initially only in UNITA areas where they ran primary health 
care services in displaced camps, nutritional and other programmes and supported hospitals 
and smaller health structures. Although in 1989 MSF Belgium and Spain started interventions 
in war-affected government areas, MSF as a whole was for a while accused by the 
government for being partial to UNITA (Ball and Campbell 1998).
75
 Church organisations 
such as the World Council of Churches, were also active in providing assistance to local 
populations in rural areas where many had their missions (UN archives). As described by 
Ostheimer (2000, 130), Caritas for instance had a major role in aid delivery in UNITA areas 
because of its local network of churches.  
The GoA during this phase provided assistance through two main channels. The first 
involved subsidised food sales of imported commodities, but was ended in 1992 following 
the effects of the drop in oil prices and of structural adjustment programmes of the late 1980s. 
The second involved assistance given under the government’s relief institutions, which in the 
1980s was the State Secretariat for Social Affairs (SEAS, and later converted into MINARS). 
The SEAS did have some operational capacity in the 1980s in terms of warehouses and 
transport means, but relied on UN and bilateral financial aid rather than on government 
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 Similar claims that MSF was supportive of anti-communist regimes have been made in relation to other 
conflicts in the 1980s. Terry (2002, 149) for instance argues that MSF had a “...strong aversion to both the 
Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh. MSF withdrew support from the Khmer Rouge 
camps as soon as the emergency period subsided and restricted its assistance to the non-Khmer Rouge refugee 
camps.”. Furthermore, MSF is also said to have been the most active NGO in Afghanistan, particularly in 
Mujahidin controlled areas during the Russian occupation, with some 120 doctors on the ground by 1983 
(Amstuz, 1986, 218). 
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funding and was criticized for its lack of coordination (Ostheimer 2000). In the 1990s as food 
aid replaced commercial food imports and gained importance, competition occurred amongst 
several state institutions concerning the responsibility for the coordination of emergency aid 
(Duffield 1994b). These government efforts however, were limited in capacity as they 
restricted aid to (urban) areas under their control and did not consider refugees or drought 
victims as eligible (ibid). Beyond such efforts, the government attempted to maintain a 
certain level of services to the population with substantial technical and personnel support 
mainly from Cuba, in areas such as health and education. However, during the 1990s the 
government’s role in local service delivery was practically negligible again leaving people, 
particularly in rural areas, to fend for themselves. Ostheimer (2000) argues that Angola’s 
state was delinked from society and therefore did not perform its function for disaster relief 
and engagement in social service delivery. UNITA on the other hand created structures 
parallel to those of government (such as the Red Cross, a Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordinator and a Social Department) in order to make itself eligible and prepared for 
receiving aid. 
 
 
1989-1992: emergence of NGOs and UN coordination 
This period of the conflict was characterized by the opening up of political space through 
which both Angolan and international NGOs gained increased presence in the delivery of aid. 
Governance and aid coordination responsibilities increasingly shifted towards UN agencies 
and international NGOs. This gave especially the UN a strong presence in the country, 
exemplified by the start of the first relief programme, SRPA. The SRPA was the result of a 
negotiation process in which humanitarian access and political interests had to be reconciled, 
resulting in defining the programme as a response to drought, while at the same time gaining 
access to UNITA areas, and viewing it as a potential tool for establishing peace. 
With the end of the Cold War and the Bicesse peace negotiations of 1991, legal 
reforms allowed the establishment of independent associations, upon which a body of 
national civil society organisations emerged. Angolan NGOs and local churches over the 
years played an important role in reaching rural populations as they did not have the same 
security restrictions as INGOs and could use their local networks. This led to frequent ‘sub-
contracting’ relationships between international and national organisations, shaping the 
latters’ role as implementing partners, but also limiting the investment in building the 
capacity of Angolan NGOs in the long term. Several international NGOs also entered the 
country at this time to start up rehabilitation-oriented programmes in the new context of 
peace. Responsibility for basic service provision to the population was left to the aid 
community as international aid agencies effectively took over the role of public service 
institutions (Christoplos 1998). However, for a long time, the main focus of the humanitarian 
response was on food aid, with basic service provision being a secondary priority. And even 
then, little attention was given to institutional aspects of the crisis and to questions of local 
capacity. As such, with governance responsibilities shifted to UN agencies and international 
NGOs, these organisations had the power to impact local institutions and people’s 
livelihoods, with intended and unintended effects.  
Furthermore, the emergency approach within which international aid expanded was to 
persist throughout the war, despite the fact that, as we have seen, there have been several 
areas and periods of relative stability in the country (Cain et al. 2002, Robson 2003). Most of 
the NGOs that arrived in Angola became engaged in the first coordinated humanitarian 
intervention programme – the Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA) – launched 
under the coordination of UNDP, in September 1990. The SRPA included four so called 
‘peace corridors’ enabling humanitarian access and safe provision of aid to mainly 
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government held territories. The SRPA was defined primarily as a response to a drought in 
Angola and in the second instance, as an instrument for peace (UNICEF 1991 in Duffield 
1994b, 48). As argued by Duffield (1994b), the programme presented the drought as the main 
component of the crisis, at the expense of other structural causes. Earlier in 1990 the UN had 
launched an appeal for government controlled areas only, as its agencies were restricted to 
such areas, with the exception of UNICEF. But following pressure from the US’s Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the SRPA was to include UNITA areas as well. Some 
have argued that this was a political manoeuvre to attempt to replace South African assistance 
(Duffield 1994b, 42, Richardson 2000). Although the SPRA allowed more people to be 
reached by aid than before, the renewal of conflict in 1992 interrupted the programme. By 
then, the SRPA was considered to be unsuccessful by many, because of problematic 
assessment and information procedures, bureaucratic procedures blocking the speedy delivery 
of aid, and manipulation by two warring parties (Ostheimer 2000, Richardson 2000). 
 
 
1992-2002: aid as a political strategy 
In this period aid became a powerful political instrument. Both UNITA and MPLA tried to 
enhance their access to aid, which ensured they could continue their military spending on 
winning the war over the other. Also, MPLA tried weakening its  opponent further by cutting 
off access to aid to those areas under UNITA’s control.  
The start of the post-election war saw the suspension and withdrawal of many 
international actors as access and security became serious problems. The WFP, UNHCR, 
ICRC and Caritas were still able to transport some aid to a few provincial cities, but this was 
ad-hoc, and ICRC, MSF and Save The Children Fund (SCF) attempted but failed to negotiate 
access with GoA and UNITA separately (Richardson 2000). For the international NGOs that 
had just started rehabilitation programmes, the re-ignited conflict meant that many withdrew 
or had to switch gears to emergency relief, for which they were ill prepared. The SRPA was 
replaced by an emergency programme, this time under the coordination of the DHA (which 
became OCHA in 1997). The first consolidated appeal for Angola was launched in May 1993 
and the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UCAH) was created by DHA, to 
take the lead in the coordination of emergency operations and negotiation of humanitarian 
access with the warring parties. UCAH retained this mandate throughout the 1990s and until 
the end of the post-war emergency. Many argue that UCAH’s role was positive “…at a time 
when there was no sign of an imminent ceasefire and humanitarian conditions were 
deteriorating“ (Paulo 2004). However, this perception also changed as the approach of ‘peace 
corridors’ as had been stipulated under the SRPA relief programme came under increasing 
scrutiny as both parties to the conflict were seen to be using aid as a bargaining tool for 
meeting their political ends. Access to humanitarian aid had become even more strategically 
important to both sides with the end of the cold war and consequent removal of external 
support (Lanzer 1996, Richardson 2000, Ostheimer 2000). Both parties requested 
humanitarian assistance and UNITA even reorganised itself to be able to receive aid as it was 
running out of resources and needed to contest the new legitimacy gained by the GoA since 
the ruling MPLA had won the elections (Duffield 1994). At the same time the GoA was 
presenting donors with exaggerated numbers in terms of humanitarian needs, enabling them 
to continue financing military means instead (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, S191).  
Furthermore, humanitarian aid became increasingly integrated with the political and 
military UN operations as both were placed under the SRSG, which further contributed to the  
UN’s general loss of credibility and growing unpopularity towards the end of the 1990s 
(Richardson 2000). The integration of humanitarian aid into the dynamics of conflict was 
further reflected in the fact that after 1998, as the Lusaka process came to a standstill, UNITA 
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areas were cut off from aid and were to remain inaccessible until the end of the war in 2002. 
This was a political decision both at the level of UNITA, but also by the UN which had at 
that point abandoned its mandate to negotiate peace and stopped attempts to deliver 
humanitarian aid to UNITA areas (Messiant 2004). Several areas under government control 
were also isolated from aid, whilst humanitarian needs continued to mount. These needs 
arose to a large extent due to the scorched earth policies employed by the belligerents, in 
which civilian, mostly rural, populations were forcibly removed from their homes to prevent 
them from providing food and support to enemy troops. 
 
 
2002-now: diminishing humanitarian presence 
With the end of the war in 2002, the opening up of newly accessible areas revealed a new 
peak in humanitarian needs and in the response by the humanitarian community. All major 
aid agencies present in Angola at that time were involved in providing assistance to the 
displaced populations, arriving by the thousands from the bush to IDP camps or quartering 
areas of ex-UNITA soldiers. UNHCR in turn, supported the return of thousands of refugees 
from neighbouring countries. The GoA also launched widespread relief operations through 
MINARS, although supplies were often irregular and programmes short-lived. Thereafter, the 
humanitarian effort centred on the processes of returning and reintegrating people into their 
areas of origin, supporting the recovery of livelihoods and the (re)building of social service 
infrastructure. Although this process is still on-going and agricultural recovery programmes 
remain the focus of many international and national NGOs’ interventions at community level, 
by 2005 the government declared that all people had been resettled, reintegrated or returned 
to their areas of origin (IDMC 2007).  
This marked a period in which many of the international aid agencies were re-
assessing their presence in Angola, or redefining their activities to fit the changing 
circumstances in which development thinking evidently became increasingly appropriate. 
This transition process was not smooth and uniform; due to better access and favourable 
climatic conditions, one geographical area was more ready for development interventions 
relatively early, whereas in other places emergency aid was still called for as people continue 
to struggle to meet their daily food needs. This demanded flexibility and an extensive 
rethinking of agencies’ mandate, funding modalities, capacities and activities. Organisations 
working in Angola have had to be flexible in their approaches due to the ever-changing 
nature of the conflict, the successive signing and breaking of peace agreements, and relative 
periods of stability and increased access.  
The potential for lasting interventions by the aid community to significantly improve 
the future of Angolans, has furthermore been severely affected by a dramatic reduction in 
donor funds and in the number of aid organisations. This withdrawal of aid which has 
characterised the arena since 2005 comes from the fact that Angola is perceived as a wealthy 
country, mainly because of its oil, capable of funding its own reconstruction. Reduced funds 
have not just affected international agencies, but have also left Angolan NGOs and local 
churches struggling to survive, which would have been best positioned to support local 
development initiatives and broader democratisation processes. The GoA in the meantime has 
been able to finance its national reconstruction efforts through oil revenues and credit loans, 
chiefly from China, which nonetheless fall short of addressing the local needs and ensuring 
an equitable distribution of its benefits. The effects of the global financial crisis have already 
been felt in the GoA´s annual budget through significant cuts and will undoubtedly also be 
reflected in the global reduction of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the 
consequences of which for Angola´s population remains to be seen.  
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The problematic nature and history of aid in Angola has been shaped by the abuse by political 
actors to use aid as an instrument to further the war economy and politics. On the other hand, 
the way the international community defined and consequently dealt with the humanitarian 
crisis contributed to a further politicization of aid in Angola.  
 Organisations are drawn into global politics as was shown by the case of MSF´s 
choices of intervention in UNITA areas. They also become enmeshed into local politics and 
adjust their practices accordingly, as is exemplified by the fact that the ICRC had to work 
with two Angolan Red Crosses, a practice that is not normally permitted under the 
organisation’s regulations (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). On the other hand, warring factions 
adapt their organisations and employ different mechanisms to make themselves eligible to 
receiving aid, UNITA by creating structures parallel to those of government and the GoA by 
inflating beneficiary numbers and needs. Together with the blatant manipulation of aid 
supplies by both belligerents that came with the negotiation of peace corridors, these make up 
the most common ways in which aid became politicised.  
However, we argue that the very policies and practices of the international community 
were in themselves playing into the politics of conflict, by the way the crisis and responses 
were defined. Duffield (1994b) demonstrates for the case of the UN’s humanitarian role from 
the late 1980s till the end of 1993, how this politicisation was done. The UN-led SRPA 
presented the Angolan crisis primarily as a situation of drought whilst promoting its potential 
for peace-making. Then in the 1993 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), the crisis was 
defined as one of physical destruction, dislocation and material shortages which could be 
normalised with emergency aid, whilst a parallel process was drawing humanitarian and 
political interventions closer by putting them under the same management structure. Through 
a process of depoliticizing the humanitarian situation in Angola, it actually created space for 
setting up an aid structure that included political interventions.  Furthermore, aid delivery was 
influenced by the interests of external actors such as the US’ pressure to extend the UN effort 
to UNITA areas. In present day Angola, aid is being shaped by economic interests, as 
evidenced for instance, by a recent visit of the new US Secretary of State to the country to 
establish closer economic ties and support for reconstruction. Increasingly such support 
involves the private sector, through collaborations particularly between oil companies and the 
US Agency of International Development (USAID) (Pleming and Almeida 2009). 
 
 
The humanitarian arena in Huíla  
 
As introduced in chapter 2, this research approached the study of humanitarian aid by 
conceptualizing it as an arena, which enables understanding of how aid actors shape the 
outcomes of aid through their own actions, agency and negotiation (Hilhorst and Jansen 
2010, Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). Using this framework requires analysing the everyday 
practices and policies of all relevant humanitarian stakeholders and the interfaces between 
them, including those actors that might not be labelled as humanitarian per se but which still 
play fundamental roles in shaping the outcomes of aid (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). This 
section of the chapter identifies the variety of actors that took part in the humanitarian arena 
during the emergency and post-conflict period in Huíla. It categorizes these actors, and shows 
how aid became part of everyday life and survival in the province. 
 
 
Church organizations 
There has been a great diversity in the types of organizations implementing aid programmes 
in the province. Among the first and constant aid providers were the churches and church-
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based organizations. Churches provided social and material support to the affected population 
throughout the different stages of conflict and in the most isolated of areas. 
The predominant image of the relationship between religion and the colonial state in 
Angola was that the Catholic Church was considered an ally to the colonial policies of the 
Portuguese, whereas the protestant missionaries were mistrusted and considered to be too 
liberal, therefore threatening Portuguese colonial expansion (Péclard 1998). Although the 
Portuguese colonial rulers in the past placed great emphasis on the linkage with the Catholic 
Church which had permitted it to be present in all areas of the Angola territory, other 
churches, through missionary activities were gradually finding spaces for themselves in 
various parts of the country. In the pre-independence era Angola’s protestant or evangelical 
churches had agreed to divide their respective mission areas in the country, more or less in 
the following way: 
 
Figure 9: Historical distribution of churches in Angola 
Church Region 
Methodists North of Angola 
IECA Central Angola 
Pentecostal North-Central Angola 
União Southwest Angola 
IESA West-Central Angola 
Lutheran South of Angola 
 
Catholic mission posts could be found throughout the country, and especially Portuguese 
missionaries were invited by the Portuguese colonial state, as they could assist the process of 
‘Portugalisation’ of the local population (Péclard 1998, 168-169). However, as insufficient 
Portuguese missionaries could be found to fill the positions at the Angolan mission posts, 
missionaries had to be drawn from other European countries even though this compromised 
the colonial state’s objective of ‘Portugalisation’(ibid). In Huíla one Dutch Spiritan 
missionary, Father Piet Pubben, stayed at mission posts in Chicomba, Chipindo and Caconda 
from 1961 until 1999. His presence during the war sometimes ensured that people living in 
these areas were able to continue agricultural production, as he would join them in the fields 
ensuring protection against attacks from troops. The Spiritans, just like the humanitarian 
agencies, needed to take a very clear neutral position with respect to the conflicting parties in 
order to be able to continue their work. But as father Pubben said: “The MPLA and UNITA 
did not understand the concept of neutrality, they always forced you to choose. To which I 
always replied: I’m a foreigner and my bishop does not want me to choose”.76 Catholic 
missions have played and continue to play a strong role in providing education and health 
services. Caritas, the catholic relief organization that was established in 1961 in Angola, had 
access to both MPLA and UNITA areas due to the strong and widespread influence of 
Catholicism in Angola. However, Cardinal Alexandre do Nascimento, former Secretary-
General of Caritas Angola, stated that they tried to restrict the distribution of aid to children 
in UNITA areas. He strongly disagreed with UNITA’s war strategies, specifically their 
practice of placing landmines in agricultural fields to prevent agricultural production from 
taking place
77
. 
Most evangelical churches traditionally had a strong link with rural areas, and this has 
continued to this day. The IESA church was founded in Caluquembe by the Swiss missionary 
Helí Chatelain in 1897. During the war in Angola, IESA had partnerships with international 
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 Interview with Father Piet Pubben, Gemert, The Netherlands, 13 November 2007. 
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 Interview with Cardinal Alexandre do Nascimento, Lubango, 3 November 2008. 
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organizations, like WFP, in order to distribute food to the population. IESA handed out meals 
in their churches in Lubango as well when access to the rural communities became too 
difficult. During the war they saw their role as twofold: “IESA’s practice of giving relief aid 
is that it remains intertwined with handing out spiritual aid. There is a fundamental difference 
in Christian and other aid. We do material activities, but we also hand out bibles next to seeds 
and food. The bible will give people spiritual food”.78 However, IESA’s role in conflict and 
aid became increasingly compromised in the 1990s, when some IESA’s leadership in 
Caluquembe openly supported UNITA and asked the local population to do the same and 
vote for Savimbi in the 1992 parliamentary elections. This has affected IESA’s image and 
made partnerships with other aid organizations difficult (Schot 2009).  
Next to aid being distributed through the head offices of these churches, nearly all 
local villages had church and/or missionary representations. These rural based churches 
played significant roles in aid, not only focusing on material but also social spheres, and 
creating a sense of continuity in people’s daily lives. In many ways churches and 
missionaries ensured protection of the population affected by the conflict. Missionaries were 
at the same time not exempt from attacks themselves, they too were killed or forced to walk 
great distances through the Angolan territory with the troops.  
In the current process of transition many churches are struggling to redefine their role 
in material and social assistance. Although they have, for many years, played a major role in 
providing basic relief to the affected population, they now try to find new roles for 
themselves in the future, next to their spiritual role. Not every church organisation is 
equipped or willing to find a place in the development arena. Caritas continues to redefine its 
mandate in practice by following approaches based on strengthening food security. The 
Angolan Catholic Church itself sees its strength and qualities in its health and education 
projects. The health posts that they have built or rehabilitated over the years have often been 
taken over by the Angolan state. 
Churches continue to play important roles in rural villages in post-conflict Angola. 
Data from the surveys conducted in the two municipalities shows that only 9 of the 58 
households were not connected to a church in their village. Households that would face 
difficulties due to for instance illness of one of their members would often get assistance in 
the form of goods or agricultural labour from the church members in their villages. In 
situations where social networks and families have become disrupted due to conflict and 
displacement, as in the case of Angola, churches usually offer important networks for mutual 
assistance, support and aid within villages.  
 
 
State institutions 
The immediate post-independence Angolan state was characterized as a one-party socialist 
regime which quickly found itself amidst an intense civil war to which it responded with 
authoritarian rule and centralization of core services (Vidal 2006b, 65). Although in the early 
post-independence years the Angolan state was engaged in aiding refugee populations from 
Namibia and Zaire, they soon had to turn their attention and finances to the war raging in 
their own country and the first signs of neglect of their own social services became apparent. 
Therefore, in 1977 and 1978 the Angolan government already had to request foreign 
assistance to meet the deteriorating humanitarian situation in their country. Core state 
functions and social service delivery by the state often suffer immensely by lack of 
accountability and priority when states are themselves in the middle of conflict and complex 
emergencies (Ostheimer 2000). This certainly seems to have happened to the Angolan state 
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which increasingly abandoned social service delivery for which international aid agencies 
became responsible (Christoplos 1998). Also, coordination of humanitarian aid during the 
1990s was primarily left in the hands of the UN, largely through UCAH. After 2002 post-
conflict reconstruction was high on the agenda of the state, although this has centred mostly 
on rebuilding infrastructure in Luanda and some other urban areas. 
The main state institutions in the province of Huíla which are responsible for the 
coordination and implementation of aid are MINARS and MINADER. MINARS holds some 
of the core humanitarian functions, through the departments of IRSEM and more specifically 
through UTCAH (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid). In Huíla, during 
the 1980s, MINARS would organize food aid distribution, coming from the port of Namibe. 
When the food shipments arrived MINARS was responsible for the administration and 
control, whereas WFP would do the financial auditing. When the influence of the UN 
expanded in Angola with the creation of UCAH as the main humanitarian coordination unit 
in 1993, the WFP started to obtain a more dominant role in the aid process, after which 
MINARS involvement was more reduced to the distribution of aid together with NGOs. 
MINARS had very little funds, and therefore lacked the means of transportation for the 
distribution of aid. Nowadays, the involvement of MINARS in aid processes varies per 
locality. Whereas it hasn’t played significant roles in Caluquembe, in aid interventions or 
coordination of NGOs as this has mostly been run by the local EDA, in Chibia it has had a 
stronger influence. Food aid was still distributed by MINARS at the time of the fieldwork to 
three Khoi-San villages in the municipality. Also, many inhabitants of Chibia remembered 
having received aid by MINARS during the war.   
In 1998/1999 UTCAH offices were opened in all 18 provinces in the country with 
help from OCHA. Its aim was to control, coordinate, and evaluate all existing humanitarian 
programmes in the respective provinces. In Huíla, the role of UTCAH was relatively small, 
consisting mostly of administrative functions, maintaining an overview of the activities of 
NGOs in the province and assisting in visa procedures for expatriate staff of NGOs working 
in the province. Most NGO’s would work directly through the Provincial Director of 
MINARS instead, as they found it to be more effective. NGOs in Huíla would also sign 
protocols with MINARS to ensure government approval for their aid programmes (Schot 
2009).  
After achieving independence the GoA’s agricultural policy was guided by its overall 
focus on a state controlled-economy, with a primary focus on creating big farms under state 
ownership. Also, the agricultural sectors for fertilizers, marketing, machinery and seeds were 
under state control during the war. The institutions created to provide these agricultural 
services did not function well and have increasingly been abandoned (Kyle 2005). 
MINADER’s role, with the expansion of aid agencies programmes focusing on agricultural 
production, has become more prominent in recent years. In Huíla province it had official 
linkages with several international organisations, also sharing office space. On municipal 
level MINADER is most visibly represented through the EDA offices which aim to provide 
extension services in the rural areas.  Their involvement in development processes and 
interaction with humanitarian efforts depended very much on personal vision and 
relationships, and the availability of resources. In the case of the municipality of Caluquembe 
some considerable efforts were done by the local EDA coordinator to cooperate with NGOs, 
in order to share knowledge and activities as well as maintain an overview of which projects 
were implemented in which location. An organisational set-up was made with several 
agencies in the area in which some NGO staff members would work at the EDA in 
Caluquembe part-time. In contrast, the EDA in Chibia did not have such schemes, or 
knowledge of the few NGOs that did projects in the Chibia region. After the war had ended, 
agricultural policies of the state focused mainly on road rehabilitation to facilitate the 
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transport of produce from the rural areas. Furthermore, a large part of the investments of 
MINADER were assigned to large-scale mechanized agriculture and not to the smallholder 
farmers (Kyle 2005) The agricultural policy of the Angolan state that favours large-scale 
irrigation schemes to smallholder development is also demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis on Chibia where smallholder farmers had to make way for the implementation of a 
large-scale irrigation project.   
Angolan state institutions initial agricultural policies and social services from a 
socialist perspective were quickly undermined with the outbreak of the post-independence 
civil war. In Huíla, the little state funding that was available for institutions such as MINARS 
had to be reverted to food aid distributions and resulted in a weakening of attention to social 
services. With the arrival of the UN and international agencies these state roles were 
increasingly taken over by external actors. In the post-conflict period these state agencies 
regained some influence. For instance, aid programmes that have an agricultural component 
are increasingly integrated with MINADER’s local institutions. The stronger engagement 
with the state that comes with adopting rehabilitation and development approaches is visible 
in Huíla through for instance the increased cooperation between the EDA and aid agencies.    
 
 
Angolan NGOs 
With the political transformation from socialism towards a multiparty democracy taking 
place in Angola, a revision of the constitution was made in 1991, allowing for the emergence 
of local civil society. Directly after, many solidarity groups and organizations were formed or 
professionalized, that became involved in reconstruction and development projects as made 
possible by the Bicesse peace accords of 1991 (Vidal 2009). When the war reignited after the 
1992 elections, most of these organizations switched to emergency relief, often acting as a 
distribution counterpart to the international agencies. Angolan NGOs have had to switch 
between relief and development mandates ever since, and they often had more organizational 
flexibility to do so as the more established international agencies.  
Some of the Angolan organisations remained working in the realm of relief, others 
tried to maintain a development approach, even though the renewed conflict made access 
more difficult. These organisations had been able to identify thematic and geographical areas 
where they would be able to start development oriented projects, irrespective of the conflict 
or its effects. Organizations like ADRA, founded in 1990, started implementing projects 
which included participatory approaches, and a focus on community development instead of 
emergency relief (Pacheco 2002). The organization had partly been formed by ex-
government staff from the agricultural extension services, which had increasingly ceased to 
function due to the war (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). ADRA had also started programmes in 
Huíla province, and in the case of Caluquembe this meant suspending their project when the 
conflict intensified there, only to come back again to the same villages when peace accords 
made a return to the area possible. The fact that after 1990 conflict and peaceful periods 
succeeded each other rapidly, made it difficult to get continuity in these development oriented 
programmes especially in the rural areas. Many of the development organizations therefore 
worked mainly in urban or peri-urban areas, and very often focused specifically on the city of 
Luanda (Pacheco 2002).  
Angolan NGOs became increasingly vocal during the mid-1990s about the 
government’s lack of responsibility in addressing issues of poverty and services in the 
country. It led to what Vidal (2009) calls a parallel civil society in which primarily the 
president and his wife created aid organizations, in particular financed by oil companies, to 
do social projects in the country. This parallel civil society continued and increased after the 
war with the co-option of organizations through political and financial manipulation. The 
154 
 
organizations that were not co-opted struggled and still struggle to find space, support from 
relevant government institutions and funding to continue operating (Vidal 2009). Their 
existence and continuation is further threatened by the diminishing donor funds that are 
available for aid programmes in Angola. 
 
 
International NGOs 
MSF, ICRC and a few other international humanitarian agencies had already been present in 
the country for a longer time. MSF started working in Angola in 1983, ICRC from 1975 
onwards. ICRC had an office in Lubango from 1982 from where food aid arriving in the ports 
of Namibe and Benguela would be distributed to other provinces, including the heavily 
affected provinces of Huambo and Kuito. At the end of the 1980s the Lubango office only 
had local staff working there, and its office was a branch of the ICRC sub-delegation in 
Lobito. In 1989 ICRC was the only organization that worked in Cunene after the South-
African army left, and logistics were arranged through the office in Lubango. At that time 
they implemented health, water and sanitation projects.   
Many (international) aid organizations during the war had their offices in Lubango 
(often next to their head offices in Luanda). Lubango was considered a stable base for 
agencies from which to implement their programmes. Unlike cities such as Kuito and 
Huambo, Lubango never came under attack, leaving the city’s infrastructure relatively intact. 
Due to the fact that Lubango was considered safe, and its vicinity to the port of Namibe, 
humanitarian goods could be distributed to the South of Angola (provinces of Cunene, 
Cuando Cubango, Namibe and Huíla).  
Other humanitarian organisations which were operational in Huíla, after the political 
shifts at the end of the 1980s opened up space for national and international agencies, were 
amongst others Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Action Against Hunger (ACF), ZOA 
refugee care. These organisations started with the distribution of relief, and after 2002 
incorporated rehabilitation and development approaches by focusing on food security and 
increasing agricultural production in those regions where they had assisted the resettlement 
process of IDPs. ICRC’s post-conflict programme consisted mainly of their Tracing 
Programme: reuniting family members that had become separated due to the war. In 2008 
ICRC closed its Lubango office, and in 2009 withdrew completely from Angola. Since the 
war ended MSF had implemented health and sanitation projects, with an additional focus on 
HIV/Aids. In 2007 MSF withdrew completely from Angola, based on MSF’s consideration 
that the Angolan government should be fully capable of providing health services itself, 
financed by the oil and diamond production
79
.  
Most of these organisations have closed their offices in Lubango, as well as their 
Luanda office if they had one. In more recent years at least two international agencies 
(Intersos and Handicap International) actually decided to move their country offices to 
Lubango because of better living conditions and rental prices as compared to Luanda. One 
international agency said that they felt increasingly uncomfortable to account to their donors 
and public that they were paying 6000 US Dollars per month for office space in Luanda 
alone, especially when comparing the costs to the overall budget they had for the programme 
they were implementing in Angola. 
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 Interview with David Hannion, MSF-CH coordinator, Lubango, 09 February 2007.  
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UN organizations 
Different socio-political events at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, made it 
possible for the UN to obtain an important presence in the country.  The increased role of the 
UN in Angola coincided with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country and the 
arrival of the first UNAVEM mission to Angola. At that time the conflict between UNITA 
and MPLA was affecting Huíla province more severely than before, specifically in the 
northern and eastern parts of the province. This intensified fighting coincided with a drought 
and consequent famine in the agricultural season of 1988/1989. These droughts and famines 
were common, especially in the dry southern part of the province, but in this particularly 
changing political context also led to a negotiation process on humanitarian access to the 
affected population. As elaborated in the first section of this chapter, the SRPA was the 
outcome of this negotiation and included four ‘peace corridors’, one of which stretched from 
Lubango to Caconda, via Caluquembe (Richardson 2000). It made it possible for WFP to 
start distributing food not only to the war-affected but also specifically to the drought- 
affected population in the north-eastern part of Huíla province. The strongest presence of UN 
organizations in Huíla consisted of the WFP, IOM, Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), UNICEF, UNDP, and OCHA. OCHA’s role in Angola was especially far-reaching: 
starting in 1993 as UCAH, its mission was to provide security information as well as much 
needed facilitation of humanitarian coordination to the NGOs that were operational in Angola 
(Ostheimer 2000). It was also deemed, by international NGO staff working in Lubango at the 
time, to have a political role in addressing the detrimental scorched earth tactics that the GoA 
was using against UNITA areas at a certain point in time. Over the years many of the 
coordination tasks of OCHA were taken over by the WFP which had gained a prominent role 
in the Angolan humanitarian community (Ostheimer 2000). The WFP set up many 
partnerships with both local and international NGOs so as to be able to distribute food 
through those partners. At the same time OCHA was trying to involve the GoA in taking up 
more responsibilities in the humanitarian coordination, by for instance assisting the GoA in 
creating the UTCAH department. A UN staff member working in Huíla commented that 
OCHA’s attempts to engage the government institutions went far from smoothly. He 
observed that OCHA lacked commitment when taking such leadership and said that it should 
have handed over the coordination responsibility much earlier, to avoid the institutional 
dependence that was created as government institutions had become accustomed to OCHA’s 
leading and coordinating role over so many years.     
OCHA, IOM and WFP do not have an operational presence in Huíla province 
anymore, which reflects the development orientation in UN’s programming in Huíla. The 
strongest UN presence in Huíla at this moment is through FAO and UNICEF. FAO’s project 
has a focus on land rights and providing land titles to rural populations, in cooperation with 
the provincial Ministry for Agriculture, MINADER. UNICEF is also taking a more 
developmental approach through their “Revitalization Project” which focuses on revitalizing 
basic services related to child health and education in cooperation with municipal 
administrations in the province. Both UNICEF and FAO are trying to engage state 
institutions as much as possible in their approaches. Regarding their more development 
oriented mandates, they could continue to be operational in Angola for some more years. At 
the same time, natural hazards, consequent cholera outbreaks, and high malnutrition rates 
amongst children forces especially an agency such as UNICEF to occasionally revert to relief 
programming. 
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Interface between aid givers and aid beneficiaries 
When investigating aid by conceptualising it as an arena, one’s attention is drawn to the 
variety of actors that shape aid in practice. Often however, local people are overlooked as 
actors in aid processes but rather portrayed as passive ‘recipients’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of aid 
(Hilhorst and Jansen 2010, Harvey and Lind 2005). In this section I want to analyse aid at the 
interface to highlight two specific issues that emerged in the everyday interactions between 
aid givers and aid beneficiaries. First of all, the quality of aid is not only assessed by 
organizational and donor evaluations, but by the people that receive it. Organizational labels 
in practice are less important than the actual qualities of the items that are received, and 
undergo processes of local experimentation.  Secondly, by defining negotiation processes at 
the interface between aid givers labelling aid recipients as signs of dependency syndrome, 
people’s agency is denied, interpreted as negative, and leads to non-intervention on the side 
of the aid givers. I argue in this section that what might be labelled as dependency syndrome 
is actually a sign of active negotiation and participation in the aid process.  
 
Assessing the quality of aid 
During the Angolan conflict people employed a multitude of survival mechanisms for 
themselves and their household members. Aid constituted one of these survival mechanisms. 
As food aid was becoming increasingly available during the 1990s, it was distributed by 
NGOs that came in all sorts of shapes, carrying a variety of labels, like: catholic, 
humanitarian, local, etc. This research found that aid beneficiaries actively assessed the 
quality of one organization compared to another, but that organizational labels had little 
effect on that assessment. I argue that differences between for instance the humanitarian and 
the developmental label, or religious and non-religious hardly play a role in people’s 
perceptions. In the village of Cue I the quality of aid amongst the different aid providers 
(WFP, ZOA, Caritas and Agromarket) was judged by the amount and quality of goods that 
had been provided, not by organizational identity or specific principled approach. Maize was 
often handed out as food aid by various organizations, and people would sometimes try 
planting it. More specifically, the different types of seeds that were handed out by the various 
NGOs came under careful scrutiny by the local farmers, who assessed the differences in 
characteristics, production and commercial viability. One inhabitant of the village of Cue 1 
assessed the quality of NGO interventions as follows. “I think that from all the NGOs ZOA 
was the best, because they gave the most goods. ZOA gave maize as food aid. The maize that 
they gave was also suitable for sowing, but wasn’t as tasty as our own maize. The maize that 
WFP handed out was not suitable for production, it was only suitable for consumption”80.  
The process of seed quality assessment is further demonstrated in the following 
encounter in the village of Cue 1: 
 
“Mr. Miapia and Mr. Abel, two farmers from Cue 1 show me three different maize 
cobs: 1. red seed, 2. white seed, and 3. yellow seed. They explain that they historically 
used these maize varieties in Cue 1, but that there are a lot differences amongst them.  
 
1. Regional maize, given by Agromarket, has more vitamins, easy to make fuba 
(maize flour) with, is more nutritious, and is worth 15 kwanza per kilo of seeds. 
2. Popular maize, given by ZOA and Caritas, has the highest market price, 20 kwanza 
per kilo of seeds. 
3. Canini, given by ZOA, has little flour, you need a mill to turn it into flour, 15 
kwanza per kilo of seeds. 
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 Interview in Cue 1, 26 January 2008. 
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Varieties 2 and 3 only take 3 months to grow, which makes them popular for quick 
production. Varieties 1 and 3 you can grow together in one field, but the white, 
popular, variety has to be grown separately. When the varieties mix they destroy each 
other.  
 
They tell me that some time ago a man visited the village and asked the local farmers 
to concentrate on producing variety 1, red maize. The man indicated that a new 
factory had opened in Lubango which would be grinding and selling fuba. If he had 
not visited the village with that message they would have only produced 2 and 3. 
Unfortunately, the man had not been back to collect harvest or make any further 
arrangements at the time of the fieldwork.
81” 
 
In the case of this village, ZOA was assessed to be the best NGO because of the different 
varieties of maize provided, and the fact that their maize were producing quickly, compared 
to the other seeds. They had tried sowing the seeds that WFP had handed out, but this failed 
as they were meant for consumption only. Assessing the quality of aid organizations is more 
linked to the type and amount of aid, than organizational labels or approaches. The example 
above also shows that within seeds and tools programmes, difference in quality is assessed, 
and people actively experiment with the available seeds, and respond to commercialisation 
opportunities by growing different varieties. This is what Sperling (2002, 332) calls internal 
evaluation of seed aid. She shows how farmers in Kenya evaluated the seed aid they had 
received, how different varieties of maize were assessed by their properties, and how seed aid 
would also become a form of local currency, in which it was traded for items such as salt and 
oil. Sperling (2002) also notes how, in some instances, seed aid was given by different 
agencies at the same time, making it difficult for farmers to distinguish amongst the different 
agencies rationales and goals for the delivery of seed.  
  
Dependency syndrome 
People did not sit around and wait for outsiders to intervene. They survived throughout most 
of the war relying on themselves, their families and occasionally on the inhabitants of the 
places they fled to. Aid only started playing a role in the last decade of the war, and became 
one of many livelihood strategies that people deployed to cope with crisis. And when aid was 
made available they themselves actively participated in negotiating what aid they needed, 
although staff of aid organisations saw this differently. During interviews with staff from two 
local NGOs, an international development NGO, and a UN agency, they referred to people in 
rural areas as suffering from a “dependency syndrome” to indicate why community 
development had not been taking place yet after years of peace and interventions aimed at the 
reconstruction of livelihoods.  
The term “dependency syndrome” was first described by Harrell-Bond (1986) as a 
blanket term used by fieldworkers to explain the undesirable social behaviour demonstrated 
by refugee populations as a result of receiving relief aid over prolonged periods of time. 
Dependency syndrome or mentality was considered as a symptom whereby people expected 
continued assistance because their initiative had been undermined and they had become 
passive due to the provision of aid (Harvey and Lind 2005). The existence of such a 
syndrome has been proven to be a myth based on various research and publications, yet it 
continues to be linked to humanitarian aid as one of its most destructive effects on local 
people (Kibreab 1993, Harvey and Lind 2005).  
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It has been argued that prolonged humanitarian assistance in Angola has caused 
dependency, passivity and has damaged the survival mechanisms of the local population and 
community institutions (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). During interviews with staff of 
aid agencies, dependency syndrome was also mentioned most often when asked about the 
possible negative impact of humanitarian aid. One NGO staff also made reference to specific 
talks they had with village elders in order to “discuss and break this cycle of dependency and 
make clear that they (the community members) have to do it themselves now”. The fact that 
people would indicate that they needed pots and pans, other essential food and non-food 
items, different seeds, or livestock would be interpreted as a sign of dependency syndrome, 
and not as a statement of need. Even though people are now in the process of producing 
enough food to feed themselves and their families, their statement of not having clothes, pans 
or livestock was still seen as a sign that people were sitting by idly and waiting for hand outs 
without actively participating in their own development process. On the contrary, stating that 
livestock and different seeds were needed to lift their livelihood above subsistence level is 
more an indication that people wanted to have the opportunity to diversify and intensify their 
agricultural livelihoods. 
The “dependency syndrome” discourse is very present amongst NGO staff in Angola, 
without questioning what it really entails. When a discourse becomes so dominant, it is 
viewed as reality instead of an actor’s interpretation (Hilhorst 2003). This then also 
influences decision-making on consequent action. By viewing the expression of certain needs 
by beneficiaries as a sign of dependency syndrome, the formulated needs can therefore be 
ignored. And following this logic, any intervention addressing that need would then even be 
counterproductive as it would reinforce the dependency syndrome.  
 
These examples at the interface between aid givers and aid recipients allows us to see the 
differences in power, in which dependency syndrome discourse by aid givers can deny 
people’s access to aid in the future. Portraying dependency syndrome as the outcome of relief 
aid not only denies the actual causes of the situation people are in, but also overlooks the 
manifold ways in which people actively engage in processes of aid. An expression of need is 
not a sign of dependency syndrome, but rather participation in the aid process, as people are 
contributing their views on which strategies are needed to improve their lives and livelihoods.  
 
 
The importance of neutrality in everyday humanitarian practice 
 
Humanitarian agencies often distinguish themselves from development agencies in their 
adherence to humanitarian principles, such as neutrality and impartiality. These principles 
assist agencies in walking the precarious path between securing access to the beneficiaries 
and sustaining a pragmatic interaction with the military players in the conflict. Humanitarian 
practice is said to be shaped by principles, but these principles in turn are also further 
reshaped by the people that interpret them and put them into practice (Hilhorst and 
Schmiemann 2002). Principles are therefore not static, their abstract meaning is concretised 
in practice by the people that have to work with them as guidelines for action (Hilhorst and 
Schmiemann 2002, Weiss and Collins 2000). In this section I want to highlight the principle 
of neutrality, one of the most debated principles and to a certain extent abandoned, realizing 
that humanitarian aid is never completely neutral. However, neutrality is still considered an 
organizational principle which should guide certain operational standards, and ensure a 
certain degree of distance between aid organisations and belligerents in complex political 
emergencies. 
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Neutrality as access 
Leader (2000) asserts that principles go through a process of continuous re-assessment in 
order to understand how they gain meaning in practice. In this section I give an example of 
this process for the principle of neutrality.  
During interviews with staff of aid organisations such as Caritas, ACF and ZOA in 
Huíla about their policy and practice, very little mention was made of how humanitarian 
principles guided or shaped their work. The reference that was made to humanitarian 
principles was often of a very operational kind, pertaining to how the principle of neutrality 
can be linked to safety and non-interference. The following description of an event in 2008 is 
an example of this type of NGO discourse on principles and the practical translation and 
implementation of them by a Caritas staff member: 
 
“On our way to Caluquembe we came across a motorcycle parked at the roadside, 
with two men standing beside it. One of the men is wearing a military uniform. They 
motion to JB, a staff member of Caritas in Huíla, that he should stop.  JB stops the 
car, and the man in the military uniform tells him that the motorcycle broke down and 
asks if he could get a ride with JB. JB hardly waits for the soldier to finish his 
sentence and bluntly replies “vamos”. The soldier jumps in the back and I asked JB if 
Caritas has any rules pertaining to aiding militaries with transport. JB told me that 
during the war he had attended courses organized by OCHA, concerning safety of 
staff, safety of the offices, and safety on the roads. One of the aspects of that 
particular course was that NGOs should beware of being associated with either one of 
the troops, and therefore not transport them in agency cars. Caritas had also 
formulated organizational rules pertaining to those situations at the time. JB mentions 
that even though you were not allowed to give soldiers a ride, they in turn would still 
come and help you out when you would get stuck at the road with a broken down car. 
After the war ended Caritas staff became much more flexible with those rules, as, in 
JB’s words: ‘you only have one army now anyway’.” 
 
This example shows that for staff operating under these circumstances, non-interference with 
military parties was interpreted flexibly. They would not openly drive around with militaries 
during the war, as it would compromise the organizations neutrality, making aid distribution 
to certain areas impossible, as well as endangering their own safety from attacks by the 
opposite party. However, if their ability to drive around and bring aid to the people was 
compromised, they would accept any help, even if it would mean being seen with a 
combatant from either side. This attitude is also in line with what Hilhorst and Schmiemann 
(2002) describe in their article on how humanitarian principles and policies are used in 
everyday practice, with MSF as an example. It describes how MSF volunteers would 
circumvent certain organizational policies and practices if they would stand in the way of 
getting the job done. Furthermore, the example above also shows the extent to which some 
NGOs went to have access to the affected population. The UN system in Angola had set up 
strict rules for their own staff regarding the areas where they could or could not operate. 
Angolan NGOs were more flexible with these rules, which ensured that they had greater 
access to the affected population than the international organizations. This in turn also 
ensured future access for international organizations easier. For example, when Caritas 
Angola decided to open a programme in Camucuio, the access road was considered by the 
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UN as a ‘red road’, indicating the presence of landmines and therefore not accessible.82 
However, once Caritas made use of the road and after subsequent inspection the road was 
opened for all traffic. Safety issues like these continued playing a role after the emergency 
period ended. Occasionally, access to the affected population was reversed because of these 
safety assessments. One international NGO closed down their base in Chipindo in 2008 after 
finding a mine on the only accessible road reaching the municipality. They immediately 
reported the incident, after which a UN organization that adhered strictly to rules regarding 
red and green roads, were forced to close down their operations in Chipindo as well. Some 
debate followed this event, whether it had been really necessary to report the presence of the 
mine in the first place at such a high level, as it was clear that the consequences would be 
detrimental for the delivery of aid to the people in Chipindo. 
 The examples above showed that even though the agencies in question were not 
explicit about principles, they approached neutrality in a very operational manner in which 
concern over access was a main driver. As such, principles only find their way in 
organizational discourse when securing access to beneficiaries is at stake. 
 
 
Neutrality in peacetime 
The history of civil war in Angola made the principles of neutrality and impartiality highly 
relevant to aid agencies wanting to operate in the country. Every aid agency needed to ensure 
its access to the affected populations, and to highlight their neutrality to be able to do so. If 
doubt was cast on the organization or particular staff members’ political affiliation it could 
seriously hamper the distribution of aid and access to villages. This continued to be of 
importance after the conflict ended in 2002. To illustrate this further I present an event from 
Caluquembe during the beginning of 2008: 
 
“With Eduardo, a facilitator of an international aid organization working in 
Caluquembe, I arranged to observe his introduction of the Farmer Field School (FFS) 
in one of my research villages, Catala. Before going to Catala I asked my research 
assistant Antonio, who came along, to please remove his MPLA cap, which he does. 
Antonio is surprised at my explanation why, and says that he has always been wearing 
it, even when he was still working as a facilitator for an international humanitarian 
organization in the region. While Antonio and I are still conducting some surveys in 
the village, Eduardo shows up and has a conversation with the soba and five other 
village elders. After about 15 minutes Eduardo starts his presentation in front of the 
people that had gathered. The presentation is short and is interrupted by a downpour 
of rain. Afterwards Eduardo tells me that when he arrived in Catala to do the 
introduction of the FFS he first had to have a conversation with the soba and some of 
the village elders. Without waiting to hear what Eduardo came to say the soba said 
“go”! The village elders interrupted the soba and told him to listen to Eduardo first. 
When Eduardo explained the FFS project and the fact that he was from an NGO that 
wanted to start a project in Catala the soba changed his mind and gave him permission 
to do the presentation. Initially he did not want to participate in the FFS programme 
nor give Eduardo the full names of the village members who would participate, 
because he thought that Eduardo was from MPLA and would write down the names 
of the village members to be used during the upcoming elections. Eduardo thinks this 
could be partly explained by the fact that he is a mulatto, who are associated as 
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landmines: red roads are inaccessible for UN agencies, yellow roads require caution, and green roads are open to 
all traffic. See for more information Angola’s landmine monitor: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/angola.html 
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belonging to MPLA. Eduardo explains the Soba’s initial resistance by saying “I know 
the soba is Unitel”. He then starts explaining that the parties are referred to as Unitel 
(UNITA) and Movicel (MPLA), which are the two competing mobile network 
suppliers in Angola.” 
 
To this day people will refer to each other along political party lines, trying to assess whether 
you belong to MPLA or UNITA. In one incident, shortly before the parliamentary elections 
of 2008, a local facilitator of an international NGO was attacked in a village in Huíla 
province where he was visiting a project. He was driving his new project motorcycle around 
in one of the communities and people physically attacked him, accusing him to belong to 
UNITA. In 1992 UNITA had been handing out new motorcycles to its supporters before the 
elections, and this association took hold of people’s minds for the next 16 years83.  
Although neutrality is supposed to be irrelevant during peacetime, access and 
implementation of aid programmes is still contingent and subject to people’s assessments of 
political affiliation. Especially for local staff of aid agencies, their political affiliation was 
continuously being assessed, making issues of neutrality still relevant in peacetime. Skin 
colour, clothing or comment would be interpreted as a sign of political affiliation, which 
could have severe consequences on the possibility of delivering aid to a particular area. The  
Weberian ideal of neutral civil servants that provide services to every citizen without 
prejudice is not believed or practised in contemporary Angolan society. Political affiliation 
clearly continues to affect service delivery performance. 
 
 
Organizational adaptation in a period of transition, the case of two Dutch NGOs  
 
This section of the chapter focuses on the so called transition period, which officially started 
in 2005 when Angola was declared to no longer be in a situation of emergency. This marked 
a start of rehabilitation and development activities, which required many agencies to reassess 
their presence, and redefine their activities. In the following sections the organizational 
adaptation of two Dutch NGOs is analysed, to see how partnerships and exit strategies were 
informed by different mandates of relief and development, the changing Angolan context and 
other factors. A comparison is made between these two NGOs which worked in Huíla 
roughly during the same period in order to understand the differences in activities between 
relief and development organizations, how they adapted to the changing circumstances in 
post-conflict Angola and how this influenced their decision-making processes with regard to 
their organizational space. The comparison is used to analyse the obstacles and difficulties of 
a LRRD process in post-conflict Angola. 
 
 
ZOA Refugee Care 
ZOA Refugee Care is a Dutch Christian relief organization that was founded in 1973 and 
focuses specifically on assistance to refugees and IDPs in situations of conflict and natural 
disasters. Their overall mission is to assist people in rebuilding their lives to a level from 
which they can ensure their own road to development. In 1998 ZOA opened an office in 
Lubango with the aim to assist the IDPs in Huíla province alone, following LRRD 
approaches. In Huíla they found a strategic partner in the IESA church, which offered them 
an office space on its premises in Lubango. Although staff numbers fluctuated enormously 
during the period in which they operated, their base always remained in Lubango and their 
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geographical focus on Huíla province. In 2004 their staff reached numbers (both local and 
expatriate) of around 250 people. They closed their office in Angola in the beginning of 
2008, with the expectation to be able to continue providing further financial assistance for 
that year to one of their partners, the Angolan organization Associação de Desenvolvimento e 
Enquadramento Social das Populações Vulneráveis (ADESPOV). 
When ZOA started their relief programme in 1998 access to the affected population 
was severely hampered because of security issues which limited their area of operations to 
Lubango and some IDPs residing in the Humpata area. These IDPs were originally from 
places like Cacula, Caluquembe and Chipindo (ZOA’s future areas of project 
implementation). In 2001 a security corridor had been opened to start the resettlement of 
displaced people. With the peace agreement in 2002 ZOA started rethinking its strategy of 
providing relief and entered the significant phase of assisting the resettlement process of IDPs 
back to their areas of origin in Huíla. They distributed agricultural kits containing seeds and 
tools, as well as oxen to assist working the land distributed through rotational groups within 
the communities, to the people that were ready to return. In the following years they defined 
their 4 thematic areas of intervention as the following: 1. Food Security, 2. Education. 3. 
Health, and 4. Income-generating Activities. Staff working in Angola found that next to food 
security, especially water and sanitation projects seemed to be ZOA’s strength and added 
value. 
ZOA’s programme in Angola received a further boost when they secured EU funding 
for their food security project called OKULIMA Project
84
, which ran from 2004 until 2007. 
The main objective of the project was to achieve food security for 6,000 people, amongst 
others by handing out agricultural inputs, creating market access for the commercialization of 
agricultural produce, creating community development groups, and capacity building of EDA 
stations as well as ADESPOV (Fret 2007). The municipalities where the project was 
eventually implemented were Cacula, Caluquembe and Caconda, all located in the north-
eastern part of the province, and localities where ZOA had previously been working 
extensively in IDP resettlement programmes. In all three municipalities ZOA had a base, 
closely linked to the local administration offices. The OKULIMA project created so called 
Community Development Committees (CDCs) and seed banks through which the project’s 
reimbursement system of seeds would run. The committees were also created with the 
intention that they would become formalized local institutions that would address further 
development issues in the localities, but according to an evaluation of the project in 2007 the 
CDCs were weakened and unable to gain legitimacy from local governance institutions (Fret 
2007).  
 
 
SNV 
SNV is a Dutch development organization which was founded in 1965 with the aim to let 
Dutch volunteers share their experiences and knowledge with people in the South. 
Throughout the years it has evolved into a professional development agency with offices 
throughout the developing world. SNV started working in Angola in 1997 with a 
developmental and capacity building approach during a time when most organizations were 
doing humanitarian work. At that time SNV chose to focus its programmes specifically on 
the provinces of Cunene, Namibe and Huila, as these areas were not so much affected by 
active conflict as other parts of Angola and local government in Huíla was considered more 
stable. From 2003 onwards SNV had two teams in Angola, one in Lubango and one in 
Luanda. Luanda was important because of the advocacy component that SNV had 
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incorporated in its strategies for Angola. SNV Lubango initially focused mostly on Water and 
Sanitation projects. Overall, their programme in Angola centred on strengthening three main 
areas: civil society, local administrations, and micro-entrepreneurs.  
SNV’s objective was to convince and enable local administrations to adopt a 
participatory approach when designing development plans for their area. SNV however 
struggled for a long time to “sell” their development approach introducing capacity building 
and good governance to the aid recipients and government institutions involved.  
 
“One of the difficulties of using a developmental approach in times of conflict is that 
the local government simply does not have the time to cooperate. Furthermore, the 
needs of people centre on food and concrete assistance, they are at that time not 
interested in capacity building. Capacity building stands a better chance when you 
also offer something concrete next to it. Five or six years ago the central government 
told SNV to stop their work, specifically regarding their emphasis on good 
governance. Currently the relationship with local government and the municipal 
administrations is much better. People understand the need for a participatory 
approach. The government’s work in the municipalities still very much centres on 
reconstruction. They are not ready yet to look at developmental approaches because 
the institutions are weak and the government lacks the strategic views that are 
necessary.”85  
 
SNV’s work to stimulate micro-entrepreneurship was never direct, but focused on training 
and advising local organizations that were active in that domain. One example of such an 
organization which received assistance by SNV was Associação das Mulheres Empresarias e 
das Negoçios da Huíla (Association of Businesswomen in Huíla AMEH). AMEH provides 
economic assistance for women as well as highlights issues of human rights and violence. It 
has created linkages with banks regarding credit, as well as with local government 
institutions. The association was founded in 1997 at a time when the overall presence of 
associations was weak in the province. When SNV started its programme in Lubango it took 
an interest in assisting AMEH with capacity building in micro enterprise, and by bringing 
them into contact with people in the Netherlands and Europe from who they could ask 
technical assistance. They also received training from SNV itself, and became an official 
partner until SNV closed in 2008.  
 
 
Partnerships 
Most international agencies in Huíla engaged in partnerships with local organizations, albeit 
very instrumentally. Partnerships are usually created to increase the effectiveness of aid and 
build local capacities (van der Haar and Hilhorst 2009). During the relief period in Angola 
the motives of international organizations to engage in partnerships with local NGOs had 
often to do with efficiency and access considerations; local organizations had better 
knowledge of local conditions and connections to local authorities, and were often able to 
reach a wider group of beneficiaries. This latter advantage enabled the aid organizations to 
circumvent the strict rules and regulations regarding access and mobility that international 
organizations had to adhere to. This allowed local partners and NGOs to take a much more 
risky approach in aid delivery. For WFP making use of local partners meant a larger 
operational range, and they relied heavily on both local and international agencies to assist 
them in food distribution. 
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Partnerships between Angolan and international NGOs have been described as 
paternalistic in nature, in that there was great dependency of national NGOs on the funding 
and aid strategies of international NGOs. Long-term partnership strategies hardly existed, 
most often not extending beyond one or two years (Pereira 2009).  Ostheimer (2000) argues 
that there were simply no adequate local counterparts for international agencies to find with 
which they could implement their programmes. My findings suggest this is not the case in 
Huíla as there has been a considerable amount of partnerships between local and international 
agencies in Lubango. These partnerships however were rather instrumentalist, paternalistic 
and often short-term, which can be attributed to the relief context as well as the issue of trust. 
As most of the Angolan NGOs were formed in a relief context or were forced to switch to 
relief soon after they started, they were deemed insufficiently equipped to apply a more 
development approach when the situation would ask for it. Despite this criticism, the 
international partners however, invested little to build capacity in development approaches 
amongst their Angolan partner NGOs. Rather, it is argued, that the capacity of Angolan 
NGOs was further weakened by attracting, or ‘stealing’, the most qualified staff of these 
organizations to come and work with the international NGOs by offering considerably higher 
salaries (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). Furthermore, the lack of trust often revolved 
around financial management of the programmes, and seemed to be based on the assumption 
that every institution in Angola is corruption-prone, even when there was no evidence of 
irregularities during the relief phase. The assumptions of corruption amongst Angolan NGOs 
also led to much insistence by the international partners on the implementation of rigid 
financial reporting mechanisms (Pereira 2009).    
SNV, together with the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development 
(ACORD), was involved in a project to enhance the capacity of local development NGOs. 
The initial aim of this programme was “strengthening theoretical and practical capacity in 
development methodology” (Santos 2001). The project was aware of imbalances between 
international and national NGOs, and the danger of paternalistic relationships to develop. 
They therefore recognized that their usual capacity building approach might be inadequate 
when looking at the diverse backgrounds these NGOs had (ibid). SNV seems to have chosen 
a unique approach, more in line with their development mandate, as compared to other 
international organizations who were still viewing partnerships with local NGOs through an 
instrumentalist lens. ZOA on the other hand started with a partnership agreement with IESA 
which included such elements as mutual assistance and agreements on an eventual handover, 
as well as the construction of a partnership board in which members of both organizations 
would overview the implementation of the partnerships (Schot 2009). However, the 
partnership with IESA turned sour. ZOA’s explanation was that the partnership ended 
because IESA was deemed to lack the capacity, quality and autonomy needed for its 
community development department (ibid). According to IESA their initial partner agreement 
wasn’t met, and the partnership and capacity building components amounted in the end to a 
mere handing over of some office material and a car.
86
 The other partnership of ZOA with 
ADESPOV, might have started out in a rather instrumentalist way with regard to relief 
distribution, but near the end of the programme in 2007 ZOA handed over its projects and 
municipal bases to ADESPOV. Capacity building training was done throughout that year, but 
financial commitments after the first transitional year could not be made. This relationship 
between ZOA and ADESPOV was not necessarily intended as a long-term partnership, but 
rather as an element in ZOA’s exit strategy from Angola. Their partnership was meant to 
ensure some continuity and follow up to ZOA’s program for which they themselves lacked 
the financial means and mandate.  
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Operational space of the two agencies: mandates and exit strategies 
After the war ended in 2002 donor funding for Angola diminished rapidly, and so did the 
presence of international aid actors. Reasons for these were said to be the prioritisation of 
other countries as well as discontent with the GoA’s limited efforts to take control over the 
reconstruction of the country despite the availability of its own substantial resources (Rafael 
Simões and Pacheco 2009).  The decision to see Angola no longer as a country in emergency, 
announced at a donor conference in 2005, had further complicated the access to funding for 
many organizations that still felt their humanitarian mandates and the existing needs of the 
population were justifying their presence in the country. Following the LRRD logic this 
would have meant a starting sign for agencies to deploy activities geared towards 
rehabilitation and development. Agencies such as Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and 
Action Against Hunger (ACF) were said to have switched their programmes to incorporate a 
focus from food security to livelihood thinking. However, linkages to development have been 
severely hampered due to the withdrawal of many agencies, mainly due to funding for 
Angola drying up. 
The humanitarian arena in the period of 2007-2008 was a place of redefining the 
future roles of aid in Angolan society. This section focuses on how aid actors were struggling 
to define the meaning of their presence in a situation that was neither emergency nor 
development, and negotiating how these new realities could be fitted within their 
organisational policy and practices. These struggles and negotiations were characterized and 
resulted in an international institutional void in which many international agencies terminated 
their aid programmes in Huíla province, and Angolan NGOs struggled to continue their 
programmes due to lack of funding possibilities. This section analyses these changing 
realities and the complex processes of decision-making regarding humanitarian interventions 
and the adaptations organizations made. It also examines the decisions that need to be made 
on where to go, what to do, when to start if at all, and when to extend or end their activities 
(Heyse 2004). Adopting LRRD approaches means including participatory processes, building 
on what activities people themselves have already developed, a switch from the individual to 
society level, and a bigger orientation towards cooperating and integrating the projects and 
programmes with local state institutions. This requires extensive organizational adaptation, 
and revisiting of mandates, partnerships and exit strategies to decide what organizational 
space there is within a new context. The most common factors mentioned in connection with 
exit strategy discussions were lack of funding, overall cost-effectiveness, administrative and 
organizational constraints, and the need for re-engagement of the state in the recovery 
process. But notwithstanding these considerations there was a permanent feeling that there 
were still enough needs that had not been met, and that humanitarian mandates were still 
applicable. Heyse (2004) sees these issues come up when talking about a shrinking 
operational space where organizations need to reassess and redefine their presence in a 
country. She uses the example of MSF-Holland to show how decision-making processes on 
whether to stay or go are influenced by many different factors. For instance, operational 
space can shrink “due to contextual constraints, such as security reasons, the presence of 
other aid agencies, lack of access to the areas that needed aid most, or the absence of needs 
that fit MSF’s mandate” (Heyse 2004, 129). In this case a situation can occur where 
organizations start searching for needs that meet the organizations mandate, or in other 
words, where “solutions started looking for a problem” (Heyse 2004, 130). This type of 
decision-making can be seen specifically with organizations that are highly specialized and 
therefore focus on very specific needs that they can address. In Huíla’s context it can be seen 
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as the other way around: problems look for solutions, but there is a lack of organizational and 
financial capacity to be able to continue addressing those problems.  
SNV and ZOA both started working in Huíla around approximately the same time. 
SNV started during a time of relative peace whereas ZOA started two years later when this 
peace process had already broken down. From the start their approaches and mandates 
differed, according to their organisational profiles of humanitarian versus development. ZOA 
was very much involved in resettlement of IDPs, and later in food security projects, whereas 
SNV chose to focus on micro-credit and supporting local civil societies’ capacity for 
development. However, after 2002 their approaches appeared to gradually converge as both 
were involved in decentralisation and capacity building of local governments. Whereas SNV 
from the start had an integrating approach towards other institutions, local government, and 
participatory processes, ZOA initially embraced a more relief-distribution idea, and only later 
started integrating more development approaches like participation and engagement with 
local and government institutions. Although with different mandates, both Dutch 
organizations operated in the province during more or less the same time span. They differed 
considerably with regards to their methodologies, strategies, beneficiaries, and the way they 
chose and went about partnerships with local organizations. In the case of both ZOA and 
SNV a shrinking of operational space, certainly in 2007 and 2008 did not play a role. Needs 
that fitted both organizations’ mandates were still present, albeit less for ZOA then for SNV. 
So, there might have been sufficient operational space, but little backing in terms of funding 
or support from head offices. Decisions to prolong programmes can normally also be 
influenced by the fact that organizations have had a long presence in the country, they feel a 
sense of commitment to finish their programmes even if the (financial and organizational) 
space to do that has become limited. This sense of commitment and obligation is especially 
relevant for organizations that focus on longer-term aid and building long-lasting 
relationships with their beneficiaries and partner organizations (Heyse 2004).  
Both SNV and ZOA closed at more or less the same time, although not necessarily 
informed on the basis of their mandates. ZOA’s reasons for closing were related to lack of 
funding. ZOA usually only works in emergency situations, and when during a donor meeting 
in 2005 Angola was declared to be no longer in an emergency situation, this had direct effects 
on ZOA’s exit strategies. Although they had earlier formulated a strategy where they would 
continue their projects until 2009, they had to cut this back by two years. At the same time 
staff at ZOA Angola’s office felt that their official mandate on rehabilitation would still 
enable them to continue their work in Angola
87
. Part of their exit strategy was to hand over 
their food security projects to their local partner, ADESPOV. This handover was material in 
that ADESPOV took over the local bases in the three municipalities and received financial 
backing for the duration of one year (Schot 2009). Furthermore, capacity building training 
took place in the last year of ZOA’s presence in Angola. One of the recommendations that 
followed from an evaluation of the OKULIMA project was that ZOA should have established 
stronger partnerships with other organizations active in Huíla to ensure a more sustainable 
follow up of its activities after their departure (Fret 2007). As ADESPOV was only 
considered as a partner to take over its activities in a rather late stage, it was difficult to say 
how they were able to bring continuity, especially with the rather small financial support of 
one year by ZOA.    
 The end of SNV’s programme in Angola seems to be more difficult to reconcile with 
its mandate to fight poverty.  In 2007 SNV was reducing its activities and handing over 
projects to organizations such as CARE, ADRA, and other local NGOs. In their annual report 
of 2007 they indicate that the programme in Angola was closed after consultation with the 
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Dutch Directorate General of International Cooperation (DGIS), but no formal reason is 
stated (SNV 2007). According to two staff members of SNV Angola the decision to close 
down was based on funding obstacles and Dutch foreign policy:  
“SNV has recently had a cut in their budget by the ministry, forcing them to close 
down several offices like Angola, Mali, and two other countries in Africa. The closure 
of these offices is not based on SNV policy or vision, but for operational reasons. The 
new criteria for funding as formulated by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
revolve around measuring impact. The results of the work that SNV does is very hard 
to catch and express in figures. Capacity building and strengthening civil society 
organizations is a long process, and cannot be instantly expressed in terms of results 
or made visible.”88 
 
The former director of SNV Angola saw the reason for the decision to end the programme in 
SNV’s approach of working at the meso-level: “to change poverty here you have to challenge 
the central government”. Also, the “bad will and arrogance” of the Angolan government was 
seen as a reason for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cut back funding, leaving them 
unwilling to include Angola as a partner country when negotiating a new contract for SNV. 
Furthermore, SNV had recently switched its attention to other mostly Francophone African 
regions. And finally, the high cost of keeping an office in Angola operational was not 
conducive to reaching a decision to stay.
89
 
Both organizations operated in the province during more or less the same time span 
and staff of both organizations felt they could have continued working in the province for 
many more years, when considering the needs of the beneficiaries. This reiterates the fact that 
LRRD is not a linear process, but that relief and development programming can co-exist 
(Russo et al. 2008, Christoplos 2006). The organizations decisions to exit seemed to have 
been mostly influenced by lack of funding, and less by elements of mandate and existing 
needs. This stresses the point that Buchanan and Fabbri (2005, 36) make when they say 
successful LRRD practice is most often revealed through the available amount of funding for 
these activities. In the case of Angola, funding for rehabilitation and development quickly 
evaporated after the emergency was declared to be over. Therefore, the groundwork laid 
down by relief and rehabilitation efforts have not been linked to development, leaving the 
LRRD process largely unfinished. As partnerships with Angolan NGOs have resulted in little 
capacity building on development approaches, and as seen with SNV, efforts to integrate 
projects with local government has been problematic, future prospects of finishing the LRRD 
process in Angola look bleak, endangering the outcomes of earlier groundwork.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the history of aid in Angola and the humanitarian arena in Huíla 
province. The history of aid in Angola was shaped by political actors using aid as an 
instrument to further the war economy and politics. During the 1990s the GoA increasingly 
withdrew from social service delivery, leaving this responsibility to humanitarian agencies 
(Christoplos 1998). This gave humanitarian agencies a significant influence in the country. In 
Huíla during the war there has been a large presence of aid agencies, in which both 
emergency and development approaches were represented, reiterating the idea that crisis and 
normality can co-exist in a same region (Hilhorst 2007).  When viewing the different 
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categories of aid stakeholders in Huíla it becomes clear that aid was shaped through 
interactions of a large variety of different actors. The analysis of the interface between aid 
givers and aid beneficiaries allows us to see the agency of aid beneficiaries in the aid process, 
as well as the organizational discourses that actually devalue and deny people’s agency by 
interpreting it as signs of dependency syndrome. It is at this interface and through these 
discourses that the future and outcomes of aid are shaped. 
The chapter has further zoomed in on the pragmatic translation of humanitarian 
principles and policies in everyday organizational practice. It shows that the principle of 
neutrality is often translated into issues of access safety, and that field staff interpret these 
principles flexibly, as well as that neutrality continued to be relevant in peacetime. This 
reiterates the fact that humanitarian principles are not static, but subject to continuous 
adaptation and interpretation, and as such should be reassessed in every new context (Leader 
2000). 
The chapter finishes with a comparison between two NGOs in Huíla province, to 
investigate organizational adaptation in the post-conflict context of Angola, and as such has 
served as an example of LRRD processes in everyday organizational practice. As the 
experiences of these two NGOs are strikingly similar to those of the majority of aid agencies 
in Huíla, it has allowed a deeper understanding of the obstacles in applying LRRD in this 
particular context. As such, the LRRD process had been left largely unfinished with little 
future prospects of continuation.   
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Introduction 
 
This chapter identifies the challenges in post-war Angolan society as they were perceived 
when peace was signed in 2002 and compares these challenges to the reconstruction and 
recovery efforts from the Angolan state, aid agencies and people themselves that ensued 
afterwards. It focuses on the so-called transition period after the conflict ended in 2002 until 
2008, from the perspective of the recovery of rural livelihoods. The chapter starts with a 
conceptual overview of reconstruction, linked to Angolan reality. It investigates which 
policies for specifically rural rehabilitation were set and whether those goals have been 
achieved. It then zooms in on the current state of rural livelihood recovery in Huíla province. 
Recovery, in my view distinguishes itself from reconstruction in that it deals with what 
people themselves do, and the operational aspects of humanitarian and development 
programming as part of LRRD processes, whereas I use reconstruction to denote the macro 
policies that inform the direction recovery takes from a governing perspective.  
Especially after the signing of the Luena peace accords in 2002, state and aid agencies 
played vital roles in aiding displaced people to resettle in their areas of origin, and started 
assisting the recovery of rural livelihoods. From interviews with state and aid agencies as 
well as beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of these assistance interventions in rural Huíla, a 
picture emerges of a uniform and narrow approach to rebuilding rural livelihoods. The 
chapter analyses the differences in livelihood options by conceptualising the post-conflict 
livelihoods as either externally driven or self-recovered. It builds this analysis from a 
comparison of the case studies in Caluquembe and Chibia. The chapter will investigate how 
seeds and tools programmes fit into livelihood recovery approaches and what the intended 
and unintended outcomes of these programmes have been.  
 
 
Angola in transition: reconstructing society  
 
An end to the long and destructive conflict in Angola in 2002 with the death of UNITA 
leader Jonas Savimbi and the signing of the Luena peace agreement soon afterwards, allowed 
Angolans to finally look forward to a future without war. Plans for the reconstruction of 
Angola were soon being developed by the Angolan government, donors and civil society. 
This section analyses the challenges that post-war Angolan society faced, and the nature and 
effects of reconstruction processes in Angola. 
 
 
Post-conflict Angola: immediate needs and resettlement 
The peace accords in 2002 offered people the opportunity to go back to their areas of origin 
and recover their livelihoods. The opportunities for livelihood recovery for people returning 
to their areas of origin during and after the war had ended in Angola, depended on many 
different factors in the context of rural Huíla province. They faced a whole range of 
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questions: Were their land and house still available? Would they be able to find a job? What 
were the opportunities in the area they had ended up in during the war? Did they still have 
family and social networks they could rely on? The answers to these questions, as well as the 
opportunities in their new surroundings, often determined people’s choices for voluntary or 
assisted resettlement, or made them decide not to resettle at all.  
Many of the displaced people did not wait for the official resettlement programmes to 
start, but found their own ways to return to their areas of origin. By May 2003 1.8 million 
IDPs had resettled to their areas of origin.70% had done so without making use of a formal 
resettlement plan or assistance offered by the GoA in cooperation with humanitarian agencies 
(United Nations 2003). Many did not participate in these resettlement programmes to their 
areas of origin at all, as they had built a life for themselves in the areas where they had ended 
up during the war. A group of displaced people living in the neighbourhood of Bairro 11 de 
Novembro in Chibia, decided not to make use of these resettlement opportunities for various 
reasons. They either were uncertain about a peaceful future as previous peace periods had 
proven unsustainable, had already found stable livelihoods in their new surroundings, or were 
waiting for the right opportunities and resources to return. Displacement and migration to the 
urban areas had been massive, and was part of the many strategies that people undertook to 
secure their livelihoods. Angola’s capital city of Luanda grew from an estimated population 
of 738.000 in 1978 to 3,277.00 in 2000 (Cain 2003, 9). The rapid urbanization of Luanda 
cannot be attributed to the war alone, but was also due to the lack of basic services and the 
limited projects that were available to especially youths in the rural areas (Pacheco 2002). 
Cain (2003, 8-9) notes that the reluctance to give up their stakes in the urban informal 
economy and access to education would lead to situations in which some household members 
would resettle whereas other members stayed behind.  
Many assisted returnees, aided by NGOs and the state, received a more or less 
standardized kit consisting of agricultural tools and seeds. This was later sometimes 
complemented by a project that handed out a small number of oxen that needed to be shared 
on a rotational basis within the villages, to make work on the land less dependent on manual 
labour alone. Attention in these villages thus focused on getting a good first harvest in order 
to be self-reliant again. Traditionally, working the fields of neighbouring commercial farmers 
had been an additional job opportunity. This practice did continue somewhat during the war, 
but only in areas that were deemed safe enough. After the war, with people returning to 
resettle in their areas of origin many people started working the fields of others as a means to 
ensure they would obtain some food while preparing their own fields for production.  
 Experiences of displacement, resettlement and rebuilding lives and livelihoods are 
never homogeneous. They depend on context, networks, and peoples’ differentiated 
opportunities and desires (Collinson 2003). Data collected in Chibia and Caluquembe 
demonstrates this varied impact of conflict on rural livelihoods and the diversity in people’s 
own recovery activities.  
 
 
Conceptualising reconstruction and recovery in a post-conflict setting 
Reconstruction can be defined as “an integrated process designed to reactivate development, 
and at the same time create a peaceful environment” (Barakat 2005, 12). Reconstruction is 
often imagined as a technological macro process, emphasizing the physical, institutional and 
economic rebuilding of a country after war or disaster (Cramer 2006, Green and Ahmed 
1999). This one-sided image is partly due to the comparison that is made to the type of 
reconstruction in Western Europe after World War II as stipulated in the Marshall Plan, but 
exists also because the differences between reconstruction after natural disasters in 
comparison to post-war reconstruction are often neglected (Green and Ahmed 1999). 
171 
 
Although natural disasters can also profoundly affect people’s lives and livelihoods requiring 
more than purely infrastructural aid and quick solutions to restore ‘normality’, conflict 
severely uproots societies on more fundamental levels and usually over prolonged periods of 
time. Post-war reconstruction is a long-term process in which few quick fixes exist. Conflict 
affects political, economic and social institutions in such a manner that rebuilding them 
requires a long-term investment, vision and strategy, as well as an integrated approach in 
which state involvement is essential. Therefore, post-war reconstruction efforts should avoid 
the trap of applying short-term fixes to heal very long-term ailments. Post-conflict 
reconstruction furthermore requires a shared vision among relevant stakeholders like state, 
people, private sector and civil society (Barakat 2005, Pacheco 2002). It is not a matter of 
moulding the country back to the shape it had before conflict started, going back to 
‘normality’ (Christoplos 1998, Pacheco 2002, Hilhorst 2007, Bakewell 2000). For the socio-
economic rehabilitation of a society there are no quick fixes both on micro and macro level. 
This complicates the role of humanitarian organizations in rehabilitation processes as 
envisaged under LRRD approaches. Humanitarian NGO mandates, expertise, and financial 
means are usually not suited for making the type of long-term commitments that 
rehabilitation requires. If the ultimate goal or conclusion of a post-war rehabilitation period is 
not some ill-defined ‘normality’, what then can be considered as the end of the rehabilitation 
phase and starting point for development?  
Although much attention is given to macro-level reconstruction processes of the 
economy and infrastructure, reconstruction is fundamental on the micro level, involving the 
restoration of societal processes through the socio-economic recovery of communities 
(Barakat 2005, Hilhorst 2007). This chapter aims to shed some light on these micro level 
recovery processes in Angola. Recovery in this sense encompasses how people have re-
established themselves after conflict, have started to rebuild their livelihoods, and how state 
and aid interventions have supported or hindered these efforts. In this thesis I prefer using the 
term recovery when discussing these micro level processes. I distinguish recovery from 
reconstruction, as the notion of recovery captures better what people themselves do to 
recuperate from conflict and disasters. Furthermore, I see recovery and rehabilitation as the 
operational aspects of humanitarian and development programming in LRRD processes. The 
concept of reconstruction is associated with the macro policies of governing bodies, like state 
and donors, that try to influence and prioritize the directions that recovery ideally should take. 
I distinguish between three domains of recovery: externally-driven recovery, state recovery 
and self recovery. Self recovery are those activities that people develop to deal with crisis and 
to rebuild their livelihoods after conflict. It is the type of recovery that is locally grounded 
and spontaneous, and which always happens to a certain extent. With externally-driven I 
mean recovery that is not  necessarily based on people’s own self recovery experiences and 
activities, or what they want or need, but on external assumptions from aid agencies, often 
shaped by a one-dimensional view of the rural society and economy. The state’s post-conflict 
reconstruction activities and the way in which they both positively and negatively influence 
people’s livelihoods is what I call state recovery.  The last section of this chapter will 
examine the different outcomes of recovery processes, and specifically how aid interventions 
have influenced their outcomes. 
“Every place has its own story of reconstruction. It follows from the pre-conflict 
situation and what the conflict has done, and gets shaped within the confines of what the 
security situation allows and what opportunities open up” (Hilhorst 2007:13). This underlines 
that reconstruction processes do not just start after official peace agreement has been signed. 
People that find themselves in relative security, even during conflict, have ways to re-
establish themselves long before official recovery assistance programmes start. It depends for 
instance on how they assess their own security situation, assets they have managed to 
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preserve, job opportunities that are available, and the strength of their social networks. 
Societies reconstruct, instead of being reconstructed only by external and macro-level 
interventions (Hilhorst 2007).  
  
 
National reconstruction policies and plans 
The first attempt to a national reconstruction plan had already come about in 1995 after the 
Lusaka peace protocol of 1994-1998 had offered Angola a short chance to rebuild the 
country’s war damaged society. The reconstruction plan’s rise and fall has been described by 
Cain (2003, 3-6) demonstrating its potential as an attempt to a grassroots reconstruction 
process instigated by the international donor community, as well as shows its failure to 
materialize due to the lack of commitment and ownership on the part of the government. The 
international donor community had started a community consultation process that resulted in 
the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) which was envisaged to act as a Marshall 
Plan for Angola, with funding promises reaching almost 1 billion USD. A trust fund was 
created, managed by the GoA and UNDP, to which communities put in requests for either 
economic or social rehabilitation (each accounting for 45% of the requests) and infrastructure 
projects (10%). Described by civil society at the time as having real potential for 
rehabilitation, development and peace, the CRP never really materialized. Reasons for its 
failure were the lack of ownership by the GoA by not implementing the necessary legal and 
economic reforms, which also made private investors hesitant to participate, and the UNDPs 
budgeting system for the trust fund was considered too bureaucratic and became subject to 
circumvention by stakeholders. Only 5 community projects were eventually implemented of 
the total of 159 requests, by the time that the Lusaka peace protocol failed in 1998 and the 
country’s civil war resumed.  
When a new chance for a national reconstruction plan presented itself in 2002 the 
challenges that the Angolan post-war society faced had grown significantly. The national 
economy had become completely reliant on oil exports, previously used to fund the war 
machine (Hodges 2004). Basic service delivery had become eroded and relied heavily on 
NGOs financial and capacity support, most visible in the health, agriculture and education 
sectors (Christoplos 1998). The conflict had stripped many rural households from their assets, 
leading to a subsistence economy (Hodges 2002). All sectors of Angolan socio-economic and 
institutional life had been affected by the conflict. This time the GoA maintained strong 
control over the formulation and implementation of the national reconstruction plans. It was 
also forced to do so as this time the international donor community proved to be less 
forthcoming with its funds as it had been during the Lusaka peace period. Since the end of the 
1990s international donors had already shown less interest in spending development 
cooperation resources in Angola because of GoA’s lack of commitment on policy measures 
regarding good governance, poverty reduction and economic management (Hodges 2002). 
After peace was signed in 2002 the GoA started preparing documents and plans for a donor 
conference on reconstruction of the country. The donor conference eventually never 
materialized. According to Paulo Jorge, MPLA’s secretary of external relations, the 
conference was blocked by the US and the UK for political reasons:  
 
“There were two countries that blocked the conference: the US and the UK. I spoke to 
the ambassadors of both countries about it. The US ambassador said: ‘This will take 
time because the GoA does not have an agreement with the IMF.’ To which I replied: 
‘Is this conference organized by the state or by the IMF? Several months before there 
was a donor conference for Afghanistan, did they have an agreement with the IMF? 
No.’ Then I asked the ambassador of the UK. He said he did not see a reason for the 
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conference because Angola had enough financial resources of its own. To which I 
replied: ‘Was it possible for Europe to overcome the destruction of the Second World 
War without the Marshall plan?’ Only Belgium offered to organize the conference. 
We think that the reason behind blocking the conference was that they were afraid that 
the money would only flow to the GoA and further weaken UNITA.”90 
 
Since the end of the war in 2002 Angola has been described as an economic recovery miracle 
as it had a steep economic growth due to its increasing oil exports over the years. The 
Angolan government has for a long time sent out the message that it wishes to control its own 
economic recovery without interference by IMF, and rather chooses to create partnerships 
with China for instance in which rehabilitation of infrastructure and reconstruction are 
exchanged for oil resources (Vines et al. 2005). The first IMF loan agreement with Angola of 
1.4 billion USD was only signed at the end of 2009 with the aim to deal with cash flow 
pressures caused by the worldwide economic crisis. The loans and oil exports have led 
donors to the assumption that the Angolan state has the necessary financial resources to do its 
socio-economic rehabilitation on its own, which is reflected by the limited amount of funding 
that Angolan reconstruction plans, also those developed by the international aid agencies, 
have received. 
At the end of the war the UN agencies and NGOs also prepared resettlement and 
reconstruction plans, seeking funding through the intra-agency Consolidated Appeals Process 
(CAP). For the 2002 CAP the donors’ reluctance to fund any sector because of GoA’s 
perceived ability to fund certain sectors itself was evident. Whereas 101% of food aid 
requirements was funded (in total 142.979.933 USD had been asked), the request for 
economic recovery and infrastructure plans (10.199.423 USD had been requested) received 
0% funding (OCHA 2009). The UN already mentioned in 2003 that they expected the 
international community to continue taking over the responsibility of basic service delivery in 
the education, health and agricultural sectors because of  “economic distortions and fiscal 
constraints” on the side of the Angolan government (United Nations 2003). In practice NGOs 
had been influential in issues of food security and rural development for years already, and 
were therefore deemed instrumental in continuing their interventions in post-war 
rehabilitation processes in Angola. In the CAP for Angola in 2003 the common humanitarian 
action plan was described as the following:  
 
“The strategic goal for humanitarian partners during the next two years is to 
progressively shift the humanitarian operation away from emergency assistance 
towards recovery and reconstruction and by 2005, to focus primarily on programmes 
aimed at generating growth and overcoming social and economic inequities under the 
Government’s poverty reduction strategy.” (UN 2002, 37) 
 
The prospect was that by 2005 post-war rehabilitation would be shifted towards more 
developmental approaches. The next section of this chapter will show how post-war 
rehabilitation and specifically recovery policies were given meaning in practice by the aid 
organisations active in Huíla province, as well as if and how the envisaged shift towards 
development approaches took place after 2005.   
The GoA developed an Estrategia de Combate A Pobreza (ECP, or Strategy to 
Combat Poverty) which is the Angolan version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) in September 2003. In this report the GoA identified several priority areas through 
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 Interview with Paulo Teixeira Jorge, MP, MPLA’s secretary of external relations and former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1984, Luanda, 5 November 2008. 
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which poverty reduction would take place, in combination with national reconstruction 
efforts. The main priority areas, and estimated costs for the period of 2003-2005/06 were the 
following: 
 
Figure 10: ECP priority areas and costs 
Priority area Total estimated costs (in million USD) 
Social Reinsertion 350 
Demining 285 
Food security and Rural Development 70 
HIV/Aids 71 
Education 450 
Health 158 
Basic infrastructure 1.038 
Employment and professional formation 45 
Governance 325 
Macroeconomic management 319 
Total 3.170 
Source: Government of Angola 2003, 106. 
 
From this overview of priority areas and expected costs, it becomes clear that creating 
employment and rural development is not considered as requiring much funding compared to 
the other areas, especially basic infrastructures. The social reinsertion strategy had a strong 
focus on supporting returnees by enhancing their “productive capacities” that would benefit 
the country’s overall food security and make the national economy less reliant on importing 
food. For food security and rural development these objectives were: to minimise the risk of 
hunger starvation, satisfy the internal food needs and re-launch the rural economy as a vital 
sector for a sustainable development (GoA 2003, 52). Specific attention is given to the 
“traditional sector”, as this would promote better integration of displaced in their areas of 
origin, and as such alleviate the pressure on the urban centres (GoA 2003, 53).The main 
obstacles for reviving the rural economy were thought to be the damaged infrastructure which 
blocked the arrival of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers and tools) and also limited peoples 
options for transporting their produce, a lack of credit opportunities, and poor local markets 
(GoA 2003, 52). To overcome these obstacles, priority was given to the strengthening of the 
municipal Agricultural Development Station (EDA), that were to promote seed and cereal 
production, take inventory of available lands, introduce adequate technologies, reactivate 
rural commerce and focus on the rehabilitation of infrastructure. It is surprising to see, 
realizing the strong role that NGOs played, that at the time of the formulation of the ECP 
very little mention was made of partnerships and cooperation with NGOs on the issue of food 
security. The only reference in the ECP to NGOs and food security is made with regard to the 
reactivation of markets. The report mentions that the state will establish a partnership and co-
ordination with humanitarian agencies, donors and NGOs in order to reach the objectives of 
the reactivation and stabilisation of Internal Market System (GoA 2003, 55). During the years 
after the formulation of the ECP it can be said that international and national NGOs have 
played key parts in agricultural development through the distribution of seeds and tools, that 
only now cooperation between these NGOs and EDAs has become more common and 
formalized, and that NGOs and the GoA both have paid little attention to reactivation of rural 
commerce, land availability, and the introduction of technologies to smallholder farmers. 
More specifically, the GoA has turned its attention primarily on the reconstruction of basic 
infrastructure, and less on poverty alleviation through rural and industrial development which 
would create more employment. It seems that building roads has been prioritized under the 
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assumption that once roads are connecting some of the rural areas to urban centres, 
development will automatically follow.  
 
 
Everyday reality of reconstruction in Angola 
Going back to pre-war ‘normality’, as a central feature in the conceptualization of 
reconstruction, in Angola’s case would have meant going back to the pre-independence state 
of the Portuguese colonial system, which indeed seems to have influenced the GoA’s 
reconstruction efforts in practice (Pacheco 2002). Ruigrok (2010) explains that the 
(economic) priority that the Angolan state is giving to those areas geographically closest to 
government, is a perpetuation of colonial policies in which roads, rails and bridges were only 
built in the coastal areas, increasing the neglect of the interior and rural areas (Ruigrok 2010, 
641-642). Reconstruction in the context of post-war Angola has been most clearly made 
visible by the large infrastructural construction projects in urban centres, most notably in 
Luanda. But in the rural areas this very tangible type of reconstruction has been far less 
prominent. Road rehabilitation was deemed to be essential in order to give rural producers 
physical market access so they might move beyond subsistence level (Kyle 2005). Some rural 
towns were benefiting from roads that were rehabilitated, which at least increased options for 
trade and transportation of agricultural produce from areas that had long been disconnected 
from the rest of the country. If roads alone would raise the rural farmers beyond subsistence 
levels however, was questionable. Recovery of rural livelihoods was slowly taking shape, but 
the type of livelihoods that developed and their sustainability were also highly dependent on 
the choices that state and aid agencies made with reference to rural social, economic and 
institutional reconstruction. Reconstruction projects have been executed mostly on macro 
(economic) level, focusing on rebuilding technical infrastructure (roads, railways, and 
buildings) and increasing foreign investments in the oil business. In rural areas, GoA’s 
reconstruction efforts were noticeable in a number of programmes, such as big road works by 
Portuguese, Brazilian or Chinese construction companies, and other forms of primarily 
infrastructural developments. These sometimes offered rural (male) inhabitants some type of 
temporary employment or day jobs, but created no structural job opportunities or training 
programmes. Road works would focus mostly on rehabilitating the already existing roads that 
connected the main cities. Towns that were connected to these roads would see benefits as an 
increase in traffic meant more trade opportunities for their local produce. Such had benefited 
the town of Chibia, where in addition the agricultural development project Sogangelas, and 
the road rehabilitation works offered some employment opportunities to the local population. 
However, as local traffic and trade increased due to this road rehabilitation, so did food 
imports from neighbouring countries, drawing rural people into an unequal competition with 
the often cheaper food from these countries. The agricultural project in the meantime only 
provided irrigated plots to a few local farmers, yet at the same time disconnected many more 
from their land and agricultural livelihoods.  
After the 2002 peace agreement, localized land conflicts have been on the rise in both 
urban and rural areas. In urban areas they have mainly revolved around land-grabbing by 
elites and private businesses, with reports of forced evictions of residents of Luanda’s shanty 
towns by government being commonplace (Almeida, 2009). In rural areas too, land issues 
have come to the fore. The availability of land was already a major concern during the 
resettlement process. 50% of the land that had been in the hands of large Portuguese 
commercial farmers before Angola’s independence had already been redistributed to new 
large landowners by 1999, leaving smallholder farmers struggling for land on their return 
after displacement (Hodges 2002, Clover 2005). Examples of conflicts over land are those in 
areas where internally displaced and residents compete over the same lands. Other conflicts 
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emerged between large commercial farmers that had fenced off their lands, thereby closing 
off livestock grazing space for pastoralists in those areas (Clover 2005). The land dispute in 
the Gambos municipality, a predominantly pastoralist society in southern Huíla, was a much 
quoted example of this latter type of land conflict. When new large landowners (often said to 
be ex-generals having been granted land by the GoA) started demarcating large pieces of land 
in Gambos, it became increasingly difficult for pastoralists in the area to access water and 
pasture resources (Pacheco 2004, Clover 2005, Clover 2007). Local authorities in 2001 found 
that these new landowners had demarcated much more land than they were registered for, and 
in one case this led to a settlement in which the new landowner had to return an amount of 
land to the local community that had used it previously as grazing land (Clover 2007, 188). 
However, in 2003 new landowners and fences reappeared in the Gambos region, cutting 
many pastoralists off from their land, without receiving compensation, some villages being 
completely enclosed by fences, or its population forcibly removed (Clover 2007, 190). A 
NGO coordinator formulated the violent and politically sensitive nature of the Gambos 
conflict as follows:  
 
“Ex-UNITA generals that had received large pieces of land as reintegration package, 
kept illegal jails on their property. They used these jails to torture the pastoralists that 
had tried to access their formerly owned land by cutting holes in the fences. There are 
stories that the former coordinator of an international NGO in Lubango had his visa 
revoked and was being followed and spied on because he reported on this matter 
openly”.91   
 
Stories about this type of land conflicts emerged soon after the war at the peak of the 
resettlement process, but are continuing to this day. One consultant working on land issues in 
Huíla province in 2009 had been told by pastoralists that they had seen themselves becoming 
confined to a small plot of land, effectively cut off from their former grazing lands. 
Frustrations had run so high that they told the consultant they were ready to pick up arms 
again to fight their neighbouring big commercial farmers, who they saw as their new 
enemies, not necessarily linked to one political party or the other.
92
 The large commercial 
farmers that fence their land, cutting off access to communal grazing lands are officially 
asked by the government of Angola to ensure compensation for the affected communities. 
But government institutions insist that they cannot do more than monitor this process, which 
leaves the matter of compensation up to the individual willingness of the landowner in 
question. Agricultural rehabilitation in this case is not politically neutral, but can ignite new 
social conflict if access to land and water for rural communities is not properly regulated 
(Clover 2005). This is demonstrated by the example in Chibia, where land redistribution 
brought on by the state’s post-conflict reconstruction projects actually cut off access to land 
and water to some of the local population.   
 Concerns over availability of land have dominated many civil society discourses and 
debates during the resettlement process, but the main bottleneck seems to be the diminishing 
grazing land for pastoralists due to the fencing practices of large commercial landowners. 
Land conflicts that are occurring in Huíla today seem to be happening primarily in the 
southern parts of the province, between the large landowners and pastoralists. The potential 
for new conflicts over land is on-going as long as there is no real solution found to the 
problem of land grabbing and lack of standardized political agreements over compensation to 
affected communities. The issue of land shows a discrepancy between the GoA’s proclaimed 
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policy on rural development as stated in the ECP, and its policy in practice. Whereas the ECP 
states that priority is given to the traditional rural sector, and stimulating agricultural 
production as a tool for the social reintegration of ex-combatants as well as IDPs in their 
areas of origin, priorities in practice show that large landowners are allowed to accumulate 
land at the detriment of the traditional rural sector: namely smallholders and pastoralists. 
Furthermore, the GoA’s prioritization of rebuilding infrastructure and large-scale commercial 
agricultural development projects over smallholder agriculture, points at a further 
discrepancy between its proclaimed rural development and food security policy and its actual 
practice. The policies and practice of aid in assisting the recovery of rural people’s 
livelihoods in Huíla is analysed in the next section.    
 
 
Rebuilding livelihoods through the humanitarian lens  
 
This section builds on the case studies in Caluquembe and Chibia, in that it compares the 
experiences and outcomes of livelihood recovery processes in these two municipalities.  The 
section specifically investigates how humanitarian agencies gave meaning to assisting 
resettlement and rural livelihood recovery in practice. It analyses post-war rehabilitation 
policies, everyday realities of livelihood recovery assistance, and what the outcomes have 
been of these type of interventions. More specifically, it analyses the use of seeds and tools 
programmes as the most common response to livelihood recovery, and investigates reasons 
for its popularity as well as the assumptions surrounding it and its effects on the long-term. 
 
 
Post-war rehabilitation policies 
According to literature about reconstruction processes in post-war societies, much emphasis 
is placed on aid agencies’ role as main figures in linking relief to development through 
rehabilitation programmes (Green and Ahmed 1999). Longley (et al 2006) argue that 
humanitarian organizations choose to act mostly at a micro level, as getting involved in the 
political processes that define the macro level might compromise their humanitarian 
principles. Especially humanitarian agencies find themselves playing an assisting role to the 
state’s efforts, by providing aid for the most vulnerable people in society, while states focus 
their attention at macro level national reconstruction projects. The period of recovery brings 
some additional challenges to humanitarian agencies and the international donor community 
with reference to accessing funding and engaging more in-depth with state efforts, as relief 
can be described as “state-avoiding”, whereas development cannot be done without the 
state’s involvement in the process (Harmer and Macrae 2004).  
Since the increased financial dependency of agencies on foreign states’ budgets for 
aid, and the short-term donor funding of programmes focusing on rehabilitation activities, 
agencies’ flexibility to respond to all existing needs has become more limited (Green and 
Ahmed 1999). This financial dependency had the effect that agencies had to change their 
rehabilitation strategies by focusing more on project cycles with strict budgets and time-
spans. This has reduced their ability to respond to local needs that take more time to address 
properly or needs that fall outside of the policy boundaries that their funding partners have 
defined (Barakat 2005). With these provisions rehabilitation can be more donor-driven than 
based on existing needs, and affects the quality of rehabilitation programmes. What these 
constraints can mean for organizational practice is elaborated on in the next section. 
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Assisting livelihood recovery in Huíla’s humanitarian sphere 
After the war ended in 2002 humanitarian actors shifted their approaches from relief to 
assisting in the resettlement of the IDPs and returnees to their areas of origin.  
The focus during the reconstruction period soon turned towards food security as a main 
thematic area of attention and means to secure peace. This is illustrated by the following 
quote from a research paper of 2002 on the development challenges that Angola would be 
facing just after peace was signed:  
 
“At the same time, however, the food crisis that has hit southern Africa has had an 
impact on Angola with the country needing to import 725,000 tons of cereal. FAO 
will be distributing seeds and tools to half a million families. Many people are in a 
bad condition in areas that were formerly under UNITA control and hence previously 
inaccessible to outside food and relief agencies. Large-scale land mining also impedes 
food delivery. It is likely in this situation that people’s energies (as well as the peace 
movements) will be concentrated on survival and on returning home rather than on 
peace and reconciliation matters. Satisfying people’s needs will indeed be vital in 
securing peace and stability”. (Kibble 2002:25) 
 
The challenges for assisting the post-war recovery of rural livelihoods were diverse 
and complex: protection of land rights; recapitalisation of peasant households; recovery of the 
rural-urban trade and credit mechanisms; demining of agricultural fields and roads; and 
reviving the agricultural extension system (Hodges 2002, 31). The main challenge for 
humanitarian agencies, as formulated in the CAP for Angola in 2003, would first lie in the 
resettlement of displaced populations which had a strong focus on diminishing vulnerability 
and reintegration mainly through promoting agricultural production of staple crops, as is 
shown in the following quote: 
 
“Reduce the dependency of vulnerable, returnee and demobilised groups on 
emergency food aid and help populations achieve self-sufficiency by improving 
productive techniques, promoting income-generation and supporting agricultural 
activities in accordance with the regulamento. 
Provide seeds, tools and technical assistance to vulnerable, returnee and 
demobilised populations prior to the planting season and distribute food rations to 
bridge the gap between planting and harvest seasons, as required. 
Promote staple crop seed multiplication, community seed banks, protection 
against insects and plagues, appropriate seed selection, soil fertility restoration, crop 
diversification, animal traction, livestock enlargement, use of compost and manure 
and adequate storage facilities.” (UN 2002, 49) 
 
NGO policies in Huíla were adapted to incorporate the changing post-conflict circumstances. 
For instance, Norwegian Refugee Council in 2003 switched its focus from distributing food 
aid to establishing sustainable livelihoods and community infrastructure (Larssen 2008, 8). 
ZOA Angola in 2004 embarked on a 3-year project aimed at improving food security for 
6,000 households in areas where they had previously done food distributions and assisted 
resettlement processes (Fret 2007). Food security usually becomes one of the major terrains 
in which relief agencies implement their programs following the assumptions that; small-
scale agriculture leads to household food production, diminishes the reliance on food aid, and 
any surplus harvest can be sold (Levine and Chastre 2004).  
Humanitarian agencies operating in Huíla have overwhelmingly chosen to support 
food security and livelihoods by assisting people to re-establish themselves in rural society 
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through the distribution of seeds and tools. The rationale was to support people’s agricultural 
productivity and as such diminish the dependency on food aid. This thesis tries to shed light 
on whether seeds and tools distribution can be viewed as a livelihood approach, or as an 
extension of relief aid. There is little evidence of needs assessment on livelihoods having 
taken place. Information on livelihood conditions and strategies were presumed to be known, 
or extrapolated from the relief period. As the former director of an international NGO that 
had been operational in Huíla for many years responded:  
“The basis of needs we already know. We weren’t so much concerned with the ‘what’ 
as with the ‘how’. We didn’t need to ask again what people needed, but rather how to 
provide them with it. Especially concerning basic needs it’s not necessary to ask 
people, you just know. In the third and last phase, the knowledge about needs came 
from the fact that we already knew the people. Our own staff were themselves 
displaced, so they could relate to what was necessary.”93  
 
This neglect of assessments and problem analysis was also noted by Levine and Chastre 
(2004) in the case of aid responses in the Great Lakes region. Needs assessments were 
sometimes not carried out at all, the emergency situation being cited as a reason for not doing 
so. “A related problem is that, where assessments were carried out, the results seem to be 
driven by a desire to find out what one could do (from a limited range of options) or, more 
commonly, to justify a predetermined response” (Levine and Chastre 2004, 19). This seems 
to have been the case for most of the agricultural and rural development projects in Angola, 
where very little needs assessments, viability studies and evaluations were done (Rafael 
Simões and Pacheco 2009). In rural settings seeds and tools were deemed the only 
appropriate response to livelihood needs. Questions regarding access to markets, 
transportation, were often only addressed at the last stages of a project, which meant that 
there was little continuity or structural support as regards to these issues. Supporting small 
businesses, skills training and other rural activities fell out of the project scope except in 
those projects that supported the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Evidence from 
interviews and NGO reports show that rarely a livelihood approach or analysis has been 
implemented in the work of humanitarian NGOs in Angola, contrary to what recent policy 
discussions, research and scientific articles on livelihood approaches in post-conflict 
situations may suggest. This lack of awareness on the use of livelihood approaches was not 
only commonplace within humanitarian organizations, but was also evident in the 
development organizations. 
 
 
Seeds and tools 
During 33 interviews with staff members of NGOs and government institutions based in 
Lubango, the most common response (22 of the 33) as to the type of projects they were 
involved in, was seeds and tools programmes. The other NGO staff members usually were 
involved in health or education activities, and/or demining. Two NGOs involved in post-war 
seeds and tools programmes were said to work specifically with a livelihood approach, such 
as NRC and ACF, although in their own words, not an extensive one. All NGOs involved in 
seeds and tools distributions mentioned that they did interventions geared towards improving 
food security and livelihoods in broad terms. In the cases where needs assessments were 
carried out in communities to identify the assets that people were lacking, seeds, tools and 
livestock were identified as tangible assets that people needed to resume agricultural 
production. 
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A workshop was organised in Lubango in March 2007 by one of the biggest 
international NGOs working in the province at that time, to discuss the approaches that 
NGOs in Huíla were using. It was found that all were tackling issues of food security by 
means of seeds and tools programmes, often in the same localities, and almost always with 
the same type of seeds: maize and beans. Although in 2007 the term transition was mostly 
used to define the changes in Angolan rural society, broader and longer-term livelihood 
options other than small-scale agriculture were not discussed. Furthermore regarding their 
approaches to food security in the province, there was no consultation or consensus about the 
need for coordination between the NGOs. Most programmes that were presented by the 
NGOs at that workshop followed identical steps: identifying the 250 most vulnerable people 
within communities (identification in most cases was done by the local chiefs, not on basis of 
needs assessments), handing out seeds (maize and beans, sometimes sorghum and millet, on a 
few occasions horticultural seeds if access to water was available), handing out tools (hoes, 
machetes, and ploughs), sometimes handing out oxen and in some instances goats (for 
instance 20 oxen for a group of 250 people, on rotational basis), and creation of a seed bank 
where the amount of distributed seeds needed to be returned once the crop was harvested. 
The selection of the type of seeds that were going to be distributed seems to have been done 
on the assumption that maize and beans are the staple foods in the area. Therefore these seeds 
would contribute directly to increased food security. One staff member of an international 
humanitarian NGO described the transition in terms of the food security situation in rural 
villages in Huíla as following:  
“The way people deal with the available food in their villages has become very 
different, it went from comer (eating) only, to comer, vender e semente (eating, selling 
and seeds): semente meaning to be able to save seeds for next year or using the 
community seed banks”.94  
Already in 1995 the UN’s humanitarian coordination body in Angola, UCAH, 
founded a Seeds and Tools Working Group consisting of representatives from the GoA, 
UNITA, donors, UN and NGOs that was especially designed to oversee and analyse seed 
needs and match them with available resources on national level (Lanzer 1996, 28). Seeds 
and tools programs further dominated the recovery process that started with the resettlement 
of refugees and internally displaced from 2002 onwards. Until 2008 not much changed. Few 
organizations tried to complement their programmes by looking into access to markets, but 
without proper resources to back those ideas up, they often didn’t come to fruition. For one 
NGO working in Caluquembe, commercialisation had been set as a specific project objective, 
which in the end was never achieved as it said that by the time its project ended in 2007 
people had not been producing sufficient amounts to be able to sell. However, from this 
research in the village of Cue 1 where many seeds and tools programmes had been 
implemented, it emerged that 80% of the respondent households had already been selling 
their produce on the market in Caluquembe-sede. Village inhabitants indicated at the time of 
the fieldwork that they wanted to start producing other crops like coffee as the market value 
for maize was considered too low to bring in cash, but rather could only be exchanged for 
other items such as salt or soap.
95
 Some of the seeds that had been handed out by NGOs 
required more extensive use of fertilizers than the seeds people had reserved themselves, 
requiring additional (financial) inputs.
96
Also, whereas seeds and tools programmes are 
instigated out of an assumption that small scale farmers have been completely dispossessed 
during conflict, this research uncovered that in most of the villages in Caluquembe people 
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had been able to continue producing food during conflict and before seeds and tools 
programmes were started. Furthermore, people had already been selling their excess produce 
during the war, sometimes even when they were still receiving food aid.    
Livelihoods that fell outside of the agricultural domain, were largely ignored in 
recovery projects. This is a common oversight that Cramer (2006) addresses when he refers 
to the typical image of rural society that persists where everyone is automatically assumed to 
be a smallholder farmer. This image simply ignores the existence of social differentiation and 
different livelihoods that people employ over time (Cramer 2006). Off-farm livelihoods are 
often not recognized in interventions that focus on rural areas (Longley et al 2006, Ellis 
2000a, Ellis and Biggs 2001). Working the fields of others, migration, firewood collection, 
hunting or other off-farm activities might be interpreted as undesirable coping strategies. 
Interventions focusing only on a narrowly defined idea of agricultural rehabilitation do not 
take into account peoples differentiated desires and capabilities. This narrow idea rather 
perpetuates the ‘yeoman farmer fallacy’, the myth that all rural people rely on farming alone 
for their livelihood (Farrington 1998). This is related to what Ellis (2000a) calls the ‘small-
farm-first’ paradigm which has dictated rural policies for decades in which it is assumed that 
rural economic growth is achieved through a narrow focus on assisting small-farmers, and 
which in effect neglects the diversification of rural livelihoods into non-farm activities. These 
assumptions on rural homogeneity often shape the one-size-fits-all response towards recovery 
and development in rural areas.  
 
 
Beyond seeds and tools 
A common response by aid agencies to support local level recovery processes is given 
through agricultural rehabilitation; and specifically seeds and tools programmes. Longley et 
al (2006) give several reasons to explain why these programmes are so attractive: “seed aid 
provides an effective way for donors to spend their money and to be seen assisting rural 
populations more sustainably; implementing agencies benefit from contracts to deliver the 
seed; seed companies profit from seed sales; and farmers are unlikely to complain about 
receiving free inputs, particularly since the seed can be exchanged or eaten if it is not 
planted” (Longley et al. 2006, 5). Seeds and tools programmes also offer humanitarian 
agencies a chance to continue working through a similar system of distribution as in food aid, 
therefore building on their logistical expertise and networks. Furthermore, seed needs 
assessments are often based on previously done food aid assessments rather than on new 
contextual assessments within changing circumstances and opportunities (Longley et al 2006, 
Levine and Chastre 2004, Sperling and McGuire 2010). Seeds and tools programmes aim at 
assisting (war-affected) people to rely less on food aid and become self-sufficient in terms of 
food production. It is especially suitable for post-conflict situations that are characterized by a 
loss of agricultural assets like seeds, tools and livestock due to displacement and theft. The 
distribution of seed, when done right, can also be seen as a symbolic intervention next to a 
practical one, as Archibald and Richards (2002) suggest. They regard a successful seed 
distribution, in terms of transparency in the process and equal access, as an aid agencies’ way 
of stressing the importance of social inclusion and common humanity for all beneficiaries in a 
war affected community. Sperling and McGuire (2010) argue that seed aid is a popular 
response by aid agencies as it provides effective links between relief and development, but 
despite its extensive implementation it is hardly evaluated. A major assumption on seed aid 
by the agencies that implement it, is that it can do no harm, even if evidence is showing that it 
can undermine local markets and seed systems. Agencies are most often concerned with seed 
availability over issues of access and quality, and that farmer feedback on these issues as well 
as long-term outcomes of seed aid are rarely sought (ibid.). 
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 In the livelihood recovery programmes currently implemented in Huíla province, the 
aspects of introducing more valuable crops, attention to markets and transportation of 
produce, diversification and use of project-created productive resources are lacking. 
Availability of seeds for different crops, cash and commerce is still very low in these areas. 
Furthermore, as seen earlier in this chapter, land availability has been an obstacle in some 
areas. With the withdrawal of many of the initiating organizations, the follow up of the above 
aspects of livelihood recovery have been left out, creating a peculiar situation in which most 
farmers produce exactly the same low value crops without diversification or alternative 
livelihood activities. The low return on especially maize was reason for the local EDA in 
Chibia to discourage the agricultural development project Sogangelas to produce maize on 
the irrigated land. The limited possibilities for transportation from the rural areas to markets 
has a negative effect on the profitability of maize. Farmers in the rural areas who do manage 
to get their maize produce transported to especially the urban coastal areas find it difficult to 
compete with the prices of imported maize (Kyle 2005). Furthermore, maize is a very labour 
intensive crop, with most of the labour for especially processing the maize being the 
responsibility of women. A staff member working at the Provincial Ministry of Agriculture 
gave the following example to indicate the low market value and how the inability to access 
markets exacerbates rural poverty.  
 
“The maize crop is very labour intensive, but the prices at the moment are very low 
because of lack of transport. The produce doesn’t find its way to the cities. I know an 
example from Chipindo where farmers had just harvested the maize. A few men from 
Huambo showed up with trucks, and they bought large quantities of maize for the 
price of 15 kwanza per kilo
97
. Then they sold it for 50 kwanza per kilo on the markets 
in Huambo. These cases make me sad. People are not able to buy anything, and they 
don’t have food reserves. Consider how many kilos of maize they have to sell in order 
to get just 1,000 kwanza together”.98  
 
In order to move away from the more traditional seeds and tools programme and to create 
more diverse rural opportunities and a long-term strategy NGOs need to invest in other 
approaches to rural development (Longley et al. 2006). Seeds and tools programmes should 
work with a vision on market access, crop diversification, micro-credit, commercialisation 
opportunities and attention to non-farm livelihood activities. However, in Huíla this 
continuity has as yet hardly taken off as the organizations either lack the expertise and/or 
vision as they have entered the country with an exclusively humanitarian mandate. Moreover, 
both local and international NGOs cannot access sufficient funding possibilities as Angola is 
no longer high on the donor agenda. Therefore there is insufficient financial and institutional 
capacity for a transition of humanitarian to development programmes. Many times the 
partnerships that existed between international and local organizations were very 
instrumentalist in nature, in the sense that they were focused primarily on increasing their 
access to areas for the distribution of their goods, thus achieving a larger coverage and scale 
of operations. Capacity building and commitment to further financial assistance of these local 
NGOs have been limited. This has had consequences for the evolution of local NGOs to 
become bigger and more durable players in the field of development, and was interpreted as a 
further lack of trust in the capacities of local organizations (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 
2009). They still often lack the capacity and international backing (financially and 
institutionally) to continue their projects. Because there are no development organizations 
                                                 
97
 The kilo is measured by an empty margarine tin. 15 Kwanza is equal to 15 eurocents. 
98
 Interview with Rita Soma, head of section rural engineering and agricultural production MINADER Huíla, 
Lubango, 11 August 2008. 
183 
 
that can really take over these projects there is a lack of continuity and development in the 
rural areas. This is compounded by a historical lack of cooperation between aid organizations 
and the Angolan state, which prevents that projects are integrated in government plans for 
reconstruction and development. The case of the EDA in Caluquembe and NGOs working 
there demonstrates that there are opportunities for extensive cooperation and capacity 
building, but with the withdrawal of many NGOs and a lack of financial resources from the 
government for these EDA’s there is little continuity to these efforts.  
 
 
Externally-driven and self recovery: comparing the cases 
By comparing the history of livelihood recovery, aid interventions and reconstruction efforts 
by the state in the two municipalities, some conclusions can be drawn. For instance, whereas 
villages in Chibia municipality incidentally received food assistance from WFP and the state, 
almost all villages in the Caluquembe municipality had seen on average two or three seeds 
and tools interventions take place, next to the food aid they had received over the years. This 
had to do with the fact that Chibia had not seen active conflict, although it had hosted groups 
of displaced people. The area is also more known for pastoralism rather than agriculture due 
to its semi-arid climate. Caluquembe on the other hand is considered to be a rich agricultural 
area, where in the past coffee had been produced on a wide scale. Interventions with an 
agricultural seeds and tools component therefore were deemed to be well-fitted to the 
Caluquembe circumstances.  
Livelihoods in Caluquembe have been singularly pushed towards a meagre 
agricultural base, where subsistence farming seems to have been the main objective as most 
projects lacked elements as access to markets and the provision of credit. Small shops and 
industries have not been re-introduced after the war, and skills training only benefited the 
demobilised soldiers. Youths, most of them without agricultural experience due to long 
periods of displacement, seemed to prefer finding a job outside agriculture. The only options 
for that type of jobs were in the health and education sector where recruiting sessions were 
flooded by unemployed youths every time. Agriculture seems to have become the only option 
due to what I call externally-driven recovery. Recovery that is not  necessarily based on 
people’s own recovery activities but on external assumptions on rural society and economy. 
These assumptions then inform the uniform interventions that do not take into account the 
manifold experiences and ways in which people rebuild their livelihoods. This externally-
driven recovery is offering limited options for assistance to livelihood recovery, in a context 
where people find themselves in extreme poverty without the availability of many other 
options.    
In contrast, the inhabitants of Chibia encountered very little external aid interventions 
by NGOs. This is related to the fact that Chibia continued to be accessible through its 
location on the main road to Lubango, which also during the war had remained more or less 
intact. Therefore, economic recovery with reference to access to markets, was easier obtained 
here than in an area like Caluquembe where the access road had been severely damaged 
during the war. Also, the role of the state has been quite strong in Chibia, with both positive 
as well as negative outcomes on livelihood opportunities. For the displaced people from 
Quilengues living in Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia agricultural livelihood options had 
become impossible as their access to land had been cut off by an agricultural development 
project instigated by the state, even after receiving agricultural assistance from an NGO. 
They managed to find other activities to sustain themselves, such as small trade on the local 
market, acquiring skills as masons or tailors, or finding employment in the area. Although 
they would still indicate the need for more employment opportunities and agricultural inputs, 
some of the inhabitants no longer wanted to go back to their areas of origin as they had found 
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sufficient opportunities for themselves in Chibia. This group of displaced people in Chibia 
are representative for the type of self recovery that one can find in many places in Angola 
where aid never reached the population. It is the type of recovery that is locally grounded and 
spontaneous, often ignored by agencies, but powerful in its message. People do recovery 
themselves with the means available to them. Aid can support these activities, but can also 
ignore, redirect or alter these efforts in unintended ways based on predefined packages for 
rural livelihood rehabilitation.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter analysed the challenges in post-war Angolan society as they were identified in 
2002 and compared them to the reconstruction, rehabilitation and recovery efforts by the 
Angolan state, aid agencies and people themselves that ensued afterwards. Conflict affects 
political, economic and social institutions profoundly and their recovery requires long-term 
commitment and investments by the actors involved in these processes. Reconstruction is a 
long-term process, where humanitarian agencies increasingly take on a role in the 
establishment of food security. But the usual short-term and non-political nature of 
humanitarian organisations is difficult to reconcile with the long-term commitment and 
engagement with state institutions that these types of reconstruction processes require.  
In this chapter I argued that although conflict and displacement have had significant 
effects on the livelihoods choices people make, state and aid agencies have further limited or 
redirected the livelihood options in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. The goals that 
were set by the Angolan state for the reconstruction of Angolan society pertaining to rural 
livelihoods were rather limitedly focused on agricultural production and the rehabilitation of 
the roads network. With the rebuilding of roads, access to markets and the reactivation of the 
rural market system was assumed to be repaired. Meanwhile, the response and interventions 
by NGOs during the resettlement and rehabilitation phase were also limited in their scope, 
creating, in the case of Caluquembe, a rather uniform social stratum of small scale farmers 
with little opportunity to diversify their livelihoods or pursue other opportunities through 
investments. Because of the lack of follow up in programmes that focus more on access to 
markets and commercialisation options, rural livelihoods have hardly risen beyond 
subsistence level. The lack of sustainability manifest in many livelihood recovery 
programmes can be partly explained by the financial constraints that are inherent to the 
indistinct lines between relief, rehabilitation and development. A transition from relief to 
development is also constrained by the lack of development organizations available to take 
over the ‘groundwork’ as well as GoA’s lack of resources and capacity to systematically 
incorporate the NGO efforts within their own local state institutions and expand on them. 
Continuing state interventions, in the meanwhile, have been mostly aimed at large-scale 
agricultural development projects and infrastructure (Kyle 2005). In between these two 
opposing approaches to rural rehabilitation and development the local population have 
continued to diversify and adapt their livelihoods themselves, in which interventions by 
NGOs and the state have played either minimal or sometimes even constraining roles.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis studies the interplay between livelihoods and aid in times of crisis. It has captured 
processes by which people deal with and recover from conflict, and how aid and state actors 
respond to these processes. As such it has followed how different actors deal with crisis, 
focusing on the interfaces where these actors meet and co-shape future livelihoods. 
 The research started with the following assumptions. Firstly, humanitarian agencies 
have seen their work domain transform from providing basic relief to incorporating more 
development approaches, while its practices have not always followed these transformations 
sufficiently (Hilhorst 2007). Secondly, my assumption was that humanitarian agencies tend to 
approach livelihood recovery differently than their development partners, formulating 
assistance less on an analysis of the actual livelihood practices that are present (Christoplos 
2006). And thirdly, conflict and displacement have profound effects on people’s livelihoods 
and people will adapt their livelihoods, often forcibly so, to respond to these situations. In the 
absence of a strong state, NGOs become key actors in addressing issues of livelihood 
recovery, and can significantly impact the recovery processes that people themselves have 
started. Therefore, this research started with the objective to analyse how people’s livelihoods 
are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have 
created for themselves. During the fieldwork an additional layer of analysis was added with 
reference to the role of the state in reconstruction processes and how these affected people’s 
own recovery efforts.   
This concluding chapter of the thesis will present the main findings of this research 
from the analysis of information from previous chapters, and provide answers to the 
following research questions: 
 
How are people’s livelihoods affected in times of crisis, and how do aid interventions 
influence the livelihood options that people have in Huíla province, Angola?  
 
The main research question is further translated into the following sub-research questions: 
 What are people’s past and current livelihoods and how have they been affected and 
influenced by crisis? 
 How have different aid interventions influenced and transformed the livelihood 
options that people have nowadays? 
 How do agencies with different mandates analyse and organize their interventions and 
how does the livelihood approach fit into the everyday practice of humanitarian 
agencies? 
 
The chapter combines the theoretical approaches to understanding outcomes of aid, and the 
debates surrounding linking relief to development, with the empirical material collected on 
changes in rural livelihoods in Huíla. Fieldwork for this research has been conducted in six 
villages in the municipalities of Chibia and Caluquembe in Huíla province. The fieldwork in 
these villages entailed participant observation of everyday livelihood practices of its 
inhabitants, their individual and collective histories and interfaces pertaining to conflict, 
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displacement, state and aid. Historical ethnography was used as a tool to investigate not only 
people’s individual life histories spanning colonial times, the conflict and post-conflict 
period, but the way the village, or that particular locality, had changed and evolved over the 
last years. The empirical data was collected during fieldwork in 2007 and 2008, and uncover 
distinct differences in livelihood recovery and the roles that different actors played in this 
process.  
 
 
Changes in livelihoods through colonialism, conflict and displacement 
 
In this thesis I have followed Ellis’ definition of a livelihood as the way an individual or 
household makes a living through the assets, activities and access to these assets and 
activities (2000a, 10). I distinguished between conceptualizing livelihoods as field of study 
opposed to livelihood approaches as a narrowly defined and schematically presented policy 
construct. Livelihoods are influenced by internal decisions and actions of the individuals and 
households, but also by the external social, economic, political and institutional changes 
surrounding them. Livelihoods are dynamic and fluid and people adapt their livelihoods to 
respond to these changes, sometimes forcibly so (Kaag et al. 2004). Conflict and colonialism 
define, and narrow down the parameters within which people can make choices with regards 
to their livelihoods, as well as affect the availability of material and immaterial resources 
necessary to sustain the household. I have argued that they also co-shape the way livelihood 
recovery takes place. 
 
 
Colonialism and conflict in the everyday lives of rural people 
In Angola, decades of political upheaval have severely affected people’s livelihoods. 
Colonial occupation by the Portuguese had been steadily extended in the country since 
the16
th
 century, and was characterized by extensive slave trade, which after its official 
abolishment in 1878 was replaced by a system of forced labour continuing to certain degrees 
until the end of colonialism in Angola in 1975 (Birmingham 1978, Bender 1978). After the 
transatlantic slave trade had ended, on which the colonial economy of Angola was built for a 
long period of time, other economic activities caused shifts in the rural areas, which affected 
the rural livelihoods of the population in significant ways. Angola was turned into a 
plantation economy of rubber, sisal, cotton and coffee primarily. To cater to the labour needs 
of the Portuguese plantation owners, a system of forced labour was used, which effectively 
was one of the many waves of displacement that the Angolan population encountered 
throughout its history. As demonstrated in chapter 6, people in Chibia became drawn into the 
system of forced labour both by working on the fazendas in the municipality itself, or being 
transferred to plantations in the north of the country. Inhabitants of Cue 1, a village in 
Caluquembe, were enrolled in a planned agricultural development scheme called a colonato. 
Effectively this meant they had to work on both a plantation type structure, with seeds and 
tools provided for by the colonial managers, as well as maintain their own fields. Although it 
meant an additional labour burden on the households, some elderly people in Cue 1 
appreciated the benefits that the colonato structure gave in terms of additional produce, and 
the greater availability of goods and agricultural inputs provided for by the Portuguese 
managers of the colonato.  
In 1975, due to a revolution in Portugal and ensuing political reforms, the road to 
Angolan independence was paved. With the declaration of independence, most Portuguese 
left the country, leading to a collapse of many features of the rural economy such as trading 
mechanisms, availability of commodities and agricultural inputs, industries, and employment 
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options. Although the exploitative colonial features had also disappeared, the conflict that 
emerged after independence led to a neglect of the rural economy and massive dispossession, 
with no reinsertion of new trade mechanisms, goods and industries.   
Immediately after independence in 1975 a power struggle ensued amongst the three main 
nationalist movements, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA which was the start of a civil war that 
caused death, destruction and displacement on a massive scale. The country was immersed in 
a civil war between MPLA and UNITA that lasted from 1975 until 2002, with peace intervals 
in 1991-1992 and 1994-1998 under the Bicesse and Lusaka peace accords respectively. 
Although the political economy of war approach has been helpful in understanding the 
interplay between resources and power, which certainly have shaped the course of the 
Angolan conflict, it overemphasizes a market-oriented explanation of war. It also neglects the 
local socio-cultural institutions through which conflict is produced. In chapter 3 of this thesis 
on the history of conflict in Angola, jointly written with Maliana Serrano, we instead have 
argued for an understanding of the conflict through a focus on the everyday realities of 
conflict, to better understand its micro-dynamics and the varied effects that the conflict has 
on the population. This was demonstrated through the case studies of four municipalities in 
Huíla province. Experiences of war have been varied in the different localities in the 
province, and the fieldwork uncovered these multiple realities of conflict and displacement. 
For example, in Caluquembe the war created massive population displacement, as the 
municipality had become at the centre of contention between MPLA and UNITA troops. 
Displacement in Caluquembe occurred in opposite directions, both from ‘bush’ to ‘town’ as 
well as the other way. In 1991 UNITA tried to take over local administration and effectively 
occupied the IESA mission and hospital, which became an important local institution through 
which local politics were played out. In 1994, MPLA bombed the hospital grounds and re-
occupied Caluquembe, after which local government was formed of both MPLA and UNITA 
members as part of the Government of National Unity. Chibia on the other hand had 
remained under MPLA control throughout the war and active conflict did not occur. Effects 
of the war were mostly seen in terms of displaced people that arrived, which increased local 
competition over land and employment. Also, basic service delivery diminished, access to the 
rest of the country became increasingly difficult, which had its effects on local livelihoods 
and the availability of goods and trade in the municipality.  
 
 
Colonialism, conflict, and displacement and their effects on livelihoods 
Colonial economic policies pushed rural livelihoods in specific directions. Forced labour and 
planned agricultural development schemes disconnected people from their families and 
livelihoods, and narrowed down the amount of time households could spend on their own 
livelihood activities. Agricultural production was steered towards certain cash crops such as 
coffee and wheat. The practices of bush traders indebted many local farmers and led to 
uneven competition with local traders, yet at the same time made commodities, trade and 
credit more widely available throughout rural societies. With the departure of the Portuguese 
in 1975, the rural economy collapsed, as important trade, commodities and industrial features 
disappeared with them. The conflict that followed Angolan independence further 
dispossessed the rural population of important assets for household survival in various ways. 
In Caluquembe, rural livelihoods came under direct attack. People were targeted by either 
MPLA or UNITA, killed or forced to fight with them. Their assets such as livestock and 
agricultural inputs, as well as other household possessions were stolen, or sold in order to 
generate cash for food. Farmers were sometimes forced to produce food for the troops if their 
village had become occupied by soldiers. Also, scorched earth tactics and the widespread 
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placing of landmines in agricultural fields further dispossessed local farmers of their land, 
making it a potentially life-threatening activity to undertake.  
 Displacement was widespread especially in villages in the municipality of 
Caluquembe. Whole villages were left abandoned, sometimes during decades. For their 
household survival they deployed a range of activities to generate food and income to sustain 
the households. Collection of firewood, making and selling charcoal and day labour on farms 
of others was undertaken frequently. People would either seek refuge in the municipal centre, 
move to other abandoned villages, or find their way to the provincial capital of Lubango. This 
not only dispossessed them of their assets further, as they could only take with them whatever 
they could carry by foot, but also disconnected them from their land and social networks. My 
research findings however also show that during the displacement period new networks 
would be formed that proved beneficial to households and villages as a whole during the 
livelihood recovery phase. For instance, new urban-rural linkages were created that provided 
market access and commercialization options. 
For people being displaced to other areas in the province, livelihood opportunities 
were dependent on the conditions they were to find. For the inhabitants of Bairro 11 de 
Novembro in Chibia, this meant they had to adapt their livelihoods to a surrounding in which 
agriculture was no longer an option. They adapted by negotiating access to the local market, 
pursuing trade, seeking semi-skilled labour opportunities, and arranging formal job 
employment. This type of livelihood adaptation extends mere ‘coping’. New livelihood 
activities were successfully incorporated in the household portfolio, even in situations where 
social assets are considered weak or non-existent. Displacement and the interaction amongst 
people with different traditions and practices, enables transformations of livelihood activities 
and sometimes even challenges gender roles.  
I conclude that livelihoods were affected in many ways by colonialism, conflict and 
displacement.  Assets were lost, opportunities diminished, and access to necessary inputs 
became increasingly hard. However, effects varied throughout the province. Some 
livelihoods were adapted to the new and changing circumstances in ways that have proven 
beneficial for household survival, especially in situations where external assistance to 
livelihood recovery was minimal as the following section of findings will show. 
 
 
Everyday practices of aid and livelihood recovery in Huíla  
 
Fieldwork in Caluquembe and Chibia offered insight into the manifold ways in which people 
reconstruct their own lives and livelihoods during and after conflict. They develop a variety 
of activities to deal with effects of the conflict on their livelihoods, some of which are 
deemed undesirable or unsustainable by the state and aid agencies. Examples of these 
activities range from collecting firewood, charcoal burning, weaving baskets for trade with 
neighbours, collecting fruits, vegetables and honey, working on fields of others, and labour 
migration. It is these activities through which people survive. Aid interventions form another 
livelihood strategy that gives people access to food, goods and activities necessary for 
household survival.  
Resettlement and recovery of livelihoods is what people do themselves and state and 
agencies interventions play an assisting role in this process. I have argued that there is a 
difference in process and outcome between villages in which self recovery, externally driven 
recovery and state recovery takes place. These three processes are not mutually exclusive or 
separated in practice, they can happen at the same time and become intertwined. However, as 
the case studies have shown, the extent to which these processes are set in motion and the 
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circumstances in which they take place, co-shape and determine the outcomes of livelihood 
recovery. 
 
 
History and everyday practices of aid 
The research focused on the different types of aid from the post-independence war starting in 
1975 onwards, and investigated the policies and everyday practice of humanitarian actors in 
Huíla province. The concept of a humanitarian arena was used to study the multiple actors 
that shape humanitarian interventions, with a focus on everyday practices instead of the 
normative framework of humanitarian principles that is intended to guide practice (Hilhorst 
and Jansen 2010). This follows from an actor-oriented approach in which interventions are 
viewed as interfaces where multiple actors meet and actively shape and negotiate the 
outcomes of aid (Long 2004).  
The humanitarian arena in Huíla consisted of a diversity of actors: local people, 
churches, state institutions, UN agencies and local and international aid agencies. Especially 
churches played significant and enduring roles in assisting the affected populations in the 
rural areas throughout the civil war. Only at the beginning of the 1990s did NGOs seriously 
enter the arena, enabled by several political transformations which allowed for the formation 
of a local civil society, and improved access for international agencies (Vidal 2009).  There 
were only a few organisations that incorporated development approaches in safe areas in the 
province during the conflict. The local NGO ADRA was one of the few organizations with a 
development approach since the beginning of the 1990s. During conflict the goals and 
objectives that humanitarian agencies put forward in Angola was to assist the population 
affected by the conflict by mainly providing food aid and basic health services. Aid kept 
people alive during this time, and to this day people remember the agencies that visited them 
regularly providing them with food, and occasionally setting up a health post in the area. 
Food aid was sometimes used to sell on markets if household needs were met in other ways, 
and people needed the cash for other goods.  
Objectives of humanitarian agencies during times of crisis differ by what the security 
situation allows. In the case of Angola, two peace accords (Bicesse, 1990-1991, and Lusaka, 
1994-1998) opened up the space to think about strategies for long-term improvement of 
people’s situations. Development thinking became increasingly relevant, especially so after 
the signing of the 2002 Luena peace accords. This required extensive organizational 
adaptation to the changing situation. Not every aid actor was sufficiently equipped in doing 
so, lacking the necessary finances and staff capacity to switch from relief to development. In 
Chibia only relief activities took place in the form of food aid or a one-time seeds and tools 
distribution. Linkages to rehabilitation and development were not made, and NGO presence 
quickly evaporated after 2002. In Caluquembe on the other hand, the biggest presence of aid 
agencies only started around 2002, making approaches to linking relief rehabilitation and 
development especially relevant in the context of large-scale resettlement of IDPs in the 
region. However, most agencies have not been able to extend their projects beyond the 
rehabilitation phase, leaving the intended aid process unfinished. Although attempts have 
been made to incorporate aid strategies within local governance structures such as the EDA, 
important socio-economic issues such as commercialization, access to markets and 
diversification have not been touched upon even though these had been specific project 
objectives for most agencies. The effects of this halted LRRD process on issues of livelihood 
recovery in Caluquembe is further elaborated in the section below.  
At the start of this research I assumed that the practice of labelling people as 
belonging to pre-set categories of beneficiaries, and subsequent targeting practices by aid 
agencies might have caused particular problems in villages. The idea that such labels as 
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“IDP” or “most vulnerable”, become self-perpetuating or that they are used to refer to other 
village members as being better off due to the fact that they had been labelled as returnee or 
demobilized soldiers, was proven not to be the case. People did not differentiate between “us” 
and “them” by using such labels, but rather stated that needs were general instead of different 
for one group or the other. People also did not distinguish between organizations with a 
humanitarian or development mandate. Assistance is assessed on quality and quantity, not on 
approaches or mandates. However, in the fieldwork villages there is one big exception when 
it comes to labels being relevant or not, and those are the political labels. People will 
continuously try and categorize others as belonging to either MPLA or UNITA. Any item of 
clothing or comment is interpreted as a sign of political affiliation. This labelling legacy from 
the war also affected particularly local staff of aid agencies in peacetime, which had 
consequences on the delivery of aid to particular villages. 
Beneficiaries of aid programmes are not simply receivers of aid, and aid is only part 
of a multitude of livelihood strategies that people deploy (Collinson 2003). They negotiate, 
use their knowledge, experiences, and agency, to transform the interventions in a way that 
suits their own aspirations. For instance, when beneficiaries trade the seeds and tools they 
received to make investments in other areas or for other purposes, this should not be seen as a 
failed intervention per se. It is rather a sign of people using these resources to pursue their 
own goals. Also, statement of need was interpreted by aid agency staff in Huíla province as a 
sign of dependency syndrome, instigated by prolonged periods of relief assistance. In this 
thesis I have argued that in fact it should be interpreted as active participation and negotiation 
in the aid process. The outcome of aid programmes depends on the beneficiaries’ agency and 
ensuing actions (Bakewell 2000). The notion of beneficiaries’ agency counters the idea that 
aid beneficiaries passively undergo an intervention. Rather, they give meaning to 
interventions, and shape them according to their experiences and aspiration. In this research 
interface analysis helped to uncover and understand these negotiation processes around 
interventions, and the way in which all actors actively participate in and co-shape aid 
processes. 
People’s perceptions of their own reality and problems usually do not fit neatly within 
the margins of what an aid programme has defined for them (Long 2004). Quick needs 
assessments also often do not capture an entire village population’s needs in relation to their 
livelihoods. Nonetheless a sense of community is something that many aid agencies rely on 
when they formulate (livelihood) programs. They set up seed banks and reimbursement 
systems that build on social ties and community structures that may no longer exist. I have 
argued that building programs on these assumptions of a community existing of social 
connections and mutual trust when they don’t exist in practice, negatively influences the 
outcomes of these aid interventions. By applying the concept of a humanitarian arena this 
research moved away from studying aid on the basis of humanitarian principles, but rather 
explained aid outcomes through the everyday practices of assistance by all actors, including 
local people.  
 
 
Self recovery 
As concluded from chapter 3, experiences and effects of the Angolan conflict were very 
diverse within the province, the municipalities and the villages itself. The research also 
uncovered the diversity in type of livelihoods that people have deployed over the years, and 
in different circumstances. There are some generalizations that can be made concerning the 
nature of livelihood activities in the two municipalities. Households in Chibia were holding a 
portfolio of activities ranging from small trade, employment, skilled labour and combining 
livestock rearing with small scale agriculture. Village inhabitants in Caluquembe, on the 
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other hand, depended solely on agricultural activities such as production of staple crops, and 
occasional beekeeping and fishing. Amongst the villages in either two municipalities the 
range and level of activities depended on factors such as: access to water and land, access to 
markets, agricultural inputs, and employment possibilities. For inhabitants of the villages in 
Chibia the reduced access to water and land, but the increased availability of trade and 
employment opportunities has led in a shift in their livelihoods from being purely 
agriculturally based to finding alternatives for diversification. The reversed seems to have 
happened in Caluquembe, where the only available shops and industries disappeared during 
the war, and where small scale agriculture has become the only option. This led to increased 
out-migration of youth, which felt themselves detached from agriculturally based livelihoods. 
In Caluquembe, the only options for youth that did not own land or wanted a future in 
agriculture was working for the state in the municipal administration or health and education 
sector. Trade, industry and formal employment opportunities were limited. In the fieldwork 
villages this was reflected by the lack of young people, who villagers said had often stayed 
behind in the urban centres during the resettlement process. This out-migration of youth to 
urban areas in turn has increased remittances flowing back into the area, as well as an 
increase in social networks. This increase in migration of youth after the war was also noted 
by Pacheco (2002) who argues that rural youth had increasingly become dissatisfied with the 
lack of basic services and projects aimed at youth specifically, and that rapid urbanization in 
Angola therefore cannot be explained by displacement during conflict alone but also by 
migration of youth that no longer feel at home in the post-conflict rural society. 
Livelihood recovery in Caluquembe commenced when the Angolan war was still on-
going, but where people found pockets of relative stability back in their villages or at places 
they had fled to. This recovery process increased after the war officially ended in 2002, with 
the resettlement of people to their areas of origin. The decision to resettle and rebuild 
livelihoods in the area of origin is dependent on numerous factors: context, networks, and 
peoples’ differentiated opportunities and desires (Collinson 2003). Moreover, people were 
not always confident that even this peace would last, and decided to await the results of the 
2008 parliamentary elections. Most resettled households were able to start food production 
relatively fast, and five years after the end of the war households had not only become food 
secure, but were able to sell some of their produce. One village in Chibia stood out as an 
exception in which livelihood recovery had not taken place. The inhabitants of the village of 
Nonguelengue are in a situation today that resembles the circumstances in which people in 
the other villages found themselves during the conflict: dependent on food aid and 
disconnected from their livelihoods. Still, they too have shown resilience in finding 
alternative ways to ensure household survival. Relying on their hunting and gathering skills 
they manage to find little food stuffs around the village. Also, trade and procuring day labour 
with their neighbours they are able to obtain some extra income.  
 The research in Chibia shows that people have gone through a process of self-
recovery of livelihoods, and that NGO interventions are not indispensable to rebuild 
livelihoods but rather play either supporting or redirecting roles. With redirecting I mean that 
aid programs often have little space and flexibility in supporting those livelihood activities 
that fall outside of the agricultural production interventions, and as such either only assist 
farmers, or motivate people with other types of skills or experiences into the direction of 
farming.  The fact that seeds and tools programs in the end were not possible in Bairro 11 de 
Novembro due to lack of land and water, has resulted in a further lack of support for the 
activities they have developed on their own throughout the years.  This village can therefore 
be seen as an example of self recovery, in that the inhabitants managed to establish new 
networks through which employment and trade opportunities became available without 
having been targeted directly by interventions aimed at the recovery of livelihoods. 
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Reconstruction is a societal process; it is not something that can only be done by outside 
actors (Hilhorst 2007). 
In this research I have argued for the need to understand the resilience of people in 
Chibia and Caluquembe, and how they manage to recover and diversify their livelihoods 
during and after a conflict that left many dispossessed and destitute. The importance of social 
networks and access to these networks have been proven to be essential elements in these 
recovery processes. I conclude that the range of activities deployed in times of crisis differed 
considerable amongst the six villages, and that the width of activities developed depends on a 
range of contextual factors such as availability of markets, and access to land and water. 
Furthermore, it is in the midst of this diversity of activities that aid actors come in, and where 
unfounded assumptions on a common denominator in rural livelihoods dictate the 
interventions that take shape.  
 
 
Externally driven recovery 
The humanitarian agencies that were present in Caluquembe played vital roles in aiding the 
displaced to resettle in their areas of origin, and assisting the livelihood recovery processes. 
However, the idea that rural post-conflict rehabilitation is a broadly pre-defined package, as 
Green and Ahmed (1999) have suggested, seems to ring particularly true when looking at the 
ensuing interventions. The livelihood recovery process was characterized by a singular focus 
on providing seeds, tools and livestock to the population. The seeds that were handed out 
were almost exclusively for maize and beans, traditionally strong subsistence crops in the 
region. The seeds and tools programmes developed by humanitarian agencies seemed to have 
followed the logic focusing on traditional food consumption patterns and quick crop results. 
Commercially valuable crops were left out of the projects, aside from two development 
organizations that experimented with coffee production and soy as pilot projects. Due to the 
distribution of seeds and promotion of increased maize and beans production the rural 
landscape of Caluquembe nowadays is dominated by these crops. I have argued that the next 
step towards commercialization and access to markets has been largely neglected in aid 
interventions. The surplus maize and beans that are being offered on the markets today are of 
a very low economic value, and there are insufficient means to access more lucrative markets 
in urban areas where the value of the produce would be higher. The result is that although 
people are mostly self-sufficient in terms of their daily food needs, they have little options to 
diversify, by making investments in other livelihood terrains. I conclude that very little 
attention has been paid to livelihoods that fall outside the agricultural realm by humanitarian 
and development agencies. There have been some projects focusing on skills training but 
these were mainly intended for reintegration purposes of ex-combatants, who would then also 
receive kits and sometimes credit to start their small businesses. 
Especially youths were not included by using this strategy, as they often had no 
experience with agriculture since having stayed in IDP camps or urban centres during the 
conflict. The practice of encouraging maize production has also had a significant impact on 
women’s livelihoods, as they are often responsible for maize production which is very labour 
intensive. Because of the overreliance on maize, market prices have dropped significantly, 
leaving households very vulnerable to shocks. The agencies practice of handing out maize 
seeds have therefore increased women’s labour burden, as well as reduced possibilities to 
diversify their livelihoods.  
In this research I have argued that a singular focus by NGOs on enhancing agricultural 
production without taking into account access to markets and support of on- and non-farm 
diversification, and has left rural livelihoods in Caluquembe uniform with little possibilities 
to be raised beyond subsistence level. Although NGOs in Caluquembe have played 
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significant roles in terms of creating food security in the area, there has been little attention 
for livelihood diversification and creating commercial opportunities with which people can 
move away from rural poverty. I conclude that livelihood recovery processes in Caluquembe 
have been very much externally driven by NGOs, directing farmers into a specific type of 
crop production.  
 
 
State recovery 
The reconstruction plans and projects of the state, and the way in which these efforts affected 
people’s livelihoods in the post-war-reconstruction phase in both positive and negative ways 
is what I have called state recovery. Reconstruction by the state in Angola has been most 
visible through the big road reconstruction projects and agricultural development projects 
which need high technological and financial inputs, and have not targeted households 
directly. For example, the Sogangelas project in Chibia has been inclusive for only a few 
farmers, while at the same time disconnecting many others from access to their land and 
water. The rehabilitation of roads has been prioritized under the assumption that once roads 
are connecting some of the rural areas to urban centres, development will automatically 
follow. Furthermore, both road rehabilitation and agricultural development projects are 
indicative of the Angolan state’s discourse on the country’s reconstruction which tends to 
reflect an overreliance on large-scale and high-tech strategies towards rural development. 
Creating limited and often temporary employment possibilities, they have often created 
processes of dispossession and displacement for the rural poor that stand in the way of these 
projects, as the examples in Chibia have shown.  
State involvement in reconstruction processes is essential, and the idea should be to 
support and stimulate further re-establishment of the state’s involvement in the rural areas. 
However, when the state is seen to prioritize the development of other terrains, and the rural 
areas are left isolated and abandoned, what further role can be expected of aid agencies in 
such situations? To what extent can and should aid agencies intervene when the state is either 
absent or does not take responsibility with regards to supporting rural livelihoods. If the 
objective of an aid agency is to improve people’s livelihoods, supporting it half-way and then 
hoping that someone will take over from there is insufficient. Efforts should be made to 
effectively integrate, coordinate and follow up these efforts with local institutions and civil 
society in order to finish a process of LRRD, instead of leaving its conclusion up to chance. 
Unfortunately this is not so much the unwillingness of the aid agencies as it is the lack of 
funding sources and mechanisms to ensure that aid processes can be maintained to reach their 
full objectives. Also, considering that, as in the case of Angola, NGOs have approached 
livelihood recovery on a micro level through much targeted distributions of seeds and tools, 
whereas the state focuses its attention on macro level reconstruction with more indirect 
effects on livelihoods, what then happens at the meso-level? One could assume this is where 
private investment and the market play a more prominent role. Yet, especially in more 
isolated areas such as Caluquembe, private investment in, for instance, industries were non-
existent, markets were difficult to reach, and reconstruction projects were more or less 
restricted to a road being rehabilitated. Aid agencies in Angola have taken on the role of 
assisting smallholders in the resettlement and recovery phase, trying to engage the state in 
that process, yet were unable to establish linkages with the meso level though industry and 
markets.  
On the one hand, aid interventions by NGOs have been conceptualized through the 
‘yeoman farmer fallacy’ or ‘small farm first’ assumptions on rural livelihoods (Farrington 
1998, Ellis 2000, Ellis and Biggs 2001). On the other hand, state policies on rehabilitation of 
rural society have approached this mainly through large-scale agricultural development 
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projects and infrastructure (Kyle 2005). In between these two opposing approaches to rural 
rehabilitation and development a whole grey area lies, where the local population has 
diversified and adapted their livelihoods to the changing circumstances, and in which 
interventions by NGOs and state play either minimal or sometimes constraining roles. 
 
 
Four popular myths in post-war recovery processes  
In this final section of the conclusion I will discuss four popular myths which have dominated 
the post-war recovery processes and discourses in Angola. 
 
1. People in crisis survive by deploying negative coping strategies. 
Coping strategies are defined as a consequence of steps that households take to deal with the 
effects of crisis, and are characterized by risk-taking behaviour and short-term solutions that 
negatively affect the household’s future (Ellis 2000a, Corbett 1988). This in contrast to 
livelihood strategies that are considered more sustainable and do not compromise a 
households future ability to deal with shocks. Displacement is considered one of the ultimate 
coping strategies that people undertake when faced with conflict, which severely increases a 
household’s socio-economic vulnerability.  
In this thesis I have made the case for a different view on the way people live through 
crisis than mere coping or survival. First of all, crisis does not hit all regions of a conflict-
affected country equally, there always remain pockets of stability in which people to a certain 
extent maintain their daily lives, routines and livelihoods. Apart from the people that make 
benefit from war economies, people also suffer from the negative and destructive effects of 
conflict. Again, the severity varies per location and household, but often revolves around 
direct effects of violence, hunger and presence of landmines, to more institutional factors that 
lessen the availability of goods, trade and services. The majority of people affected by war do 
not just sit around and wait for aid to come as their only strategy to deal with crisis. They 
actively seek opportunities to complement or replace their livelihoods activities when some 
activities become impossible to pursue due to violence, risk and uncertainty. Replacing these 
activities with new ones, I argue, is not necessarily always a negative and unwanted outcome. 
Displacement, although mostly considered the worst possible outcome of war and coping 
strategies, can in some instances be a well-considered livelihood strategy called labour 
migration. Examples from this thesis show that as practicing agriculture becomes 
increasingly difficult, working on the informal markets in urban areas, or at mining 
companies in neighbouring provinces, can be a valuable and effective contribution to the 
household economy and an investment in the future. As I noted in Caluquembe, the social 
networks that were formed during displacement and migration was proven to be a decisive 
factor in opening up trade opportunities in the post-conflict period, from which whole 
villages benefitted. In conclusion, people actively seek ways to deal with crisis, and 
dismissing all the activities that occur during wartime as coping strategies or survival ignores 
the manifold ways in which people pursue new activities that can actually contribute to rural 
economies and households in the long-term. By paying more attention to self recovery 
processes, aid interventions can more adequately deal with people’s varying needs during and 
after conflict. 
  
2. Build roads and development will follow. 
In 2003 the Government of Angola presented its plan for post-conflict reconstruction of the 
country. In the Estrategia de Combate A Pobreza (ECP, or Strategy to Combat Poverty) 
several priority areas for poverty reduction were identified, ranging from basic infrastructures 
to social reinsertion. Although strengthening the rural economy was considered an essential 
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component, also to relieve the pressures on the urban centres caused by displacement during 
the war, food security and rural development was one of the least financed priority areas. 
Rather, Angola’s national reconstruction efforts have manifested itself primarily in rebuilding 
the country’s basic infrastructure, with a main focus on urban areas. In some rural areas in 
Huíla, the rehabilitation of roads was the first and only visible sign of the state’s attention in 
decades. Building roads was prioritized under the assumption that once roads reconnect the 
rural areas to urban centres, access to markets is ensured and development will automatically 
follow.  
However, this development has of yet taken place. Although roads have or are in the 
process of being built, the rural areas continue to suffer from an overriding lack of goods, 
services, employment and trade. Roads alone will not ensure people’s access to assets, 
institutions such as markets or the ability to gain sufficient financial means to arrange 
transportation of goods. Moreover, as I have argued in chapter 6 on the state’s reconstruction 
projects in Chibia, the rebuilding of roads has also facilitated the transportation of produce 
from neighbouring countries such as Namibia, which can lead to a situation in which local 
farmers actually have to increasingly compete with cheap food imports. Therefore, 
rehabilitation of roads does not necessarily lead to development, it can actually run counter to 
it. If the rebuilding of roads are accompanied by a more holistic vision and strategy on 
revitalizing the rural economy, making the country less dependent on food imports, and 
actually strengthening local farmers transportation, commercialization and production 
capacities, then roads could certainly contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable rural 
economic development. However, asphalt alone does not automatically make development 
happen. 
 
3. Seeds and tools are the most logical and effective ways of linking relief to 
development. 
The overwhelming majority of aid responses to post-conflict rural areas in Angola have 
consisted of seeds and tools programs. Two thirds of the NGOs in Lubango were 
implementing seeds and tools programmes in the province, with the other one third involved 
in health, demining and educational projects. NGOs were approaching resettlement programs, 
and the food security and rural development domain exclusively by means of seeds and tools 
programmes, often in the same localities and making the same crop choices; maize and beans. 
As shown in this thesis, this response has led to a form of externally driven recovery in 
which all local farmers only produce maize and beans, with little ability to sell their excess 
produce and are competing with each other on local markets. I have argued that this has not 
led to a state of development as envisaged under a LRRD approach. In fact it has led to a 
uniform rural society, with little opportunities for diversification, and in which most available 
household labour is absorbed by subsistence agriculture alone. Combined with the lack of 
institutional and industrial developments it leaves the inhabitants vulnerable to new shocks.  
Seed aid has become one of the most popular aid responses over the last years, and is seen 
as an intervention that can “do no harm”, despite evidence of disruptions of local markets and 
seed systems and a relative lack of evaluations of long-term outcomes (Sperling and Mcguire 
2010). In Huíla, organizational-wide assumptions about agriculture as the only right 
livelihood option, funding restrictions and a lack of coordination amongst the organizations 
and local governments seem to have played into the one-size-fits-all response. Furthermore, 
seeds and tools programs do not automatically lead to development. Due to rapidly 
disappearing funding modalities, little capacity building of local NGOs, and a local 
government that either lacks the capacity or resources to effectively continue where the 
NGOs have left, the LRRD process was not finished. There is a need to critically assess the 
assumptions on desirable livelihoods in these contexts. Who defines what ‘normal 
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livelihoods’ are in post-conflict recovery processes, which transitions take place along the 
way, and how do these underlying assumptions inform the shape and directions that 
interventions and people’s future activities take. 
 
4. Humanitarian aid is fundamentally different from other forms of aid. 
Humanitarian action is characterized as the alleviation of human suffering, lacking political 
motivation, led by humanitarian principles and short-term in nature. One of the main 
differences between humanitarian and development aid is that the former tends to focus on 
targeting individuals instead of societies, and little engagement with state institutions. 
For aid beneficiaries, the approaches of agencies with different mandates appeared 
similar in practice. Food aid was given by both types of organizations during the war, and 
resettlement programmes carrying similar programme components of basic service delivery, 
health, education and livelihood recovery through seeds and tools were implemented 
irrespective of differing organizational mandates or principles. Interventions were often long-
term in nature, focusing on rural societies and villages instead of specific individuals, and 
especially during the last period state engagement was actively sought by relief organisations.  
LRRD processes were internalized by organisations rather than coordinated amongst 
organizations and institutions whose mandates would have made them more suitable for one 
end of the spectrum rather than the other.  
This research has shown that humanitarian and development aid have increasingly 
converged. Not only do their policies and practices move towards the same domains, 
organizational decision-making processes have become more similar, and the normative 
framework of humanitarian principles have lost some of its significance in setting agencies 
apart from each other. Neutrality was not an overall guiding principle for humanitarians in 
Huíla, but interpreted flexibly and pragmatically as a way to ensure staff safety and get access 
to affected populations and which could be ignored if it would stand in the way of getting the 
job done. In conclusion, the labels of development and humanitarian aid were not significant 
in the context of Huíla, and in policies and practice these labels have increasingly become 
intertwined.  
   
 
If recovery and reconstruction is meant to return to the situation of before the war, 
‘normality’ so to say, then in the Angolan context this means returning to forced labour, 
planned agricultural production and unequal and exploitative trading mechanisms which 
characterized the era of colonial rule. Who decides what direction livelihood recovery should 
take. And moreover, what aims and objectives can be expected from aid agencies when it 
comes to livelihood recovery in this context? Is rebuilding what was there at some particular 
point in time sufficient, or could the principles of ‘building back better’ also apply when it 
comes to livelihood recovery? Building back better would then come to include a more 
holistic approach to rural livelihoods, and attention to the diversity in experiences and 
aspirations that rural people have with regards to their livelihoods. In my opinion, agencies 
that start LRRD approaches should have the ambition to build back better, instead of aiming 
for pre-conflict ‘normality’. Development as an end-objective is more than maintaining a 
status-quo, it is about improving the socio-economic wellbeing of populations, which 
includes reducing people’s vulnerability to shocks. As it now stands, this end-objective has 
not been realized in Huíla province.   
In conclusion, this research has been about uncovering diversity. The diversity of 
conflict experiences, displacement movements, aid actors, and most importantly the diversity 
of rural people and their livelihood practices. People themselves reconstruct, and efforts to 
assist that reconstruction process should be built on the notion of local ownership and social 
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differentiation, as well as better integration, coordination and follow up with the available 
local institutions and civil society actors to ensure that aid processes can fully reach their 
intended objectives of supporting socio-economic development in rural areas. 
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Summary 
 
 
In this thesis I examined the ways in which rural people in Huíla province, Angola, have dealt 
with crises and adapted their livelihoods accordingly. These responses and adaptations to 
crises are then juxtaposed against the variety of interventions by state and aid agencies which 
affect rural livelihoods in broad terms. The Angolan population has lived through a long 
history of conflict, starting with an independence war against Portugal since 1961, and 
evolving into a civil war from the start of independence in 1975 lasting until 2002. 
Throughout this violent history, humanitarian actors made a significant range of interventions 
with the intention to alleviate the suffering of the country’s population and help them rebuild 
their lives and livelihoods after the end of the war in 2002. In this thesis I analysed these 
interventions, especially related to the recovery of rural livelihoods, to understand the 
assumptions underlying them, as well as their outcomes. 
The core question that guided the research underlying this thesis was the following: 
How are people’s livelihoods affected in times of crisis, and how do aid interventions 
influence the livelihood options that people have in Huíla province, Angola? In my analysis I 
used the concept of a humanitarian arena in order to 1) acknowledge the diversity of actors 
that shape the outcomes of aid processes, 2) move away from normative explanations of aid 
and rather focus on its everyday practices, and 3) focus on the negotiations, experiences and 
agency of the actors at the interface at which processes of aid are shaped. This builds on an 
actor-oriented approach which calls attention to agency, actors and interfaces to explain that 
planned development is rarely a linear process but rather a site of struggles and negotiations 
amongst a variety of actors. The fieldwork underlying this thesis was done in six villages 
with different experiences of conflict, aid, and livelihoods.    
This research has analysed the everyday realities and outcomes of post-war recovery 
and reconstruction practices by aid agencies and the Angolan state. It shows how aid 
programmes that focus on resettlement of conflict-affected populations and rebuilding of 
rural livelihoods can have unintended consequences when little attention is given to follow up 
of these activities that were assumed to lead to development. At the same time, the research 
shows how state post-war reconstruction efforts by the state largely bypass rural areas, or at 
worst even lead to renewed displacement from land and livelihoods. Therefore, the title of 
this thesis reiterates that livelihoods in conflict and post-conflict situations continuously 
move between crisis and normality, yet that this phenomenon is not necessarily linked to war 
itself. Also, the use of the word normality underscores the underlying assumptions on which 
aid interventions are designed in processes of livelihood recovery: a return to normality. One 
can question what ‘normal’ livelihoods are in the Angolan context of long-term instability. 
Also, who defines normality? As shown in this thesis, aid actors have had quite uniform and 
fixed assumptions and interpretations about what ‘normal’ rural livelihoods should look like, 
reflected in the one-size-fits-all interventions that consequently took place.  
Chapter 1 starts with an introduction to the research objectives, questions and 
methodologies. It describes the process through which the six villages for fieldwork were 
selected, by taking into account the varied experiences with conflict and aid. This research 
has relied on mostly qualitative methods such as participant observation, life histories and a 
comparative analysis of livelihood processes and outcomes in six villages. Choices that have 
been made in terms of research focus as well as fieldwork are explained. Furthermore, this 
chapter shows some of the personal difficulties and experiences that have marked the 
fieldwork in Angola in various ways.  
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In chapter 2 I introduce and define the conceptual framework underlying the data in 
the remainder of this thesis. I look at the concept of livelihoods as comprising the assets and 
activities that people employ to make a living, and the access to these (Ellis 2000a, 10). I 
deviate from the policy construct of a livelihoods approach, which tends to define livelihoods 
by a restricted focus on the various capitals. Rather, I have looked at livelihoods as being 
more flexible in nature in which the disappearance of some assets can be dealt with by 
strengthening others. Livelihoods are fluid and flexible, and certainly have to be so in 
situations of crisis and conflict. Aid in this thesis is seen as one of the many strategies that 
people rely on for their survival in times of crisis. The chapter starts with an overview of the 
notion of humanitarian aid, its principles and changing practice due to the more protracted 
nature of the crisis situations it operates in. This has demanded the incorporation of 
rehabilitation and development approaches, translated in a stronger engagement with the 
state, and a shift from a focus on individuals to society. I question the practices of Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approaches when it is uncertain whether 
intervention objectives can be attained or processes have to be abandoned. This thesis sheds 
light on the consequences of such unfinished LRRD processes.  
In chapter 3, jointly written with Maliana Serrano, we have analysed the history of the 
Angolan conflict in order to shed light on the socio-economic impact in the country. We 
demonstrate that the motivations and dynamics of war changed continuously due to the major 
developments over time, and the various internal and external forces that influenced the 
course of war. We have argued for understanding conflict in Angola through a political 
economy of war perspective, focusing on issues of power and wealth. Furthermore, power 
relations and wealth distribution become visible through studying socio-cultural institutions, 
which demands a focus on the local level in which the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped 
and played out. By analysing four cases from different municipalities in Huíla province we 
have shown the diversity of experiences and effects of war. A limited understanding of these 
differentiated everyday realities of war can inform assumptions about people’s needs during 
as well as after conflict, but may lead to standardised humanitarian and political responses, 
without taking into account local capacities in areas or periods of relative stability. 
An analysis of Angola’s colonial history, as done in chapter 4, is essential in 
understanding the current processes of rural development. Rural livelihoods and institutions 
today are the result of the parameters which the colonial state set and enforced during its rule, 
and are further shaped by the effects of the civil war which ensued after independence. In this 
chapter the major colonial policies are explained, and highlighted by the local manifestations 
of colonial rule in the rural area of Huíla province. The analysis of colonial history in Angola 
shows how its policies had profound negative effects on rural societies by indebting the local 
population through taxation, forced labour contracts, land grabbing and uneven competition. 
However, with the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola, the rural trading system which 
also ensured people’s access to credit, seeds and employment also collapsed and was not 
replaced by a new Angolan rural development policy, as the country was engulfed by war. In 
this chapter I have argued that the state’s current post-conflict reconstruction plans bare a 
strong resemblance to the former colonial policies, by only focusing on large-scale 
agricultural development schemes and rebuilding infrastructure, with the last point having its 
primary focus on rebuilding major cities and ports along the coast at the expense of the rural 
area.  
Chapters 5 and 6 contain the empirical data from fieldwork in six villages in the two 
municipalities Caluquembe (chapter 5) and Chibia (chapter 6). Both chapters start with the 
history and local experiences with colonialism, conflict and aid interventions. By analysing 
the data from semi-structured interviews and surveys done in the six villages I present an 
overview of the type of livelihoods that have emerged in these localities, and the different 
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factors that played a role throughout time. The municipalities serve as case studies as they 
represent very different histories, processes and outcomes with regards to livelihoods and aid. 
Caluquembe was heavily affected by conflict, control over the area was violently fought over 
by MPLA and UNITA, creating several waves of displacement in different directions. Most 
people had to cease working on their land and start collecting firewood, working on farms of 
others, migrate, or seek other alternative strategies for household survival during the war and 
consequent displacement. During the resettlement period many NGOs worked in the region, 
and mostly assisted the population through the distribution of seeds and tools. These seeds 
and tools programmes have led to what I call a process of externally driven recovery. 
Because of the undiversified crop production, people within villages now have to compete 
with each other to get the same type of produce sold or traded at the same locations, and are 
more vulnerable to natural hazards destroying their livelihood base. As Chibia had not been 
at the centre of fighting, major aid interventions never took place in Chibia, apart from 
occasional food assistance by WFP and MINARS when cyclical droughts and famines 
affected the region. The comparison between the three villages in Chibia show that the 
village that had received the most assistance in the past (Bairro 11 de Novembro) currently 
seem to have the most diversified livelihood options. However, the agriculture-biased type of 
assistance was unrelated to the mostly non-agricultural livelihood activities that were 
developed. The only village that was still receiving food aid, Nonguelengue, was hit not by 
war, but by modernity. Livelihoods in Chibia are the results of processes of self and state 
recovery. The role of the state in Chibia was very strong, and its national reconstruction 
programmes were giving people more, but often temporary, employment options. Yet, at the 
same time the state made certain livelihoods impossible, either intentionally or 
unintentionally.  
Chapter 7 discusses the history of aid in Angola and the humanitarian arena in Huíla 
province. Through an analysis of the interface between aid givers and aid beneficiaries 
organizational discourses on the dependency syndrome are uncovered that downgrade and 
deny people’s agency. The chapter also highlights aid organisations’ everyday practices and 
uses of the humanitarian principle of neutrality, which is often translated into issues of access 
and safety, and which continues to be relevant in peacetime. By comparing two NGOs that 
were operational in Huíla province, organizational adaptation in the post-conflict context of 
Angola is investigated, serving as an example of LRRD processes in everyday organizational 
practice.   
Chapter 8 focuses on reconstruction and recovery processes in post-war Angola. 
In this chapter I argue that although conflict and displacement have had significant effects on 
the livelihoods choices people make, state and aid agencies have further limited or redirected 
the livelihood options in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. Taking the example of seeds 
and tools programmes I argue that in the case of Caluquembe, aid assistance has created a 
rather uniform social stratum of small scale farmers with little opportunity to diversify their 
livelihoods and unable to rise beyond subsistence level. On the other hand, state 
reconstruction has been narrow in its focus, mostly urban-focused and with the underlying 
assumption that rebuilding roads will automatically lead to development in the rural areas.  
Concluding this thesis, in chapter 9 answers are provided to the research questions by 
showing the history of Huíla province in terms of conflict and aid, and an analysis of how the 
diversity of self-, state- and externally driven recovery processes have come together and 
what the outcomes have been of those processes on the livelihoods of people in post-conflict 
Angola.  
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Samenvatting 
 
 
In dit proefschrift heb ik de manieren geanalyseerd waarop de plattelandsbevolking in de 
provincie Huíla, Angola, crises hebben doorstaan en hun bestaansmiddelen en manieren van 
levensonderhoud (livelihoods) daaraan hebben aangepast. Daarnaast heb ik hun reacties en 
aanpassingen gesteld tegenover de verscheidenheid aan interventies van staat en 
hulporganisaties welke in brede zin betrekking hebben op deze rurale methoden van bestaan. 
De bevolking van Angola heeft een lange geschiedenis van conflicten ondergaan welke 
begon met een onafhankelijkheidsstrijd met Portugal sinds 1961 die uitmondde in een 
burgeroorlog welke woedde vanaf het begin van de onafhankelijkheid in 1975 tot aan 2002. 
Gedurende deze gewelddadige periode hebben humanitaire hulpinstanties een waaier aan 
interventies op touw gezet om het lijden van het Angolese volk te lenigen en hen te helpen, 
hun leven en hun middelen van levensonderhoud weer op te bouwen na het einde van de 
oorlog in 2002. In dit proefschrift heb ik een analyse van deze interventies gemaakt, met 
name die welke gericht waren op het herstel van de bestaansmethoden van de 
plattelandsbevolking, om inzicht te krijgen in de uitgangspunten van de interventies alsmede 
in de resultaten ervan. 
De kernvraag welke in het onderzoek werd gesteld dat aan dit proefschrift ten 
grondslag ligt was de volgende: Op welke wijze wordt in tijden van crises het dagelijkse 
bestaan van mensen aangetast en hoe beïnvloeden hulpprogramma’s de 
bestaansmogelijkheden van de bevolking van de provincie Huíla, Angola? In mijn analyse 
heb ik het model van een humanitaire arena gebruikt met als doelen 1) aandacht te vestigen 
op de verscheidenheid aan actoren waardoor de resultaten van de processen van 
hulpverlening tot stand zijn gekomen, 2) de normatieve verklaringen van hulpverlening te 
mijden en liever de dagelijkse praktijk van hulpprogramma’s  onder de loep te nemen, en 3) 
de onderhandelingen, ervaringen en rollen te beschouwen van de diverse actoren op het vlak 
waar hulpverleningsprocessen hun vorm krijgen. Uitgangspunt bij deze analyse is de 
zogenaamde ‘actor’ benadering, waarbij de rollen, actoren en speelveld worden uitgelicht om 
te laten zien dat geplande ontwikkeling zelden een lineair proces is maar veeleer een toneel 
van strijd en onderhandelingen tussen uiteenlopende actoren. Het veldonderzoek voor dit 
proefschrift werd uitgevoerd in zes dorpen met verschillende ervaringsgeschiedenissen van 
conflict, soorten van hulp en manieren van levensonderhoud. 
Dit onderzoek behelsde het analyseren van de dagelijkse werkelijkheid en de 
resultaten van de herstel- en wederopbouwprogramma’s welke na de oorlog door 
hulporganisaties en de Angolese staat in gang waren gezet. Het legt bloot hoe 
hulpprogramma’s gericht op hervestiging van groepen van mensen die door conflicten zijn 
getroffen en op herstel van middelen en methoden van bestaan, tot onvoorziene uitkomsten 
kunnen leiden wanneer onvoldoende aandacht wordt geschonken aan een follow-up van deze 
activiteiten die geacht werden ‘ontwikkeling’ tot stand te brengen. Tezelfdertijd laat het 
onderzoek zien dat de naoorlogse herstelprogramma’s van de staat de landelijke gebieden 
grotendeels overslaan, of er in de slechtste gevallen zelfs toe kunnen leiden dat mensen 
opnieuw van huis en haard worden verdreven. Daarom verwijst de titel van dit proefschrift 
naar de bevinding dat de mogelijkheden van bestaan en levensonderhoud in situaties van 
conflicten en hun nasleep zich voortdurend bewegen tussen crisis en normaliteit, maar dat 
van een direct verband met oorlog zelf geen sprake hoeft te zijn. Tevens  bevestigt het 
gebruik van het woord normaliteit wat de veronderstellingen zijn waarop hulpprogramma’s 
worden toegesneden in het proces van het herstel van levensonderhoud en bestaansmiddelen: 
een terugkeer naar normaliteit. Men kan zich afvragen wat ‘normale’ manieren van leven en 
bestaansonderhoud zijn in de Angolese context van de langdurige periode van instabiliteit. 
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Bovendien, wie definieert ‘normaliteit’? Dit proefschrift laat zien dat actoren in de 
humanitaire arena tamelijk uniforme en rigide opvattingen en interpretaties hebben van wat 
als ‘normale’ wijzen van bestaan beschouwd behoort te worden, zoals blijkt uit de dertien-in-
een-dozijn interventies die plaatsvonden met deze veronderstellingen als uitgangspunt. 
Hoofdstuk 1 begint met een inleiding tot de doelen, de vragen en de methodologie van 
het onderzoek. Het beschrijft het proces van het selecteren van de zes dorpen voor het 
veldonderzoek, waarbij de uiteenlopende ervaringen met conflict en hulp een rol speelden. 
Dit onderzoek heeft voornamelijk van kwalitatieve methoden gebruik gemaakt zoals 
participerende observatie, persoonlijke geschiedenissen en een vergelijkende analyse van de 
praktijken van  levensonderhoud en bestaan in zes dorpen. Een uiteenzetting wordt gegeven 
van de keuzen die werden gemaakt met betrekking tot de gerichtheid van het onderzoek 
zowel als het veldwerk. Voorts gaat dit hoofdstuk in op enkele persoonlijke moeilijkheden en 
ervaringen welke het veldwerk in Angola op verschillende wijzen hebben gemarkeerd. 
In hoofdstuk 2 introduceer en definieer ik het begrippenkader dat de basis vormt voor 
de data in het vervolg van dit proefschrift. Ik beschouw het concept ‘livelihoods‘ in de 
betekenis van het geheel aan middelen en activiteiten die mensen tot hun beschikking hebben 
om in hun levensonderhoud te voorzien, en de toegang tot dezen (Ellis 2000a, 10). Ik kies een 
andere benadering van het begrip ‘livelihoods’ dan die welke voor beleidsdoeleinden is 
ontworpen en die de neiging heeft om ‘livelihoods ’ in te perken tot de aanwezigheid en het 
gebruik van verschillende soorten kapitaal. In mijn opvatting is ‘livelihoods’ flexibeler van 
aard waarbij het verdwijnen van bepaalde factoren gecompenseerd kan worden door het 
versterken van andere. De manieren van levensonderhoud zijn veranderlijk en flexibel en 
behoren dit zeker te zijn in tijden van crisis en conflict. In dit proefschrift blijkt dat noodhulp 
wordt gezien als een van de strategieën welke mensen toepassen om in tijden van crisis te 
overleven. Het hoofdstuk begint met een exploratie van het begrip humanitaire hulp, de 
beginselen ervan en de veranderingen welke bij de uitvoer ervan optreden die het gevolg zijn 
van langer voortslepende crisissituaties waarin deze hulp wordt geboden. Deze 
noodgedwongen verlenging maakte het opnemen van rehabilitatie- en 
ontwikkelingsbenaderingen noodzakelijk, vertaalde zich in een sterkere afstemming met de 
overheid en veroorzaakte een verschuiving van de aandacht van individuen naar 
gemeenschappen. Ik zet vraagtekens bij de doelmatigheid van Linking Relief, Rehabilitation 
and Development (LRRD) benaderingen in situaties waarin het onzeker is of de 
doelstellingen van de interventie wel gehaald worden of dat de processen moeten worden 
afgebroken. Dit proefschrift verheldert de consequenties van zulke onvoltooide LRRD 
processen. 
 In hoofdstuk 3, gezamenlijk met Maliana Serrano geschreven, wordt de geschiedenis 
van het Angolese conflict geanalyseerd om de socio-economische impact ervan op het land te 
belichten. We tonen aan dat de oorlog voortdurend van drijfveren en dynamiek veranderde 
als gevolg van de opeenvolgende grote ontwikkelingen en de verschillende en wisselende 
interne en externe krachten die de loop van de oorlog beïnvloedden. We hebben argumenten 
aangedragen voor een begrijpen van het conflict in Angola vanuit een politieke economie van 
oorlog interpretatie, die laat zien hoe macht en rijkdom verdeeld worden en veranderen 
tijdens conflict. Ook worden machtsverhoudingen en verdeling van rijkdom zichtbaar door 
het bestuderen van socio-culturele instellingen hetgeen een focus vereist op het lokale niveau 
waar het conflict zijn eigen dynamiek en vorm vindt. Door middel van een analyse van vier 
casussen uit verschillende gemeenten in de provincie Huíla hebben we de verscheidenheid 
aan ervaringen en effecten van de oorlog laten zien. Een beperkt begrip van deze 
uiteenlopende dagelijkse praktijk van een leven in oorlogstijd kan de aannamen over de 
behoeften van mensen in conflict en post-conflict situaties wel een zekere onderbouwing 
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geven maar leidt mogelijkerwijs tot humanitaire en politieke standaardreacties waarin lokaal 
potentieel in gebieden of perioden van relatieve stabiliteit niet worden verdisconteerd. 
 Een analyse van Angola’s koloniaal verleden welke in hoofdstuk 4 wordt gemaakt is 
voor een begrip van de huidige processen van rurale ontwikkeling van wezenlijk belang. 
Bestaansmogelijkheden en instituties op het platteland in de huidige tijd komen voort uit de 
parameters die tijdens het koloniale bewind werden vastgesteld en opgelegd en werden verder 
gevormd door de effecten van de burgeroorlog na het verkrijgen van de onafhankelijkheid. In 
dit hoofdstuk komen de hoofdlijnen van de koloniale politiek aan de orde; deze krijgen een 
extra dimensie door de beschrijving van de manieren waarop het koloniale bewind zich 
manifesteerde op het platteland van de provincie Huíla. De analyse van de Angolese 
koloniale geschiedenis maakt duidelijk hoe ingrijpend de negatieve effecten op het leven van 
rurale gemeenschappen waren van een koloniaal beleid van belastingheffing, vormen van 
dwangarbeid, confiscatie van land en concurrentievervalsing. Anderzijds stortte met de 
terugtrekking van de Portugezen uit Angola het rurale handelssysteem dat de bevolking wel 
toegang verschafte tot kredieten, zaden en werk eveneens in. Hiervoor kwam geen nieuw 
Angolees ruraal beleid in de plaats omdat het land door oorlog werd overspoeld. Mijn betoog 
in dit hoofdstuk is dat de huidige naoorlogse reconstructieplannen van de overheid een nauwe 
gelijkenis vertonen met het voorgaande koloniale beleid omdat het zich louter richt op 
grootschalige landbouwontwikkelingsschema’s en infrastructurele herstelwerkzaamheden. 
Bij dit laatste punt ligt het voornaamste accent op de herbouw van de grote steden en havens 
aan de kust hetgeen ten koste gaat van het platteland. 
 De hoofdstukken 5 en 6 bevatten de empirische data van het veldwerk gedaan in zes 
dorpen in de twee municipaliteiten Caluquembe (hoofdstuk 5) en Chibia (hoofdstuk 6). Beide 
hoofdstukken beginnen met de historie en de lokale ervaringen met kolonialisme, conflicten 
en hulpprogramma’s. Met mijn analyse van de gegevens die ik door middel van semi-
gestructureerde interviews en verkenningen verkreeg bied ik een overzicht van het type 
livelihoods die in deze plaatsen zijn opgekomen alsmede van de verschillende factoren die in 
de loop der tijden een rol hebben gespeeld. De municipaliteiten dienen als case studies omdat 
ze sterk uiteenlopende geschiedenissen, processen en resultaten op het gebied van 
bestaansmiddelen en hulp vertegenwoordigen. Caluquembe werd zwaar getroffen door de 
oorlog, MPLA en UNITA vochten hevig om het beheer over het gebied waardoor de 
bevolking vervolgens in uiteenlopende richtingen werd verdreven. De meeste mensen 
moesten het werk op hun land op te geven en beginnen met het verzamelen van brandhout, 
migreren, het werken op andermans boerderijen, of het zoeken van andere alternatieve 
strategieën om tijdens de oorlog en de daaruit volgende ontheemding het hoofd boven water 
te houden. Tijdens de periode van terugkeer waren veel NGO’s actief in de regio en stonden 
meestal de bevolking bij door landbouwzaden en gereedschap uit te delen. Deze 
distributieprogramma’s van zaden en gereedschap hebben geleid tot wat ik noem een proces 
van een van buitenaf gestuurd herstel. Vanwege de ongedifferentieerde productie van 
gewassen moeten dorpsbewoners nu met elkaar concurreren om hetzelfde soort product op 
dezelfde plaatsen te kunnen verkopen of te verhandelen en zijn ze kwetsbaarder voor 
natuurlijke plagen die de basis onder hun manier van levensonderhoud wegvagen. Omdat 
Chibia nooit in een strijdgebied heeft gelegen heeft het nooit enig hulpprogramma van 
betekenis gekend, behoudens enige voedselhulp van WFP en MINARS telkens wanneer de 
regio werd getroffen door cyclische droogtes en hongersnood. Een vergelijking tussen de drie 
dorpen in Chibia laat zien dat het dorp Bairro 11 de Novembro dat in het verleden relatief de 
meeste hulp had ontvangen op dit ogenblik de meest gediversifieerde mogelijkheden van 
bestaan lijkt te hebben. Echter, de meeste activiteiten die werden ontwikkeld om in het 
levensonderhoud te voorzien hebben weinig te maken met landbouw hoewel het soort hulp 
dat werd geboden nu juist landbouw als zwaartepunt had. Het enige dorp dat nog steeds 
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voedselhulp ontving, Nonguelengue, was niet het slachtoffer van de oorlog maar van de 
vooruitgang. De manieren waarop in Chibia in het levensonderhoud wordt voorzien komen 
voort uit herstelprocessen die door de staat en de bevolking zelf in gang zijn gezet. In Chibia 
was de rol van de staat zeer sterk en de nationale wederopbouwprogramma’s brachten de 
bevolking, al dan niet tijdelijk, meer werkgelegenheidskansen. Maar tegelijkertijd maakte de 
staat, bewust of onbewust, bepaalde manieren van bestaan onmogelijk. 
 In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de geschiedenis van de hulpverlening in Angola en de 
humanitaire arena in de provincie Huíla aan de orde gesteld. Door het raakvlak waarop de 
gevers en de ontvangers van hulp opereren te analyseren komen door organisaties 
gehanteerde vertogen over het afhankelijkheidsyndroom aan het licht waarin de rol van de 
bevolking als weinig betekenend wordt gekenmerkt en ontkend. Dit hoofdstuk belicht ook 
hoe de hulporganisaties de bij humanitaire hulp gebruikelijke principes van neutraliteit 
toepassen en benutten. In de dagelijkse praktijk komt het gebruik ervan vaak neer op 
vraagstukken van toegang en veiligheid hetgeen ook in vredestijd relevant blijft. In een 
vergelijking tussen twee NGO’s die in de provincie Huíla actief waren wordt de aanpassing 
van organisaties aan de context van het Angola na de oorlog onderzocht, daarmee een 
voorbeeld gevend van LRRD processen waarmee organisaties in de praktijk van alledag te 
maken hebben. 
 Hoofdstuk 8 neemt de wederopbouw- en herstelprocessen in het naoorlogse Angola 
onder de loep. In dit hoofdstuk draag ik argumenten aan voor mijn stelling dat afgezien van 
de aanzienlijke effecten die conflict en ontheemding reeds hebben gehad op de manieren van 
levensonderhoud die mensen kiezen, de staat en de hulporganisaties in de naoorlogse 
wederopbouwfase de bestaansmogelijkheden verder hebben ingeperkt of omgebogen. Met de 
distributieprogramma’s van zaden en gereedschap als voorbeeld beweer ik dat in het geval 
van Caluquembe de verstrekking van hulp een tamelijk uniform sociaal stratum van kleine 
boeren heeft gecreëerd die weinig kansen hebben om variatie aan te brengen in de wijzen 
waarop zij in hun bestaan voorzien en die niet in staat zijn om zich boven het niveau van 
overleven op te werken. Anderzijds is de aanpak van de wederopbouw door de overheid smal 
geweest, met vooral aandacht voor stedelijke gebieden en gebaseerd op de aanname dat het 
herstel van wegen automatisch leidt tot ontwikkeling in de rurale gebieden. 
 Tot slot worden in hoofdstuk 9 antwoorden gegeven op de onderzoeksvragen door de 
aspecten van conflict en hulp in de geschiedenis van de provincie Huíla te belichten, en door 
de analyse van de waaier aan processen die hebben geleid tot een gezamenlijke wederopbouw 
door de overheid, de hulporganisaties en de bevolking zelf en wat de resultaten van deze 
processen zijn geweest voor de livelihoods van de mensen in het Angola van na de oorlog.  
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